Commit Graph
17 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Bolin 0a6bc4e687 windows-sandbox: remove SandboxPolicy runner plumbing (#23813)
## Why

The Windows sandbox runner still carried the old `SandboxPolicy`
compatibility path even though core now computes `PermissionProfile`.
That meant Windows command-runner execution could only see the legacy
projection, so profile-only filesystem rules such as deny globs were not
part of the runner input.

## What Changed

- Removed the Windows-local `SandboxPolicy` parser/export and deleted
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/policy.rs`.
- Changed restricted-token capture/session setup, elevated setup,
world-writable audit, read-root grant, and command-runner session APIs
to accept `PermissionProfile` plus the profile cwd.
- Bumped the elevated command-runner IPC protocol to version 2 because
`SpawnRequest` now carries `permission_profile` /
`permission_profile_cwd` instead of the legacy `policy_json_or_preset` /
`sandbox_policy_cwd` fields.
- Updated core exec, unified exec, debug-sandbox, TUI setup/grant flows,
and app-server setup to pass the actual effective `PermissionProfile`.
- Left regression coverage asserting the old IPC policy fields are
absent and the runner serializes tagged `PermissionProfile` JSON.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core windows_sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
request_processors::windows_sandbox_processor`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-app-server
-p codex-cli -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-cli -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-tui`
- `rg "\\bSandboxPolicy\\b" codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` returned no
matches.

Note: `cargo test -p codex-cli` was attempted but did not reach crate
tests because local disk filled while compiling dependencies (`No space
left on device`). The targeted clippy pass compiled the affected CLI/TUI
surfaces afterward.




---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23813).
* #24108
* __->__ #23813
2026-05-26 14:56:27 -07:00
iceweasel-oai 5b1b6a20dd [codex] Use rolling files for Windows sandbox logs (#24117)
## Why

Windows sandbox diagnostics currently append to a single `sandbox.log`
under `CODEX_HOME/.sandbox`. That file never rolls over, which makes it
hard to safely include sandbox diagnostics in future feedback reports
without risking unbounded growth.

## What changed

- Replaced direct append-open sandbox logging with
`tracing_appender::rolling::RollingFileAppender`.
- Configured sandbox logs to rotate daily using names like
`sandbox.YYYY-MM-DD.log`.
- Added a conservative `MAX_LOG_FILES` cap of 90 retained matching log
files.
- Routed the Windows sandbox setup helper through the same rolling
writer.
- Added helpers for resolving the current daily sandbox log path so
future feedback upload work can use the same filename logic.
- Updated tests and test diagnostics to read the dated daily log file.

This intentionally does not include sandbox logs in `/feedback` yet;
scrubbing and attachment behavior can happen in a follow-up.

## Testing

- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox logging::tests`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-windows-sandbox --all-targets -- -D warnings`
2026-05-22 11:37:01 -07:00
Michael Bolin c9ff067e31 windows-sandbox: add profile-native elevated APIs (#23714)
## Why

This is the next step after #23167 in the Windows sandbox
`PermissionProfile` migration. The elevated Windows backend still
exposed policy-string entry points, which forced callers to pass a
compatibility `SandboxPolicy` before the command-runner IPC could
receive a profile.

Adding profile-native APIs first keeps the core switch in the next PR
small: reviewers can see that the Windows crate can prepare elevated
setup, capability SIDs, and runner IPC from a resolved
`PermissionProfile` without changing core behavior yet.

## What

- Adds `ElevatedSandboxProfileCaptureRequest` and
`run_windows_sandbox_capture_for_permission_profile_elevated` for
one-shot elevated capture.
- Adds `spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated_for_permission_profile`
for unified exec sessions.
- Factors elevated spawn prep through
`prepare_elevated_spawn_context_for_permissions`, so both new APIs
operate from `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` directly.
- Keeps the existing legacy policy-string APIs as adapters for callers
that have not moved yet.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`












---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23714).
* #23715
* __->__ #23714
2026-05-21 00:25:31 +00:00
Michael Bolin 896ee672cc windows-sandbox: feed setup from resolved permissions (#23167)
## Why

This is the next step in the Windows sandbox migration away from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy` abstraction. #22923 moved write-root and token
decisions onto `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, but setup and
identity still accepted `SandboxPolicy` and converted internally. This
PR pushes that conversion outward so the setup path consumes the
resolved Windows permission view directly.

## What Changed

- Changed `SandboxSetupRequest` to carry
`ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` instead of `SandboxPolicy` plus
policy cwd.
- Updated setup refresh/elevation and identity credential preparation to
use resolved permissions for read roots, write roots, network identity,
and deny-write payload planning.
- Removed the production `allow.rs` legacy wrapper; allow-path
computation now takes resolved permissions directly.
- Added a permissions-based world-writable audit entry point while
keeping the existing legacy wrapper for compatibility.
- Updated legacy ACL setup and the core Windows setup bridge to
construct resolved permissions at the boundary.
- Hardened the Windows sandbox integration test helper staging so Bazel
retries can reuse an already-staged helper if a prior sandbox helper
process still has the executable open.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all --no-run`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- Attempted `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target
x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm`, but the local machine is missing
`x86_64-w64-mingw32-clang`; Windows CI should cover that target.











---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23167).
* #23715
* #23714
* __->__ #23167
2026-05-20 14:52:38 -07:00
Michael Bolin e1ec0eee5f windows-sandbox: drive write roots from resolved permissions (#22923)
## Why

This is the third PR in the Windows sandbox `SandboxPolicy` ->
`PermissionProfile` migration stack.

#22896 introduced `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, and #22918 moved
elevated runner IPC to carry `PermissionProfile`. This PR starts moving
the remaining setup/spawn helpers away from asking legacy enum questions
like “is this `WorkspaceWrite`?” and toward resolved runtime permission
questions like “does this profile require write capability roots?”

## What changed

- Added resolved-permissions helpers for network identity and
write-capability detection.
- Moved setup write-root gathering to operate on
`ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, with the legacy `SandboxPolicy`
wrapper left in place for existing call sites.
- Updated identity setup, elevated capture setup, and world-writable
audit denies to use resolved write roots.
- Updated spawn preparation to carry resolved permissions in
`SpawnContext` and use them for network blocking, setup write roots,
elevated capability SID selection, and legacy capability roots.
- Removed a now-unused legacy write-root helper.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- Existing stack checks are green on #22896 and #22918; CI has started
for this PR.
















---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22923).
* #23715
* #23714
* #23167
* __->__ #22923
2026-05-20 14:30:42 -07:00
Michael Bolin 729bdf3c8d windows-sandbox: send permission profiles to elevated runner (#22918)
## Why

This is the next PR in the Windows sandbox migration stack after #22896.
The bottom PR introduces a Windows-local resolved permissions helper
while existing callers still start from legacy `SandboxPolicy`. This PR
moves the elevated runner IPC boundary to `PermissionProfile`, which
makes the direction of the stack visible without changing the public
core call sites yet.

Because that changes the CLI-to-command-runner message shape, the framed
IPC protocol version is bumped in the same PR so the boundary change is
explicit.

## What changed

- Replaced elevated IPC `policy_json_or_preset`/`sandbox_policy_cwd`
fields with `permission_profile`/`permission_profile_cwd`.
- Bumped the elevated command-runner IPC protocol to
`IPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 2` and switched parent/runner frames to use the
shared constant.
- Converted the parent elevated paths from the parsed legacy policy into
a materialized `PermissionProfile` before sending the runner request.
- Added `WindowsSandboxTokenMode` resolution for managed
`PermissionProfile` values and made the runner choose read-only vs
writable-root capability tokens from that resolved profile.
- Rejected disabled, external, unrestricted, and full-disk-write
profiles before token selection.
- Added IPC JSON coverage for tagged `PermissionProfile` payloads and
token-mode unit coverage for the resolved permission helper.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
--tests` was attempted locally but blocked before crate type-checking
because the macOS compiler environment lacks Windows C headers such as
`windows.h` and `assert.h`; GitHub Windows CI is the required
verification for the runner path.

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22918).
* #23715
* #23714
* #23167
* #22923
* __->__ #22918
2026-05-20 12:41:06 -07:00
iceweasel-oai b1c13b6fe5 Simplify legacy Windows sandbox ACL persistence (#22569)
## Why

The legacy Windows sandbox still carried a `persist_aces` mode switch,
even though the only path that meaningfully applies filesystem ACEs
today is `workspace-write`, which already uses the persistent behavior.
Legacy read-only sessions rely on the read-only capability SID rather
than per-command filesystem ACE mutation, so the temporary cleanup
branch had become conceptual overhead without a corresponding behavioral
need.

Removing that split makes the ACL lifecycle match the current sandbox
model more directly and trims the guard/revocation plumbing from the
legacy launcher paths.

## What changed

- Removed the `persist_aces` parameter from legacy ACL preparation.
- Made legacy deny-read handling always use the persistent
reconciliation path.
- Dropped guard tracking and post-exit ACE revocation from both capture
and unified-exec legacy flows.
- Kept workspace `.codex` / `.agents` protection tied directly to
`WorkspaceWrite` instead of an intermediate persistence flag.

## Verification

- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `git diff --check`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
  - 85 passed, 2 ignored, 2 (unrelated) failed locally.
2026-05-18 11:00:03 -07:00
Adrian 3d2a0b5517 [codex] Scope Windows sandbox write-root capability SIDs (#21479)
## Summary
- fix by scoping Windows workspace-write capability SIDs to active
effective write roots
- build legacy/elevated tokens from only the active effective write
roots
- align setup/audit deny ACL handling with active root-specific SIDs

## Testing
- just fmt
- git diff --check --cached
- just argument-comment-lint
- cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --locked (blocked by libwebrtc ->
libyuv fetch: CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403)
2026-05-13 18:28:52 +00:00
viyatb-oaiandCodex 46f30d0282 feat(sandbox): add Windows deny-read parity (#18202)
## Why

The split filesystem policy stack already supports exact and glob
`access = none` read restrictions on macOS and Linux. Windows still
needed subprocess handling for those deny-read policies without claiming
enforcement from a backend that cannot provide it.

## Key finding

The unelevated restricted-token backend cannot safely enforce deny-read
overlays. Its `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token model is authoritative for write
checks, not read denials, so this PR intentionally fails that backend
closed when deny-read overrides are present instead of claiming
unsupported enforcement.

## What changed

This PR adds the Windows deny-read enforcement layer and makes the
backend split explicit:

- Resolves Windows deny-read filesystem policy entries into concrete ACL
targets.
- Preserves exact missing paths so they can be materialized and denied
before an enforceable sandboxed process starts.
- Snapshot-expands existing glob matches into ACL targets for Windows
subprocess enforcement.
- Honors `glob_scan_max_depth` when expanding Windows deny-read globs.
- Plans both the configured lexical path and the canonical target for
existing paths so reparse-point aliases are covered.
- Threads deny-read overrides through the elevated/logon-user Windows
sandbox backend and unified exec.
- Applies elevated deny-read ACLs synchronously before command launch
rather than delegating them to the background read-grant helper.
- Reconciles persistent deny-read ACEs per sandbox principal so policy
changes do not leave stale deny-read ACLs behind.
- Fails closed on the unelevated restricted-token backend when deny-read
overrides are present, because its `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token model is not
authoritative for read denials.

## Landed prerequisites

These prerequisite PRs are already on `main`:

1. #15979 `feat(permissions): add glob deny-read policy support`
2. #18096 `feat(sandbox): add glob deny-read platform enforcement`
3. #17740 `feat(config): support managed deny-read requirements`

This PR targets `main` directly and contains only the Windows deny-read
enforcement layer.

## Implementation notes

- Exact deny-read paths remain enforceable on the elevated path even
when they do not exist yet: Windows materializes the missing path before
applying the deny ACE, so the sandboxed command cannot create and read
it during the same run.
- Existing exact deny paths are preserved lexically until the ACL
planner, which then adds the canonical target as a second ACL target
when needed. That keeps both the configured alias and the resolved
object covered.
- Windows ACLs do not consume Codex glob syntax directly, so glob
deny-read entries are expanded to the concrete matches that exist before
process launch.
- Glob traversal deduplicates directory visits within each pattern walk
to avoid cycles, without collapsing distinct lexical roots that happen
to resolve to the same target.
- Persistent deny-read ACL state is keyed by sandbox principal SID, so
cleanup only removes ACEs owned by the same backend principal.
- Deny-read ACEs are fail-closed on the elevated path: setup aborts if
mandatory deny-read ACL application fails.
- Unelevated restricted-token sessions reject deny-read overrides early
instead of running with a silently unenforceable read policy.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core
windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts`
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- GitHub Actions rerun is in progress on the pushed head.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-05-11 23:04:28 -07:00
Charlie MarshandCodex 7c9731c9af Enable --deny-warnings for cargo shear (#21616)
## Summary

In https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/21584, we disabled doctests for
crates that lack any doctests. We can enforce that property via `cargo
shear --deny-warnings`: crates that lack doctests will be flagged if
doctests are enabled, and crates with doctests will be flagged if
doctests are disabled.

A few additional notes:

- By adding `--deny-warnings`, `cargo shear` also flagged a number of
modules that were not reachable at all. Some of those have been removed.
- This PR removes a usage of `windows_modules!` (since `cargo shear` and
`rustfmt` couldn't see through it) in favor of simple `#[cfg(target_os =
"windows")]` macros. As a consequence, many of these files exhibit churn
in this PR, since they weren't being formatted by `rustfmt` at all on
main.
- Again, to make the code more analyzable, this PR also removes some
usages of `#[path = "cwd_junction.rs"]` in favor of a more standard
module structure. The bin sidecar structure is still retained, but,
e.g., `windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/command_runner.rs‎` was moved to
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/command_runner/main.rs`, and so on.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-05-08 20:29:00 +00:00
iceweasel-oai 5d5500650b Fix Windows PTY teardown by preserving ConPTY ownership (#20685)
## Why

On Windows, background terminals could stay visible after their shell
process had already exited. The elevated runner waits for the PTY output
reader to reach EOF before it sends the final exit message, but the
ConPTY helper was reducing ownership down to raw handles too early. That
left the pseudoconsole's borrowed pipe handles alive past teardown, so
EOF never propagated and the session stayed `running`.

## What changed

- change `utils/pty/src/win/conpty.rs` to hand off owned ConPTY
resources instead of leaking only raw handles
- make `windows-sandbox-rs/src/conpty/mod.rs` keep the pseudoconsole
owner and the backing pipe handles together until teardown
- update the elevated runner and the legacy unified-exec backend to keep
that `ConptyInstance` alive, take only the specific pipe handles they
need, and drop the owner at teardown instead of trying to close a
detached pseudoconsole handle later

## Testing

- desktop app in `Auto-review`: 11 x `cmd /c "ping -n 3 google.com"` all
exited cleanly and did not accumulate in the UI
- desktop app in `Auto-review`: 5 x `cmd /c "ping -n 30 google.com"`
appeared in the UI and drained back out on their own
2026-05-04 18:40:00 +00:00
Michael Bolin 466798aa83 ci: cross-compile Windows Bazel tests (#20585)
## Status

This is the Bazel PR-CI cross-compilation follow-up to #20485. It is
intentionally split from the Cargo/cargo-xwin release-build PoC so
#20485 can stay as the historical release-build exploration. The
unrelated async-utils test cleanup has been moved to #20686, so this PR
is focused on the Windows Bazel CI path.

The intended tradeoff is now explicit in `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`:
pull requests get the fast Windows cross-compiled Bazel test leg, while
post-merge pushes to `main` run both that fast cross leg and a fully
native Windows Bazel test leg. The native main-only job keeps full
V8/code-mode coverage and gets a 40-minute timeout because it is less
latency-sensitive than PR CI. All other Bazel jobs remain at 30 minutes.

## Why

Windows Bazel PR CI currently does the expensive part of the build on
Windows. A native Windows Bazel test job on `main` completed in about
28m12s, leaving very little headroom under the 30-minute job timeout and
making Windows the slowest PR signal.

#20485 showed that Windows cross-compilation can be materially faster
for Cargo release builds, but PR CI needs Bazel because Bazel owns our
test sharding, flaky-test retries, and integration-test layout. This PR
applies the same high-level shape we already use for macOS Bazel CI:
compile with remote Linux execution, then run platform-specific tests on
the platform runner.

The compromise is deliberately signal-aware: code-mode/V8 changes are
rare enough that PR CI can accept losing the direct V8/code-mode
smoke-test signal temporarily, while `main` still runs the native
Windows job post-merge to catch that class of regression. A follow-up PR
should investigate making the cross-built Windows gnullvm V8 archive
pass the direct V8/code-mode tests so this tradeoff can eventually go
away.

## What Changed

- Adds a `ci-windows-cross` Bazel config that targets
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm`, uses Linux RBE for build actions, and keeps
`TestRunner` actions local on the Windows runner.
- Adds explicit Windows platform definitions for
`windows_x86_64_gnullvm`, `windows_x86_64_msvc`, and a bridge toolchain
that lets gnullvm test targets execute under the Windows MSVC host
platform.
- Updates the Windows Bazel PR test leg to opt into the cross-compile
path via `--windows-cross-compile` and `--remote-download-toplevel`.
- Adds a `test-windows-native-main` job that runs only for `push` events
on `refs/heads/main`, uses the native Windows Bazel path, includes
V8/code-mode smoke tests, and has `timeout-minutes: 40`.
- Keeps fork/community PRs without `BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY` on the previous
local Windows MSVC-host fallback, including
`--host_platform=//:local_windows_msvc` and `--jobs=8`.
- Preserves the existing integration-test shape on non-gnullvm
platforms, while generating Windows-cross wrapper targets only for
`windows_gnullvm`.
- Resolves `CARGO_BIN_EXE_*` values from runfiles at test runtime,
avoiding hard-coded Cargo paths and duplicate test runfiles.
- Extends the V8 Bazel patches enough for the
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm` target and Linux remote execution path.
- Makes the Windows sandbox test cwd derive from `INSTA_WORKSPACE_ROOT`
at runtime when Bazel provides it, because cross-compiled binaries may
contain Linux compile-time paths.
- Keeps the direct V8/code-mode unit smoke tests out of the Windows
cross PR path for now while native Windows CI continues to cover them
post-merge.

## Command Shape

The fast Windows PR test leg invokes the normal Bazel CI wrapper like
this:

```shell
./.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh \
  --print-failed-action-summary \
  --print-failed-test-logs \
  --windows-cross-compile \
  --remote-download-toplevel \
  -- \
  test \
  --test_tag_filters=-argument-comment-lint \
  --test_verbose_timeout_warnings \
  --build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA} \
  -- \
  //... \
  -//third_party/v8:all \
  -//codex-rs/code-mode:code-mode-unit-tests \
  -//codex-rs/v8-poc:v8-poc-unit-tests
```

With the BuildBuddy secret available on Windows, the wrapper selects
`--config=ci-windows-cross` and appends the important Windows-cross
overrides after rc expansion:

```shell
--host_platform=//:rbe
--shell_executable=/bin/bash
--action_env=PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
--host_action_env=PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
--test_env=PATH=${CODEX_BAZEL_WINDOWS_PATH}
```

The native post-merge Windows job intentionally omits
`--windows-cross-compile` and does not exclude the V8/code-mode unit
targets:

```shell
./.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh \
  --print-failed-action-summary \
  --print-failed-test-logs \
  -- \
  test \
  --test_tag_filters=-argument-comment-lint \
  --test_verbose_timeout_warnings \
  --build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA} \
  --build_metadata=TAG_windows_native_main=true \
  -- \
  //... \
  -//third_party/v8:all
```

## Research Notes

The existing macOS Bazel CI config already uses the model we want here:
build actions run remotely with `--strategy=remote`, but `TestRunner`
actions execute on the macOS runner. This PR mirrors that pattern for
Windows with `--strategy=TestRunner=local`.

The important Bazel detail is that `rules_rs` is already targeting
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm` for Windows Bazel PR tests. This PR changes
where the build actions execute; it does not switch the Bazel PR test
target to Cargo, `cargo-nextest`, or the MSVC release target.

Cargo release builds differ from this Bazel path for V8: the normal
Windows Cargo release target is MSVC, and `rusty_v8` publishes prebuilt
Windows MSVC `.lib.gz` archives. The Bazel PR path targets
`windows-gnullvm`; `rusty_v8` does not publish a prebuilt Windows
GNU/gnullvm archive, so this PR builds that archive in-tree. That
Linux-RBE-built gnullvm archive currently crashes in direct V8/code-mode
smoke tests, which is why the workflow keeps native Windows coverage on
`main`.

The less obvious Bazel detail is test wrapper selection. Bazel chooses
the Windows test wrapper (`tw.exe`) from the test action execution
platform, not merely from the Rust target triple. The outer
`workspace_root_test` therefore declares the default test toolchain and
uses the bridge toolchain above so the test action executes on Windows
while its inner Rust binary is built for gnullvm.

The V8 investigation exposed a Windows-client gotcha: even when an
action execution platform is Linux RBE, Bazel can still derive the
genrule shell path from the Windows client. That produced remote
commands trying to run `C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\bash.exe` on Linux
workers. The wrapper now passes `--shell_executable=/bin/bash` with
`--host_platform=//:rbe` for the Windows cross path.

The same Windows-client/Linux-RBE boundary also affected
`third_party/v8:binding_cc`: a multiline genrule command can carry CRLF
line endings into Linux remote bash, which failed as `$'\r'`. That
genrule now keeps the `sed` command on one physical shell line while
using an explicit Starlark join so the shell arguments stay readable.

## Verification

Local checks included:

```shell
bash -n .github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh
bash -n workspace_root_test_launcher.sh.tpl
ruby -e "require %q{yaml}; YAML.load_file(%q{.github/workflows/bazel.yml}); puts %q{ok}"
RUNNER_OS=Linux ./scripts/list-bazel-clippy-targets.sh
RUNNER_OS=Windows ./scripts/list-bazel-clippy-targets.sh
RUNNER_OS=Linux ./tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh
RUNNER_OS=Windows ./tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh
```

The Linux clippy and argument-comment target lists contain zero
`*-windows-cross-bin` labels, while the Windows lists still include 47
Windows-cross internal test binaries.

CI evidence:

- Baseline native Windows Bazel test on `main`: success in about 28m12s,
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/25206257208/job/73907325959
- Green Windows-cross Bazel run on the split PR before adding the
main-only native leg: Windows test 9m16s, Windows release verify 5m10s,
Windows clippy 4m43s,
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/25231890068
- The latest SHA adds the explicit PR-vs-main tradeoff in `bazel.yml`;
CI is rerunning on that focused diff.

## Follow-Up

A subsequent PR should investigate making a cross-built Windows binary
work with V8/code-mode enabled. Likely options are either making the
Linux-RBE-built `windows-gnullvm` V8 archive correct at runtime, or
evaluating whether a Bazel MSVC target/toolchain can reuse the same
prebuilt MSVC `rusty_v8` archive shape that Cargo release builds already
use.
2026-05-01 15:55:28 -07:00
iceweasel-oai cecca5ae06 Improve Windows process management edge cases (#19211)
## Summary

Some improvements to Windows process-management issues from
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15578

- bound the elevated runner pipe-connect handshake instead of waiting
forever on blocking pipe connects
- terminate the spawned runner if that handshake fails, so timeout/error
paths do not leave a stray `codex-command-runner.exe`
- loop on partial `WriteFile` results when forwarding stdin in the
elevated runner, so input is not silently truncated
- fix the concrete HANDLE/SID cleanup paths in the runner setup code
- keep draining driver-backed stdout/stderr after exit until the backend
closes, instead of dropping the tail after a fixed 200ms grace period
- reuse `LocalSid` for SID ownership and add more explanatory comments
around the ownership/concurrency-sensitive code paths

## Why

The original PR fixed a lot of Windows session plumbing, but there were
still a few sharp process-lifecycle edges:

- some elevated runner handshakes could block forever
- the new timeout path could still orphan the spawned runner process
- stdin forwarding still assumed a single `WriteFile` consumed the whole
buffer
- a few raw HANDLE/SID error paths still leaked
- driver-backed output could still lose the last chunk of stdout/stderr
on slower backends

## Validation

- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-utils-pty`
- `cargo test -p codex-utils-pty`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox finish_driver_spawn`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox runner_`

Ran a local test matrix of unified-exec and shell_tool tests, all
passing
2026-04-29 10:00:01 -07:00
Dylan Hurd 32aad7bd13 Serialize legacy Windows PowerShell sandbox tests (#19453)
## Why

Recent `main` CI had repeated Windows timeouts in the legacy sandbox
process tests:

- `codex-windows-sandbox
session::tests::legacy_capture_powershell_emits_output` failed in runs
[24909500958](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24909500958),
[24908076251](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24908076251),
[24906197645](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24906197645),
[24905411571](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24905411571),
[24903336028](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24903336028),
and
[24898949647](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24898949647).
- `legacy_tty_powershell_emits_output_and_accepts_input` failed in the
same set of runs.
- `legacy_non_tty_cmd_emits_output` failed in runs
[24909500958](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24909500958),
[24908076251](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24908076251),
[24906197645](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24906197645),
and
[24903336028](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24903336028).
- `legacy_non_tty_powershell_emits_output` failed in runs
[24908076251](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24908076251),
[24906197645](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24906197645),
and
[24903336028](https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/24903336028).

These failures were 30s timeouts on Windows x64 and/or arm64 rather than
assertion failures.

## Root Cause

The active legacy Windows sandbox process tests all exercise host-level
resources: sandbox setup, ACL/user state, private desktop process
launch, stdio capture, and PowerShell/cmd child cleanup. Running several
of these tests concurrently can leave them competing for the same
Windows sandbox setup path and process/session resources, which makes
command startup or output collection hang under CI load.

## What Changed

- Added a shared in-process mutex for the active legacy Windows sandbox
process tests.
- Held that guard across each legacy cmd/PowerShell process test so
those host-resource-heavy cases run one at a time.
- Kept the skipped legacy cmd TTY tests unchanged.

## Why This Should Be Reliable

The tests still use unique homes and run the real legacy sandbox process
path, but they no longer overlap the fragile host-level setup and
process/session lifecycle. Serializing just this small group removes the
concurrency race without reducing the behavioral coverage of each test.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- GitHub Windows CI is the primary validation signal for the affected
tests; on this PR, Windows clippy, Windows release, and Windows local
Bazel passed after the serialization fix.
2026-04-24 16:18:30 -07:00
iceweasel-oaiandviyatb-oai e787358f70 check PID of named pipe consumer (#19283)
## Why
The elevated Windows command runner currently trusts the first process
that connects to its parent-created named pipes. Tightening the pipe ACL
already narrows who can reach that boundary, but verifying the connected
client PID gives the parent one more fail-closed check: it only accepts
the exact runner process it just spawned.

## What changed
- validate `GetNamedPipeClientProcessId` after `ConnectNamedPipe` and
reject clients whose PID does not match the spawned runner
- also did some code de-duplication to route the one-shot elevated
capture flow in `windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs` through
`spawn_runner_transport()` so both elevated codepaths use the same pipe
bootstrap and PID validation

Using the transport unification here also reduces duplication in the
elevated Windows IPC bootstrap, so future hardening to the runner
handshake only needs to land in one place.

## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- manual testing: one-shot elevated path via `target/debug/codex.exe
exec` running a randomized shell command and confirming captured output
- manual testing: elevated session path via `target/debug/codex.exe -c
'windows.sandbox="elevated"' sandbox windows -- python -u -c ...` with
stdin/stdout round-trips (`READY`, then `GOT:...` for two input lines)

---------

Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
2026-04-24 17:41:08 +00:00
iceweasel-oai 6f6997758a skip busted tests while I fix them (#18885) 2026-04-21 13:40:34 -07:00
8612714aa6 Add Windows sandbox unified exec runtime support (#15578)
## Summary

This is the runtime/foundation half of the Windows sandbox unified-exec
work.

- add Windows sandbox `unified_exec` session support in
`windows-sandbox-rs` for both:
  - the legacy restricted-token backend
  - the elevated runner backend
- extend the PTY/process runtime so driver-backed sessions can support:
  - stdin streaming
  - stdout/stderr separation
  - exit propagation
  - PTY resize hooks
- add Windows sandbox runtime coverage in `codex-windows-sandbox` /
`codex-utils-pty`

This PR does **not** enable Windows sandbox `UnifiedExec` for product
callers yet because hooking this up to app-server comes in the next PR.

Windows sandbox advertising is intentionally kept aligned with `main`,
so sandboxed Windows callers still fall back to `ShellCommand`.

This PR isolates the runtime/session layer so it can be reviewed
independently from product-surface enablement.

---------

Co-authored-by: jif-oai <jif@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-21 10:44:49 -07:00