mirror of
https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-11-03 16:23:51 +00:00
## Summary This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements, permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server protocol. Concretely, it: - introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission (`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`, `denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists - updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently - exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces, and app-server config APIs - rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect the new config format ## Why The previous representation split related network policy across multiple parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of derived projections only. ## Backward Compatibility ### Backward compatible - Managed requirements still accept the legacy `experimental_network.allowed_domains`, `experimental_network.denied_domains`, and `experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally. - App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`, `deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can continue reading managed network requirements. - App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`, `deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views derived from the canonical maps. - `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries. ### Not backward compatible - Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical `[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`, `denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`. - Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with `allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be combined with `allow_unix_sockets`. - The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny lists. ## Testing `/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config ``` [permissions.workspace.network.domains] "www.example.com" = "allow" ``` and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403`. Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works: ``` [experimental_network] allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"] ```
565 lines
19 KiB
Rust
565 lines
19 KiB
Rust
use std::borrow::Cow;
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use std::collections::BTreeMap;
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use std::io;
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use std::path::Component;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkDomainPermission as ProxyNetworkDomainPermission;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkMode;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxyConfig;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkUnixSocketPermission as ProxyNetworkUnixSocketPermission;
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use codex_network_proxy::normalize_host;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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use schemars::JsonSchema;
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use serde::Serialize;
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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pub struct PermissionsToml {
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#[serde(flatten)]
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pub entries: BTreeMap<String, PermissionProfileToml>,
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}
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impl PermissionsToml {
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pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
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self.entries.is_empty()
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}
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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#[schemars(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct PermissionProfileToml {
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pub filesystem: Option<FilesystemPermissionsToml>,
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pub network: Option<NetworkToml>,
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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pub struct FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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#[serde(flatten)]
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pub entries: BTreeMap<String, FilesystemPermissionToml>,
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}
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impl FilesystemPermissionsToml {
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pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
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self.entries.is_empty()
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}
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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#[serde(untagged)]
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pub enum FilesystemPermissionToml {
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Access(FileSystemAccessMode),
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Scoped(BTreeMap<String, FileSystemAccessMode>),
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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pub struct NetworkDomainPermissionsToml {
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#[serde(flatten)]
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pub entries: BTreeMap<String, NetworkDomainPermissionToml>,
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}
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impl NetworkDomainPermissionsToml {
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pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
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self.entries.is_empty()
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) fn allowed_domains(&self) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
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let allowed_domains: Vec<String> = self
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.entries
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.iter()
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.filter(|(_, permission)| matches!(permission, NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Allow))
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.map(|(pattern, _)| pattern.clone())
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.collect();
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(!allowed_domains.is_empty()).then_some(allowed_domains)
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) fn denied_domains(&self) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
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let denied_domains: Vec<String> = self
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.entries
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.iter()
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.filter(|(_, permission)| matches!(permission, NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Deny))
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.map(|(pattern, _)| pattern.clone())
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.collect();
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(!denied_domains.is_empty()).then_some(denied_domains)
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}
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}
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#[derive(
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Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, JsonSchema,
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)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
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pub enum NetworkDomainPermissionToml {
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Allow,
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Deny,
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for NetworkDomainPermissionToml {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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let permission = match self {
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Self::Allow => "allow",
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Self::Deny => "deny",
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};
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f.write_str(permission)
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}
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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pub struct NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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#[serde(flatten)]
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pub entries: BTreeMap<String, NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml>,
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}
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impl NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
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self.entries.is_empty()
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}
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pub(crate) fn allow_unix_sockets(&self) -> Vec<String> {
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self.entries
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.iter()
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.filter(|(_, permission)| matches!(permission, NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::Allow))
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.map(|(path, _)| path.clone())
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.collect()
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}
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}
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#[derive(
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Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, JsonSchema,
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)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
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pub enum NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml {
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Allow,
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None,
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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let permission = match self {
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Self::Allow => "allow",
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Self::None => "none",
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};
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f.write_str(permission)
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}
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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#[schemars(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct NetworkToml {
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pub enabled: Option<bool>,
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pub proxy_url: Option<String>,
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pub enable_socks5: Option<bool>,
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pub socks_url: Option<String>,
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pub enable_socks5_udp: Option<bool>,
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pub allow_upstream_proxy: Option<bool>,
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pub dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy: Option<bool>,
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pub dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: Option<bool>,
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#[schemars(with = "Option<NetworkModeSchema>")]
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pub mode: Option<NetworkMode>,
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pub domains: Option<NetworkDomainPermissionsToml>,
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pub unix_sockets: Option<NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml>,
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pub allow_local_binding: Option<bool>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
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enum NetworkModeSchema {
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Limited,
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Full,
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}
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impl NetworkToml {
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pub(crate) fn apply_to_network_proxy_config(&self, config: &mut NetworkProxyConfig) {
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if let Some(enabled) = self.enabled {
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config.network.enabled = enabled;
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}
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if let Some(proxy_url) = self.proxy_url.as_ref() {
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config.network.proxy_url = proxy_url.clone();
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}
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if let Some(enable_socks5) = self.enable_socks5 {
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config.network.enable_socks5 = enable_socks5;
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}
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if let Some(socks_url) = self.socks_url.as_ref() {
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config.network.socks_url = socks_url.clone();
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}
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if let Some(enable_socks5_udp) = self.enable_socks5_udp {
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config.network.enable_socks5_udp = enable_socks5_udp;
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}
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if let Some(allow_upstream_proxy) = self.allow_upstream_proxy {
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config.network.allow_upstream_proxy = allow_upstream_proxy;
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}
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if let Some(dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy) =
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self.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy
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{
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config.network.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy =
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dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy;
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}
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if let Some(dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets) = self.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets {
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config.network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets = dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets;
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}
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if let Some(mode) = self.mode {
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config.network.mode = mode;
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}
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if let Some(domains) = self.domains.as_ref() {
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overlay_network_domain_permissions(config, domains);
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}
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if let Some(unix_sockets) = self.unix_sockets.as_ref() {
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let mut proxy_unix_sockets = config.network.unix_sockets.take().unwrap_or_default();
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for (path, permission) in &unix_sockets.entries {
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let permission = match permission {
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::Allow => {
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ProxyNetworkUnixSocketPermission::Allow
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}
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NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml::None => ProxyNetworkUnixSocketPermission::None,
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};
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proxy_unix_sockets.entries.insert(path.clone(), permission);
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}
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config.network.unix_sockets =
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(!proxy_unix_sockets.entries.is_empty()).then_some(proxy_unix_sockets);
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}
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if let Some(allow_local_binding) = self.allow_local_binding {
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config.network.allow_local_binding = allow_local_binding;
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn to_network_proxy_config(&self) -> NetworkProxyConfig {
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let mut config = NetworkProxyConfig::default();
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self.apply_to_network_proxy_config(&mut config);
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config
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn overlay_network_domain_permissions(
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config: &mut NetworkProxyConfig,
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domains: &NetworkDomainPermissionsToml,
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) {
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for (pattern, permission) in &domains.entries {
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let permission = match permission {
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NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Allow => ProxyNetworkDomainPermission::Allow,
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NetworkDomainPermissionToml::Deny => ProxyNetworkDomainPermission::Deny,
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};
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config
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.network
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.upsert_domain_permission(pattern.clone(), permission, normalize_host);
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn network_proxy_config_from_profile_network(
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network: Option<&NetworkToml>,
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) -> NetworkProxyConfig {
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network.map_or_else(
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NetworkProxyConfig::default,
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NetworkToml::to_network_proxy_config,
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)
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}
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pub(crate) fn resolve_permission_profile<'a>(
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permissions: &'a PermissionsToml,
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profile_name: &str,
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) -> io::Result<&'a PermissionProfileToml> {
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permissions.entries.get(profile_name).ok_or_else(|| {
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io::Error::new(
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io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
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format!("default_permissions refers to undefined profile `{profile_name}`"),
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)
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})
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}
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pub(crate) fn compile_permission_profile(
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permissions: &PermissionsToml,
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profile_name: &str,
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startup_warnings: &mut Vec<String>,
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) -> io::Result<(FileSystemSandboxPolicy, NetworkSandboxPolicy)> {
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let profile = resolve_permission_profile(permissions, profile_name)?;
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let mut entries = Vec::new();
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if let Some(filesystem) = profile.filesystem.as_ref() {
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if filesystem.is_empty() {
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push_warning(
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startup_warnings,
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missing_filesystem_entries_warning(profile_name),
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);
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} else {
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for (path, permission) in &filesystem.entries {
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compile_filesystem_permission(path, permission, &mut entries, startup_warnings)?;
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}
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}
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} else {
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push_warning(
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startup_warnings,
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missing_filesystem_entries_warning(profile_name),
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);
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}
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let network_sandbox_policy = compile_network_sandbox_policy(profile.network.as_ref());
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Ok((
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FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries),
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network_sandbox_policy,
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))
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}
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/// Returns a list of paths that must be readable by shell tools in order
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/// for Codex to function. These should always be added to the
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/// `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` for a thread.
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pub(crate) fn get_readable_roots_required_for_codex_runtime(
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codex_home: &Path,
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zsh_path: Option<&PathBuf>,
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main_execve_wrapper_exe: Option<&PathBuf>,
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) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
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let arg0_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(codex_home.join("tmp").join("arg0")).ok();
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let zsh_path = zsh_path.and_then(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).ok());
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let execve_wrapper_root = main_execve_wrapper_exe.and_then(|path| {
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let path = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).ok()?;
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if let Some(arg0_root) = arg0_root.as_ref()
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&& path.as_path().starts_with(arg0_root.as_path())
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{
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path.parent()
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} else {
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Some(path)
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}
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});
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let mut readable_roots = Vec::new();
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if let Some(zsh_path) = zsh_path {
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readable_roots.push(zsh_path);
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}
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if let Some(execve_wrapper_root) = execve_wrapper_root {
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readable_roots.push(execve_wrapper_root);
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}
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readable_roots
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}
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fn compile_network_sandbox_policy(network: Option<&NetworkToml>) -> NetworkSandboxPolicy {
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let Some(network) = network else {
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return NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted;
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};
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match network.enabled {
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Some(true) => NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
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_ => NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
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}
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}
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fn compile_filesystem_permission(
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path: &str,
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permission: &FilesystemPermissionToml,
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entries: &mut Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
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startup_warnings: &mut Vec<String>,
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) -> io::Result<()> {
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match permission {
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FilesystemPermissionToml::Access(access) => entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: compile_filesystem_path(path, startup_warnings)?,
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access: *access,
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}),
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FilesystemPermissionToml::Scoped(scoped_entries) => {
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for (subpath, access) in scoped_entries {
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entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: compile_scoped_filesystem_path(path, subpath, startup_warnings)?,
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access: *access,
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});
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn compile_filesystem_path(
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path: &str,
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startup_warnings: &mut Vec<String>,
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) -> io::Result<FileSystemPath> {
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if let Some(special) = parse_special_path(path) {
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maybe_push_unknown_special_path_warning(&special, startup_warnings);
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return Ok(FileSystemPath::Special { value: special });
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}
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let path = parse_absolute_path(path)?;
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Ok(FileSystemPath::Path { path })
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}
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fn compile_scoped_filesystem_path(
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path: &str,
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subpath: &str,
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startup_warnings: &mut Vec<String>,
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) -> io::Result<FileSystemPath> {
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if subpath == "." {
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return compile_filesystem_path(path, startup_warnings);
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}
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if let Some(special) = parse_special_path(path) {
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let subpath = parse_relative_subpath(subpath)?;
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let special = match special {
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FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { .. } => Ok(FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some(subpath)),
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}),
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FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { path, .. } => Ok(FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::unknown(path, Some(subpath)),
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}),
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_ => Err(io::Error::new(
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io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
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format!("filesystem path `{path}` does not support nested entries"),
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)),
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}?;
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if let FileSystemPath::Special { value } = &special {
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maybe_push_unknown_special_path_warning(value, startup_warnings);
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}
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return Ok(special);
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}
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let subpath = parse_relative_subpath(subpath)?;
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let base = parse_absolute_path(path)?;
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let path = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(&subpath, base.as_path())?;
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Ok(FileSystemPath::Path { path })
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}
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// WARNING: keep this parser forward-compatible.
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// Adding a new `:special_path` must not make older Codex versions reject the
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// config. Unknown values intentionally round-trip through
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// `FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown` so they can be surfaced as warnings and
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// ignored, rather than aborting config load.
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fn parse_special_path(path: &str) -> Option<FileSystemSpecialPath> {
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match path {
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":root" => Some(FileSystemSpecialPath::Root),
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":minimal" => Some(FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal),
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":project_roots" => Some(FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(/*subpath*/ None)),
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":tmpdir" => Some(FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir),
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_ if path.starts_with(':') => {
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Some(FileSystemSpecialPath::unknown(path, /*subpath*/ None))
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}
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_ => None,
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}
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}
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fn parse_absolute_path(path: &str) -> io::Result<AbsolutePathBuf> {
|
|
parse_absolute_path_for_platform(path, cfg!(windows))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn parse_absolute_path_for_platform(path: &str, is_windows: bool) -> io::Result<AbsolutePathBuf> {
|
|
let path_ref = normalize_absolute_path_for_platform(path, is_windows);
|
|
if !is_absolute_path_for_platform(path, path_ref.as_ref(), is_windows)
|
|
&& path != "~"
|
|
&& !path.starts_with("~/")
|
|
{
|
|
return Err(io::Error::new(
|
|
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
|
|
format!("filesystem path `{path}` must be absolute, use `~/...`, or start with `:`"),
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path_ref.as_ref())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn is_absolute_path_for_platform(path: &str, normalized_path: &Path, is_windows: bool) -> bool {
|
|
if is_windows {
|
|
is_windows_absolute_path(path)
|
|
|| is_windows_absolute_path(&normalized_path.to_string_lossy())
|
|
} else {
|
|
normalized_path.is_absolute()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn normalize_absolute_path_for_platform(path: &str, is_windows: bool) -> Cow<'_, Path> {
|
|
if !is_windows {
|
|
return Cow::Borrowed(Path::new(path));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
match normalize_windows_device_path(path) {
|
|
Some(normalized) => Cow::Owned(PathBuf::from(normalized)),
|
|
None => Cow::Borrowed(Path::new(path)),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn normalize_windows_device_path(path: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
|
if let Some(unc) = path.strip_prefix(r"\\?\UNC\") {
|
|
return Some(format!(r"\\{unc}"));
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(unc) = path.strip_prefix(r"\\.\UNC\") {
|
|
return Some(format!(r"\\{unc}"));
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(path) = path.strip_prefix(r"\\?\")
|
|
&& is_windows_drive_absolute_path(path)
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(path.to_string());
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(path) = path.strip_prefix(r"\\.\")
|
|
&& is_windows_drive_absolute_path(path)
|
|
{
|
|
return Some(path.to_string());
|
|
}
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn is_windows_absolute_path(path: &str) -> bool {
|
|
is_windows_drive_absolute_path(path) || path.starts_with(r"\\")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn is_windows_drive_absolute_path(path: &str) -> bool {
|
|
let bytes = path.as_bytes();
|
|
bytes.len() >= 3
|
|
&& bytes[0].is_ascii_alphabetic()
|
|
&& bytes[1] == b':'
|
|
&& matches!(bytes[2], b'\\' | b'/')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn parse_relative_subpath(subpath: &str) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
|
|
let path = Path::new(subpath);
|
|
if !subpath.is_empty()
|
|
&& path
|
|
.components()
|
|
.all(|component| matches!(component, Component::Normal(_)))
|
|
{
|
|
return Ok(path.to_path_buf());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Err(io::Error::new(
|
|
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
|
|
format!(
|
|
"filesystem subpath `{}` must be a descendant path without `.` or `..` components",
|
|
path.display()
|
|
),
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn push_warning(startup_warnings: &mut Vec<String>, message: String) {
|
|
tracing::warn!("{message}");
|
|
startup_warnings.push(message);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn missing_filesystem_entries_warning(profile_name: &str) -> String {
|
|
format!(
|
|
"Permissions profile `{profile_name}` does not define any recognized filesystem entries for this version of Codex. Filesystem access will remain restricted. Upgrade Codex if this profile expects filesystem permissions."
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn maybe_push_unknown_special_path_warning(
|
|
special: &FileSystemSpecialPath,
|
|
startup_warnings: &mut Vec<String>,
|
|
) {
|
|
let FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { path, subpath } = special else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
push_warning(
|
|
startup_warnings,
|
|
match subpath.as_deref() {
|
|
Some(subpath) => format!(
|
|
"Configured filesystem path `{path}` with nested entry `{}` is not recognized by this version of Codex and will be ignored. Upgrade Codex if this path is required.",
|
|
subpath.display()
|
|
),
|
|
None => format!(
|
|
"Configured filesystem path `{path}` is not recognized by this version of Codex and will be ignored. Upgrade Codex if this path is required."
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
#[path = "permissions_tests.rs"]
|
|
mod tests;
|