Drop capabilities from Linux sandbox processes (#39103)

## What changed

- Pass `--cap-drop ALL` in both bubblewrap launch modes.
- Verify in the inner sandbox stage that the effective and permitted Linux
  capability sets are empty, and abort before executing the command otherwise.
- Cover the generated bubblewrap arguments, capability state of sandboxed
  commands, and rejection of a capability-bearing inner-stage process.

GitOrigin-RevId: 9dbd651d306d92327e36c9b3f308619db7d80a67
This commit is contained in:
Eric Traut authored and copyberry committed 2026-08-17 23:21:28 +00:00
1 parent 2eee483e49
commit 632420e67a
4 files changed
+107

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@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static PENDING_FORWARDED_SIGNAL: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(0);
const FORWARDED_SIGNALS: &[libc::c_int] =
&[libc::SIGHUP, libc::SIGINT, libc::SIGQUIT, libc::SIGTERM];
const LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: u32 = 0x2008_0522;
const SYNTHETIC_MOUNT_MARKER_SYNTHETIC: &[u8] = b"synthetic\n";
const SYNTHETIC_MOUNT_MARKER_EXISTING: &[u8] = b"existing\n";
const PROTECTED_CREATE_MARKER: &[u8] = b"protected-create\n";
@@ -180,6 +181,30 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
// Inner stage: apply seccomp/no_new_privs after bubblewrap has already
// established the filesystem view.
if apply_seccomp_then_exec {
let mut capability_header = [LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0];
let mut capability_sets = [[0_u32; 3]; 2];
// SAFETY: capability ABI version 3 uses a [version, pid] header and
// two [effective, permitted, inheritable] capability-set entries.
let result = unsafe {
libc::syscall(
libc::SYS_capget,
capability_header.as_mut_ptr(),
capability_sets.as_mut_ptr(),
)
};
if result < 0 {
panic!(
"failed to verify Linux sandbox capabilities: {}",
std::io::Error::last_os_error()
);
}
if capability_sets
.into_iter()
.any(|[effective, permitted, _]| effective != 0 || permitted != 0)
{
panic!("Linux sandbox retained effective or permitted capabilities");
}
if allow_network_for_proxy {
let spec = proxy_route_spec
.as_deref()