Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
T
Michael Bolin 0a00b5ed29 fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732)
Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with:


https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108

Specifically:

* It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as
opposed to additive.
* It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed
to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we
would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something
extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user
as explicitly allowed.

This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms
of two concepts:

* A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be
granted to the agent/sandbox.
* A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`,
but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure
Seatbelt/Landlock.

Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively
mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that
`SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single
`--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it
into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the
current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy,
so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and
we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing.

Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to
get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean
way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml`
right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well.

Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy`
changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as
well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`:

* `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one
might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize,
Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user
has specified explicitly.
* `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging
`ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw
`Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final
`SandboxPolicy`.

The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra
special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the
`SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively.

Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been
renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that
`(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this
is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when
`sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
2025-04-29 15:01:16 -07:00

361 lines
11 KiB
Rust

use std::io;
#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
use std::process::ExitStatus;
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use std::time::Instant;
use serde::Deserialize;
use tokio::io::AsyncRead;
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use tokio::io::BufReader;
use tokio::process::Command;
use tokio::sync::Notify;
use crate::error::CodexErr;
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::error::SandboxErr;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
// Maximum we send for each stream, which is either:
// - 10KiB OR
// - 256 lines
const MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT: usize = 10 * 1024;
const MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES: usize = 256;
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10_000;
// Hardcode these since it does not seem worth including the libc crate just
// for these.
const SIGKILL_CODE: i32 = 9;
const TIMEOUT_CODE: i32 = 64;
const MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY: &str = include_str!("seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl");
/// When working with `sandbox-exec`, only consider `sandbox-exec` in `/usr/bin`
/// to defend against an attacker trying to inject a malicious version on the
/// PATH. If /usr/bin/sandbox-exec has been tampered with, then the attacker
/// already has root access.
const MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE: &str = "/usr/bin/sandbox-exec";
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ExecParams {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub workdir: Option<String>,
/// This is the maximum time in seconds that the command is allowed to run.
#[serde(rename = "timeout")]
// The wire format uses `timeout`, which has ambiguous units, so we use
// `timeout_ms` as the field name so it is clear in code.
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SandboxType {
None,
/// Only available on macOS.
MacosSeatbelt,
/// Only available on Linux.
LinuxSeccomp,
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
async fn exec_linux(
params: ExecParams,
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
crate::linux::exec_linux(params, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
async fn exec_linux(
_params: ExecParams,
_ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
_sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"linux sandbox is not supported on this platform",
)))
}
pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
params: ExecParams,
sandbox_type: SandboxType,
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
let start = Instant::now();
let raw_output_result = match sandbox_type {
SandboxType::None => exec(params, ctrl_c).await,
SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => {
let ExecParams {
command,
workdir,
timeout_ms,
} = params;
let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, sandbox_policy);
exec(
ExecParams {
command: seatbelt_command,
workdir,
timeout_ms,
},
ctrl_c,
)
.await
}
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => exec_linux(params, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await,
};
let duration = start.elapsed();
match raw_output_result {
Ok(raw_output) => {
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_output.stdout).to_string();
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_output.stderr).to_string();
#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
match raw_output.exit_status.signal() {
Some(TIMEOUT_CODE) => return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Timeout)),
Some(signal) => {
return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Signal(signal)));
}
None => {}
}
let exit_code = raw_output.exit_status.code().unwrap_or(-1);
// NOTE(ragona): This is much less restrictive than the previous check. If we exec
// a command, and it returns anything other than success, we assume that it may have
// been a sandboxing error and allow the user to retry. (The user of course may choose
// not to retry, or in a non-interactive mode, would automatically reject the approval.)
if exit_code != 0 && sandbox_type != SandboxType::None {
return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied(
exit_code, stdout, stderr,
)));
}
Ok(ExecToolCallOutput {
exit_code,
stdout,
stderr,
duration,
})
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("exec error: {err}");
Err(err)
}
}
}
pub fn create_seatbelt_command(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
) -> Vec<String> {
let (file_write_policy, extra_cli_args) = {
if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
// Allegedly, this is more permissive than `(allow file-write*)`.
(
r#"(allow file-write* (regex #"^/"))"#.to_string(),
Vec::<String>::new(),
)
} else {
let writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots();
let (writable_folder_policies, cli_args): (Vec<String>, Vec<String>) = writable_roots
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(index, root)| {
let param_name = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}");
let policy: String = format!("(subpath (param \"{param_name}\"))");
let cli_arg = format!("-D{param_name}={}", root.to_string_lossy());
(policy, cli_arg)
})
.unzip();
if writable_folder_policies.is_empty() {
("".to_string(), Vec::<String>::new())
} else {
let file_write_policy = format!(
"(allow file-write*\n{}\n)",
writable_folder_policies.join(" ")
);
(file_write_policy, cli_args)
}
}
};
let file_read_policy = if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
"; allow read-only file operations\n(allow file-read*)"
} else {
""
};
// TODO(mbolin): apply_patch calls must also honor the SandboxPolicy.
let network_policy = if sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
"(allow network-outbound)\n(allow network-inbound)\n(allow system-socket)"
} else {
""
};
let full_policy = format!(
"{MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY}\n{file_read_policy}\n{file_write_policy}\n{network_policy}"
);
let mut seatbelt_command: Vec<String> = vec![
MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE.to_string(),
"-p".to_string(),
full_policy,
];
seatbelt_command.extend(extra_cli_args);
seatbelt_command.push("--".to_string());
seatbelt_command.extend(command);
seatbelt_command
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct RawExecToolCallOutput {
pub exit_status: ExitStatus,
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ExecToolCallOutput {
pub exit_code: i32,
pub stdout: String,
pub stderr: String,
pub duration: Duration,
}
pub async fn exec(
ExecParams {
command,
workdir,
timeout_ms,
}: ExecParams,
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
let mut child = {
if command.is_empty() {
return Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"command args are empty",
)));
}
let mut cmd = Command::new(&command[0]);
if command.len() > 1 {
cmd.args(&command[1..]);
}
if let Some(dir) = &workdir {
cmd.current_dir(dir);
}
// Do not create a file descriptor for stdin because otherwise some
// commands may hang forever waiting for input. For example, ripgrep has
// a heuristic where it may try to read from stdin as explained here:
// https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/blob/e2362d4d5185d02fa857bf381e7bd52e66fafc73/crates/core/flags/hiargs.rs#L1101-L1103
cmd.stdin(Stdio::null());
cmd.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.kill_on_drop(true)
.spawn()?
};
let stdout_handle = tokio::spawn(read_capped(
BufReader::new(child.stdout.take().expect("stdout is not piped")),
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT,
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES,
));
let stderr_handle = tokio::spawn(read_capped(
BufReader::new(child.stderr.take().expect("stderr is not piped")),
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT,
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES,
));
let interrupted = ctrl_c.notified();
let timeout = Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS));
let exit_status = tokio::select! {
result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, child.wait()) => {
match result {
Ok(Ok(exit_status)) => exit_status,
Ok(e) => e?,
Err(_) => {
// timeout
child.start_kill()?;
// Debatable whether `child.wait().await` should be called here.
synthetic_exit_status(128 + TIMEOUT_CODE)
}
}
}
_ = interrupted => {
child.start_kill()?;
synthetic_exit_status(128 + SIGKILL_CODE)
}
};
let stdout = stdout_handle.await??;
let stderr = stderr_handle.await??;
Ok(RawExecToolCallOutput {
exit_status,
stdout,
stderr,
})
}
async fn read_capped<R: AsyncRead + Unpin>(
mut reader: R,
max_output: usize,
max_lines: usize,
) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(max_output.min(8 * 1024));
let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
let mut remaining_bytes = max_output;
let mut remaining_lines = max_lines;
loop {
let n = reader.read(&mut tmp).await?;
if n == 0 {
break;
}
// Copy into the buffer only while we still have byte and line budget.
if remaining_bytes > 0 && remaining_lines > 0 {
let mut copy_len = 0;
for &b in &tmp[..n] {
if remaining_bytes == 0 || remaining_lines == 0 {
break;
}
copy_len += 1;
remaining_bytes -= 1;
if b == b'\n' {
remaining_lines -= 1;
}
}
buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..copy_len]);
}
// Continue reading to EOF to avoid back-pressure, but discard once caps are hit.
}
Ok(buf)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn synthetic_exit_status(code: i32) -> ExitStatus {
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(code)
}
#[cfg(windows)]
fn synthetic_exit_status(code: i32) -> ExitStatus {
use std::os::windows::process::ExitStatusExt;
std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(code.try_into().unwrap())
}