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feat(sandbox): add glob deny-read platform enforcement (#18096)
## Summary - adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns - expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap, including canonical symlink targets - keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal or Bazel test environments - adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command` with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not reach the model ## Linux glob expansion ```text Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root> Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction ``` ``` [permissions.workspace.filesystem] glob_scan_max_depth = 2 [permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"] "**/*.env" = "none" ``` This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently omitting deny-read masks. ## Platform support - macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex deny rules - Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing glob matches and masking them in bwrap - Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main` from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement, rather than silently running unsandboxed ## Stack 1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows 2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows fail-closed clarification 3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements ## Verification - Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob deny-read enforcement - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests` - `cargo check -p codex-core --test all` - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests` - `just bazel-lock-check` --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
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@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ async fn restricted_read_implicitly_allows_helper_executables() -> std::io::Resu
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"workspace".to_string(),
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PermissionProfileToml {
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filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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glob_scan_max_depth: None,
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entries: BTreeMap::new(),
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}),
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network: None,
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@@ -226,6 +227,7 @@ fn network_toml_overlays_unix_socket_permissions_by_path() {
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#[test]
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fn read_write_glob_warnings_skip_supported_deny_read_globs_and_trailing_subpaths() {
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let filesystem = FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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glob_scan_max_depth: None,
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entries: BTreeMap::from([
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(
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"/tmp/**/*.log".to_string(),
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@@ -256,6 +258,47 @@ fn read_write_glob_warnings_skip_supported_deny_read_globs_and_trailing_subpaths
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn unreadable_globstar_warning_is_suppressed_when_scan_depth_is_configured() {
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let filesystem = FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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glob_scan_max_depth: None,
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entries: BTreeMap::from([(
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":project_roots".to_string(),
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FilesystemPermissionToml::Scoped(BTreeMap::from([
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("**/*.env".to_string(), FileSystemAccessMode::None),
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("*.pem".to_string(), FileSystemAccessMode::None),
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])),
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)]),
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};
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assert_eq!(
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unbounded_unreadable_globstar_paths(&filesystem),
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vec![":project_roots/**/*.env".to_string()]
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);
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let configured_filesystem = FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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glob_scan_max_depth: Some(2),
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..filesystem
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};
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assert_eq!(
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unbounded_unreadable_globstar_paths(&configured_filesystem),
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Vec::<String>::new()
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn glob_scan_max_depth_must_be_positive() {
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let err = validate_glob_scan_max_depth(Some(0))
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.expect_err("zero depth would silently skip deny-read glob expansion");
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assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
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assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "glob_scan_max_depth must be at least 1");
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assert_eq!(
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validate_glob_scan_max_depth(Some(2)).expect("depth should be valid"),
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Some(2)
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn read_write_trailing_glob_suffix_compiles_as_subpath() -> std::io::Result<()> {
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let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
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@@ -266,6 +309,7 @@ fn read_write_trailing_glob_suffix_compiles_as_subpath() -> std::io::Result<()>
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"workspace".to_string(),
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PermissionProfileToml {
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filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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glob_scan_max_depth: None,
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entries: BTreeMap::from([(
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":project_roots".to_string(),
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FilesystemPermissionToml::Scoped(BTreeMap::from([(
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