core: stop threading SandboxPolicy through exec (#25700)

## Why

#25450 attempts a broad `SandboxPolicy` removal across several unrelated
surfaces, which makes it hard to review and still leaves new helper code
moving legacy policies around. This PR is a narrower alternative:
migrate only the exec-side Windows sandbox plumbing so the review can
focus on one production path and one compatibility boundary.

The goal is to stop threading `SandboxPolicy` through exec code without
expanding the migration into app-server, protocol, telemetry, config, or
session behavior.

## What changed

- Removed `ExecRequest::compatibility_sandbox_policy()`.
- Changed the Windows restricted-token and elevated filesystem override
helpers to accept `PermissionProfile` plus the split filesystem/network
policies instead of a `SandboxPolicy`.
- Kept the remaining legacy projection local to the writable-root
comparison that still needs to compare split policy behavior against the
legacy Windows backend model.
- Rejected restricted split filesystem policies that still grant
full-disk writes before using the Windows restricted-token backend,
preserving the previous clear-failure behavior for profiles that project
to `ExternalSandbox`.
- Updated the Windows sandbox override tests to exercise the new call
shape and cover the full-write split-profile regression.

## Verification

- `just test -p codex-core windows_restricted_token`
- `just test -p codex-core windows_elevated`

codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_summary.rs

@@ -179,11 +179,8 @@ pub(crate) fn thread_response_sandbox_policy(
     permission_profile: &codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile,
     cwd: &Path,
 ) -> codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy {
-    let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
     let sandbox_policy = codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
         permission_profile,
-        &file_system_policy,
-        permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
         cwd,
     );
     sandbox_policy.into()

codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs

@@ -76,11 +76,8 @@ pub struct ThreadConfigSnapshot {
 
 impl ThreadConfigSnapshot {
     pub fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
-        let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
         codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
             &self.permission_profile,
-            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            self.permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
             self.cwd.as_path(),
         )
     }

codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs

@@ -444,13 +444,7 @@ impl Permissions {
     /// Legacy compatibility projection derived from the canonical profile.
     pub fn legacy_sandbox_policy(&self, cwd: &Path) -> SandboxPolicy {
         let permission_profile = self.materialized_permission_profile();
-        let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+        compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(&permission_profile, cwd)
-        compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
-            cwd,
-        )
     }
 
     /// Check whether a legacy sandbox policy can be applied to this permission

codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs

@@ -31,19 +31,18 @@ use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
 use codex_protocol::exec_output::ExecToolCallOutput;
 use codex_protocol::exec_output::StreamOutput;
 use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
-use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::Event;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecCommandOutputDeltaEvent;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecOutputStream;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxCommand;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxManager;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformRequest;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
+use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use codex_utils_pty::DEFAULT_OUTPUT_BYTES_CAP;
 use codex_utils_pty::process_group::kill_child_process_group;
@@ -419,22 +418,17 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
         exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
         exec_req.network.is_some(),
     );
-    let sandbox_policy = exec_req.compatibility_sandbox_policy();
     exec_req.windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides = if use_windows_elevated_backend {
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             exec_req.sandbox,
-            &sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.permission_profile,
-            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_cwd,
             use_windows_elevated_backend,
         )
     } else {
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             exec_req.sandbox,
-            &sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.permission_profile,
-            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_cwd,
             exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
         )
@@ -1004,34 +998,28 @@ async fn exec(
 }
 
 #[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "windows"), allow(dead_code))]
-fn should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+fn permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
-    sandbox: SandboxType,
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
 ) -> bool {
-    sandbox == SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken
+    match permission_profile {
-        && file_system_sandbox_policy.kind == FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted
+        PermissionProfile::Managed { file_system, .. } => {
-        && !matches!(
+            !file_system.to_sandbox_policy().has_full_disk_write_access()
-            sandbox_policy,
+        }
-            SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. }
+        PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. } => false,
-        )
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
 pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
     sandbox: SandboxType,
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
     windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
 ) -> Option<String> {
     if windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated {
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             sandbox,
-            sandbox_policy,
+            permission_profile,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_policy_cwd,
             windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
         )
@@ -1039,9 +1027,7 @@ pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
     } else {
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             sandbox,
-            sandbox_policy,
+            permission_profile,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            network_sandbox_policy,
             sandbox_policy_cwd,
             windows_sandbox_level,
         )
@@ -1051,9 +1037,7 @@ pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
 
 pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
     sandbox: SandboxType,
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
     windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
 ) -> std::result::Result<Option<WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides>, String> {
@@ -1063,25 +1047,22 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
+    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
+        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
+
     let needs_direct_runtime_enforcement = file_system_sandbox_policy
         .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
 
-    if should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+    if permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile)
-        sandbox,
+        && !needs_direct_runtime_enforcement
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-    ) && !needs_direct_runtime_enforcement
     {
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    if !should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+    if !permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile) {
-        sandbox,
+        let permission_profile_name = permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile);
-        sandbox_policy,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-    ) {
         return Err(format!(
-            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, legacy_policy={sandbox_policy:?}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
+            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, permission_profile={permission_profile_name}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
             file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
         ));
     }
@@ -1090,7 +1071,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
     // but its WRITE_RESTRICTED token does not make capability SID deny-read ACEs
     // participate in read access checks. Read restrictions therefore require the
     // elevated backend, even when the filesystem root remains readable.
-    if !windows_policy_has_root_read_access(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd) {
+    if !windows_policy_has_root_read_access(&file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd) {
         return Err(
             "windows unelevated restricted-token sandbox cannot enforce split filesystem read restrictions directly; refusing to run unsandboxed"
                 .to_string(),
@@ -1098,7 +1079,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
     }
 
     let additional_deny_read_paths = codex_windows_sandbox::resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
     )?;
     if !additional_deny_read_paths.is_empty() {
@@ -1108,7 +1089,11 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
         );
     }
 
-    let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let legacy_projection = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
+        permission_profile,
+        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
+    );
+    let legacy_writable_roots = legacy_projection.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let split_writable_roots =
         file_system_sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let legacy_root_paths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = legacy_writable_roots
@@ -1204,9 +1189,7 @@ fn windows_policy_has_root_read_access(
 
 pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     sandbox: SandboxType,
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
     use_windows_elevated_backend: bool,
 ) -> std::result::Result<Option<WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides>, String> {
@@ -1214,19 +1197,19 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    if !should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
+    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
-        sandbox,
+        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
-        sandbox_policy,
+
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+    if !permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile) {
-    ) {
+        let permission_profile_name = permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile);
         return Err(format!(
-            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, legacy_policy={sandbox_policy:?}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
+            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, permission_profile={permission_profile_name}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
             file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
         ));
     }
 
     let additional_deny_read_paths = codex_windows_sandbox::resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
         sandbox_policy_cwd,
     )?;
 
@@ -1242,7 +1225,11 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     let needs_direct_runtime_enforcement = file_system_sandbox_policy
         .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let normalize_path = |path: PathBuf| dunce::canonicalize(&path).unwrap_or(path);
-    let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let legacy_projection = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
+        permission_profile,
+        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
+    );
+    let legacy_writable_roots = legacy_projection.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let legacy_root_paths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = legacy_writable_roots
         .iter()
         .map(|root| normalize_path(root.root.to_path_buf()))
@@ -1264,7 +1251,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     // whether the baseline still reads from the filesystem root and only needs
     // additional deny ACLs layered on top.
     let split_has_root_read_access =
-        windows_policy_has_root_read_access(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
+        windows_policy_has_root_read_access(&file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
     let read_roots_override = if split_has_root_read_access {
         None
     } else {
@@ -1329,6 +1316,14 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
     }))
 }
 
+fn permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile) -> &'static str {
+    match permission_profile {
+        PermissionProfile::Managed { .. } => "Managed",
+        PermissionProfile::Disabled => "Disabled",
+        PermissionProfile::External { .. } => "External",
+    }
+}
+
 fn has_reopened_writable_descendant(
     writable_roots: &[codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot],
 ) -> bool {

codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs

@@ -379,34 +379,18 @@ async fn process_exec_tool_call_preserves_full_buffer_capture_policy() -> Result
 
 #[test]
 fn windows_restricted_token_skips_external_sandbox_policies() {
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::External {
-        network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
+        network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
     };
-    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
 
-    assert_eq!(
+    assert!(!permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(&permission_profile));
-        should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
-            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
-            &file_system_policy,
-        ),
-        false
-    );
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_runs_for_legacy_restricted_policies() {
+fn windows_restricted_token_supports_read_only_profiles() {
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
-    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
 
-    assert_eq!(
+    assert!(permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(&permission_profile));
-        should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
-            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
-            &file_system_policy,
-        ),
-        true
-    );
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -427,39 +411,64 @@ fn windows_proxy_enforcement_uses_elevated_backend() {
 
 #[test]
 fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_network_only_restrictions() {
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
-        network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
+        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
-    };
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted();
+    );
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
 
     assert_eq!(
             unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
                 SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-                &policy,
+                &permission_profile,
-                &file_system_policy,
-                NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
                 &sandbox_policy_cwd,
                 WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
             ),
             Some(
-                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ExternalSandbox { network_access: Restricted }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
+                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, permission_profile=Managed; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
             )
         );
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
+fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_managed_root_write_profiles() {
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
-    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
+        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
+                value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
+            },
+            access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+        },
+    ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
+            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
+        ),
+        Some(
+            "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Restricted, network=Restricted, permission_profile=Managed; refusing to run unsandboxed"
+                .to_string()
+        )
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn windows_restricted_token_allows_read_only_profiles() {
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
+    let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
+            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
+            &permission_profile,
             &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -468,22 +477,19 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_workspace_write_policies() {
+fn windows_restricted_token_allows_workspace_write_profiles() {
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
-        writable_roots: vec![],
+        &[],
-        network_access: false,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+        /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
-    };
+    );
-    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
     let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &sandbox_policy_cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -499,22 +505,21 @@ fn windows_elevated_allows_split_restricted_read_policies() {
     )
     .expect("absolute docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
-        network_access: false,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
         ),
@@ -527,12 +532,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
     let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -550,13 +549,15 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -572,12 +573,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
     let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -593,13 +588,15 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -618,12 +615,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
         .abs();
     let docs = cwd.join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -644,17 +635,20 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
-    // The legacy workspace-write root already protects top-level `.codex`, so
+    // The workspace-write compatibility projection already protects top-level
-    // the restricted-token overlay only needs the extra read-only docs carveout.
+    // `.codex`, so the restricted-token overlay only needs the extra read-only
+    // docs carveout.
     let expected_deny_write_paths = vec![docs];
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -676,12 +670,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
         .abs();
     let blocked = cwd.join("blocked");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(blocked.as_path()).expect("create blocked");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -702,13 +690,15 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &cwd,
             WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
         ),
@@ -725,9 +715,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
     let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
-        network_access: false,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path {
@@ -737,13 +724,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -763,12 +752,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
     let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -792,13 +775,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -821,12 +806,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
     let blocked = temp_dir.path().join("blocked");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
     let expected_blocked = dunce::canonicalize(&blocked).expect("canonical blocked");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -850,13 +829,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -884,12 +865,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
     let secret = temp_dir.path().join("app").join(".env");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(secret.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
     std::fs::write(&secret, "secret").expect("write secret");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -912,13 +887,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
         ),
@@ -941,12 +918,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     let nested = docs.join("nested");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("create nested");
-    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
-        writable_roots: vec![],
-        network_access: false,
-        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
-        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
-    };
     let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
         codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
             path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -977,13 +948,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
             access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
         },
     ]);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
 
     assert_eq!(
         unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
             SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
-            &policy,
+            &permission_profile,
-            &file_system_policy,
-            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
             &temp_dir.path().abs(),
             WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
         ),

codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs

@@ -22,10 +22,8 @@ use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 pub use codex_protocol::models::SandboxPermissions;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxExecRequest;
 use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
-use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
@@ -102,15 +100,6 @@ impl ExecRequest {
         }
     }
 
-    pub(crate) fn compatibility_sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
-        compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-            &self.permission_profile,
-            &self.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            self.network_sandbox_policy,
-            self.windows_sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
-        )
-    }
-
     pub(crate) fn from_sandbox_exec_request(
         request: SandboxExecRequest,
         options: ExecOptions,

codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs

@@ -150,17 +150,11 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
     }
 
     pub(super) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
-        self.permission_profile()
+        let permission_profile = self.permission_profile();
-            .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(&self.cwd)
+        codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
-            .unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+            &permission_profile,
-                let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+            &self.cwd,
-                codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
+        )
-                    self.permission_profile_state.permission_profile(),
-                    &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-                    self.network_sandbox_policy(),
-                    &self.cwd,
-                )
-            })
     }
 
     pub(super) fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {

codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs

@@ -124,12 +124,8 @@ impl TurnContext {
     }
 
     pub(crate) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
-        let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
-        let network_sandbox_policy = self.network_sandbox_policy();
         compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
             &self.permission_profile,
-            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            network_sandbox_policy,
             #[allow(deprecated)]
             &self.cwd,
         )

codex-rs/core/src/spawn.rs

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ pub enum StdioPolicy {
     Inherit,
 }
 
-/// Spawns the appropriate child process for the ExecParams and SandboxPolicy,
+/// Spawns the appropriate child process for the exec params and sandbox settings,
 /// ensuring the args and environment variables used to create the `Command`
 /// (and `Child`) honor the configuration.
 ///

codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs

@@ -290,19 +290,18 @@ impl SandboxManager {
 
 pub fn compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
     permissions: &PermissionProfile,
-    file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     cwd: &Path,
 ) -> SandboxPolicy {
     permissions
         .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd)
         .unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+            let (file_system_policy, network_policy) = permissions.to_runtime_permissions();
             compatibility_workspace_write_policy(file_system_policy, network_policy, cwd)
         })
 }
 
 fn compatibility_workspace_write_policy(
-    file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
     network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
     cwd: &Path,
 ) -> SandboxPolicy {