Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/shell.rs
T
Charley CunninghamandCodex cb1a182bbe Clarify sandbox permission override helper semantics (#13703)
## Summary
Today `SandboxPermissions::requires_additional_permissions()` does not
actually mean "is `WithAdditionalPermissions`". It returns `true` for
any non-default sandbox override, including `RequireEscalated`. That
broad behavior is relied on in multiple `main` callsites.

The naming is security-sensitive because `SandboxPermissions` is used on
shell-like tool calls to tell the executor how a single command should
relate to the turn sandbox:
- `UseDefault`: run with the turn sandbox unchanged
- `RequireEscalated`: request execution outside the sandbox
- `WithAdditionalPermissions`: stay sandboxed but widen permissions for
that command only

## Problem
The old helper name reads as if it only applies to the
`WithAdditionalPermissions` variant. In practice it means "this command
requested any explicit sandbox override."

That ambiguity made it easy to read production checks incorrectly and
made the guardian change look like a standalone `main` fix when it is
not.

On `main` today:
- `shell` and `unified_exec` intentionally reject any explicit
`sandbox_permissions` request unless approval policy is `OnRequest`
- `exec_policy` intentionally treats any explicit sandbox override as
prompt-worthy in restricted sandboxes
- tests intentionally serialize both `RequireEscalated` and
`WithAdditionalPermissions` as explicit sandbox override requests

So changing those callsites from the broad helper to a narrow
`WithAdditionalPermissions` check would be a behavior change, not a pure
cleanup.

## What This PR Does
- documents `SandboxPermissions` as a per-command sandbox override, not
a generic permissions bag
- adds `requests_sandbox_override()` for the broad meaning: anything
except `UseDefault`
- adds `uses_additional_permissions()` for the narrow meaning: only
`WithAdditionalPermissions`
- keeps `requires_additional_permissions()` as a compatibility alias to
the broad meaning for now
- updates the current broad callsites to use the accurately named broad
helper
- adds unit coverage that locks in the semantics of all three helpers

## What This PR Does Not Do
This PR does not change runtime behavior. That is intentional.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-06 09:57:48 -08:00

625 lines
22 KiB
Rust

use async_trait::async_trait;
use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::models::FunctionCallOutputBody;
use codex_protocol::models::ShellCommandToolCallParams;
use codex_protocol::models::ShellToolCallParams;
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::codex::TurnContext;
use crate::exec::ExecParams;
use crate::exec_env::create_env;
use crate::exec_policy::ExecApprovalRequest;
use crate::features::Feature;
use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
use crate::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
use crate::protocol::ExecCommandSource;
use crate::shell::Shell;
use crate::skills::maybe_emit_implicit_skill_invocation;
use crate::tools::context::ToolInvocation;
use crate::tools::context::ToolOutput;
use crate::tools::context::ToolPayload;
use crate::tools::events::ToolEmitter;
use crate::tools::events::ToolEventCtx;
use crate::tools::handlers::apply_patch::intercept_apply_patch;
use crate::tools::handlers::normalize_and_validate_additional_permissions;
use crate::tools::handlers::parse_arguments_with_base_path;
use crate::tools::handlers::resolve_workdir_base_path;
use crate::tools::orchestrator::ToolOrchestrator;
use crate::tools::registry::ToolHandler;
use crate::tools::registry::ToolKind;
use crate::tools::runtimes::shell::ShellRequest;
use crate::tools::runtimes::shell::ShellRuntime;
use crate::tools::runtimes::shell::ShellRuntimeBackend;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolCtx;
use crate::tools::spec::ShellCommandBackendConfig;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
pub struct ShellHandler;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
enum ShellCommandBackend {
Classic,
ZshFork,
}
pub struct ShellCommandHandler {
backend: ShellCommandBackend,
}
struct RunExecLikeArgs {
tool_name: String,
exec_params: ExecParams,
additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
prefix_rule: Option<Vec<String>>,
session: Arc<crate::codex::Session>,
turn: Arc<TurnContext>,
tracker: crate::tools::context::SharedTurnDiffTracker,
call_id: String,
freeform: bool,
shell_runtime_backend: ShellRuntimeBackend,
}
impl ShellHandler {
fn to_exec_params(
params: &ShellToolCallParams,
turn_context: &TurnContext,
thread_id: ThreadId,
) -> ExecParams {
ExecParams {
command: params.command.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.resolve_path(params.workdir.clone()),
expiration: params.timeout_ms.into(),
env: create_env(&turn_context.shell_environment_policy, Some(thread_id)),
network: turn_context.network.clone(),
sandbox_permissions: params.sandbox_permissions.unwrap_or_default(),
windows_sandbox_level: turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
justification: params.justification.clone(),
arg0: None,
}
}
}
impl ShellCommandHandler {
fn shell_runtime_backend(&self) -> ShellRuntimeBackend {
match self.backend {
ShellCommandBackend::Classic => ShellRuntimeBackend::ShellCommandClassic,
ShellCommandBackend::ZshFork => ShellRuntimeBackend::ShellCommandZshFork,
}
}
fn resolve_use_login_shell(
login: Option<bool>,
allow_login_shell: bool,
) -> Result<bool, FunctionCallError> {
if !allow_login_shell && login == Some(true) {
return Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(
"login shell is disabled by config; omit `login` or set it to false.".to_string(),
));
}
Ok(login.unwrap_or(allow_login_shell))
}
fn base_command(shell: &Shell, command: &str, use_login_shell: bool) -> Vec<String> {
shell.derive_exec_args(command, use_login_shell)
}
fn to_exec_params(
params: &ShellCommandToolCallParams,
session: &crate::codex::Session,
turn_context: &TurnContext,
thread_id: ThreadId,
allow_login_shell: bool,
) -> Result<ExecParams, FunctionCallError> {
let shell = session.user_shell();
let use_login_shell = Self::resolve_use_login_shell(params.login, allow_login_shell)?;
let command = Self::base_command(shell.as_ref(), &params.command, use_login_shell);
Ok(ExecParams {
command,
cwd: turn_context.resolve_path(params.workdir.clone()),
expiration: params.timeout_ms.into(),
env: create_env(&turn_context.shell_environment_policy, Some(thread_id)),
network: turn_context.network.clone(),
sandbox_permissions: params.sandbox_permissions.unwrap_or_default(),
windows_sandbox_level: turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
justification: params.justification.clone(),
arg0: None,
})
}
}
impl From<ShellCommandBackendConfig> for ShellCommandHandler {
fn from(config: ShellCommandBackendConfig) -> Self {
let backend = match config {
ShellCommandBackendConfig::Classic => ShellCommandBackend::Classic,
ShellCommandBackendConfig::ZshFork => ShellCommandBackend::ZshFork,
};
Self { backend }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ToolHandler for ShellHandler {
fn kind(&self) -> ToolKind {
ToolKind::Function
}
fn matches_kind(&self, payload: &ToolPayload) -> bool {
matches!(
payload,
ToolPayload::Function { .. } | ToolPayload::LocalShell { .. }
)
}
async fn is_mutating(&self, invocation: &ToolInvocation) -> bool {
match &invocation.payload {
ToolPayload::Function { arguments } => {
serde_json::from_str::<ShellToolCallParams>(arguments)
.map(|params| !is_known_safe_command(&params.command))
.unwrap_or(true)
}
ToolPayload::LocalShell { params } => !is_known_safe_command(&params.command),
_ => true, // unknown payloads => assume mutating
}
}
async fn handle(&self, invocation: ToolInvocation) -> Result<ToolOutput, FunctionCallError> {
let ToolInvocation {
session,
turn,
tracker,
call_id,
tool_name,
payload,
..
} = invocation;
match payload {
ToolPayload::Function { arguments } => {
let cwd = resolve_workdir_base_path(&arguments, turn.cwd.as_path())?;
let params: ShellToolCallParams =
parse_arguments_with_base_path(&arguments, cwd.as_path())?;
let prefix_rule = params.prefix_rule.clone();
let exec_params =
Self::to_exec_params(&params, turn.as_ref(), session.conversation_id);
Self::run_exec_like(RunExecLikeArgs {
tool_name: tool_name.clone(),
exec_params,
additional_permissions: params.additional_permissions.clone(),
prefix_rule,
session,
turn,
tracker,
call_id,
freeform: false,
shell_runtime_backend: ShellRuntimeBackend::Generic,
})
.await
}
ToolPayload::LocalShell { params } => {
let exec_params =
Self::to_exec_params(&params, turn.as_ref(), session.conversation_id);
Self::run_exec_like(RunExecLikeArgs {
tool_name: tool_name.clone(),
exec_params,
additional_permissions: None,
prefix_rule: None,
session,
turn,
tracker,
call_id,
freeform: false,
shell_runtime_backend: ShellRuntimeBackend::Generic,
})
.await
}
_ => Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!(
"unsupported payload for shell handler: {tool_name}"
))),
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ToolHandler for ShellCommandHandler {
fn kind(&self) -> ToolKind {
ToolKind::Function
}
fn matches_kind(&self, payload: &ToolPayload) -> bool {
matches!(payload, ToolPayload::Function { .. })
}
async fn is_mutating(&self, invocation: &ToolInvocation) -> bool {
let ToolPayload::Function { arguments } = &invocation.payload else {
return true;
};
serde_json::from_str::<ShellCommandToolCallParams>(arguments)
.map(|params| {
let use_login_shell = match Self::resolve_use_login_shell(
params.login,
invocation.turn.tools_config.allow_login_shell,
) {
Ok(use_login_shell) => use_login_shell,
Err(_) => return true,
};
let shell = invocation.session.user_shell();
let command = Self::base_command(shell.as_ref(), &params.command, use_login_shell);
!is_known_safe_command(&command)
})
.unwrap_or(true)
}
async fn handle(&self, invocation: ToolInvocation) -> Result<ToolOutput, FunctionCallError> {
let ToolInvocation {
session,
turn,
tracker,
call_id,
tool_name,
payload,
..
} = invocation;
let ToolPayload::Function { arguments } = payload else {
return Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!(
"unsupported payload for shell_command handler: {tool_name}"
)));
};
let cwd = resolve_workdir_base_path(&arguments, turn.cwd.as_path())?;
let params: ShellCommandToolCallParams =
parse_arguments_with_base_path(&arguments, cwd.as_path())?;
maybe_emit_implicit_skill_invocation(
session.as_ref(),
turn.as_ref(),
&params.command,
params.workdir.as_deref(),
)
.await;
let prefix_rule = params.prefix_rule.clone();
let exec_params = Self::to_exec_params(
&params,
session.as_ref(),
turn.as_ref(),
session.conversation_id,
turn.tools_config.allow_login_shell,
)?;
ShellHandler::run_exec_like(RunExecLikeArgs {
tool_name,
exec_params,
additional_permissions: params.additional_permissions.clone(),
prefix_rule,
session,
turn,
tracker,
call_id,
freeform: true,
shell_runtime_backend: self.shell_runtime_backend(),
})
.await
}
}
impl ShellHandler {
async fn run_exec_like(args: RunExecLikeArgs) -> Result<ToolOutput, FunctionCallError> {
let RunExecLikeArgs {
tool_name,
exec_params,
additional_permissions,
prefix_rule,
session,
turn,
tracker,
call_id,
freeform,
shell_runtime_backend,
} = args;
let mut exec_params = exec_params;
let dependency_env = session.dependency_env().await;
if !dependency_env.is_empty() {
exec_params.env.extend(dependency_env.clone());
}
let mut explicit_env_overrides = turn.shell_environment_policy.r#set.clone();
for key in dependency_env.keys() {
if let Some(value) = exec_params.env.get(key) {
explicit_env_overrides.insert(key.clone(), value.clone());
}
}
let request_permission_enabled = session.features().enabled(Feature::RequestPermissions);
let normalized_additional_permissions = normalize_and_validate_additional_permissions(
request_permission_enabled,
turn.approval_policy.value(),
exec_params.sandbox_permissions,
additional_permissions,
&exec_params.cwd,
)
.map_err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel)?;
// Approval policy guard for explicit escalation in non-OnRequest modes.
if exec_params.sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override()
&& !matches!(
turn.approval_policy.value(),
codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval::OnRequest
)
{
let approval_policy = turn.approval_policy.value();
return Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!(
"approval policy is {approval_policy:?}; reject command — you should not ask for escalated permissions if the approval policy is {approval_policy:?}"
)));
}
// Intercept apply_patch if present.
if let Some(output) = intercept_apply_patch(
&exec_params.command,
&exec_params.cwd,
exec_params.expiration.timeout_ms(),
session.clone(),
turn.clone(),
Some(&tracker),
&call_id,
tool_name.as_str(),
)
.await?
{
return Ok(output);
}
let source = ExecCommandSource::Agent;
let emitter = ToolEmitter::shell(
exec_params.command.clone(),
exec_params.cwd.clone(),
source,
freeform,
);
let event_ctx = ToolEventCtx::new(session.as_ref(), turn.as_ref(), &call_id, None);
emitter.begin(event_ctx).await;
let exec_approval_requirement = session
.services
.exec_policy
.create_exec_approval_requirement_for_command(ExecApprovalRequest {
command: &exec_params.command,
approval_policy: turn.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn.sandbox_policy.get(),
sandbox_permissions: exec_params.sandbox_permissions,
prefix_rule,
})
.await;
let req = ShellRequest {
command: exec_params.command.clone(),
cwd: exec_params.cwd.clone(),
timeout_ms: exec_params.expiration.timeout_ms(),
env: exec_params.env.clone(),
explicit_env_overrides,
network: exec_params.network.clone(),
sandbox_permissions: exec_params.sandbox_permissions,
additional_permissions: normalized_additional_permissions,
justification: exec_params.justification.clone(),
exec_approval_requirement,
};
let mut orchestrator = ToolOrchestrator::new();
let mut runtime = {
use ShellRuntimeBackend::*;
match shell_runtime_backend {
Generic => ShellRuntime::new(),
backend @ (ShellCommandClassic | ShellCommandZshFork) => {
ShellRuntime::for_shell_command(backend)
}
}
};
let tool_ctx = ToolCtx {
session: session.clone(),
turn: turn.clone(),
call_id: call_id.clone(),
tool_name,
};
let out = orchestrator
.run(
&mut runtime,
&req,
&tool_ctx,
&turn,
turn.approval_policy.value(),
)
.await
.map(|result| result.output);
let event_ctx = ToolEventCtx::new(session.as_ref(), turn.as_ref(), &call_id, None);
let content = emitter.finish(event_ctx, out).await?;
Ok(ToolOutput::Function {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content),
success: Some(true),
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use codex_protocol::models::ShellCommandToolCallParams;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use crate::codex::make_session_and_context;
use crate::exec_env::create_env;
use crate::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
use crate::powershell::try_find_powershell_executable_blocking;
use crate::powershell::try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking;
use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use crate::shell::Shell;
use crate::shell::ShellType;
use crate::shell_snapshot::ShellSnapshot;
use crate::tools::handlers::ShellCommandHandler;
use tokio::sync::watch;
/// The logic for is_known_safe_command() has heuristics for known shells,
/// so we must ensure the commands generated by [ShellCommandHandler] can be
/// recognized as safe if the `command` is safe.
#[test]
fn commands_generated_by_shell_command_handler_can_be_matched_by_is_known_safe_command() {
let bash_shell = Shell {
shell_type: ShellType::Bash,
shell_path: PathBuf::from("/bin/bash"),
shell_snapshot: crate::shell::empty_shell_snapshot_receiver(),
};
assert_safe(&bash_shell, "ls -la");
let zsh_shell = Shell {
shell_type: ShellType::Zsh,
shell_path: PathBuf::from("/bin/zsh"),
shell_snapshot: crate::shell::empty_shell_snapshot_receiver(),
};
assert_safe(&zsh_shell, "ls -la");
if let Some(path) = try_find_powershell_executable_blocking() {
let powershell = Shell {
shell_type: ShellType::PowerShell,
shell_path: path.to_path_buf(),
shell_snapshot: crate::shell::empty_shell_snapshot_receiver(),
};
assert_safe(&powershell, "ls -Name");
}
if let Some(path) = try_find_pwsh_executable_blocking() {
let pwsh = Shell {
shell_type: ShellType::PowerShell,
shell_path: path.to_path_buf(),
shell_snapshot: crate::shell::empty_shell_snapshot_receiver(),
};
assert_safe(&pwsh, "ls -Name");
}
}
fn assert_safe(shell: &Shell, command: &str) {
assert!(is_known_safe_command(
&shell.derive_exec_args(command, /* use_login_shell */ true)
));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(
&shell.derive_exec_args(command, /* use_login_shell */ false)
));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_command_handler_to_exec_params_uses_session_shell_and_turn_context() {
let (session, turn_context) = make_session_and_context().await;
let command = "echo hello".to_string();
let workdir = Some("subdir".to_string());
let login = None;
let timeout_ms = Some(1234);
let sandbox_permissions = SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated;
let justification = Some("because tests".to_string());
let expected_command = session.user_shell().derive_exec_args(&command, true);
let expected_cwd = turn_context.resolve_path(workdir.clone());
let expected_env = create_env(
&turn_context.shell_environment_policy,
Some(session.conversation_id),
);
let params = ShellCommandToolCallParams {
command,
workdir,
login,
timeout_ms,
sandbox_permissions: Some(sandbox_permissions),
additional_permissions: None,
prefix_rule: None,
justification: justification.clone(),
};
let exec_params = ShellCommandHandler::to_exec_params(
&params,
&session,
&turn_context,
session.conversation_id,
true,
)
.expect("login shells should be allowed");
// ExecParams cannot derive Eq due to the CancellationToken field, so we manually compare the fields.
assert_eq!(exec_params.command, expected_command);
assert_eq!(exec_params.cwd, expected_cwd);
assert_eq!(exec_params.env, expected_env);
assert_eq!(exec_params.network, turn_context.network);
assert_eq!(exec_params.expiration.timeout_ms(), timeout_ms);
assert_eq!(exec_params.sandbox_permissions, sandbox_permissions);
assert_eq!(exec_params.justification, justification);
assert_eq!(exec_params.arg0, None);
}
#[test]
fn shell_command_handler_respects_explicit_login_flag() {
let (_tx, shell_snapshot) = watch::channel(Some(Arc::new(ShellSnapshot {
path: PathBuf::from("/tmp/snapshot.sh"),
cwd: PathBuf::from("/tmp"),
})));
let shell = Shell {
shell_type: ShellType::Bash,
shell_path: PathBuf::from("/bin/bash"),
shell_snapshot,
};
let login_command = ShellCommandHandler::base_command(&shell, "echo login shell", true);
assert_eq!(
login_command,
shell.derive_exec_args("echo login shell", true)
);
let non_login_command =
ShellCommandHandler::base_command(&shell, "echo non login shell", false);
assert_eq!(
non_login_command,
shell.derive_exec_args("echo non login shell", false)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_command_handler_defaults_to_non_login_when_disallowed() {
let (session, turn_context) = make_session_and_context().await;
let params = ShellCommandToolCallParams {
command: "echo hello".to_string(),
workdir: None,
login: None,
timeout_ms: None,
sandbox_permissions: None,
additional_permissions: None,
prefix_rule: None,
justification: None,
};
let exec_params = ShellCommandHandler::to_exec_params(
&params,
&session,
&turn_context,
session.conversation_id,
false,
)
.expect("non-login shells should still be allowed");
assert_eq!(
exec_params.command,
session.user_shell().derive_exec_args("echo hello", false)
);
}
#[test]
fn shell_command_handler_rejects_login_when_disallowed() {
let err = ShellCommandHandler::resolve_use_login_shell(Some(true), false)
.expect_err("explicit login should be rejected");
assert!(
err.to_string()
.contains("login shell is disabled by config"),
"unexpected error: {err}"
);
}
}