Support FD mounts with older system Bubblewrap versions (#39404)

## Why

System Bubblewrap installations that lack `--ro-bind-fd` cannot directly create
the descriptor-backed read-only mounts used by the Linux sandbox.

## What changed

- Detect `--ro-bind-fd` support when probing system Bubblewrap.
- On older versions, translate descriptor-backed mounts to `/proc/self/fd`
  read-only binds and pass their descriptors and destinations to the trusted
  inner sandbox stage for verification.
- Reject malformed, duplicate, mismatched, or symlink-substituted mounts, and
  close inherited descriptors before running sandboxed code.

## Testing

Added unit coverage for capability detection, legacy argument translation,
invalid mount rejection, inode verification, and descriptor closure.

GitOrigin-RevId: dfc0a457b572cdd9aed093fb5abf57360e9724a2
This commit is contained in:
Adam Perry @ OpenAI authored and copyberry committed 2026-08-19 04:06:50 +00:00
1 parent 956f590ad5
commit 6cc2ba8a95
5 files changed
+448

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@@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ pub struct LandlockCommand {
#[arg(long = "proxy-route-spec", hide = true)]
pub proxy_route_spec: Option<String>,
/// Inherited fallback mounts that must be authenticated before sandboxed code runs.
#[arg(long = "verify-fd-mount", hide = true)]
pub verify_fd_mounts: Vec<String>,
/// When set, skip mounting a fresh `/proc` even though PID isolation is
/// still enabled. This is primarily intended for restrictive container
/// environments that deny `--proc /proc`.
@@ -158,6 +162,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
apply_seccomp_then_exec,
allow_network_for_proxy,
proxy_route_spec,
verify_fd_mounts,
no_proc,
command,
} = LandlockCommand::parse();
@@ -165,6 +170,9 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
if command.is_empty() {
panic!("No command specified to execute.");
}
if !apply_seccomp_then_exec && !verify_fd_mounts.is_empty() {
panic!("--verify-fd-mount is only supported in the inner sandbox stage");
}
ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec, use_legacy_landlock);
let EffectivePermissions {
permission_profile,
@@ -181,6 +189,10 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
// Inner stage: apply seccomp/no_new_privs after bubblewrap has already
// established the filesystem view.
if apply_seccomp_then_exec {
if let Err(err) = crate::fd_mount::verify_fd_mounts(&verify_fd_mounts) {
panic!("failed to verify descriptor-backed bubblewrap mount: {err}");
}
let mut capability_header = [LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0];
let mut capability_sets = [[0_u32; 3]; 2];
// SAFETY: capability ABI version 3 uses a [version, pid] header and