Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- split `models-manager` out of `core` and add `ModelsManagerConfig`
plus `Config::to_models_manager_config()` so model metadata paths stop
depending on `core::Config`
- move login-owned/auth-owned code out of `core` into `codex-login`,
move model provider config into `codex-model-provider-info`, move API
bridge mapping into `codex-api`, move protocol-owned types/impls into
`codex-protocol`, and move response debug helpers into a dedicated
`response-debug-context` crate
- move feedback tag emission into `codex-feedback`, relocate tests to
the crates that now own the code, and keep broad temporary re-exports so
this PR avoids a giant import-only rewrite
## Major moves and decisions
- created `codex-models-manager` as the owner for model
cache/catalog/config/model info logic, including the new
`ModelsManagerConfig` struct
- created `codex-model-provider-info` as the owner for provider config
parsing/defaults and kept temporary `codex-login`/`codex-core`
re-exports for old import paths
- moved `api_bridge` error mapping + `CoreAuthProvider` into
`codex-api`, while `codex-login::api_bridge` temporarily re-exports
those symbols and keeps the `auth_provider_from_auth` wrapper
- moved `auth_env_telemetry` and `provider_auth` ownership to
`codex-login`
- moved `CodexErr` ownership to `codex-protocol::error`, plus
`StreamOutput`, `bytes_to_string_smart`, and network policy helpers to
protocol-owned modules
- created `codex-response-debug-context` for
`extract_response_debug_context`, `telemetry_transport_error_message`,
and related response-debug plumbing instead of leaving that behavior in
`core`
- moved `FeedbackRequestTags`, `emit_feedback_request_tags`, and
`emit_feedback_request_tags_with_auth_env` to `codex-feedback`
- deferred removal of temporary re-exports and the mechanical import
rewrites to a stacked follow-up PR so this PR stays reviewable
## Test moves
- moved auth refresh coverage from `core/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs` to
`login/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs`
- moved text encoding coverage from
`core/tests/suite/text_encoding_fix.rs` to
`protocol/src/exec_output_tests.rs`
- moved model info override coverage from
`core/tests/suite/model_info_overrides.rs` to
`models-manager/src/model_info_overrides_tests.rs`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
The Windows `ProviderAuthScript` test helpers do not need PowerShell.
Running them through `cmd.exe` is enough to emit the next fixture token
and rotate `tokens.txt`, and it avoids a PowerShell-specific dependency
in these tests.
## What changed
- Replaced the Windows `print-token.ps1` fixtures with `print-token.cmd`
in `codex-rs/core/src/models_manager/manager_tests.rs` and
`codex-rs/login/src/auth/auth_tests.rs`.
- Switched the failing external-auth helper in
`codex-rs/login/src/auth/auth_tests.rs` from `powershell.exe -Command
'exit 1'` to `cmd.exe /d /s /c 'exit /b 1'`.
- Updated Windows timeout comments so they no longer call out PowerShell
specifically.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (fails in unrelated
`core/src/config/config_tests.rs` assertions in this checkout)
## Why
`external_bearer_only_auth_manager_uses_cached_provider_token` can fail
on Windows when cold `powershell.exe` startup exceeds the provider-auth
helper's 1s timeout. When that happens,
`AuthManager::resolve_external_api_key_auth()` [logs the resolver error
and returns
`None`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/024b08b411fe/codex-rs/login/src/auth/manager.rs#L1449-L1455),
which is exactly the assertion failure from the flake.
## What
- Invoke `powershell.exe` explicitly in the Windows provider-auth test
helpers in `login/src/auth/auth_tests.rs`.
- Increase the helper timeout to `10_000` ms and document why that slack
exists.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
## Why
Follow-up to #16288: the new dynamic provider auth token flow currently
defaults `refresh_interval_ms` to a non-zero value and rejects `0`
entirely.
For command-backed bearer auth, `0` should mean "never auto-refresh".
That lets callers keep using the cached token until the backend actually
returns `401 Unauthorized`, at which point Codex can rerun the auth
command as part of the existing retry path.
## What changed
- changed `ModelProviderAuthInfo.refresh_interval_ms` to accept `0` and
documented that value as disabling proactive refresh
- updated the external bearer token refresher to treat
`refresh_interval_ms = 0` as an indefinitely reusable cached token,
while still rerunning the auth command during unauthorized recovery
- regenerated `core/config.schema.json` so the schema minimum is `0` and
the new behavior is described in the field docs
- added coverage for both config deserialization and the no-auto-refresh
plus `401` recovery behavior
## How tested
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
- `cargo test -p codex-core test_deserialize_provider_auth_config_`
## Why
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/16287 introduced a change to
`codex-rs/login/src/auth/auth_tests.rs` that uses a PowerShell helper to
read the next token from `tokens.txt` and rewrite the remainder back to
disk. On Windows, `Get-Content` can return a scalar when the file has
only one remaining line, so `$lines[0]` reads the first character
instead of the full token. That breaks the external bearer refresh test
once the token list is nearly exhausted.
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/16288 introduced similar changes to
`codex-rs/core/src/models_manager/manager_tests.rs` and
`codex-rs/core/tests/suite/client.rs`.
These went unnoticed because the failures showed up when the test was
run via Cargo on Windows, but not in our Bazel harness. Figuring out
that Cargo-vs-Bazel delta will happen in a follow-up PR.
## Verification
On my Windows machine, I verified `cargo test` passes when run in
`codex-rs/login` and `codex-rs/core`. Once this PR is merged, I will
keep an eye on
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/workflows/rust-ci-full.yml to
verify it goes green.
## What changed
- Wrap `Get-Content -Path tokens.txt` in `@(...)` so the script always
gets array semantics before counting, indexing, and rewriting the
remaining lines.
## Summary
- Replace the separate external auth enum and refresher trait with a
single `ExternalAuth` trait in login auth flow
- Move bearer token auth behind `BearerTokenRefresher` and update
`AuthManager` and app-server wiring to use the generic external auth API
## Summary
`AuthManager` and `UnauthorizedRecovery` already own token resolution
and staged `401` recovery. The missing piece for provider auth was a
bearer-only mode that still fit that design, instead of pushing a second
auth abstraction into `codex-core`.
This PR keeps the design centered on `AuthManager`: it teaches
`codex-login` how to own external bearer auth directly so later provider
work can keep calling `AuthManager.auth()` and `UnauthorizedRecovery`.
## Motivation
This is the middle layer for #15189.
The intended design is still:
- `AuthManager` encapsulates token storage and refresh
- `UnauthorizedRecovery` powers staged `401` recovery
- all request tokens go through `AuthManager.auth()`
This PR makes that possible for provider-backed bearer tokens by adding
a bearer-only auth mode inside `AuthManager` instead of building
parallel request-auth plumbing in `core`.
## What Changed
- move `ModelProviderAuthInfo` into `codex-protocol` so `core` and
`login` share one config shape
- add `login/src/auth/external_bearer.rs`, which runs the configured
command, caches the bearer token in memory, and refreshes it after `401`
- add `AuthManager::external_bearer_only(...)` for provider-scoped
request paths that should use command-backed bearer auth without
mutating the shared OpenAI auth manager
- add `AuthManager::shared_with_external_chatgpt_auth_refresher(...)`
and rename the other `AuthManager` helpers that only apply to external
ChatGPT auth so the ChatGPT-only path is explicit at the call site
- keep external ChatGPT refresh behavior unchanged while ensuring
bearer-only external auth never persists to `auth.json`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16287).
* #16288
* __->__ #16287
## Summary
`ExternalAuthRefresher` was still shaped around external ChatGPT auth:
`ExternalAuthTokens` always implied ChatGPT account metadata even when a
caller only needed a bearer token.
This PR generalizes that contract so bearer-only sources are
first-class, while keeping the existing ChatGPT paths strict anywhere we
persist or rebuild ChatGPT auth state.
## Motivation
This is the first step toward #15189.
The follow-on provider-auth work needs one shared external-auth contract
that can do both of these things:
- resolve the current bearer token before a request is sent
- return a refreshed bearer token after a `401`
That should not require a second token result type just because there is
no ChatGPT account metadata attached.
## What Changed
- change `ExternalAuthTokens` to carry `access_token` plus optional
`ExternalAuthChatgptMetadata`
- add helper constructors for bearer-only tokens and ChatGPT-backed
tokens
- add `ExternalAuthRefresher::resolve()` with a default no-op
implementation so refreshers can optionally provide the current token
before a request is sent
- keep ChatGPT-only persistence strict by continuing to require ChatGPT
metadata anywhere the login layer seeds or reloads ChatGPT auth state
- update the app-server bridge to construct the new token shape for
external ChatGPT auth refreshes
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16286).
* #16288
* #16287
* __->__ #16286
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Summary
- add `self_serve_business_usage_based` and `enterprise_cbp_usage_based`
to the public/internal plan enums and regenerate the app-server + Python
SDK artifacts
- map both plans through JWT login and backend rate-limit payloads, then
bucket them with the existing Team/Business entitlement behavior in
cloud requirements, usage-limit copy, tooltips, and status display
- keep the earlier display-label remap commit on this branch so the new
Team-like and Business-like plans render consistently in the UI
## Testing
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `uv run --project sdk/python python
sdk/python/scripts/update_sdk_artifacts.py generate-types`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-login -p codex-core -p
codex-backend-client -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-tui -p
codex-tui-app-server -p codex-backend-openapi-models`
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
usage_based_plan_types_use_expected_wire_names`
- `cargo test -p codex-login usage_based`
- `cargo test -p codex-backend-client usage_based`
- `cargo test -p codex-cloud-requirements usage_based`
- `cargo test -p codex-core usage_limit_reached_error_formats_`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui plan_type_display_name_remaps_display_labels`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui remapped`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
plan_type_display_name_remaps_display_labels`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server remapped`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
preserves_usage_based_plan_type_wire_name`
## Notes
- a broader multi-crate `cargo test` run still hits unrelated existing
guardian-approval config failures in
`codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs`
I've seen several intermittent failures of
`get_auth_status_returns_token_after_proactive_refresh_recovery` today.
I investigated, and I found a couple of issues.
First, `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)` could refresh twice in one
request: once via `refresh_token_if_requested()` and again via the
proactive refresh path inside `auth_manager.auth()`. In the
permanent-failure case this produced an extra `/oauth/token` call and
made the app-server auth tests flaky. Use `auth_cached()` after an
explicit refresh request so the handler reuses the post-refresh auth
state instead of immediately re-entering proactive refresh logic. Keep
the existing proactive path for `refreshToken=false`.
Second, serialize auth refresh attempts in `AuthManager` have a
startup/request race. One proactive refresh could already be in flight
while a `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=false)` request entered
`auth().await`, causing a second `/oauth/token` call before the first
failure or refresh result had been recorded. Guarding the refresh flow
with a single async lock makes concurrent callers share one refresh
result, which prevents duplicate refreshes and stabilizes the
proactive-refresh auth tests.
built from #14256. PR description from @etraut-openai:
This PR addresses a hole in [PR
11802](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/11802). The previous PR
assumed that app server clients would respond to token refresh failures
by presenting the user with an error ("you must log in again") and then
not making further attempts to call network endpoints using the expired
token. While they do present the user with this error, they don't
prevent further attempts to call network endpoints and can repeatedly
call `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)` resulting in many failed calls
to the token refresh endpoint.
There are three solutions I considered here:
1. Change the getAuthStatus app server call to return a null auth if the
caller specified "refreshToken" on input and the refresh attempt fails.
This will cause clients to immediately log out the user and return them
to the log in screen. This is a really bad user experience. It's also a
breaking change in the app server contract that could break third-party
clients.
2. Augment the getAuthStatus app server call to return an additional
field that indicates the state of "token could not be refreshed". This
is a non-breaking change to the app server API, but it requires
non-trivial changes for all clients to properly handle this new field
properly.
3. Change the getAuthStatus implementation to handle the case where a
token refresh fails by marking the AuthManager's in-memory access and
refresh tokens as "poisoned" so it they are no longer used. This is the
simplest fix that requires no client changes.
I chose option 3.
Here's Codex's explanation of this change:
When an app-server client asks `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)`, we
may try to refresh a stale ChatGPT access token. If that refresh fails
permanently (for example `refresh_token_reused`, expired, or revoked),
the old behavior was bad in two ways:
1. We kept the in-memory auth snapshot alive as if it were still usable.
2. Later auth checks could retry refresh again and again, creating a
storm of doomed `/oauth/token` requests and repeatedly surfacing the
same failure.
This is especially painful for app-server clients because they poll auth
status and can keep driving the refresh path without any real chance of
recovery.
This change makes permanent refresh failures terminal for the current
managed auth snapshot without changing the app-server API contract.
What changed:
- `AuthManager` now poisons the current managed auth snapshot in memory
after a permanent refresh failure, keyed to the unchanged `AuthDotJson`.
- Once poisoned, later refresh attempts for that same snapshot fail fast
locally without calling the auth service again.
- The poison is cleared automatically when auth materially changes, such
as a new login, logout, or reload of different auth state from storage.
- `getAuthStatus(includeToken=true)` now omits `authToken` after a
permanent refresh failure instead of handing out the stale cached bearer
token.
This keeps the current auth method visible to clients, avoids forcing an
immediate logout flow, and stops repeated refresh attempts for
credentials that cannot recover.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
Follow up to #15357 by making proactive ChatGPT auth refresh depend on
the access token's JWT expiration instead of treating `last_refresh` age
as the primary source of truth.
## Summary
Fix a managed ChatGPT auth bug where a stale Codex process could
proactively refresh using an old in-memory refresh token even after
another process had already rotated auth on disk.
This changes the proactive `AuthManager::auth()` path to reuse the
existing guarded `refresh_token()` flow instead of calling the refresh
endpoint directly from cached auth state.
## Original Issue
Users reported repeated `codexd` log lines like:
```text
ERROR codex_core::auth: Failed to refresh token: error sending request for url (https://auth.openai.com/oauth/token)
```
In practice this showed up most often when multiple `codexd` processes
were left running. Killing the extra processes stopped the noise, which
suggested the issue was caused by stale auth state across processes
rather than invalid user credentials.
## Diagnosis
The bug was in the proactive refresh path used by `AuthManager::auth()`:
- Process A could refresh successfully, rotate refresh token `R0` to
`R1`, and persist the updated auth state plus `last_refresh` to disk.
- Process B could keep an older auth snapshot cached in memory, still
holding `R0` and the old `last_refresh`.
- Later, when Process B called `auth()`, it checked staleness from its
cached in-memory auth instead of first reloading from disk.
- Because that cached `last_refresh` was stale, Process B would
proactively call `/oauth/token` with stale refresh token `R0`.
- On failure, `auth()` logged the refresh error but kept returning the
same stale cached auth, so repeated `auth()` calls could keep retrying
with dead state.
This differed from the existing unauthorized-recovery flow, which
already did the safer thing: guarded reload from disk first, then
refresh only if the on-disk auth was unchanged.
## What Changed
- Switched proactive refresh in `AuthManager::auth()` to:
- do a pure staleness check on cached auth
- call `refresh_token()` when stale
- return the original cached auth on genuine refresh failure, preserving
existing outward behavior
- Removed the direct proactive refresh-from-cached-state path
- Added regression tests covering:
- stale cached auth with newer same-account auth already on disk
- the same scenario even when the refresh endpoint would fail if called
## Why This Fix
`refresh_token()` already contains the right cross-process safety
behavior:
- guarded reload from disk
- same-account verification
- skip-refresh when another process already changed auth
Reusing that path makes proactive refresh consistent with unauthorized
recovery and prevents stale processes from trying to refresh
already-rotated tokens.
## Testing
Test shape:
- create a fresh temp `CODEX_HOME` from `~/.codex/auth.json`
- force `last_refresh` to an old timestamp so proactive refresh is
required
- start two long-lived helper processes against the same auth file
- start `B` first so it caches stale auth and sleeps
- start `A` second so it refreshes first
- point both at a local mock `/oauth/token` server
- inspect whether `B` makes a second refresh request with the stale
in-memory token, or reloads the rotated token from disk
### Before the fix
The repro showed the bug clearly: the mock server saw two refreshes with
the same stale token, `A` rotated to a new token, and `B` still returned
the stale token instead of reloading from disk.
```text
POST /oauth/token refresh_token=rt_j6s0...
POST /oauth/token refresh_token=rt_j6s0...
B:cached_before=rt_j6s0...
B:cached_after=rt_j6s0...
B:returned=rt_j6s0...
A:cached_before=rt_j6s0...
A:cached_after=rotated-refresh-token-logged-run-v2
A:returned=rotated-refresh-token-logged-run-v2
```
### After the fix
After the fix, the mock server saw only one refresh request. `A`
refreshed once, and `B` started with the stale token but reloaded and
returned the rotated token.
```text
POST /oauth/token refresh_token=rt_j6s0...
B:cached_before=rt_j6s0...
B:cached_after=rotated-refresh-token-fix-branch
B:returned=rotated-refresh-token-fix-branch
A:cached_before=rt_j6s0...
A:cached_after=rotated-refresh-token-fix-branch
A:returned=rotated-refresh-token-fix-branch
```
This shows the new behavior: `A` refreshes once, then `B` reuses the
updated auth from disk instead of making a second refresh request with
the stale token.
- Move the auth implementation and token data into codex-login.
- Keep codex-core re-exporting that surface from codex-login for
existing callers.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
