[codex] Bypass managed network for escalated exec (#19595)

## Why

`sandbox_permissions = "require_escalated"` is treated as an explicit
request to approve the command and run it outside the
filesystem/platform sandbox. Before this change, shell and unified exec
still registered managed network approval context and could inject
Codex-managed proxy state into the child process, which meant an
approved escalated command could still hit a second network approval
path.

This PR makes that escalation boundary consistent: once a command is
explicitly approved to run outside the sandbox, Codex does not also
route that process through the managed network proxy.

## Security impact

Command/filesystem sandbox approval now implies network approval for
that command. If an untrusted command or script is allowed to run with
`require_escalated`, its network calls are unsandboxed: Codex-managed
network allowlists and denylists are not respected for that process, so
the command can exfiltrate any data it can read.

## What changed

- Skip managed network approval specs for
`SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated`.
- Pass `network: None` into shell, zsh-fork shell, and unified exec
sandbox preparation for explicitly escalated requests.
- Strip Codex-managed proxy environment variables when
`CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE` is present, while preserving user proxy env
when the Codex marker is absent.
- Add regression coverage for the prepared exec request so the old
behavior cannot silently reappear.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core explicit_escalation`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`
This commit is contained in:
viyatb-oai authored and GitHub committed 2026-04-25 23:23:58 +00:00
1 parent 0c785598b3
commit 9aaa5d9358
6 files changed
+204 -26

No files matched your search

+24
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ small and focused and reuses the orchestrator for approvals + sandbox + retry.
*/
use crate::exec_env::CODEX_THREAD_ID_ENV_VAR;
use crate::path_utils;
use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use crate::shell::Shell;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolError;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
@@ -43,6 +44,29 @@ pub(crate) fn build_sandbox_command(
})
}
pub(crate) fn exec_env_for_sandbox_permissions(
env: &HashMap<String, String>,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
) -> HashMap<String, String> {
let mut env = env.clone();
if sandbox_permissions.requires_escalated_permissions()
&& env.contains_key(PROXY_ACTIVE_ENV_KEY)
{
for key in PROXY_ENV_KEYS {
env.remove(*key);
}
// Only macOS injects a Codex-owned SSH wrapper for the managed SOCKS proxy.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
if env
.get(PROXY_GIT_SSH_COMMAND_ENV_KEY)
.is_some_and(|command| command.starts_with(CODEX_PROXY_GIT_SSH_COMMAND_MARKER))
{
env.remove(PROXY_GIT_SSH_COMMAND_ENV_KEY);
}
}
env
}
/// POSIX-only helper: for commands produced by `Shell::derive_exec_args`
/// for Bash/Zsh/sh of the form `[shell_path, "-lc", "<script>"]`, and
/// when a snapshot is configured on the session shell, rewrite the argv