Commit Graph
12 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Adam Perry @ OpenAI 31372078d1 auth: move domain mode below app wire types (#29721)
## Why

Authentication mode is a domain concept used by login, model selection,
telemetry, and transports. Keeping the canonical type in app-server
protocol forces those lower-level crates to depend on an unrelated wire
API.

## What changed

- Added canonical `codex_protocol::auth::AuthMode` domain values.
- Kept the app-server wire DTO unchanged and added an explicit app-side
conversion.
- Removed production app-server-protocol dependencies from login,
model-provider-info, models-manager, and otel call paths.

## Stack

This is PR 2 of 6, stacked on [PR
#29714](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/29714). Review only the
delta from `codex/split-json-rpc-protocols`. Next: [PR
#29722](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/29722).

## Validation

- Auth and login coverage passed in the focused protocol/domain test
run.
- App-server account and auth conversion coverage passed.
2026-06-24 03:10:20 +00:00
canvrno-oai 1659c4a629 PAC 2 - Add shared auth system proxy contract (#26707)
## Summary

Stacked on #26706.

Adds the shared auth/system-proxy contract that later platform resolver
PRs plug into. This PR moves Codex-owned auth and startup HTTP clients
through a common route-aware boundary, but does not yet add Windows or
macOS system proxy resolution.

The default path remains unchanged when `respect_system_proxy` is absent
or disabled.

## Implementation

- Adds `codex-client/src/outbound_proxy.rs` with the shared
route-selection model:
  - `OutboundProxyConfig`;
  - `ClientRouteClass`;
  - `RouteFailureClass`;
  - `build_reqwest_client_for_route`.
- Preserves the existing reqwest/default-client behavior when no route
config is supplied.
- Uses the fixed MVP routing policy when route config is supplied:
platform system/PAC/WPAD discovery, then explicit env proxy variables,
then direct connection.
- Keeps platform-specific system discovery behind the shared client
boundary. This PR provides the contract and fallback behavior; later
resolver PRs plug in Windows and macOS discovery.
- Adds `login::AuthRouteConfig` so auth call sites depend on a small
policy type instead of platform resolver details.
- Maps the resolved `Config.respect_system_proxy` boolean into
`AuthRouteConfig` for auth-owned clients.
- Wires the route config through browser login, device-code login,
access-token login, login status, logout/revoke, token refresh, API-key
exchange, app-server account login, TUI/app startup, cloud-config
bootstrap, cloud tasks, plugin auth, and exec startup config loading.

## End-user behavior

- No behavior changes by default.
- When `respect_system_proxy = true`, auth-owned clients opt into the
shared route-aware client path.
- On platforms without a resolver implementation in this PR, system
discovery is unavailable and the route-aware path falls back to explicit
env proxy handling, then direct connection.
- Custom CA handling remains separate from proxy route selection and
still runs through the shared client builder.
- No proxy URLs, PAC contents, or resolved platform details are exposed
through the public config surface introduced here.

## Tests

Adds or updates coverage for:

- preserving default auth-client fallback behavior when no route config
is provided;
- injected environment-proxy fallback without mutating process
environment;
- existing login-server E2E flows using explicit `auth_route_config:
None` to guard unchanged default behavior;
- updated auth manager, login, logout, cloud-config, startup, and
plugin-auth call sites passing route config explicitly.
2026-06-22 13:03:11 -07:00
Adrian ec848dde0e feat: opt ChatGPT auth into agent identity (#19049)
## Stack

This is PR 2 of the simplified HAI single-run-task stack:

- [#19047](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19047) Agent Identity
assertion and task-registration primitives, including the shared
run-task helper used by existing Agent Identity JWT auth.
- [#19049](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19049)
Disabled-by-default ChatGPT auth opt-in that provisions/reuses persisted
Agent Identity runtime auth and its single run task.
- [#19051](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19051) Run-scoped
provider auth that uses one backend-owned task id for first-party
inference and compaction requests.

[#19054](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19054) collapsed out of
the active stack because the simplified design no longer needs a
separate background/control-plane task helper.

## Summary

This PR adds the disabled-by-default path for normal ChatGPT-login Codex
sessions to obtain Agent Identity runtime auth through the Codex
backend. Existing Agent Identity JWT startup mode remains a separate
path and does not require the feature flag.

What changed:

- adds the experimental `use_agent_identity` feature flag and config
schema entry
- adds an explicit `AgentIdentityAuthPolicy` so call sites choose
`JwtOnly` or `ChatGptAuth` instead of passing a bare boolean
- stores standalone Agent Identity JWT credentials separately from
backend-registered Agent Identity records
- persists the registered Agent Identity record, private key, and single
run task id in `auth.json` so process restarts reuse the same identity
- derives the agent/task registration base URL from ChatGPT/Codex auth
config while keeping JWT JWKS lookup separate
- provisions and caches ChatGPT-derived Agent Identity runtime auth when
`use_agent_identity` is enabled
- reuses the shared run-task registration helper from PR1 rather than
adding a second task-registration path

This PR intentionally does not switch model inference over to
`AgentAssertion` auth. The provider-auth integration lands in the next
PR.

## Testing

- `just test -p codex-login`
2026-06-18 14:05:27 -07:00
Anton Panasenko 336f907ec1 Support staging OAuth client ID overrides (#28257)
## Summary

- allow app-server ChatGPT login to use a configured OAuth client ID
- reuse the same client ID for refresh and revoke requests
- cover staging login, refresh, and revoke request payloads

## Tests

- `just test -p codex-login`
- `just test -p codex-app-server
login_account_chatgpt_uses_debug_oauth_overrides`
- `just test -p codex-login
logout_with_revoke_revokes_refresh_token_then_removes_auth`
- `just fix -p codex-login`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
- `just fmt`
2026-06-15 10:56:53 -07:00
Celia Chen 56c97e3b5c feat: use encrypted local secrets for CLI auth (#27539)
## Why

Windows Credential Manager limits generic credential blobs to 2,560
bytes. Large serialized ChatGPT auth payloads can exceed that limit, so
keyring-mode CLI auth needs a backend that keeps only the encryption key
in the OS keyring and stores the payload in Codex's encrypted
local-secrets file.

This is the third PR in the encrypted-auth stack:

1. #27504 — feature and config selection
2. #27535 — auth-specific local-secrets namespaces
3. This PR — CLI auth implementation and activation
4. MCP OAuth implementation and activation

## What Changed

- Added encrypted CLI-auth storage using the `CliAuth` secrets
namespace.
- Preserved direct keyring storage for platforms/configurations where it
remains selected.
- Selected the backend consistently for login, logout, refresh,
device-code login, auth loading, and login restrictions.
- Threaded resolved bootstrap/full config through CLI, exec, TUI,
app-server account handling, cloud config, and cloud tasks.
- Removed stale `auth.json` fallback data after successful encrypted
saves and removed encrypted, direct-keyring, and fallback data during
logout.
- Added storage and integration coverage for both direct and encrypted
keyring modes.

MCP OAuth persistence is intentionally left to the next PR.

## Validation

- `just test -p codex-login` — 131 passed
- `just test -p codex-cli` — 280 passed
- `just test -p codex-app-server v2::account` — 25 passed
- `just test -p codex-cloud-config service` — 21 passed, 7 skipped
- `just fix -p codex-login`
- `just fix -p codex-cli`
- `just fmt`
2026-06-12 21:23:50 +00:00
cooper-oai d1aaf789ad [login] revoke existing auth before starting login (#27674)
## Why

`codex login` previously persisted newly issued OAuth credentials and
only then attempted to revoke the superseded refresh token. The old
credential must be revoked before a replacement browser or device-code
flow starts, and successful login must not perform any post-login
revocation attempt.

## What changed

- Revoke and clear existing stored auth before browser or device-code
CLI login begins.
- Remove superseded-token detection and revocation from the shared token
persistence path; successful login now only saves the new credentials.
- Read the raw configured auth store during CLI cleanup so
environment-provided auth cannot mask the stored refresh token.
- Preserve `auto` storage fallback semantics when keyring deletion fails
by clearing the fallback auth file.
- Add a process-level CLI regression test that requires the revoke
request to precede every device-login request and occur exactly once.

If replacement login is canceled or fails, the previous local
credentials have already been cleared. Remote revocation remains best
effort, matching explicit logout behavior.

## Validation

### Process-level before/after reproduction

I compiled the real `codex` CLI from the pre-fix parent (`14df0e8833`)
and from the PR implementation (`25c002f23b`; the login behavior is
unchanged at the current head), then ran the same device-code flow
against a local HTTP mock OAuth authority.

Each run:

1. Used a fresh temporary `CODEX_HOME` configured with
`cli_auth_credentials_store = "file"`.
2. Seeded that temporary home with managed ChatGPT auth containing
`old-access` and `old-refresh` tokens.
3. Pointed `CODEX_REVOKE_TOKEN_URL_OVERRIDE` at the mock `/oauth/revoke`
endpoint.
4. Ran the compiled CLI as:

   ```shell
   CODEX_HOME=<temporary-home> \
     CODEX_REVOKE_TOKEN_URL_OVERRIDE=<mock-issuer>/oauth/revoke \
<compiled-codex> login --device-auth --experimental_issuer <mock-issuer>
   ```

5. Recorded every request received by the mock authority. The mock
marked `new-access` valid when `/oauth/token` issued it and invalidated
it if `/oauth/revoke` arrived afterward, reproducing the observed
session-invalidating failure mode. After login exited, the harness also
verified the persisted refresh token and probed a protected endpoint
with `new-access`.

| Build | Observed request order | CLI/persistence result | `new-access`
probe |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pre-fix | `usercode → device token → OAuth token →
revoke(old-refresh)` | Exit `0`; `new-refresh` persisted | `401` |
| PR | `revoke(old-refresh) → usercode → device token → OAuth token` |
Exit `0`; `new-refresh` persisted | `200` |

The PR run therefore issued exactly one revocation request, before any
request that initiated the replacement login, and issued no revocation
after token exchange.

### Regression coverage


`codex-rs/cli/tests/login.rs::device_login_revokes_existing_auth_before_requesting_new_tokens`
runs the real first-party `codex` binary against a `wiremock` OAuth
server with an isolated temporary `CODEX_HOME`. It asserts:

- the exact request sequence is `/oauth/revoke`,
`/api/accounts/deviceauth/usercode`, `/api/accounts/deviceauth/token`,
then `/oauth/token`;
- there is exactly one revoke request and its body contains
`old-refresh` with the `refresh_token` hint;
- the completed login persists `new-refresh`.

Local validation:

- `just test -p codex-login` — 130 passed
- `just test -p codex-cli` — 280 passed, including the new process-level
regression test
- `just bazel-lock-check`
2026-06-12 12:38:30 -07:00
Celia Chen 06afd63f4a feat: add Bedrock API key as a managed auth mode (#27443)
## Why

Codex needs to manage Amazon Bedrock API key credentials through the
existing auth lifecycle instead of introducing a separate auth manager
or provider-specific credential file. Treating Bedrock API key login as
a primary auth mode gives it the same persistence, keyring, reload, and
logout behavior as the existing OpenAI API key and ChatGPT modes.

The credential is valid only for the `amazon-bedrock` model provider.
OpenAI-compatible providers must reject this auth mode rather than
treating the Bedrock key as an OpenAI bearer token.

## What changed

- Added `bedrockApiKey` as an app-server `AuthMode` and
`CodexAuth::BedrockApiKey` as a primary `AuthManager` mode.
- Added `BedrockApiKeyAuth`, containing the API key and AWS region, to
the existing `AuthDotJson` payload stored in `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` or
the configured keyring backend.
- Added `login_with_bedrock_api_key(...)`, parallel to
`login_with_api_key(...)`, which replaces the current stored login with
Bedrock credentials.
- Reused generic auth reload and logout behavior instead of adding a
Bedrock-specific auth manager or logout path.
- Updated login restrictions, status reporting, diagnostics, telemetry
classification, generated app-server schemas, and auth fixtures for the
new mode.
- Added explicit errors when Bedrock API key auth is selected with an
OpenAI-compatible model provider.

This PR establishes managed storage and auth-mode behavior. Routing the
managed key and region into Amazon Bedrock requests will be in follow-up
PRs.
2026-06-10 20:42:38 -07:00
cooper-oai df7818c7d1 [codex-rs] support v2 personal access tokens (#25731)
## Summary

- add v2 personal access token support for `codex login
--with-access-token` and `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN`
- classify opaque `at-` tokens separately from legacy Agent Identity
JWTs
- hydrate required ChatGPT account metadata through AuthAPI
`/v1/user-auth-credential/whoami`
- use PATs directly as bearer tokens while preserving existing ChatGPT
account surfaces
- expose PAT-backed auth as the explicit `personalAccessToken`
app-server auth mode

## Implementation

PAT auth is intentionally small and stateless. Loading a PAT performs
one AuthAPI metadata request, stores the hydrated metadata in the
in-memory auth object, and redacts the secret from debug output. Legacy
Agent Identity JWT handling remains unchanged. The shared access-token
classifier lives in a private neutral module because it dispatches
between both credential types.

PAT hydration fails closed when AuthAPI omits any required metadata,
including email. Hydrated metadata is intentionally not persisted:
startup performs a live `whoami` preflight so revoked tokens or changed
account metadata are not accepted from a stale cache.

## Workspace restriction scope

This change intentionally does **not** apply
`forced_chatgpt_workspace_id` to PAT authentication. The setting is a
client-side config guardrail, not an authorization boundary, and PAT
does not currently require workspace-ID parity. The PAT login and
`CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` paths therefore validate through AuthAPI without
threading workspace-restriction state through access-token loading.
Existing workspace checks for non-PAT auth remain on their established
paths.

## App-server compatibility

The public app-server `AuthMode` is shared across v1 and v2, and
PAT-backed auth reports `personalAccessToken` through both APIs.
Following human review, this intentionally removes the temporary v1
compatibility mapping that reported PATs as `chatgpt`; the deprecated v1
API is kept in parity with v2 rather than maintaining a separate closed
enum. Clients with exhaustive auth-mode handling in either API version
must add the new case and should generally treat it as ChatGPT-backed
unless they need PAT-specific behavior.

The v1 auth-status response still omits the raw PAT when `includeToken`
is requested because that response cannot carry the account metadata
needed to reuse the credential safely. Persisted PAT auth also omits the
new enum value so older Codex builds can deserialize `auth.json` and
infer PAT auth from the credential field after a rollback.

## Validation

Latest review-fix validation:

- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-login` (126 passed)
- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-cli` (263 passed)
- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-cli
stored_auth_validation_handles_personal_access_token`
- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` (226
passed)
- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-models-manager
refresh_available_models_uses_remote_only_catalog_for_chatgpt_auth`
- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-tui
existing_non_oauth_chatgpt_login_counts_as_signed_in`
- `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just fix -p codex-login -p
codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-models-manager -p codex-tui -p
codex-cli`
- `just fmt`
- `git diff --check`

The broader `codex-tui` suite previously compiled and ran 2,834 tests.
Three unrelated environment-sensitive guardian/IDE-socket tests failed
after retries; the PAT-relevant TUI coverage passed.
2026-06-05 17:36:18 -07:00
efrazer-oai 2009f6e894 refactor: make auth loading async (#19762)
## Summary

Auth loading used to expose synchronous construction helpers in several
places even though some auth sources now need async work. This PR makes
the auth-loading surface async and updates the callers to await it.

This is intentionally only plumbing. It does not change how
AgentIdentity tokens are decoded, how task runtime ids are allocated, or
how JWT signatures are verified.

## Stack

1. **This PR:** [refactor: make auth loading
async](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19762)
2. [refactor: load AgentIdentity runtime
eagerly](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19763)
3. [feat: verify AgentIdentity JWTs with
JWKS](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19764)

## Important call sites

| Area | Change |
| --- | --- |
| `codex-login` auth loading | `CodexAuth` and `AuthManager`
construction paths now await auth loading. |
| app-server startup | Auth manager construction is awaited during
initialization. |
| CLI/TUI/exec/MCP/chatgpt callers | Existing auth-loading calls now
await the same behavior. |
| cloud requirements storage loader | The loader becomes async so it can
share the same auth construction path. |
| auth tests | Tests that load auth now run in async contexts. |

## Testing

Tests: targeted Rust auth test compilation, formatter, scoped Clippy
fix, and Bazel lock check.
2026-04-27 11:00:27 -07:00
efrazer-oai 69c8913e24 feat: add explicit AgentIdentity auth mode (#18785)
## Summary

This PR adds `CodexAuth::AgentIdentity` as an explicit auth mode.

An AgentIdentity auth record is a standalone `auth.json` mode. When
`AuthManager::auth().await` loads that mode, it registers one
process-scoped task and stores it in runtime-only state on the auth
value. Header creation stays synchronous after that because the task is
initialized before callers receive the auth object.

This PR also removes the old feature flag path. AgentIdentity is
selected by explicit auth mode, not by a hidden flag or lazy mutation of
ChatGPT auth records.

Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes

## Design Decisions

- AgentIdentity is a real auth enum variant because it can be the only
credential in `auth.json`.
- The process task is ephemeral runtime state. It is not serialized and
is not stored in rollout/session data.
- Account/user metadata needed by existing Codex backend checks lives on
the AgentIdentity record for now.
- `is_chatgpt_auth()` remains token-specific.
- `uses_codex_backend()` is the broader predicate for ChatGPT-token auth
and AgentIdentity auth.

## Stack

1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert
2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: isolated Agent Identity
crate
3. This PR: explicit AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate Codex backend
auth callsites through AuthProvider
5. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18904: accept AgentIdentity JWTs
and load `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY`

## Testing

Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
2026-04-21 22:33:24 -07:00
efrazer-oai be75785504 fix: fully revert agent identity runtime wiring (#18757)
## Summary

This PR fully reverts the previously merged Agent Identity runtime
integration from the old stack:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes

It removes the Codex-side task lifecycle wiring, rollout/session
persistence, feature flag plumbing, lazy `auth.json` mutation,
background task auth paths, and request callsite changes introduced by
that stack.

This leaves the repo in a clean pre-AgentIdentity integration state so
the follow-up PRs can reintroduce the pieces in smaller reviewable
layers.

## Stack

1. This PR: full revert
2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: move Agent Identity
business logic into a crate
3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: add explicit
AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate auth callsites
through AuthProvider

## Testing

Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
2026-04-21 14:30:55 -07:00
sashank-oaiandCodex 22f7ef1cb7 [codex] Revoke ChatGPT tokens on logout (#17825)
## Summary

This changes Codex logout so managed ChatGPT auth is revoked against
AuthAPI before local auth state is removed. CLI logout, TUI `/logout`,
and the app-server account logout path now use the token-revoking logout
flow instead of only deleting `auth.json` / credential store state.

## Root Cause

Logout previously cleared only local auth storage. That removed Codex's
local credentials but did not ask the backend to invalidate the
refresh/access token state associated with a managed ChatGPT login.

## Behavior

For managed ChatGPT auth, logout sends the stored refresh token to
`https://auth.openai.com/oauth/revoke` with `token_type_hint:
refresh_token` and the Codex OAuth client id, then deletes all local
auth stores after revocation succeeds. If only an access token is
available, it falls back to revoking that access token. API key auth and
externally supplied `chatgptAuthTokens` are still only cleared locally
because Codex does not own a refresh token for those modes.

Revocation failures are fail-closed: if Codex cannot load stored auth or
the backend revoke call fails, logout returns an error and leaves local
auth in place so the user can retry instead of silently clearing local
state while backend tokens remain valid.

## Validation
ran local version of `codex-cli` with staging overrides/harness for auth

ran `codex login` then `codex logout`:

saw auth.json clear and  backend revocation endpoints were called

```
POST /oauth/revoke
status: 200

revoking access token
should clear auth session
clearing auth session due to token revocation
successfully revoked session and access token
CANONICAL-API-LINE Response: status='200' method='POST' path='/oauth/revoke
```

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-16 22:51:21 -07:00