fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox (#14172)

## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots

## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:

```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```

the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.

A policy like:

```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```

still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.

## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
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viyatb-oai authored and GitHub committed 2026-03-24 22:54:18 -07:00
1 parent 8c62829a2b
commit 95ba762620
8 files changed
+538 -185

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use crate::exec::ExecCapturePolicy;
use crate::exec::ExecExpiration;
use crate::exec::ExecToolCallOutput;
use crate::exec::StdoutStream;
use crate::exec::WindowsRestrictedTokenFilesystemOverlay;
use crate::exec::execute_exec_request;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
@@ -46,10 +47,46 @@ pub struct ExecRequest {
pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
pub file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
pub network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
pub(crate) windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overlay:
Option<WindowsRestrictedTokenFilesystemOverlay>,
pub arg0: Option<String>,
}
impl ExecRequest {
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn new(
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
expiration: ExecExpiration,
capture_policy: ExecCapturePolicy,
sandbox: SandboxType,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: bool,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
arg0: Option<String>,
) -> Self {
Self {
command,
cwd,
env,
network,
expiration,
capture_policy,
sandbox,
windows_sandbox_level,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overlay: None,
arg0,
}
}
pub(crate) fn from_sandbox_exec_request(
request: SandboxExecRequest,
options: ExecOptions,
@@ -94,6 +131,7 @@ impl ExecRequest {
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overlay: None,
arg0,
}
}