Delegate remote process sandboxing to the executor (#37480)

## What changed

- Preserve executor-native working directories, workspace roots, and permission profiles when preparing remote `exec_command` requests instead of resolving them through the host platform.
- Send sandbox intent to the remote executor, including a restricted-token default for Windows executors and `-NoProfile` for elevated PowerShell commands.
- Reject intercepted cross-platform `apply_patch` commands when filesystem writes are restricted, while continuing to allow them for unsandboxed or full-disk-write profiles.

## Testing

Extended remote unified-exec coverage for foreign Windows workspaces, elevated PowerShell, sandbox metadata, and restricted and unrestricted intercepted patches.

GitOrigin-RevId: 9fd328879fa2c15594fd58e40b6b32e8ba0847e7
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai authored and copyberry committed 2026-08-07 18:05:17 +00:00
1 parent 92fb33b758
commit 511262b984
8 files changed
+284 -44

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@@ -6,10 +6,19 @@ use codex_config::test_support::CloudConfigBundleFixture;
use codex_features::Feature;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
use codex_protocol::protocol::TurnEnvironmentSelection;
use codex_protocol::protocol::TurnEnvironmentSelections;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
use core_test_support::managed_network_requirements_loader;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
@@ -43,9 +52,14 @@ const REPLAY_OUTPUT_EVENT_COUNT: u64 = 1024;
const REPLAY_RETAINED_OUTPUT_SEQ: u64 = 800;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
#[cfg_attr(windows, allow(dead_code))]
enum PushedExecScenario {
Complete,
DirectDenied,
ElevatedPowerShell,
InterceptedPatch,
UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch,
FullDiskInterceptedPatch,
LegacyExit,
ReplayGap,
}
@@ -103,19 +117,31 @@ async fn accept_initialized_exec_server(listener: TcpListener) -> WebSocketStrea
websocket
}
async fn send_environment_info(websocket: &mut WebSocketStream<TcpStream>) {
async fn send_environment_info(
websocket: &mut WebSocketStream<TcpStream>,
scenario: PushedExecScenario,
) {
let info = read_exec_server_json(websocket).await;
assert_eq!(info["method"], "environment/info");
respond_environment_info(websocket, &info["id"]).await;
respond_environment_info(websocket, &info["id"], scenario).await;
}
async fn respond_environment_info(websocket: &mut WebSocketStream<TcpStream>, id: &Value) {
async fn respond_environment_info(
websocket: &mut WebSocketStream<TcpStream>,
id: &Value,
scenario: PushedExecScenario,
) {
let shell = if matches!(scenario, PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell) {
json!({ "name": "powershell", "path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe" })
} else {
json!({ "name": "zsh", "path": "/bin/zsh" })
};
send_exec_server_json(
websocket,
json!({
"id": id,
"result": {
"shell": { "name": "zsh", "path": "/bin/zsh" },
"shell": shell,
"capabilities": { "networkProxyLaunch": true }
}
}),
@@ -127,15 +153,20 @@ async fn serve_exec_with_pushed_events(
listener: TcpListener,
scenario: PushedExecScenario,
) -> PushedExecServerResult {
let unrestricted_patch = matches!(
scenario,
PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch
| PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch
);
let mut websocket = accept_initialized_exec_server(listener).await;
send_environment_info(&mut websocket).await;
send_environment_info(&mut websocket, scenario).await;
let process_start = loop {
let request = read_exec_server_json(&mut websocket).await;
match request["method"].as_str() {
Some("process/start") => break request,
Some("environment/info") => {
respond_environment_info(&mut websocket, &request["id"]).await;
respond_environment_info(&mut websocket, &request["id"], scenario).await;
}
Some("fs/getMetadata") => {
send_exec_server_json(
@@ -147,6 +178,24 @@ async fn serve_exec_with_pushed_events(
)
.await;
}
Some("fs/readFile") if unrestricted_patch => {
send_exec_server_json(
&mut websocket,
json!({
"id": request["id"],
"error": { "code": -32004, "message": "not found" }
}),
)
.await;
}
Some("fs/writeFile") if unrestricted_patch => {
send_exec_server_json(&mut websocket, json!({ "id": request["id"], "result": {} }))
.await;
return PushedExecServerResult {
process_read_requests: 0,
process_start: request,
};
}
Some("fs/canonicalize") => {
send_exec_server_json(
&mut websocket,
@@ -229,7 +278,7 @@ async fn serve_exec_with_pushed_events(
.await;
match scenario {
PushedExecScenario::Complete => {
PushedExecScenario::Complete | PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell => {
let encoded_output = BASE64_STANDARD.encode(COMPLETE_OUTPUT);
for message in [
json!({
@@ -273,6 +322,13 @@ async fn serve_exec_with_pushed_events(
)
.await;
}
PushedExecScenario::InterceptedPatch => {
panic!("cross-platform intercepted patches must not start a remote process")
}
PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch
| PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch => {
panic!("unsandboxed intercepted patches must write through the remote filesystem")
}
PushedExecScenario::LegacyExit => {
send_exec_server_json(
&mut websocket,
@@ -319,6 +375,16 @@ async fn serve_exec_with_pushed_events(
"failure": null,
"sandboxDenied": true,
}),
PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell => {
panic!("elevated remote PowerShell must not read a remote process")
}
PushedExecScenario::InterceptedPatch => {
panic!("cross-platform intercepted patches must not read a remote process")
}
PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch
| PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch => {
panic!("unsandboxed intercepted patches must not read a remote process")
}
PushedExecScenario::LegacyExit => json!({
"chunks": [],
"nextSeq": 3,
@@ -390,17 +456,23 @@ async fn serve_exec_with_pushed_events(
}
}
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, false, false ; "complete_event_stream")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::DirectDenied, false, false ; "direct_sandbox_denial")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::LegacyExit, false, false ; "legacy_exit_metadata")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::ReplayGap, false, false ; "truncated_event_replay")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, true, true ; "managed_network_uses_executor_proxy_launch")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, true, false ; "strict_managed_allowlist_omits_policy_callbacks")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, false, false, false ; "complete_event_stream")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::DirectDenied, false, false, false ; "direct_sandbox_denial")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::LegacyExit, false, false, false ; "legacy_exit_metadata")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::ReplayGap, false, false, false ; "truncated_event_replay")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, true, true, false ; "managed_network_uses_executor_proxy_launch")]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, true, false, false ; "strict_managed_allowlist_omits_policy_callbacks")]
#[cfg_attr(not(windows), test_case(PushedExecScenario::Complete, false, false, true ; "foreign_windows_workspace_sandbox"))]
#[test_case(PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell, false, false, true ; "windows_elevated_powershell_disables_profile")]
#[cfg_attr(not(windows), test_case(PushedExecScenario::InterceptedPatch, false, false, true ; "foreign_windows_intercepted_patch_fails_closed"))]
#[cfg_attr(not(windows), test_case(PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch, false, false, true ; "foreign_windows_unsandboxed_intercepted_patch_succeeds"))]
#[cfg_attr(not(windows), test_case(PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch, false, false, true ; "foreign_windows_full_disk_intercepted_patch_succeeds"))]
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn exec_command_consumes_pushed_remote_process_events(
scenario: PushedExecScenario,
managed_network: bool,
policy_callbacks: bool,
foreign_cwd: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
let server = start_mock_server().await;
@@ -413,7 +485,16 @@ async fn exec_command_consumes_pushed_remote_process_events(
CALL_ID,
"exec_command",
&json!({
"cmd": "pwd",
"cmd": match scenario {
PushedExecScenario::InterceptedPatch => {
"apply_patch <<'PATCH'\n*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: secret.txt\n@@\n-old\n+new\n*** End Patch\nPATCH"
}
PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch
| PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch => {
"apply_patch <<'PATCH'\n*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: allowed.txt\n+allowed\n*** End Patch\nPATCH"
}
_ => "pwd",
},
"yield_time_ms": 1_000,
})
.to_string(),
@@ -481,6 +562,9 @@ timeout = 900
let mut builder = builder.with_config(move |config| {
config.project_doc_max_bytes = 0;
config.use_experimental_unified_exec_tool = true;
if matches!(scenario, PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell) {
config.set_windows_elevated_sandbox_enabled(/*value*/ true);
}
if managed_network {
config.approvals_reviewer = ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview;
config.bypass_hook_trust = true;
@@ -496,6 +580,18 @@ timeout = 900
let turn_permission_profile = if managed_network {
test.session_configured.permission_profile.clone()
} else if matches!(scenario, PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch) {
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry::new(
FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
)]),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
)
} else if foreign_cwd && !matches!(scenario, PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch) {
PermissionProfile::workspace_write()
} else {
PermissionProfile::Disabled
};
@@ -511,6 +607,21 @@ timeout = 900
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
additional_context: Default::default(),
thread_settings: codex_protocol::protocol::ThreadSettingsOverrides {
environments: foreign_cwd.then(|| {
let cwd = PathUri::parse("file:///C:/workspace").expect("valid Windows cwd");
TurnEnvironmentSelections::new(
test.config.cwd.clone(),
vec![TurnEnvironmentSelection {
environment_id: codex_exec_server::REMOTE_ENVIRONMENT_ID.to_string(),
cwd: cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: vec![
cwd,
PathUri::parse("file:///D:/other-workspace")
.expect("valid Windows workspace root"),
],
}],
)
}),
approval_policy: Some(if managed_network {
AskForApproval::OnRequest
} else {
@@ -546,6 +657,64 @@ timeout = 900
}
}
}
if matches!(scenario, PushedExecScenario::InterceptedPatch) {
assert!(!saw_exec_command_begin);
let request = response_mock
.last_request()
.context("model should receive the intercepted patch rejection")?;
let (output, success) = request
.function_call_output_content_and_success(CALL_ID)
.context("intercepted patch rejection should be model visible")?;
assert_ne!(success, Some(true));
assert!(
output
.context("intercepted patch rejection should contain text")?
.contains("cross-platform remote apply_patch is unavailable")
);
assert!(
!exec_server.is_finished(),
"intercepted patch must not access the executor filesystem"
);
exec_server.abort();
return Ok(());
}
if matches!(
scenario,
PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch
| PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch
) {
let request = response_mock
.last_request()
.context("model should receive the unrestricted patch result")?;
let (output, success) = request
.function_call_output_content_and_success(CALL_ID)
.context("unrestricted patch result should be model visible")?;
assert_ne!(success, Some(false));
let output = output.context("unrestricted patch result should contain text")?;
assert!(
output.contains("Success. Updated the following files:"),
"unrestricted intercepted patch failed: {output}"
);
let exec_server_result = timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), exec_server)
.await
.context("fake exec-server should observe the unrestricted patch write")??;
let write_request = exec_server_result.process_start;
assert_eq!(write_request["method"], "fs/writeFile");
assert_eq!(
write_request["params"]["path"],
"file:///C:/workspace/allowed.txt"
);
assert_eq!(write_request["params"]["sandbox"], Value::Null);
assert_eq!(
BASE64_STANDARD.decode(
write_request["params"]["dataBase64"]
.as_str()
.expect("filesystem write should include encoded contents")
)?,
b"allowed\n"
);
return Ok(());
}
let cleanup_timeout = if managed_network {
Duration::from_secs(15)
} else {
@@ -554,6 +723,26 @@ timeout = 900
let exec_server_result = timeout(cleanup_timeout, exec_server)
.await
.context("fake exec-server should observe process cleanup")??;
if foreign_cwd {
let params = &exec_server_result.process_start["params"];
assert_eq!(params["cwd"], "file:///C:/workspace");
assert_eq!(params["sandbox"]["cwd"], "file:///C:/workspace");
assert_eq!(
params["sandbox"]["workspaceRoots"],
json!(["file:///C:/workspace", "file:///D:/other-workspace"])
);
if matches!(scenario, PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell) {
assert_eq!(params["sandbox"]["windowsSandboxLevel"], "elevated");
assert!(
params["argv"]
.as_array()
.is_some_and(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-NoProfile")),
"elevated remote PowerShell must not load a user profile"
);
} else {
assert_eq!(params["sandbox"]["windowsSandboxLevel"], "restricted-token");
}
}
if managed_network {
let params = &exec_server_result.process_start["params"];
assert_eq!(params["enforceManagedNetwork"], true);
@@ -585,7 +774,7 @@ timeout = 900
let output = output.context("exec_command output should contain text")?;
let process_read_requests = exec_server_result.process_read_requests;
match scenario {
PushedExecScenario::Complete => {
PushedExecScenario::Complete | PushedExecScenario::ElevatedPowerShell => {
assert_ne!(success, Some(false));
assert!(saw_exec_command_begin);
assert!(output.contains("Process exited with code 0"));
@@ -597,6 +786,11 @@ timeout = 900
assert!(output.contains("Process exited with code 1"));
assert_eq!(process_read_requests, 0, "unexpected compatibility read");
}
PushedExecScenario::InterceptedPatch => unreachable!("intercepted patch returned early"),
PushedExecScenario::UnsandboxedInterceptedPatch
| PushedExecScenario::FullDiskInterceptedPatch => {
unreachable!("unsandboxed intercepted patch returned early")
}
PushedExecScenario::LegacyExit => {
assert!(!saw_exec_command_begin);
assert!(output.contains("Process exited with code 1"));