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## Why `codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates, which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module instead of the actual owner crate. Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following files: ``` codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml ``` ## What - Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by `codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`, `codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`, `codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`. - Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`. - Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the owning `codex-*` crate. - Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`.
365 lines
12 KiB
Rust
365 lines
12 KiB
Rust
//! Shared approvals and sandboxing traits used by tool runtimes.
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//!
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//! Consolidates the approval flow primitives (`ApprovalDecision`, `ApprovalStore`,
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//! `ApprovalCtx`, `Approvable`) together with the sandbox orchestration traits
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//! and helpers (`Sandboxable`, `ToolRuntime`, `SandboxAttempt`, etc.).
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use crate::codex::Session;
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use crate::codex::TurnContext;
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use crate::error::CodexErr;
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use crate::sandboxing::ExecOptions;
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use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
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use crate::state::SessionServices;
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use crate::tools::network_approval::NetworkApprovalSpec;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
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use codex_protocol::approvals::ExecPolicyAmendment;
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use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkApprovalContext;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxCommand;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxManager;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformError;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformRequest;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
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use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
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use futures::Future;
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use futures::future::BoxFuture;
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use serde::Serialize;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::fmt::Debug;
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use std::hash::Hash;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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#[derive(Clone, Default, Debug)]
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pub(crate) struct ApprovalStore {
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// Store serialized keys for generic caching across requests.
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map: HashMap<String, ReviewDecision>,
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}
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impl ApprovalStore {
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pub fn get<K>(&self, key: &K) -> Option<ReviewDecision>
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where
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K: Serialize,
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{
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let s = serde_json::to_string(key).ok()?;
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self.map.get(&s).cloned()
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}
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pub fn put<K>(&mut self, key: K, value: ReviewDecision)
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where
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K: Serialize,
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{
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if let Ok(s) = serde_json::to_string(&key) {
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self.map.insert(s, value);
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}
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}
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}
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/// Takes a vector of approval keys and returns a ReviewDecision.
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/// There will be one key in most cases, but apply_patch can modify multiple files at once.
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///
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/// - If all keys are already approved for session, we skip prompting.
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/// - If the user approves for session, we store the decision for each key individually
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/// so future requests touching any subset can also skip prompting.
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pub(crate) async fn with_cached_approval<K, F, Fut>(
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services: &SessionServices,
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// Name of the tool, used for metrics collection.
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tool_name: &str,
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keys: Vec<K>,
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fetch: F,
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) -> ReviewDecision
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where
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K: Serialize,
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F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
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Fut: Future<Output = ReviewDecision>,
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{
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// To be defensive here, don't bother with checking the cache if keys are empty.
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if keys.is_empty() {
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return fetch().await;
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}
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let already_approved = {
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let store = services.tool_approvals.lock().await;
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keys.iter()
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.all(|key| matches!(store.get(key), Some(ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession)))
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};
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if already_approved {
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return ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession;
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}
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let decision = fetch().await;
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services.session_telemetry.counter(
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"codex.approval.requested",
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/*inc*/ 1,
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&[
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("tool", tool_name),
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("approved", decision.to_opaque_string()),
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],
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);
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if matches!(decision, ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession) {
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let mut store = services.tool_approvals.lock().await;
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for key in keys {
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store.put(key, ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession);
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}
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}
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decision
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub(crate) struct ApprovalCtx<'a> {
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pub session: &'a Arc<Session>,
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pub turn: &'a Arc<TurnContext>,
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pub call_id: &'a str,
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pub retry_reason: Option<String>,
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pub network_approval_context: Option<NetworkApprovalContext>,
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}
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// Specifies what tool orchestrator should do with a given tool call.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) enum ExecApprovalRequirement {
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/// No approval required for this tool call.
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Skip {
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/// The first attempt should skip sandboxing (e.g., when explicitly
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/// greenlit by policy).
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bypass_sandbox: bool,
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/// Proposed execpolicy amendment to skip future approvals for similar commands
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/// Only applies if the command fails to run in sandbox and codex prompts the user to run outside the sandbox.
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Option<ExecPolicyAmendment>,
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},
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/// Approval required for this tool call.
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NeedsApproval {
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reason: Option<String>,
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/// Proposed execpolicy amendment to skip future approvals for similar commands
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/// See core/src/exec_policy.rs for more details on how proposed_execpolicy_amendment is determined.
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Option<ExecPolicyAmendment>,
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},
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/// Execution forbidden for this tool call.
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Forbidden { reason: String },
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}
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impl ExecApprovalRequirement {
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pub fn proposed_execpolicy_amendment(&self) -> Option<&ExecPolicyAmendment> {
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match self {
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Self::NeedsApproval {
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(prefix),
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..
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} => Some(prefix),
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Self::Skip {
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Some(prefix),
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..
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} => Some(prefix),
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_ => None,
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}
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}
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}
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/// - Never, OnFailure: do not ask
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/// - OnRequest: ask unless filesystem access is unrestricted
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/// - Granular: ask unless filesystem access is unrestricted, but auto-reject
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/// when granular sandbox approval is disabled.
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/// - UnlessTrusted: always ask
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pub(crate) fn default_exec_approval_requirement(
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policy: AskForApproval,
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file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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) -> ExecApprovalRequirement {
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let needs_approval = match policy {
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AskForApproval::Never | AskForApproval::OnFailure => false,
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AskForApproval::OnRequest | AskForApproval::Granular(_) => {
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matches!(
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file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
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FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted
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)
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}
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AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => true,
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};
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if needs_approval
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&& matches!(
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policy,
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AskForApproval::Granular(granular_config)
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if !granular_config.allows_sandbox_approval()
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)
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{
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ExecApprovalRequirement::Forbidden {
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reason: "approval policy disallowed sandbox approval prompt".to_string(),
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}
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} else if needs_approval {
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ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
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reason: None,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
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}
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} else {
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ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
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bypass_sandbox: false,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
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}
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) enum SandboxOverride {
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NoOverride,
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BypassSandboxFirstAttempt,
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}
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pub(crate) fn sandbox_override_for_first_attempt(
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sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
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exec_approval_requirement: &ExecApprovalRequirement,
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) -> SandboxOverride {
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// ExecPolicy `Allow` can intentionally imply full trust (Skip + bypass_sandbox=true),
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// which supersedes `with_additional_permissions` sandboxed execution hints.
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if sandbox_permissions.requires_escalated_permissions()
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|| matches!(
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exec_approval_requirement,
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ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
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bypass_sandbox: true,
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..
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}
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)
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{
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SandboxOverride::BypassSandboxFirstAttempt
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} else {
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SandboxOverride::NoOverride
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}
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}
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pub(crate) trait Approvable<Req> {
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type ApprovalKey: Hash + Eq + Clone + Debug + Serialize;
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// In most cases (shell, unified_exec), a request will have a single approval key.
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//
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// However, apply_patch needs session "Allow, don't ask again" semantics that
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// apply to multiple atomic targets (e.g., apply_patch approves per file path). Returning
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// a list of keys lets the runtime treat the request as approved-for-session only if
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// *all* keys are already approved, while still caching approvals per-key so future
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// requests touching a subset can be auto-approved.
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fn approval_keys(&self, req: &Req) -> Vec<Self::ApprovalKey>;
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/// Some tools may request to skip the sandbox on the first attempt
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/// (e.g., when the request explicitly asks for escalated permissions).
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/// Defaults to `NoOverride`.
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fn sandbox_mode_for_first_attempt(&self, _req: &Req) -> SandboxOverride {
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SandboxOverride::NoOverride
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}
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fn should_bypass_approval(&self, policy: AskForApproval, already_approved: bool) -> bool {
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if already_approved {
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// We do not ask one more time
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return true;
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}
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matches!(policy, AskForApproval::Never)
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}
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/// Return `Some(_)` to specify a custom exec approval requirement, or `None`
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/// to fall back to policy-based default.
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fn exec_approval_requirement(&self, _req: &Req) -> Option<ExecApprovalRequirement> {
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None
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}
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/// Decide we can request an approval for no-sandbox execution.
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fn wants_no_sandbox_approval(&self, policy: AskForApproval) -> bool {
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match policy {
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AskForApproval::OnFailure => true,
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AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => true,
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AskForApproval::Never => false,
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AskForApproval::OnRequest => false,
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AskForApproval::Granular(granular_config) => granular_config.sandbox_approval,
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}
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}
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fn start_approval_async<'a>(
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&'a mut self,
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req: &'a Req,
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ctx: ApprovalCtx<'a>,
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) -> BoxFuture<'a, ReviewDecision>;
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}
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pub(crate) trait Sandboxable {
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fn sandbox_preference(&self) -> SandboxablePreference;
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fn escalate_on_failure(&self) -> bool {
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true
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}
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}
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pub(crate) struct ToolCtx {
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pub session: Arc<Session>,
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pub turn: Arc<TurnContext>,
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pub call_id: String,
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pub tool_name: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub(crate) enum ToolError {
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Rejected(String),
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Codex(CodexErr),
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}
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pub(crate) trait ToolRuntime<Req, Out>: Approvable<Req> + Sandboxable {
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fn network_approval_spec(&self, _req: &Req, _ctx: &ToolCtx) -> Option<NetworkApprovalSpec> {
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None
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}
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async fn run(
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&mut self,
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req: &Req,
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attempt: &SandboxAttempt<'_>,
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ctx: &ToolCtx,
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) -> Result<Out, ToolError>;
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}
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pub(crate) struct SandboxAttempt<'a> {
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pub sandbox: SandboxType,
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pub policy: &'a codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
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pub file_system_policy: &'a FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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pub network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
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pub enforce_managed_network: bool,
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pub(crate) manager: &'a SandboxManager,
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pub(crate) sandbox_cwd: &'a Path,
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pub codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<&'a std::path::PathBuf>,
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pub use_legacy_landlock: bool,
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pub windows_sandbox_level: codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel,
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pub windows_sandbox_private_desktop: bool,
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}
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impl<'a> SandboxAttempt<'a> {
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pub fn env_for(
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&self,
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command: SandboxCommand,
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options: ExecOptions,
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network: Option<&NetworkProxy>,
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) -> Result<crate::sandboxing::ExecRequest, SandboxTransformError> {
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self.manager
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.transform(SandboxTransformRequest {
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command,
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policy: self.policy,
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file_system_policy: self.file_system_policy,
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network_policy: self.network_policy,
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sandbox: self.sandbox,
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enforce_managed_network: self.enforce_managed_network,
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network,
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sandbox_policy_cwd: self.sandbox_cwd,
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codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
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use_legacy_landlock: self.use_legacy_landlock,
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windows_sandbox_level: self.windows_sandbox_level,
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windows_sandbox_private_desktop: self.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
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})
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.map(|request| {
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crate::sandboxing::ExecRequest::from_sandbox_exec_request(request, options)
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})
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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#[path = "sandboxing_tests.rs"]
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mod tests;
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