Scope network approvals by environment (#28899)

Stacked on #28766.

## Why

Network approvals are environment-scoped: allowing a host in one
execution environment should not allow the same host in another
environment.

#28766 adds the inert IDs and constructor plumbing. This PR applies the
behavior on top.

## What changed

- Route managed network traffic through per-environment HTTP and SOCKS
proxy listeners.
- Stamp HTTP, HTTPS CONNECT, SOCKS TCP, and SOCKS UDP policy requests
with the source environment at the proxy boundary.
- Carry the selected execution environment through shell, unified exec,
zsh-fork, and sandbox transform paths.
- Include the environment in pending, approved-for-session, and
denied-for-session network approval cache keys.
- Include the environment in approval IDs and approval prompts.
- Preserve legacy fallback for unattributed requests, but deny when
active-call attribution is ambiguous.
- Fail closed if an environment-specific proxy endpoint cannot be
prepared.

## Validation

- just fmt
- CI will run tests and clippy
This commit is contained in:
jif authored and GitHub committed 2026-06-19 13:49:45 +02:00
1 parent dac588f413
commit bd5d31b250
20 files changed
+1026 -109

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@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ impl From<SandboxTransformError> for CodexErr {
SandboxTransformError::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable => {
CodexErr::LandlockSandboxExecutableNotProvided
}
SandboxTransformError::EnvironmentNetworkProxy(message) => {
CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(message)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
SandboxTransformError::Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap => {
CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(crate::bwrap::WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING.to_string())