Prevent filesystem-root read denies in the Windows sandbox (#44327)

## Why

The elevated Windows sandbox requires effective `:root` read access and cannot safely enforce policies that deny reads at the filesystem root.

## What changed

- Validate root read access before elevated setup, service provisioning, and setup refresh, rejecting root-denying globs before expansion.
- Reject filesystem-root deny-read ACL targets after canonicalization and check the opened handle before applying an ACL, so aliases cannot bypass the root guard.
- Read and update deny ACLs through the same handle, and allow an existing deny ACE to be recognized when write access to the ACL is unavailable.

## Testing

Add regression coverage for default root denial, root-denying globs, allowed root reads with narrower deny rules, handle-based root detection, and reading existing deny ACEs without `WRITE_DAC`.

GitOrigin-RevId: b904e7cdbc09ee0147e1818c898b0382b5820c1b
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai authored and copyberry committed 2026-09-09 22:50:03 +00:00
1 parent 0adfc1f2f2
commit f11d0dd012
9 files changed
+392 -30

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@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ use codex_core::exec::ExecCapturePolicy;
use codex_core::exec::ExecParams;
use codex_core::exec::process_exec_tool_call;
use codex_core::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_core::windows_sandbox::WindowsSandboxSetupMode;
use codex_core::windows_sandbox::WindowsSandboxSetupRequest;
use codex_core::windows_sandbox::run_windows_sandbox_setup;
use codex_core::windows_sandbox::sandbox_setup_is_complete;
use codex_features::Feature;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
@@ -229,13 +232,12 @@ fn windows_sandbox_cli_preserves_managed_deny_reads_across_launches() -> anyhow:
\n\
[permissions.managed-deny-test.filesystem]\n\
\":minimal\" = \"read\"\n\
\"{}\" = \"read\"\n\
\":root\" = \"read\"\n\
\"{}\" = \"write\"\n\
\"{}\" = \"deny\"\n\
\n\
[permissions.managed-deny-test.network]\n\
enabled = false\n",
escape_toml_path(&fixture_root),
escape_toml_path(&work),
escape_toml_path(&denied),
),
@@ -262,6 +264,43 @@ fn windows_sandbox_cli_preserves_managed_deny_reads_across_launches() -> anyhow:
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial(codex_home)]
async fn windows_elevated_setup_rejects_default_root_deny() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let codex_home = codex_home_for_windows_sandbox_test("windows-elevated-root-deny-codex-home")?;
let workspace = TempDir::new()?;
let cwd = dunce::canonicalize(workspace.path())?.abs();
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(/*subpath*/ None),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
missing_path_behavior: None,
}]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
let err = run_windows_sandbox_setup(WindowsSandboxSetupRequest {
mode: WindowsSandboxSetupMode::Elevated,
permission_profile,
workspace_roots: vec![cwd.clone()],
command_cwd: cwd.to_path_buf(),
env_map: HashMap::new(),
codex_home: codex_home.path().to_path_buf(),
})
.await
.expect_err("elevated setup should reject default root deny");
assert_eq!(
err.to_string(),
"elevated Windows sandbox requires effective `:root` read access"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial(codex_home)]
async fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_exact_and_glob_deny_read_policy() -> anyhow::Result<()> {