Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/apply_patch.rs
T
Michael Bolin 26c8373821 fix: tighten up checks against writable folders for SandboxPolicy (#2338)
I was looking at the implementation of `Session::get_writable_roots()`,
which did not seem right, as it was a copy of writable roots, which is
not guaranteed to be in sync with the `sandbox_policy` field.

I looked at who was calling `get_writable_roots()` and its only call
site was `apply_patch()` in `codex-rs/core/src/apply_patch.rs`, which
took the roots and forwarded them to `assess_patch_safety()` in
`safety.rs`. I updated `assess_patch_safety()` to take `sandbox_policy:
&SandboxPolicy` instead of `writable_roots: &[PathBuf]` (and replaced
`Session::get_writable_roots()` with `Session::get_sandbox_policy()`).

Within `safety.rs`, it was fairly easy to update
`is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths()` to work with
`SandboxPolicy`, and in particular, it is far more accurate because, for
better or worse, `SandboxPolicy::get_writable_roots_with_cwd()` _returns
an empty vec_ for `SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess`, suggesting that
_nothing_ is writable when in reality _everything_ is writable. With
this PR, `is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths()` now does the
right thing for each variant of `SandboxPolicy`.

I thought this would be the end of the story, but it turned out that
`test_writable_roots_constraint()` in `safety.rs` needed to be updated,
as well. In particular, the test was writing to
`std::env::current_dir()` instead of a `TempDir`, which I suspect was a
holdover from earlier when `SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` would always
make `TMPDIR` writable on macOS, which made it hard to write tests to
verify `SandboxPolicy` in `TMPDIR`. Fortunately, we now have
`exclude_tmpdir_env_var` as an option on
`SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite`, so I was able to update the test to
preserve the existing behavior, but to no longer write to
`std::env::current_dir()`.







---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/2338).
* #2345
* #2329
* #2343
* #2340
* __->__ #2338
2025-08-15 09:06:15 -07:00

124 lines
4.6 KiB
Rust

use crate::codex::Session;
use crate::models::FunctionCallOutputPayload;
use crate::models::ResponseInputItem;
use crate::protocol::FileChange;
use crate::protocol::ReviewDecision;
use crate::safety::SafetyCheck;
use crate::safety::assess_patch_safety;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchAction;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchFileChange;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
pub const CODEX_APPLY_PATCH_ARG1: &str = "--codex-run-as-apply-patch";
pub(crate) enum InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
/// The `apply_patch` call was handled programmatically, without any sort
/// of sandbox, because the user explicitly approved it. This is the
/// result to use with the `shell` function call that contained `apply_patch`.
Output(ResponseInputItem),
/// The `apply_patch` call was approved, either automatically because it
/// appears that it should be allowed based on the user's sandbox policy
/// *or* because the user explicitly approved it. In either case, we use
/// exec with [`CODEX_APPLY_PATCH_ARG1`] to realize the `apply_patch` call,
/// but [`ApplyPatchExec::auto_approved`] is used to determine the sandbox
/// used with the `exec()`.
DelegateToExec(ApplyPatchExec),
}
pub(crate) struct ApplyPatchExec {
pub(crate) action: ApplyPatchAction,
pub(crate) user_explicitly_approved_this_action: bool,
}
impl From<ResponseInputItem> for InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
fn from(item: ResponseInputItem) -> Self {
InternalApplyPatchInvocation::Output(item)
}
}
pub(crate) async fn apply_patch(
sess: &Session,
sub_id: &str,
call_id: &str,
action: ApplyPatchAction,
) -> InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
match assess_patch_safety(
&action,
sess.get_approval_policy(),
sess.get_sandbox_policy(),
sess.get_cwd(),
) {
SafetyCheck::AutoApprove { .. } => {
InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToExec(ApplyPatchExec {
action,
user_explicitly_approved_this_action: false,
})
}
SafetyCheck::AskUser => {
// Compute a readable summary of path changes to include in the
// approval request so the user can make an informed decision.
//
// Note that it might be worth expanding this approval request to
// give the user the option to expand the set of writable roots so
// that similar patches can be auto-approved in the future during
// this session.
let rx_approve = sess
.request_patch_approval(sub_id.to_owned(), call_id.to_owned(), &action, None, None)
.await;
match rx_approve.await.unwrap_or_default() {
ReviewDecision::Approved | ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => {
InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToExec(ApplyPatchExec {
action,
user_explicitly_approved_this_action: true,
})
}
ReviewDecision::Denied | ReviewDecision::Abort => {
ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: call_id.to_owned(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload {
content: "patch rejected by user".to_string(),
success: Some(false),
},
}
.into()
}
}
}
SafetyCheck::Reject { reason } => ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: call_id.to_owned(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload {
content: format!("patch rejected: {reason}"),
success: Some(false),
},
}
.into(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn convert_apply_patch_to_protocol(
action: &ApplyPatchAction,
) -> HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange> {
let changes = action.changes();
let mut result = HashMap::with_capacity(changes.len());
for (path, change) in changes {
let protocol_change = match change {
ApplyPatchFileChange::Add { content } => FileChange::Add {
content: content.clone(),
},
ApplyPatchFileChange::Delete => FileChange::Delete,
ApplyPatchFileChange::Update {
unified_diff,
move_path,
new_content: _new_content,
} => FileChange::Update {
unified_diff: unified_diff.clone(),
move_path: move_path.clone(),
},
};
result.insert(path.clone(), protocol_change);
}
result
}