Request read control when updating Windows sandbox ACLs (#40475)

## Why

`SetSecurityInfo` can reject a directory handle opened with only `WRITE_DAC`.

## What changed

- Request `READ_CONTROL` alongside `WRITE_DAC` when opening or creating a
  no-reparse sandbox directory.
- Add a Windows regression test that provisions and locks a plain sandbox
  directory through the handle-based ACL path.

GitOrigin-RevId: bd50dc54d4cc80e9609323ddb4ecc7e4780a31fb

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/setup_main/win.rs

@@ -1035,6 +1035,10 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut dyn Write, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Res
     Ok(())
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "win_acl_tests.rs"]
+mod acl_tests;
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::Payload;

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/setup_main/win/no_reparse_dir.rs

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL;
 use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_SHARE_DELETE;
 use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_SHARE_READ;
 use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_SHARE_WRITE;
+use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::READ_CONTROL;
 use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::WRITE_DAC;
 use windows_sys::Win32::System::IO::IO_STATUS_BLOCK;
 use windows_sys::Win32::System::IO::IO_STATUS_BLOCK_0;
@@ -115,9 +116,10 @@ pub(super) fn open_or_create_no_reparse(path: &Path) -> Result<OwnedHandle> {
     };
     let mut handle = 0;
     let status = unsafe {
+        // SetSecurityInfo can reject a WRITE_DAC-only directory handle.
         NtCreateFile(
             &mut handle,
-            WRITE_DAC,
+            READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC,
             &object_attributes,
             &mut io_status_block,
             ptr::null(),

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/setup_main/win_acl_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+use super::DELETE;
+use super::FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE;
+use super::FILE_GENERIC_READ;
+use super::FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
+use super::GRANT_ACCESS;
+use super::SetupMode;
+use super::lock_sandbox_dir;
+use super::resolve_sid;
+
+#[test]
+fn provision_only_locks_plain_directory_via_handle() {
+    let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let sandbox_bin = temp.path().join(".sandbox-bin");
+    let real_user = std::env::var("USERNAME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "Administrators".to_string());
+    let real_sid = resolve_sid(&real_user).expect("resolve real user SID");
+
+    lock_sandbox_dir(
+        &sandbox_bin,
+        &real_user,
+        &real_sid,
+        GRANT_ACCESS,
+        FILE_GENERIC_READ | FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE,
+        FILE_GENERIC_READ | FILE_GENERIC_WRITE | FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE | DELETE,
+        SetupMode::ProvisionOnly,
+    )
+    .expect("lock sandbox bin via no-reparse handle");
+
+    assert!(sandbox_bin.is_dir());
+}