## Why
Guardian treated all skill instructions as untrusted, so it could not use the
invocation of a user-owned skill as authorization evidence.
## What changed
- Record explicit and implicit skill invocations through extension contributors.
- Send Guardian a bounded, deduplicated list of canonical skill paths only when
they resolve under the user's Codex or `.agents` skill directories.
- Keep repository skills and symlinks that escape trusted roots untrusted, and
send only verified paths rather than skill contents to the classifier.
- Avoid recording host skill prompts that were superseded by core skill
injection.
## Testing
- Added unit coverage for trusted roots, symlink escapes, deduplication, and
size limits.
- Added integration coverage showing that Guardian trusts invoked user skills
while rejecting a forged repository skill.
GitOrigin-RevId: 1cc0be230f7e6649110201c23c3de8f26447ff36
## What changed
- Add `HostSkillsSnapshot::load_skill_prompts` so the skills extension owns reading and rendering selected host skills.
- Keep explicit invocation telemetry, unreadable-skill warnings, plugin prompt ordering, and suppression of host prompts superseded by provider prompts.
- Remove the legacy prompt injection and fragment implementation from `codex-core-skills`.
## Testing
- Cover prompt truncation without an installed skills extension, skill/plugin ordering, selective provider supersession, unreadable skills, and contextual fragment detection.
GitOrigin-RevId: 9c8b84ad54b90d174abc287ab49cc5a231e9e1aa