feat(easysearch): add first-class database support
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+875
-107
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@@ -676,6 +676,13 @@ pub fn classify_sql_risk(sql: &str, dialect: &str) -> Result<SqlRisk, String> {
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/// Classify SQL risk using both the parser dialect and the concrete database
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/// type so dialect-specific write forms cannot be mistaken for read queries.
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pub fn classify_sql_risk_for_database(sql: &str, database_type: DatabaseType) -> Result<SqlRisk, String> {
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if let Some(risk) = crate::query_execution_sql::classify_search_engine_query_risk(sql, database_type) {
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return Ok(match risk {
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crate::query_execution_sql::SearchEngineQueryRisk::ReadOnly => SqlRisk::ReadOnly,
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crate::query_execution_sql::SearchEngineQueryRisk::Write => SqlRisk::Write,
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crate::query_execution_sql::SearchEngineQueryRisk::Dangerous => SqlRisk::Ddl,
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});
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}
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let database_type_name = format!("{database_type:?}");
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let normalized = normalize_dialect(&database_type_name);
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classify_sql_risk_with_database(sql, normalized, Some(database_type))
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@@ -686,6 +693,9 @@ pub fn classify_sql_risk_for_database(sql: &str, database_type: DatabaseType) ->
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/// and single-table UPDATE/DELETE statements with an effective predicate;
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/// broader or opaque mutations require central high-risk permission.
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pub fn is_dangerous_sql_for_database(sql: &str, database_type: DatabaseType) -> bool {
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if let Some(risk) = crate::query_execution_sql::classify_search_engine_query_risk(sql, database_type) {
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return risk == crate::query_execution_sql::SearchEngineQueryRisk::Dangerous;
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}
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let database_type_name = format!("{database_type:?}");
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let normalized = normalize_dialect(&database_type_name);
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let parser_dialect = resolve_dialect(normalized);
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@@ -712,6 +722,9 @@ pub fn is_dangerous_sql_for_database(sql: &str, database_type: DatabaseType) ->
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/// A `USE` statement mutates pooled/session state and could redirect later SQL,
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/// so it is forbidden independently of read/write and high-risk permissions.
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pub fn mcp_sql_has_forbidden_database_switch(sql: &str, database_type: DatabaseType) -> bool {
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if crate::query_execution_sql::classify_search_engine_query_risk(sql, database_type).is_some() {
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return false;
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}
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let database_type_name = format!("{database_type:?}");
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let normalized = normalize_dialect(&database_type_name);
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let dialect = resolve_dialect(normalized);
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@@ -1234,4 +1247,25 @@ mod tests {
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// This depends on sqlparser's coverage, but we can test the catch-all
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assert_eq!(classify_sql_risk("GRANT SELECT ON users TO admin", "postgres").unwrap(), SqlRisk::Ddl);
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}
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#[test]
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fn classifies_search_engine_rest_risk_by_method_and_path() {
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for database_type in [DatabaseType::Elasticsearch, DatabaseType::Easysearch] {
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assert_eq!(
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classify_sql_risk_for_database("GET /_cluster/health", database_type).unwrap(),
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SqlRisk::ReadOnly
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);
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assert_eq!(
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classify_sql_risk_for_database("POST /products/_search\n{}", database_type).unwrap(),
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SqlRisk::ReadOnly
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);
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assert_eq!(
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classify_sql_risk_for_database("PUT /products/_doc/1\n{}", database_type).unwrap(),
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SqlRisk::Write
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);
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assert!(!is_dangerous_sql_for_database("PUT /products/_doc/1\n{}", database_type));
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assert_eq!(classify_sql_risk_for_database("DELETE /products", database_type).unwrap(), SqlRisk::Ddl);
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assert!(is_dangerous_sql_for_database("DELETE /products", database_type));
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}
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}
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}
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