Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
viyatb-oai 208f05b233 Enforce automatic review for managed models (#37511)
## What changed

- Add the managed `auto_review.required_on_models` requirement, unioning model slugs across requirement layers and exposing the result through `configRequirements/read`.
- Force listed models to use `on-request` approvals with the `auto_review` reviewer. Downgrade Full Access to workspace-write when starting a protected session, and reject incompatible runtime overrides or use when automatic review is disabled.
- Preserve these protections across thread starts, resumes, forks, model changes, turn overrides, MCP approvals, and TUI session attachment.

## Testing

- Add coverage for layered model requirements and exact provider-alias matching.
- Add app-server tests for protected thread lifecycle operations, unsafe setting overrides, legacy thread upgrades, disabled automatic review, and requirements API output.

GitOrigin-RevId: c4b1d52c3b5b75e86880725412b8f0812e0dfcd9
2026-08-07 23:43:14 +00:00
iceweasel-oai 4bc2c723ef Select the elevated Windows sandbox for network proxies (#33445)
## Why

Windows firewall enforcement is tied to the logon-user sandbox identities. Proxy-enforced commands therefore need the elevated backend even when the configured sandbox mode is the default restricted-token mode.

## What changed

- Select the elevated Windows sandbox backend whenever a command uses the managed network proxy.
- Remove configuration and startup checks that required users or managed requirements to select the elevated sandbox explicitly.
- Start and expose managed network proxy state consistently on Windows.

## Testing

- Verify that proxy enforcement selects the elevated backend for the restricted-token sandbox mode.

GitOrigin-RevId: e01ac052587721c468a8fbcf4e2c7c5a185a3e05
2026-07-15 23:19:00 +00:00
iceweasel-oai abbb8c569c Require the elevated Windows sandbox for network proxies (#32857)
## Why

Network proxy enforcement on Windows requires the elevated sandbox backend. Silently selecting that backend for an unelevated configuration makes the effective sandbox differ from the configured mode.

## What changed

- Reject enabled network proxy configurations on Windows unless managed requirements allow only the elevated sandbox and `windows.sandbox` resolves to `"elevated"`.
- Preserve the configured sandbox backend during execution and validate proxy compatibility at config loading, sandbox setup, and process launch boundaries.
- Defer this validation during cloud-config bootstrap so authoritative managed requirements can be loaded first.
- Do not start or expose disabled Windows proxies, and render transitions to disabled networking as `<network enabled="false"></network>`.

## Testing

- Cover Windows requirement and sandbox compatibility matrices, bootstrap behavior, backend selection, disabled proxy handling, and environment-context updates.

GitOrigin-RevId: bfa1dda98594e0db61883f8e7f65bd560e3453e6
2026-07-13 19:04:22 +00:00
felixxia-oai db541f4553 [codex] Add managed MCP server matchers (#29648)
## Summary

This PR extends the existing managed `mcp_servers` identity requirement
so that one name-qualified rule can use either:

- the released exact command or URL identity;
- an exact stdio executable with an exact-length, ordered argument
matcher list; or
- a direct MCP URL matcher.

Matcher-based rules stay under the released `identity` key and use the
same `McpServerRequirement` abstraction and `mcp_servers.<server_name>`
namespace.

## Behavior

Policy activation and name qualification are unchanged:

- If `mcp_servers` is absent, ordinary configured MCP servers remain
unrestricted.
- If `mcp_servers` is present, a server needs a matching same-name
requirement.
- `mcp_servers = {}` continues to deny every configured MCP server.
- Existing exact identity requirements keep their released semantics.

Plugin-bundled MCP servers use the same requirement shapes under
`plugins.<plugin_name>.mcp_servers.<server_name>`. Top-level non-empty
rules continue to govern only ordinary configured servers; plugin rules
remain explicitly plugin-scoped. The existing globally empty
`mcp_servers = {}` plugin kill switch is preserved.

Requirements layers continue to use the existing regular TOML merge
behavior. Atomic replacement of named MCP requirements is intentionally
out of scope here and is tracked independently in #30118.

## Requirement contract

The released exact identity contract remains valid:

```toml
[mcp_servers.docs.identity]
command = "codex-mcp"

[mcp_servers.remote.identity]
url = "https://example.com/mcp"
```

Command identities continue to check only `command`; they do not inspect
arguments, `cwd`, `env`, or `env_vars`.

A command matcher uses an exact executable plus an exact-length, ordered
argument list. Each argument position supports `exact`, `prefix`, or
full-value `regex` matching:

```toml
[mcp_servers.internal_mcp_proxy.identity]
command = { executable = "company-cli", args = [
  { match = "exact", value = "mcp" },
  { match = "exact", value = "proxy" },
  { match = "exact", value = "--server" },
  { match = "regex", expression = '^https://[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.mcp\.internal\.example\.com(?::443)?(?:/.*)?$' },
] }
```

Direct streamable HTTP MCP definitions can use the same value matcher
types through `identity.url`:

```toml
[mcp_servers.internal_http.identity]
url = {
  match = "regex",
  expression = '^https://[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.mcp\.internal\.example\.com(?:/.*)?$',
}
```

Plugin-bundled MCP matchers use the same contract inside the
plugin-qualified allowlist:

```toml
[plugins."sample@test".mcp_servers.internal_mcp_proxy.identity]
command = { executable = "company-cli", args = [
  { match = "exact", value = "mcp" },
  { match = "exact", value = "proxy" },
] }
```

Regexes are validated while managed requirements are loaded, and regex
matching must cover the complete value. Command matchers constrain only
the executable and arguments.

## Why

Enterprise administrators need to allow MCP servers by executable and
positional-argument shape, including fixed arguments plus constrained
values such as internal MCP URLs passed to a proxy.

## Validation

- `just fmt`
- `git diff --check`
- `just test -p codex-config` (198 passed)
- `just test -p codex-core mcp_servers_by_matchers --lib` (2 passed)
2026-06-25 22:15:50 +01:00
viyatb-oaiandCodex dae0608c06 feat(config): support managed deny-read requirements (#17740)
## Summary
- adds managed requirements support for deny-read filesystem entries
- constrains config layers so managed deny-read requirements cannot be
widened by user-controlled config
- surfaces managed deny-read requirements through debug/config plumbing

This PR lets managed requirements inject deny-read filesystem
constraints into the effective filesystem sandbox policy.
User-controlled config can still choose the surrounding permission
profile, but it cannot remove or weaken the managed deny-read entries.

## Managed deny-read shape
A managed requirements file can declare exact paths and glob patterns
under `[permissions.filesystem]`:

```toml
# /etc/codex/requirements.toml
[permissions.filesystem]
deny_read = [
  "/Users/alice/.gitconfig",
  "/Users/alice/.ssh",
  "./managed-private/**/*.env",
]
```

Those entries are compiled into the effective filesystem policy as
`access = none` rules, equivalent in shape to filesystem permission
entries like:

```toml
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
"/Users/alice/.gitconfig" = "none"
"/Users/alice/.ssh" = "none"
"/absolute/path/to/managed-private/**/*.env" = "none"
```

The important difference is that the managed entries come from
requirements, so lower-precedence user config cannot remove them or make
those paths readable again.

Relative managed `deny_read` entries are resolved relative to the
directory containing the managed requirements file. Glob entries keep
their glob suffix after the non-glob prefix is normalized.

## Runtime behavior
- Managed `deny_read` entries are appended to the effective
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` after the selected permission profile is
resolved.
- Exact paths become `FileSystemPath::Path { access: None }`; glob
patterns become `FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { access: None }`.
- When managed deny-read entries are present, `sandbox_mode` is
constrained to `read-only` or `workspace-write`; `danger-full-access`
and `external-sandbox` cannot silently bypass the managed read-deny
policy.
- On Windows, the managed deny-read policy is enforced for direct file
tools, but shell subprocess reads are not sandboxed yet, so startup
emits a warning for that platform.
- `/debug-config` shows the effective managed requirement as
`permissions.filesystem.deny_read` with its source.

## Stack
1. #15979 - glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support
2. #18096 - macOS and Linux sandbox enforcement
3. This PR - managed deny-read requirements

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-17 08:40:09 -07:00
Michael Bolin 61dfe0b86c chore: clean up argument-comment lint and roll out all-target CI on macOS (#16054)
## Why

`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.

This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.

## What changed

- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`

That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.

## Validation

- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`

## Follow-up

- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
2026-03-27 19:00:44 -07:00
Michael Bolin 577a416f9a Extract codex-config from codex-core (#11389)
`codex-core` had accumulated config loading, requirements parsing,
constraint logic, and config-layer state handling in a single crate.
This change extracts that subsystem into `codex-config` to reduce
`codex-core` rebuild/test surface area and isolate future config work.

## What Changed

### Added `codex-config`

- Added new workspace crate `codex-rs/config` (`codex-config`).
- Added workspace/build wiring in:
  - `codex-rs/Cargo.toml`
  - `codex-rs/config/Cargo.toml`
  - `codex-rs/config/BUILD.bazel`
- Updated lockfiles (`codex-rs/Cargo.lock`, `MODULE.bazel.lock`).
- Added `codex-core` -> `codex-config` dependency in
`codex-rs/core/Cargo.toml`.

### Moved config internals from `core` into `config`

Moved modules to `codex-rs/config/src/`:

- `core/src/config/constraint.rs` -> `config/src/constraint.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/cloud_requirements.rs` ->
`config/src/cloud_requirements.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/config_requirements.rs` ->
`config/src/config_requirements.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/fingerprint.rs` -> `config/src/fingerprint.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/merge.rs` -> `config/src/merge.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/overrides.rs` -> `config/src/overrides.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/requirements_exec_policy.rs` ->
`config/src/requirements_exec_policy.rs`
- `core/src/config_loader/state.rs` -> `config/src/state.rs`

`codex-config` now re-exports this surface from `config/src/lib.rs` at
the crate top level.

### Updated `core` to consume/re-export `codex-config`

- `core/src/config_loader/mod.rs` now imports/re-exports config-loader
types/functions from top-level `codex_config::*`.
- Local moved modules were removed from `core/src/config_loader/`.
- `core/src/config/mod.rs` now re-exports constraint types from
`codex_config`.
2026-02-11 10:02:49 -08:00