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Enforce configured network proxy in codex sandbox (#27035)
## Why `codex sandbox` can start a network proxy from a configured permission profile. Previously, sandbox-level containment was tied to managed network requirements rather than whether a proxy was actually active. This meant config-driven proxy policies were not consistently enforced as the sandbox's only network path. ## What changed - Enable proxy-only network containment whenever `codex sandbox` starts a network proxy. - Apply the same active-proxy check to the macOS and Linux sandbox paths. - Add a Linux regression test that verifies a sandboxed command cannot establish a direct connection while the configured proxy is active. ## Test plan - `just test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox::tests` - `sandbox_with_network_proxy_blocks_direct_loopback_access` runs on Linux to cover the config-driven proxy path end to end.
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@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ pub fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
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"--permission-profile".to_string(),
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permission_profile_json,
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];
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if use_legacy_landlock {
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// Proxy-only networking requires bubblewrap's isolated network namespace.
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if use_legacy_landlock && !allow_network_for_proxy {
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linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());
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}
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if allow_network_for_proxy {
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@@ -83,7 +84,8 @@ fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
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"--command-cwd".to_string(),
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command_cwd,
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];
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if use_legacy_landlock {
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// Proxy-only networking requires bubblewrap's isolated network namespace.
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if use_legacy_landlock && !allow_network_for_proxy {
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linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());
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}
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if allow_network_for_proxy {
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