Enforce configured network proxy in codex sandbox (#27035)

## Why

`codex sandbox` can start a network proxy from a configured permission
profile. Previously, sandbox-level containment was tied to managed
network requirements rather than whether a proxy was actually active.
This meant config-driven proxy policies were not consistently enforced
as the sandbox's only network path.

## What changed

- Enable proxy-only network containment whenever `codex sandbox` starts
a network proxy.
- Apply the same active-proxy check to the macOS and Linux sandbox
paths.
- Add a Linux regression test that verifies a sandboxed command cannot
establish a direct connection while the configured proxy is active.

## Test plan

- `just test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox::tests`
- `sandbox_with_network_proxy_blocks_direct_loopback_access` runs on
Linux to cover the config-driven proxy path end to end.
This commit is contained in:
viyatb-oai authored and GitHub committed 2026-06-08 14:03:37 -07:00
1 parent e0ee491df3
commit 85fd52f7e4
7 files changed
+98 -8

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@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ pub fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
"--permission-profile".to_string(),
permission_profile_json,
];
if use_legacy_landlock {
// Proxy-only networking requires bubblewrap's isolated network namespace.
if use_legacy_landlock && !allow_network_for_proxy {
linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());
}
if allow_network_for_proxy {
@@ -83,7 +84,8 @@ fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
"--command-cwd".to_string(),
command_cwd,
];
if use_legacy_landlock {
// Proxy-only networking requires bubblewrap's isolated network namespace.
if use_legacy_landlock && !allow_network_for_proxy {
linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());
}
if allow_network_for_proxy {