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permissions: derive compatibility policies from profiles (#19392)
## Why After #19391, `PermissionProfile` and the split filesystem/network policies could still be stored in parallel. That creates drift risk: a profile can preserve deny globs, external enforcement, or split filesystem entries while a cached projection silently loses those details. This PR makes the profile the runtime source and derives compatibility views from it. ## What Changed - Removes stored filesystem/network sandbox projections from `Permissions` and `SessionConfiguration`; their accessors now derive from the canonical `PermissionProfile`. - Derives legacy `SandboxPolicy` snapshots from profiles only where an older API still needs that field. - Updates MCP connection and elicitation state to track `PermissionProfile` instead of `SandboxPolicy` for auto-approval decisions. - Adds semantic filesystem-policy comparison so cwd changes can preserve richer profiles while still recognizing equivalent legacy projections independent of entry ordering. - Updates config/session tests to assert profile-derived projections instead of parallel stored fields. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots` - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19392). * #19395 * #19394 * #19393 * __->__ #19392
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@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ async fn restricted_read_implicitly_allows_helper_executables() -> std::io::Resu
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let expected_zsh = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(zsh_path)?;
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let expected_allowed_arg0_dir = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(allowed_arg0_dir)?;
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let expected_sibling_arg0_dir = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(sibling_arg0_dir)?;
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let policy = &config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy;
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let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
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assert!(
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policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(expected_zsh.as_path(), &cwd),
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