From c840206b25c1cc6a854c993313ca4025a7b8f523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cyqdev <32971655+cyqdev@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2026 02:54:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix(ssh): move ext-info and strict-kex markers to kex tail --- crates/dbx-drivers/src/db/ssh_tunnel.rs | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/dbx-drivers/src/db/ssh_tunnel.rs b/crates/dbx-drivers/src/db/ssh_tunnel.rs index 42ecaca752..c5b599e121 100644 --- a/crates/dbx-drivers/src/db/ssh_tunnel.rs +++ b/crates/dbx-drivers/src/db/ssh_tunnel.rs @@ -196,7 +196,6 @@ fn ssh_client_config() -> Config { kex.push(algorithm); } } - preferred.kex = Cow::Owned(kex); let mut mac = preferred.mac.into_owned(); // Keep SHA-1 MAC variants as last-resort fallbacks for legacy SSH proxies. @@ -222,6 +221,27 @@ fn ssh_client_config() -> Config { } preferred.cipher = Cow::Owned(ciphers); + // Move the RFC 8308 / strict-kex extension marker names (ext-info-c, + // ext-info-s, kex-strict-*-v00@openssh.com) to the tail of the offer. + // + // russh's default order places them mid-list, right after + // `diffie-hellman-group14-sha256`. Some legacy SSH daemons (reproduced + // against Apache MINA SSHD 0.9.5) abort the handshake with a bare TCP EOF + // when the offer contains an unknown algorithm name immediately before + // `ext-info-c`, so that default order kills the connection before auth. + // OpenSSH itself advertises these markers at the end of its kex offer; + // RFC 8308 does not require any particular position, so relocating them + // keeps extension negotiation fully intact while avoiding the parser bug. + let extension_markers = [ + russh::kex::EXTENSION_SUPPORT_AS_CLIENT, + russh::kex::EXTENSION_SUPPORT_AS_SERVER, + russh::kex::EXTENSION_OPENSSH_STRICT_KEX_AS_CLIENT, + russh::kex::EXTENSION_OPENSSH_STRICT_KEX_AS_SERVER, + ]; + kex.retain(|name| !extension_markers.contains(name)); + kex.extend(extension_markers); + preferred.kex = Cow::Owned(kex); + Config { nodelay: true, keepalive_interval: Some(Duration::from_secs(30)), @@ -2228,6 +2248,51 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(effective_hop_timeout(&tunnel), default_ssh_connect_timeout_secs()); } + #[test] + fn ssh_client_config_moves_extension_markers_to_kex_tail() { + let config = ssh_client_config(); + let kex = config.preferred.kex; + let len = kex.len(); + let position = |needle: russh::kex::Name| kex.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == needle).unwrap(); + + // In the config proposal the four extension markers occupy the last + // four slots, in the same relative order russh ships them. On the wire + // russh's write_kex filters out the two server-role markers, so only + // the client-role pair (ext-info-c, kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com) + // actually reaches the server. + assert_eq!(kex[len - 4], russh::kex::EXTENSION_SUPPORT_AS_CLIENT); + assert_eq!(kex[len - 3], russh::kex::EXTENSION_SUPPORT_AS_SERVER); + assert_eq!(kex[len - 2], russh::kex::EXTENSION_OPENSSH_STRICT_KEX_AS_CLIENT); + assert_eq!(kex[len - 1], russh::kex::EXTENSION_OPENSSH_STRICT_KEX_AS_SERVER); + + // Every key-exchange algorithm that actually performs a DH/ECDH + // exchange stays ahead of the markers, so a server scanning the offer + // left-to-right still selects a real exchange before reaching them. + let nistp256_index = position(russh::kex::ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256); + let group14_sha1_index = position(russh::kex::DH_G14_SHA1); + assert!(nistp256_index < len - 4); + assert!(group14_sha1_index < len - 4); + } + + #[test] + fn ssh_client_config_keeps_each_extension_marker_once() { + let config = ssh_client_config(); + let kex = config.preferred.kex; + for marker in [ + russh::kex::EXTENSION_SUPPORT_AS_CLIENT, + russh::kex::EXTENSION_SUPPORT_AS_SERVER, + russh::kex::EXTENSION_OPENSSH_STRICT_KEX_AS_CLIENT, + russh::kex::EXTENSION_OPENSSH_STRICT_KEX_AS_SERVER, + ] { + // Relocation must not duplicate (retain + extend, not append-only). + assert_eq!( + kex.iter().filter(|algorithm| **algorithm == marker).count(), + 1, + "extension marker appears more than once: {marker:?}" + ); + } + } + #[test] fn ssh_client_config_keeps_legacy_cbc_ciphers_after_safe_defaults() { let config = ssh_client_config();