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chore: refactor network permissions to use explicit domain and unix socket rule maps (#15120)
## Summary This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements, permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server protocol. Concretely, it: - introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission (`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`, `denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists - updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently - exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces, and app-server config APIs - rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect the new config format ## Why The previous representation split related network policy across multiple parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of derived projections only. ## Backward Compatibility ### Backward compatible - Managed requirements still accept the legacy `experimental_network.allowed_domains`, `experimental_network.denied_domains`, and `experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally. - App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`, `deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can continue reading managed network requirements. - App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`, `deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views derived from the canonical maps. - `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries. ### Not backward compatible - Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical `[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`, `denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`. - Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with `allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be combined with `allow_unix_sockets`. - The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny lists. ## Testing `/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config ``` [permissions.workspace.network.domains] "www.example.com" = "allow" ``` and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403`. Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works: ``` [experimental_network] allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"] ```
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@@ -76,3 +76,132 @@ fn restricted_read_implicitly_allows_helper_executables() -> std::io::Result<()>
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Ok(())
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}
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#[test]
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fn network_toml_ignores_legacy_network_list_keys() {
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let parsed = toml::from_str::<NetworkToml>(
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r#"
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allowed_domains = ["openai.com"]
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"#,
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)
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.expect("legacy network list keys should be ignored");
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assert_eq!(parsed, NetworkToml::default());
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}
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#[test]
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fn network_permission_containers_project_allowed_and_denied_entries() {
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let domains = NetworkDomainPermissionsToml {
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entries: BTreeMap::from([
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(
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"*.openai.com".to_string(),
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NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Allow,
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),
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(
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"api.example.com".to_string(),
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NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Allow,
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),
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(
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"blocked.example.com".to_string(),
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NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Deny,
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),
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]),
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};
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let unix_sockets = NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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entries: BTreeMap::from([
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(
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"/tmp/example.sock".to_string(),
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::Allow,
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),
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(
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"/tmp/ignored.sock".to_string(),
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::None,
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),
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]),
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};
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assert_eq!(
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domains.allowed_domains(),
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Some(vec![
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"*.openai.com".to_string(),
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"api.example.com".to_string()
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])
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);
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assert_eq!(
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domains.denied_domains(),
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Some(vec!["blocked.example.com".to_string()])
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);
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assert_eq!(
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NetworkDomainPermissionsToml {
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entries: BTreeMap::from([(
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"api.example.com".to_string(),
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NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Allow,
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)]),
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}
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.denied_domains(),
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None
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);
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assert_eq!(
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unix_sockets.allow_unix_sockets(),
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vec!["/tmp/example.sock".to_string()]
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn network_toml_overlays_unix_socket_permissions_by_path() {
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let mut config = NetworkProxyConfig::default();
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NetworkToml {
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unix_sockets: Some(NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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entries: BTreeMap::from([
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(
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"/tmp/base.sock".to_string(),
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::Allow,
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),
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(
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"/tmp/override.sock".to_string(),
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::Allow,
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),
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]),
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}),
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..Default::default()
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}
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.apply_to_network_proxy_config(&mut config);
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NetworkToml {
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unix_sockets: Some(NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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entries: BTreeMap::from([
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(
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"/tmp/extra.sock".to_string(),
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::Allow,
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),
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(
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"/tmp/override.sock".to_string(),
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::None,
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),
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]),
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}),
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..Default::default()
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}
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.apply_to_network_proxy_config(&mut config);
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assert_eq!(
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config.network.unix_sockets,
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Some(codex_network_proxy::NetworkUnixSocketPermissions {
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entries: BTreeMap::from([
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(
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"/tmp/base.sock".to_string(),
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ProxyNetworkUnixSocketPermission::Allow,
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),
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(
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"/tmp/extra.sock".to_string(),
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ProxyNetworkUnixSocketPermission::Allow,
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),
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(
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"/tmp/override.sock".to_string(),
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ProxyNetworkUnixSocketPermission::None,
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),
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]),
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})
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);
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}
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