Preserve filesystem permission path conventions (#39084)

## Why

Filesystem permission paths can use a convention that differs from the host
running Codex. Converting them immediately to native absolute paths can change
the meaning of ambiguous paths such as `/C:/secret` or Windows UNC paths.

## What changed

- Store literal filesystem permission paths as `PathUri` values through the
  runtime policy and execution protocol.
- Keep legacy string-based serialization at explicit protocol boundaries and
  reject conversions that cannot be represented losslessly.
- Encode native paths as opaque URIs when a normal file URI would imply the
  wrong path convention.

## Testing

Added coverage for cross-platform and ambiguous path round trips, UNC path
variants, permission-profile serialization, and deny-policy enforcement.

GitOrigin-RevId: 5247713796d1f2bb4e02f94eb9fc82d4698060f0
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai authored and copyberry committed 2026-08-17 21:49:30 +00:00
1 parent a4f37a5b7f
commit 2013e04354
46 files changed
+765 -260

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+9 -7
View File
@@ -2226,14 +2226,14 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: cwd_root.clone(),
path: cwd_root.clone().into(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
missing_path_behavior: None,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: cwd_root.join("docs"),
path: cwd_root.join("docs").into(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
missing_path_behavior: None,
@@ -2923,7 +2923,8 @@ async fn explicit_builtin_workspace_profile_ignores_legacy_workspace_write_setti
assert!(
!policy.entries.iter().any(|entry| matches!(
&entry.path,
FileSystemPath::Path { path } if path.as_path() == extra_root.path()
FileSystemPath::Path { path }
if path.to_abs_path().is_ok_and(|path| path.as_path() == extra_root.path())
)),
"explicit :workspace should not inherit sandbox_workspace_write roots as concrete grants, \
policy: {policy:?}"
@@ -4437,7 +4438,7 @@ exclude_slash_tmp = true
file_system_policy
.entries
.contains(&FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: cwd.abs() },
path: cwd.abs().into(),
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
missing_path_behavior: None,
})
@@ -4447,7 +4448,7 @@ exclude_slash_tmp = true
.entries
.contains(&FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: extra_root.clone(),
path: extra_root.clone().into(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
missing_path_behavior: None,
@@ -4462,7 +4463,8 @@ exclude_slash_tmp = true
path: AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
subpath,
cwd.path()
),
)
.into(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
missing_path_behavior: Some(
@@ -10442,7 +10444,7 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_preserves_split_write_roots() -> std::io::R
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: outside_root.clone(),
path: outside_root.clone().into(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
missing_path_behavior: None,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ fn insert_filesystem_permission_toml(
match entry.path {
FileSystemPath::Path { path } => {
entries.insert(
path.into_path_buf().to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
path.inferred_native_path_string(),
FilesystemPermissionToml::Access(entry.access),
);
}