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## Why Default read-only protections for project metadata should apply when paths such as `.git`, `.agents`, and `.codex` exist, without causing sandbox setup to materialize missing paths as ACL targets. ## What changed - Add an optional `missing_path_behavior` to filesystem sandbox entries and mark default project-metadata protections with `skip`. - Preserve the behavior through permission transforms and exec/MCP protocol serialization while keeping existing path wire variants stable. - Ignore skip-missing entries when projecting configuration or Windows sandbox overrides, while retaining explicit metadata carveouts. ## Testing - Cover protocol round trips for path and special-path entries. - Verify default metadata protections and Windows explicit carveout handling. GitOrigin-RevId: 6df13dadacdd131c44aab9f15a967c81051355c1
146 lines
5.1 KiB
Rust
146 lines
5.1 KiB
Rust
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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/// Returns a warning describing why `--add-dir` entries will be ignored for the
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/// resolved permission profile. The caller is responsible for presenting the
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/// warning to the user (for example, printing to stderr).
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pub fn add_dir_warning_message(
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additional_dirs: &[PathBuf],
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permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
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cwd: &std::path::Path,
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) -> Option<String> {
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if additional_dirs.is_empty() {
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return None;
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}
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if matches!(
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permission_profile,
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PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. }
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) {
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return None;
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}
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let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
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if file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
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return None;
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}
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if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
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return None;
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}
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Some(format_warning(additional_dirs))
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}
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fn format_warning(additional_dirs: &[PathBuf]) -> String {
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let joined_paths = additional_dirs
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.iter()
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.map(|path| path.to_string_lossy())
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.collect::<Vec<_>>()
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.join(", ");
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format!(
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"Ignoring --add-dir ({joined_paths}) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them."
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)
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::add_dir_warning_message;
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use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions;
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use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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#[test]
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fn returns_none_for_workspace_write() {
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let profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write();
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let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
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assert_eq!(
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add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
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None
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn returns_none_for_danger_full_access() {
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let profile = PermissionProfile::Disabled;
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let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
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assert_eq!(
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add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
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None
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn returns_none_for_external_sandbox() {
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let profile: PermissionProfile = PermissionProfile::External {
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network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
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};
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let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
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assert_eq!(
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add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
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None
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn warns_for_read_only() {
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let profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
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let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("relative"), PathBuf::from("/abs")];
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let message = add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project"))
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.expect("expected warning for read-only sandbox");
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assert_eq!(
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message,
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"Ignoring --add-dir (relative, /abs) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them."
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn warns_when_profile_can_write_elsewhere_but_not_cwd() {
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let profile: PermissionProfile = PermissionProfile::Managed {
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network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
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file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
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entries: vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
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},
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access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
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missing_path_behavior: None,
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},
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Path {
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path: "/tmp/writable".try_into().expect("absolute path"),
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},
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access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
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missing_path_behavior: None,
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},
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],
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glob_scan_max_depth: None,
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},
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};
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let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/extra")];
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assert_eq!(
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add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
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Some("Ignoring --add-dir (/tmp/extra) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them.".to_string())
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn returns_none_when_no_additional_dirs() {
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let profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
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let dirs: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
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assert_eq!(
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add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
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None
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);
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}
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}
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