Files
dbx/crates/dbx-core/src/db/ssh_tunnel.rs
T

1497 lines
59 KiB
Rust

use std::borrow::Cow;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use crate::path_utils::expand_tilde;
use std::sync::Arc;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD;
use base64::Engine;
use russh::client::{self, AuthResult, Config, Handle};
use russh::keys::agent::{client::AgentClient, AgentIdentity};
use russh::keys::ssh_key::HashAlg;
use russh::keys::{decode_secret_key, key::PrivateKeyWithHashAlg, PrivateKey};
use russh::MethodKind;
use russh::MethodSet;
use russh::{kex, mac, ChannelMsg, Preferred};
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use tokio::time::{Duration, MissedTickBehavior};
use crate::db::ssh_host_key::{HostKeyState, HostKeyVerifier};
use crate::db::ssh_prompt;
use crate::models::connection::SshTunnelConfig;
use super::file_validator::validate_file_path;
/// Initial delay between SSH reconnect attempts.
const INITIAL_RECONNECT_DELAY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Maximum delay for exponential backoff.
const MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Maximum number of consecutive reconnect attempts before giving up.
const MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 10;
/// How often an idle local listener verifies that the SSH session still answers.
const IDLE_SESSION_CHECK_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
/// Maximum time to wait for an explicit SSH ping response.
const IDLE_SESSION_PING_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
/// Maximum time to wait for the UI to answer a host-key verification prompt
/// (explicit TOFU). Fail-closed: if the UI does not answer in time, the host
/// is rejected and no credential is sent.
const TOFU_PROMPT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
/// SSH client handler. Holds a host-key verifier so that
/// [`client::Handler::check_server_key`] can reject untrusted/changed server
/// keys *before* any credential is sent.
struct SshClient {
host_key_verifier: Arc<HostKeyVerifier>,
host: String,
port: u16,
}
impl client::Handler for SshClient {
type Error = russh::Error;
async fn check_server_key(
&mut self,
server_public_key: &russh::keys::ssh_key::PublicKey,
) -> Result<bool, Self::Error> {
// Runs *before any credential authentication*. We first check the
// known-hosts stores (system + dbx-managed). A trusted key is accepted
// immediately; a *changed* key is rejected (MITM hardening); an unknown
// key triggers an explicit TOFU prompt so the user can confirm the host
// fingerprint before any password/key is sent.
match self.host_key_verifier.check(&self.host, self.port, server_public_key) {
Ok(HostKeyState::Trusted) => Ok(true),
Ok(HostKeyState::Unknown) => self.prompt_for_host_key(server_public_key).await,
Err(e) => {
// Changed host key => possible MITM. Surface it to the user as a
// clear notice (best-effort; never affects the fail-closed below).
let msg = e.to_string();
let _ =
ssh_prompt::notify_host_key(ssh_prompt::SshHostKeyNoticeKind::Changed, &self.host, self.port, &msg);
Err(russh::Error::from(e))
}
}
}
}
impl SshClient {
/// Explicit TOFU: ask the UI to confirm an unknown host key. Fail-closed:
/// if no gateway is installed, or the user rejects, or the prompt times
/// out, the host is not trusted and the handshake is aborted — so no
/// credential is ever sent to an unverified endpoint.
async fn prompt_for_host_key(
&mut self,
server_public_key: &russh::keys::ssh_key::PublicKey,
) -> Result<bool, russh::Error> {
let key_type = Some(server_public_key.algorithm().to_string());
let fingerprint = Some(server_public_key.fingerprint(HashAlg::Sha256).to_string());
let request = ssh_prompt::host_key_verify_request(&self.host, self.port, key_type, fingerprint);
let Some(responder_rx) = ssh_prompt::request_ssh_prompt(request) else {
log::warn!(
"No SSH prompt gateway installed; refusing to trust unknown host {}:{} (fail-closed)",
self.host,
self.port
);
return Ok(false);
};
let answer = tokio::time::timeout(TOFU_PROMPT_TIMEOUT, responder_rx).await;
match answer {
Ok(Ok(ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer::Accept { remember })) => {
if remember {
if let Err(e) = self.host_key_verifier.learn(&self.host, self.port, server_public_key) {
// Persistence failure does not by itself abort the
// session — the host is simply trusted for this session
// only. Still log it AND surface a notice so the UI can
// warn the user (otherwise they will be silently
// re-prompted on next connect with no explanation).
let detail =
format!("Could not persist host key for {}:{} to known_hosts: {e}", self.host, self.port);
log::warn!("{detail}");
let _ = ssh_prompt::notify_host_key(
ssh_prompt::SshHostKeyNoticeKind::LearnFailed,
&self.host,
self.port,
&detail,
);
}
}
Ok(true)
}
Ok(Ok(ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer::Reject)) => {
// User explicitly rejected -> tell them, then fail-closed.
let _ = ssh_prompt::notify_host_key(
ssh_prompt::SshHostKeyNoticeKind::Rejected,
&self.host,
self.port,
&format!("User rejected the host key for {}:{}.", self.host, self.port),
);
log::warn!("Host key for {}:{} was rejected by the user; aborting handshake", self.host, self.port);
Ok(false)
}
Ok(Ok(ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer::Secret(_))) | Ok(Err(_)) | Err(_) => {
log::warn!(
"Host key for {}:{} was not accepted (prompt timed out or was cancelled); aborting handshake",
self.host,
self.port
);
Ok(false)
}
}
}
}
fn ssh_client_config() -> Config {
let mut preferred = Preferred::default();
let mut kex = preferred.kex.into_owned();
for algorithm in [kex::ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, kex::ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, kex::ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, kex::DH_G14_SHA1] {
if !kex.contains(&algorithm) {
kex.push(algorithm);
}
}
preferred.kex = Cow::Owned(kex);
let mut mac = preferred.mac.into_owned();
// Keep SHA-1 MAC variants as last-resort fallbacks for legacy SSH proxies.
for algorithm in [mac::HMAC_SHA1_ETM, mac::HMAC_SHA1] {
if !mac.contains(&algorithm) {
mac.push(algorithm);
}
}
preferred.mac = Cow::Owned(mac);
Config { nodelay: true, keepalive_interval: Some(Duration::from_secs(30)), preferred, ..Default::default() }
}
/// Returns `true` only when the server explicitly advertised `password` among
/// the authentication methods that may continue the dialog.
///
/// Per RFC 4252 §5.1, the "authentications that can continue" name-list is the
/// authoritative signal of what the server will accept next. A `partial_success`
/// flag alone is NOT a license to send a password: it merely reports that the
/// preceding step succeeded, and the next method may be something other than
/// `password` (e.g. `keyboard-interactive`). Honoring only the advertised list
/// prevents leaking the password to a server that never offered password auth
/// (the MITM credential-harvest case), while still covering publickey+password
/// MFA (where `password` IS present in the list).
fn server_offers_password(remaining_methods: &MethodSet) -> bool {
remaining_methods.contains(&MethodKind::Password)
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn connect_and_authenticate(
ssh_host: &str,
ssh_port: u16,
ssh_user: &str,
ssh_password: &str,
ssh_key_path: &str,
ssh_key_passphrase: &str,
use_ssh_agent: bool,
ssh_agent_sock_path: &str,
auth_method: &str,
connect_timeout_secs: u64,
known_hosts_path: &Path,
) -> Result<Handle<SshClient>, String> {
let config = Arc::new(ssh_client_config());
let connect_timeout = Duration::from_secs(connect_timeout_secs);
// Verify server identity against the known-hosts store before sending any
// credential. The store lives at `<data_dir>/known_hosts` (NOT `~/.ssh`):
// an unknown host is trusted on first use (TOFU) and recorded there, a
// changed host key is rejected, and an unknown host whose key cannot be
// persisted fails closed instead of being silently trusted.
let host_key_verifier = Arc::new(HostKeyVerifier::new(known_hosts_path.to_path_buf()));
let mut session = tokio::time::timeout(
connect_timeout,
client::connect(
config,
(ssh_host, ssh_port),
SshClient { host_key_verifier: host_key_verifier.clone(), host: ssh_host.to_string(), port: ssh_port },
),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("SSH connection timed out ({connect_timeout_secs}s)"))?
.map_err(|e| format!("SSH connection failed: {e}"))?;
// Probe with "none" authentication first. Some SSH proxies and jump-hosts
// accept connections without any credential, and this is also the standard
// SSH probe used to discover the auth methods the server supports.
let none_res = tokio::time::timeout(connect_timeout, session.authenticate_none(ssh_user))
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("SSH auth probe timed out ({connect_timeout_secs}s)"))?
.map_err(|e| format!("SSH auth probe failed: {e}"))?;
if none_res.success() {
return Ok(session);
}
// When auth_method is "none" and the probe was rejected, fail early
// instead of falling back to other credential methods.
if auth_method == "none" {
return Err("SSH authentication failed: server rejected the connection without credentials".to_string());
}
// "key+password": try private key first, fall back to password on failure.
// Both credential fields are expected to be filled in by the UI.
if auth_method == "key+password" {
// Attempt the private key first (when supplied), then decide whether a
// password fallback is safe to attempt.
let try_password = if ssh_key_path.is_empty() {
// No key configured: only attempt password if the "none" probe
// showed the server advertises it — otherwise we would leak the
// password to any endpoint that rejected our (empty) key.
match &none_res {
AuthResult::Failure { remaining_methods, .. } => server_offers_password(remaining_methods),
_ => false,
}
} else {
validate_file_path(ssh_key_path, |_| false)?;
let passphrase = if ssh_key_passphrase.is_empty() { None } else { Some(ssh_key_passphrase) };
let key_pair =
load_ssh_private_key(ssh_key_path, passphrase).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to load SSH key: {e}"))?;
let auth_res = tokio::time::timeout(
connect_timeout,
session.authenticate_publickey(
ssh_user,
PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(
Arc::new(key_pair),
session.best_supported_rsa_hash().await.ok().flatten().flatten(),
),
),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("SSH key auth timed out ({connect_timeout_secs}s)"))?
.map_err(|e| format!("SSH key auth failed: {e}"))?;
match auth_res {
AuthResult::Success => return Ok(session),
AuthResult::Failure { remaining_methods, partial_success } => {
// Only fall back to password when the server still offers it.
// This prevents sending the password to a server that never
// advertised password auth — the MITM credential-harvest
// case — and preserves the protocol state needed for
// publickey+password MFA (where `password` IS in the list).
if server_offers_password(&remaining_methods) {
true
} else {
return Err(format!(
"SSH key rejected and the server does not offer password authentication \
(remaining_methods={remaining_methods:?}, partial_success={partial_success})"
));
}
}
}
};
if try_password && !ssh_password.is_empty() {
let auth_res = tokio::time::timeout(connect_timeout, session.authenticate_password(ssh_user, ssh_password))
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("SSH password auth timed out ({connect_timeout_secs}s)"))?
.map_err(|e| format!("SSH password auth failed: {e}"))?;
match auth_res {
AuthResult::Success => return Ok(session),
AuthResult::Failure { partial_success, .. } => {
return Err(format!("SSH password authentication failed (partial_success={partial_success})"));
}
}
}
return Err("SSH authentication failed: both key and password were rejected".to_string());
}
// "none" was rejected — fall back to the configured credential method.
// When auth_method is set, only try the matching method.
let try_key = auth_method.is_empty() && !ssh_key_path.is_empty() || auth_method == "key";
let try_password = auth_method.is_empty() && !ssh_password.is_empty() || auth_method == "password";
let try_agent = auth_method.is_empty() && use_ssh_agent || auth_method == "agent";
if try_key {
// Validate SSH key file path
validate_file_path(ssh_key_path, |_| false)?;
let passphrase = if ssh_key_passphrase.is_empty() { None } else { Some(ssh_key_passphrase) };
let key_pair =
load_ssh_private_key(ssh_key_path, passphrase).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to load SSH key: {e}"))?;
let auth_res = tokio::time::timeout(
connect_timeout,
session.authenticate_publickey(
ssh_user,
PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(
Arc::new(key_pair),
session.best_supported_rsa_hash().await.ok().flatten().flatten(),
),
),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("SSH key auth timed out ({connect_timeout_secs}s)"))?
.map_err(|e| format!("SSH key auth failed: {e}"))?;
if !auth_res.success() {
return Err("SSH public key authentication failed".to_string());
}
} else if try_password {
let auth_res = tokio::time::timeout(connect_timeout, session.authenticate_password(ssh_user, ssh_password))
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("SSH password auth timed out ({connect_timeout_secs}s)"))?
.map_err(|e| format!("SSH password auth failed: {e}"))?;
if !auth_res.success() {
return Err("SSH password authentication failed".to_string());
}
} else if try_agent {
match try_authenticate_with_agent(&mut session, ssh_user, ssh_agent_sock_path, &connect_timeout).await {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(agent_err) => return Err(agent_err),
}
} else {
return Err(
"SSH authentication failed: \"none\" was rejected and no password, key, or ssh-agent is configured"
.to_string(),
);
}
Ok(session)
}
/// Try to authenticate using ssh-agent identities. Returns `Ok(())` on success,
/// or an error describing why agent auth failed (unavailable, no identities, all rejected).
async fn try_authenticate_with_agent(
session: &mut Handle<SshClient>,
ssh_user: &str,
_ssh_agent_sock_path: &str,
connect_timeout: &Duration,
) -> Result<(), String> {
#[cfg(unix)]
let mut agent = if _ssh_agent_sock_path.is_empty() {
match AgentClient::connect_env().await {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => {
return Err(format!("No SSH password or key provided, and ssh-agent is unavailable: {e}"));
}
}
} else {
match AgentClient::connect_uds(_ssh_agent_sock_path).await {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => {
return Err(format!(
"No SSH password or key provided, and ssh-agent at '{}' is unavailable: {e}",
_ssh_agent_sock_path
));
}
}
};
#[cfg(windows)]
let mut agent = {
let stream = pageant::PageantStream::new()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("No SSH password or key provided, and ssh-agent (Pageant) is unavailable: {e}"))?;
AgentClient::connect(stream)
};
let identities = match agent.request_identities().await {
Ok(ids) if ids.is_empty() => {
return Err("No SSH password or key provided, and ssh-agent has no identities".to_string());
}
Ok(ids) => ids,
Err(e) => {
return Err(format!("No SSH password or key provided, and ssh-agent request failed: {e}"));
}
};
let hash_alg = session.best_supported_rsa_hash().await.ok().flatten().flatten();
let auth_result = tokio::time::timeout(*connect_timeout, async {
for identity in identities {
let result = match &identity {
AgentIdentity::PublicKey { key, .. } => {
session.authenticate_publickey_with(ssh_user, key.clone(), hash_alg, &mut agent).await
}
AgentIdentity::Certificate { certificate, .. } => {
session.authenticate_certificate_with(ssh_user, certificate.clone(), hash_alg, &mut agent).await
}
};
match result {
Ok(auth_res) if auth_res.success() => return Ok(()),
Ok(_) => continue,
Err(e) => {
log::debug!("SSH agent identity ({}) auth failed: {e}", identity.comment());
continue;
}
}
}
Err("No SSH password or key provided, and no ssh-agent identity was accepted".to_string())
})
.await;
match auth_result {
Ok(Ok(())) => Ok(()),
Ok(Err(e)) => Err(e),
Err(_) => Err("No SSH password or key provided, and ssh-agent auth timed out".to_string()),
}
}
fn load_ssh_private_key(path: &str, passphrase: Option<&str>) -> Result<PrivateKey, String> {
let expanded = expand_tilde(path);
let secret = fs::read_to_string(&expanded).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
match decode_secret_key(&secret, passphrase) {
Ok(key) => Ok(key),
Err(err) if is_ssh_key_character_encoding_error(&err.to_string()) => {
let sanitized = sanitize_unencrypted_openssh_comment(&secret)?;
decode_secret_key(&sanitized, passphrase).map_err(|retry_err| retry_err.to_string())
}
Err(err) => Err(err.to_string()),
}
}
fn is_ssh_key_character_encoding_error(error: &str) -> bool {
error.contains("SshKey: character encoding invalid")
}
fn sanitize_unencrypted_openssh_comment(secret: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
const BEGIN: &str = "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----";
const END: &str = "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----";
if !secret.lines().any(|line| line == BEGIN) {
return Err("SSH key comment encoding is invalid and the key is not an OpenSSH private key".to_string());
}
let body = secret.lines().filter(|line| !line.starts_with("-----")).collect::<String>();
let mut bytes =
BASE64_STANDARD.decode(body.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| format!("OpenSSH key base64 decode failed: {e}"))?;
sanitize_unencrypted_openssh_comment_bytes(&mut bytes)?;
Ok(format!("{BEGIN}\n{}\n{END}\n", BASE64_STANDARD.encode(bytes)))
}
fn sanitize_unencrypted_openssh_comment_bytes(bytes: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), String> {
const AUTH_MAGIC: &[u8] = b"openssh-key-v1\0";
if !bytes.starts_with(AUTH_MAGIC) {
return Err("OpenSSH key header is invalid".to_string());
}
let mut pos = AUTH_MAGIC.len();
let ciphername = read_ssh_string(bytes, &mut pos)?;
if ciphername != b"none" {
return Err("SSH key comment encoding is invalid and encrypted OpenSSH keys cannot be sanitized".to_string());
}
let _kdfname = read_ssh_string(bytes, &mut pos)?;
let _kdfoptions = read_ssh_string(bytes, &mut pos)?;
let key_count = read_u32(bytes, &mut pos)?;
if key_count != 1 {
return Err("OpenSSH keys with multiple private keys are unsupported".to_string());
}
let _public_key = read_ssh_string(bytes, &mut pos)?;
let private_blob_len_pos = pos;
let private_blob = read_ssh_string(bytes, &mut pos)?;
let patched_private_blob = sanitize_private_blob_comment(private_blob)?;
let patched_private_blob_len = (patched_private_blob.len() as u32).to_be_bytes();
bytes.splice(private_blob_len_pos..pos, patched_private_blob_len.into_iter().chain(patched_private_blob));
Ok(())
}
fn sanitize_private_blob_comment(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let unpadded_end = blob
.len()
.checked_sub(openssh_padding_len(blob)?)
.ok_or_else(|| "OpenSSH private key padding is invalid".to_string())?;
let comment_len_pos = find_trailing_ssh_string_len_pos(&blob[..unpadded_end])
.ok_or_else(|| "OpenSSH private key comment field was not found".to_string())?;
let mut patched = Vec::with_capacity(blob.len());
patched.extend_from_slice(&blob[..comment_len_pos]);
patched.extend_from_slice(&0u32.to_be_bytes());
let padding_len = padding_len_for_block(patched.len(), 8);
for value in 1..=padding_len {
patched.push(value as u8);
}
Ok(patched)
}
fn openssh_padding_len(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<usize, String> {
for len in (1..=16).rev() {
if bytes.len() >= len
&& bytes[bytes.len() - len..].iter().enumerate().all(|(index, byte)| *byte == (index + 1) as u8)
{
return Ok(len);
}
}
Err("OpenSSH private key padding is invalid".to_string())
}
fn find_trailing_ssh_string_len_pos(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
(8..bytes.len().saturating_sub(3)).rev().find(|pos| {
let Some(len_bytes) = bytes.get(*pos..*pos + 4) else {
return false;
};
let len = u32::from_be_bytes(len_bytes.try_into().expect("slice length checked")) as usize;
pos.checked_add(4).and_then(|value| value.checked_add(len)) == Some(bytes.len())
})
}
fn padding_len_for_block(len: usize, block_size: usize) -> usize {
let remainder = len % block_size;
if remainder == 0 {
block_size
} else {
block_size - remainder
}
}
fn read_ssh_string<'a>(bytes: &'a [u8], pos: &mut usize) -> Result<&'a [u8], String> {
let len = read_u32(bytes, pos)? as usize;
let end = pos.checked_add(len).ok_or_else(|| "OpenSSH key field length is invalid".to_string())?;
if end > bytes.len() {
return Err("OpenSSH key field is truncated".to_string());
}
let value = &bytes[*pos..end];
*pos = end;
Ok(value)
}
fn read_u32(bytes: &[u8], pos: &mut usize) -> Result<u32, String> {
let end = pos.checked_add(4).ok_or_else(|| "OpenSSH key field length is invalid".to_string())?;
let value = bytes.get(*pos..end).ok_or_else(|| "OpenSSH key field is truncated".to_string())?;
*pos = end;
Ok(u32::from_be_bytes(value.try_into().map_err(|_| "OpenSSH key field length is invalid".to_string())?))
}
/// Accept connections on the local listener and forward them through the SSH session.
/// Returns when the SSH session dies (listener error or session.is_closed()).
async fn forward_loop(session: &Handle<SshClient>, listener: &TcpListener, remote_host: &str, remote_port: u16) {
let mut idle_check = tokio::time::interval(IDLE_SESSION_CHECK_INTERVAL);
idle_check.set_missed_tick_behavior(MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
loop {
let accepted = tokio::select! {
result = listener.accept() => result,
_ = idle_check.tick() => {
if session.is_closed() {
log::warn!("SSH session closed while tunnel was idle");
break;
}
match tokio::time::timeout(IDLE_SESSION_PING_TIMEOUT, session.send_ping()).await {
Ok(Ok(())) => continue,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
log::warn!("SSH idle ping failed: {e}");
break;
}
Err(_) => {
log::warn!("SSH idle ping timed out");
break;
}
}
}
};
let (mut stream, peer_addr) = match accepted {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
log::error!("SSH tunnel listener error: {e}");
break;
}
};
// Check session health before opening a new channel
if session.is_closed() {
log::warn!("SSH session closed, exiting forward loop");
break;
}
let mut channel = match session
.channel_open_direct_tcpip(
remote_host,
remote_port.into(),
peer_addr.ip().to_string(),
peer_addr.port().into(),
)
.await
{
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
log::error!("SSH direct-tcpip failed: {e}");
break;
}
};
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 65536];
let mut stream_closed = false;
loop {
tokio::select! {
r = stream.read(&mut buf), if !stream_closed => {
match r {
Ok(0) => {
stream_closed = true;
let _ = channel.eof().await;
}
Ok(n) => {
if channel.data(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Err(_) => break,
}
}
msg = channel.wait() => {
match msg {
Some(ChannelMsg::Data { ref data }) => {
if stream.write_all(data).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Some(ChannelMsg::Eof) | None => break,
_ => {}
}
}
}
}
});
}
}
/// Main tunnel task: runs the forward loop and automatically reconnects
/// the SSH session when it drops. The local TcpListener survives across
/// reconnections so the tunnel appears continuously available to clients.
/// Uses exponential backoff for reconnect attempts and gives up after
/// MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS to avoid log storms from permanent failures.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn tunnel_reconnect_loop(
mut session: Handle<SshClient>,
connect_host: String,
connect_port: u16,
ssh_user: String,
ssh_password: String,
ssh_key_path: String,
ssh_key_passphrase: String,
use_ssh_agent: bool,
ssh_agent_sock_path: String,
auth_method: String,
connect_timeout_secs: u64,
known_hosts_path: PathBuf,
listener: TcpListener,
remote_host: String,
remote_port: u16,
) {
loop {
log::info!("SSH tunnel active: {}:{} -> {}:{}", connect_host, connect_port, remote_host, remote_port);
forward_loop(&session, &listener, &remote_host, remote_port).await;
log::warn!("SSH tunnel connection lost ({}:{}), reconnecting...", connect_host, connect_port);
// Reconnect with exponential backoff
let mut delay = INITIAL_RECONNECT_DELAY;
let mut attempts: u32 = 0;
loop {
if attempts >= MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS {
log::error!(
"SSH tunnel ({connect_host}:{connect_port}): max reconnect attempts ({MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS}) exhausted, giving up"
);
return;
}
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
match connect_and_authenticate(
&connect_host,
connect_port,
&ssh_user,
&ssh_password,
&ssh_key_path,
&ssh_key_passphrase,
use_ssh_agent,
&ssh_agent_sock_path,
&auth_method,
connect_timeout_secs,
&known_hosts_path,
)
.await
{
Ok(new_session) => {
session = new_session;
log::info!(
"SSH tunnel reconnected to {}:{} (attempt {})",
connect_host,
connect_port,
attempts + 1
);
break;
}
Err(e) => {
attempts += 1;
log::error!(
"SSH reconnect failed ({}:{}, attempt {attempts}/{MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS}): {e}",
connect_host,
connect_port,
);
// Exponential backoff: double the delay, cap at MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY
delay = std::cmp::min(delay * 2, MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY);
}
}
}
}
}
struct TunnelEntry {
handles: Vec<JoinHandle<()>>,
local_port: u16,
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct PlannedTunnel {
connect_host: String,
connect_port: u16,
remote_host: String,
remote_port: u16,
}
pub struct TunnelManager {
tunnels: Mutex<HashMap<String, TunnelEntry>>,
/// dbx-managed known_hosts path (`<data_dir>/known_hosts`) threaded into
/// every SSH connection for host-key verification.
known_hosts_path: PathBuf,
}
impl Default for TunnelManager {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new(PathBuf::new())
}
}
impl TunnelManager {
pub fn new(data_dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
let known_hosts_path = data_dir.join("known_hosts");
Self { tunnels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), known_hosts_path }
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub async fn start_tunnel(
&self,
connection_id: &str,
ssh_host: &str,
ssh_port: u16,
ssh_user: &str,
ssh_password: &str,
ssh_key_path: &str,
ssh_key_passphrase: &str,
use_ssh_agent: bool,
ssh_agent_sock_path: &str,
auth_method: &str,
connect_timeout_secs: u64,
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: u16,
expose_to_lan: bool,
) -> Result<u16, String> {
// Check cache under lock to avoid race with concurrent callers.
// Also evict stale entries whose background task has exited.
{
let mut tunnels = self.tunnels.lock().await;
if let Some(port) = Self::get_active_port(&mut tunnels, connection_id) {
return Ok(port);
}
}
// Slow SSH connection — do this outside the lock.
let (handle, local_port) = spawn_tunnel(
ssh_host,
ssh_port,
ssh_user,
ssh_password,
ssh_key_path,
ssh_key_passphrase,
use_ssh_agent,
ssh_agent_sock_path,
auth_method,
connect_timeout_secs,
&self.known_hosts_path,
remote_host,
remote_port,
expose_to_lan,
)
.await?;
// Re-check under lock: another caller may have beaten us.
let mut tunnels = self.tunnels.lock().await;
if let Some(port) = Self::get_active_port(&mut tunnels, connection_id) {
// Another task already created a live tunnel; abort ours.
handle.abort();
return Ok(port);
}
tunnels.insert(connection_id.to_string(), TunnelEntry { handles: vec![handle], local_port });
Ok(local_port)
}
/// Returns the local port for a cached tunnel entry, or `None` if the entry
/// is stale (all background handles have exited).
fn get_active_port(tunnels: &mut HashMap<String, TunnelEntry>, connection_id: &str) -> Option<u16> {
let entry = tunnels.get(connection_id)?;
if entry.handles.iter().all(|h| h.is_finished()) {
tunnels.remove(connection_id);
return None;
}
Some(entry.local_port)
}
pub async fn start_chain(
&self,
connection_id: &str,
hops: &[SshTunnelConfig],
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: u16,
) -> Result<u16, String> {
if hops.is_empty() {
return Err("No SSH tunnel hops configured".to_string());
}
// Check cache under lock; evict stale entries.
{
let mut tunnels = self.tunnels.lock().await;
if let Some(port) = Self::get_active_port(&mut tunnels, connection_id) {
return Ok(port);
}
}
let mut handles = Vec::new();
let mut next_connect_endpoint: Option<(String, u16)> = None;
let mut final_local_port = 0;
for (index, hop) in hops.iter().enumerate() {
let is_last = index + 1 == hops.len();
let (connect_host, connect_port) =
next_connect_endpoint.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| (hop.host.clone(), hop.port));
let (target_host, target_port) = if is_last {
(remote_host.to_string(), remote_port)
} else {
(hops[index + 1].host.clone(), hops[index + 1].port)
};
let (handle, local_port) = spawn_tunnel(
&connect_host,
connect_port,
&hop.user,
&hop.password,
&hop.key_path,
&hop.key_passphrase,
hop.use_ssh_agent,
&hop.ssh_agent_sock_path,
&hop.auth_method,
effective_hop_timeout(hop),
&self.known_hosts_path,
&target_host,
target_port,
is_last && hop.expose_lan,
)
.await
.map_err(|err| format!("SSH hop {} failed: {err}", index + 1))?;
handles.push(handle);
final_local_port = local_port;
next_connect_endpoint = Some(("127.0.0.1".to_string(), local_port));
}
// Re-check under lock: another caller may have beaten us.
let mut tunnels = self.tunnels.lock().await;
if let Some(port) = Self::get_active_port(&mut tunnels, connection_id) {
for handle in handles {
handle.abort();
}
return Ok(port);
}
tunnels.insert(connection_id.to_string(), TunnelEntry { handles, local_port: final_local_port });
Ok(final_local_port)
}
pub async fn local_port(&self, connection_id: &str) -> Option<u16> {
self.tunnels.lock().await.get(connection_id).map(|entry| entry.local_port)
}
pub async fn stop_tunnel(&self, connection_id: &str) {
if let Some(entry) = self.tunnels.lock().await.remove(connection_id) {
for handle in entry.handles {
handle.abort();
}
}
}
pub async fn stop_tunnels_with_prefix(&self, connection_id_prefix: &str) {
let mut tunnels = self.tunnels.lock().await;
let keys: Vec<String> = tunnels.keys().filter(|key| key.starts_with(connection_id_prefix)).cloned().collect();
for key in keys {
if let Some(entry) = tunnels.remove(&key) {
for handle in entry.handles {
handle.abort();
}
}
}
}
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn spawn_tunnel(
connect_host: &str,
connect_port: u16,
ssh_user: &str,
ssh_password: &str,
ssh_key_path: &str,
ssh_key_passphrase: &str,
use_ssh_agent: bool,
ssh_agent_sock_path: &str,
auth_method: &str,
connect_timeout_secs: u64,
known_hosts_path: &Path,
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: u16,
expose_to_lan: bool,
) -> Result<(JoinHandle<()>, u16), String> {
let local_port = portpicker::pick_unused_port().ok_or("No available port")?;
let bind_addr = if expose_to_lan { "0.0.0.0" } else { "127.0.0.1" };
let listener =
TcpListener::bind((bind_addr, local_port)).await.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to bind local port: {e}"))?;
// Initial connection: fail fast on bad credentials
let session = connect_and_authenticate(
connect_host,
connect_port,
ssh_user,
ssh_password,
ssh_key_path,
ssh_key_passphrase,
use_ssh_agent,
ssh_agent_sock_path,
auth_method,
connect_timeout_secs,
known_hosts_path,
)
.await?;
let handle = tokio::spawn(tunnel_reconnect_loop(
session,
connect_host.to_string(),
connect_port,
ssh_user.to_string(),
ssh_password.to_string(),
ssh_key_path.to_string(),
ssh_key_passphrase.to_string(),
use_ssh_agent,
ssh_agent_sock_path.to_string(),
auth_method.to_string(),
connect_timeout_secs,
known_hosts_path.to_path_buf(),
listener,
remote_host.to_string(),
remote_port,
));
Ok((handle, local_port))
}
fn effective_hop_timeout(hop: &SshTunnelConfig) -> u64 {
if hop.connect_timeout_secs == 0 {
crate::models::connection::default_ssh_connect_timeout_secs()
} else {
hop.connect_timeout_secs
}
}
/// Serializes every test that mutates the process-global SSH prompt gateway so
/// they cannot clobber each other's gateway (or the MITM fail-closed test,
/// which relies on *no* gateway being installed). Test-only.
#[cfg(test)]
static PROMPT_TEST_LOCK: tokio::sync::Mutex<()> = tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new(());
#[cfg(test)]
fn plan_chain(
hops: &[SshTunnelConfig],
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: u16,
local_ports: &[u16],
) -> Vec<PlannedTunnel> {
let mut planned = Vec::new();
let mut next_connect_endpoint: Option<(String, u16)> = None;
for (index, hop) in hops.iter().enumerate() {
let is_last = index + 1 == hops.len();
let (connect_host, connect_port) =
next_connect_endpoint.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| (hop.host.clone(), hop.port));
let (target_host, target_port) = if is_last {
(remote_host.to_string(), remote_port)
} else {
(hops[index + 1].host.clone(), hops[index + 1].port)
};
planned.push(PlannedTunnel { connect_host, connect_port, remote_host: target_host, remote_port: target_port });
if let Some(local_port) = local_ports.get(index) {
next_connect_endpoint = Some(("127.0.0.1".to_string(), *local_port));
}
}
planned
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::SshClient;
use super::PROMPT_TEST_LOCK;
use super::{
effective_hop_timeout, openssh_padding_len, plan_chain, read_ssh_string,
sanitize_unencrypted_openssh_comment_bytes, server_offers_password, ssh_client_config, HostKeyState,
HostKeyVerifier, PlannedTunnel, TunnelManager,
};
use crate::db::ssh_prompt;
use crate::models::connection::{default_ssh_connect_timeout_secs, SshTunnelConfig};
use russh::client;
use russh::client::Handler;
use russh::keys::decode_secret_key;
use russh::keys::ssh_key::PublicKey;
use russh::server::{self, Auth, Server};
use russh::MethodKind;
use russh::MethodSet;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tempfile::tempdir;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
fn push_u32(bytes: &mut Vec<u8>, value: u32) {
bytes.extend_from_slice(&value.to_be_bytes());
}
fn push_ssh_string(bytes: &mut Vec<u8>, value: &[u8]) {
push_u32(bytes, value.len() as u32);
bytes.extend_from_slice(value);
}
fn padded_private_blob(comment: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut blob = Vec::new();
push_u32(&mut blob, 7);
push_u32(&mut blob, 7);
blob.extend_from_slice(b"fake-private-key");
push_ssh_string(&mut blob, comment);
for value in 1..=(8 - (blob.len() % 8)) {
blob.push(value as u8);
}
blob
}
fn openssh_container(private_blob: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut bytes = b"openssh-key-v1\0".to_vec();
push_ssh_string(&mut bytes, b"none");
push_ssh_string(&mut bytes, b"none");
push_ssh_string(&mut bytes, b"");
push_u32(&mut bytes, 1);
push_ssh_string(&mut bytes, b"fake-public-key");
push_ssh_string(&mut bytes, private_blob);
bytes
}
fn hop(id: &str, host: &str, port: u16) -> SshTunnelConfig {
SshTunnelConfig {
profile_id: String::new(),
id: id.to_string(),
name: String::new(),
enabled: true,
host: host.to_string(),
port,
user: "user".to_string(),
password: "secret".to_string(),
key_path: String::new(),
key_passphrase: String::new(),
connect_timeout_secs: 5,
expose_lan: false,
use_ssh_agent: false,
ssh_agent_sock_path: String::new(),
auth_method: "password".to_string(),
}
}
#[test]
fn chain_plan_routes_each_hop_to_next_endpoint() {
let hops = vec![hop("a", "bastion-a", 22), hop("b", "bastion-b", 2200)];
let planned = plan_chain(&hops, "db.internal", 5432, &[41001, 41002]);
assert_eq!(
planned,
vec![
PlannedTunnel {
connect_host: "bastion-a".to_string(),
connect_port: 22,
remote_host: "bastion-b".to_string(),
remote_port: 2200,
},
PlannedTunnel {
connect_host: "127.0.0.1".to_string(),
connect_port: 41001,
remote_host: "db.internal".to_string(),
remote_port: 5432,
},
]
);
}
#[test]
fn zero_hop_timeout_uses_default() {
let mut tunnel = hop("a", "bastion-a", 22);
tunnel.connect_timeout_secs = 0;
assert_eq!(effective_hop_timeout(&tunnel), default_ssh_connect_timeout_secs());
}
#[test]
fn ssh_client_config_keeps_legacy_kex_after_safe_defaults() {
let config = ssh_client_config();
let kex = config.preferred.kex;
let curve25519_index = kex.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == russh::kex::CURVE25519).unwrap();
let ecdh_index = kex.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == russh::kex::ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256).unwrap();
let group14_sha1_index = kex.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == russh::kex::DH_G14_SHA1).unwrap();
assert!(curve25519_index < ecdh_index);
assert!(ecdh_index < group14_sha1_index);
}
#[test]
fn ssh_client_config_keeps_legacy_mac_after_safe_defaults() {
let config = ssh_client_config();
let mac = config.preferred.mac;
let sha2_etm_index = mac.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == russh::mac::HMAC_SHA256_ETM).unwrap();
let sha1_etm_index = mac.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == russh::mac::HMAC_SHA1_ETM).unwrap();
let sha1_index = mac.iter().position(|algorithm| *algorithm == russh::mac::HMAC_SHA1).unwrap();
assert!(sha2_etm_index < sha1_etm_index);
assert!(sha1_etm_index < sha1_index);
}
#[test]
fn sanitizes_invalid_openssh_private_key_comment() {
let mut key = openssh_container(&padded_private_blob(&[0xff, 0xfe, b'a']));
sanitize_unencrypted_openssh_comment_bytes(&mut key).unwrap();
let mut pos = b"openssh-key-v1\0".len();
assert_eq!(read_ssh_string(&key, &mut pos).unwrap(), b"none");
let _kdfname = read_ssh_string(&key, &mut pos).unwrap();
let _kdfoptions = read_ssh_string(&key, &mut pos).unwrap();
pos += 4;
let _public_key = read_ssh_string(&key, &mut pos).unwrap();
let private_blob = read_ssh_string(&key, &mut pos).unwrap();
let unpadded_end = private_blob.len() - openssh_padding_len(private_blob).unwrap();
let comment_len_pos = unpadded_end - 4;
assert_eq!(&private_blob[comment_len_pos..unpadded_end], &0u32.to_be_bytes());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn local_port_reuses_existing_chain_entry() {
let manager = TunnelManager::new(std::env::temp_dir().to_path_buf());
assert_eq!(manager.local_port("missing").await, None);
manager.stop_tunnel("missing").await;
}
// --- Host-key verification (MITM hardening) ---------------------------------
/// Builds the public key embedded in [`TEST_SERVER_KEY_PEM`]. The comment
/// is cleared so it matches the comment-less key parsed back from the
/// known_hosts file (real server keys presented during KEX carry no
/// comment, so this mirrors production behaviour).
fn test_server_public_key() -> PublicKey {
let mut key =
decode_secret_key(TEST_SERVER_KEY_PEM, None).expect("decode test server key").public_key().clone();
key.set_comment("");
key
}
#[test]
fn tofu_unknown_host_check_then_learn_records_it() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path.clone());
let key = test_server_public_key();
// Unknown host -> candidate for explicit TOFU (not silently trusted).
assert_eq!(verifier.check("db.example.com", 22, &key).unwrap(), HostKeyState::Unknown);
// User accepts -> record it via learn().
verifier.learn("db.example.com", 22, &key).unwrap();
// Second contact with the same key is now trusted (read back from file).
assert_eq!(verifier.check("db.example.com", 22, &key).unwrap(), HostKeyState::Trusted);
// And the key really landed in the store.
let contents = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
assert!(contents.contains("db.example.com"), "recorded host missing: {contents}");
}
#[test]
fn changed_host_key_is_rejected() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
// Pre-seed the store with a *different* (valid) ed25519 key for the host.
std::fs::write(
&path,
"db.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIA6rWI3G1sz07DnfFlrouTcysQlj2P+jpNSOEWD9OJ3X\n",
)
.unwrap();
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path);
// The server actually presents TEST_SERVER_KEY_PEM's key -> mismatch.
let key = test_server_public_key();
assert!(verifier.check("db.example.com", 22, &key).is_err(), "changed host key must be rejected (MITM)");
}
#[test]
fn unknown_host_without_persist_permission_is_rejected() {
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
// Make the would-be parent a regular file so the store can never be
// created — this is the "no write permission" edge case.
let frozen = dir.path().join("frozen");
std::fs::write(&frozen, b"not a directory").unwrap();
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(frozen.join("known_hosts"));
let key = test_server_public_key();
// Fail-closed: the unknown host is reported as a candidate, but it
// cannot be persisted (no write permission), so we must NOT trust it in
// memory — learn() must error rather than silently accept.
assert_eq!(verifier.check("db.example.com", 22, &key).unwrap(), HostKeyState::Unknown);
assert!(
verifier.learn("db.example.com", 22, &key).is_err(),
"learn must fail when the store is unwritable (fail-closed)"
);
}
// --- Explicit TOFU prompt bridge (HostKeyVerify) ---------------------------
/// Spawns a fake UI gateway that answers every prompt with `answer`.
fn install_fake_prompt_gateway(answer: ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer) {
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<ssh_prompt::SshPromptEnvelope>(8);
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Some(env) = rx.recv().await {
let _ = env.responder.send(answer);
}
});
ssh_prompt::install_ssh_prompt_gateway(tx);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_host_prompt_accept_learns_key() {
let _guard = PROMPT_TEST_LOCK.lock().await;
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path.clone());
let key = test_server_public_key();
install_fake_prompt_gateway(ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer::Accept { remember: true });
let mut client =
SshClient { host_key_verifier: Arc::new(verifier), host: "db.example.com".to_string(), port: 22 };
let trusted = client.check_server_key(&key).await.unwrap();
assert!(trusted, "accepted host key should be trusted");
// The accepted key must be persisted when remember=true.
let contents = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
assert!(contents.contains("db.example.com"), "accepted key should be learned: {contents}");
ssh_prompt::clear_ssh_prompt_gateway();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_host_prompt_accept_without_remember_is_session_only() {
let _guard = PROMPT_TEST_LOCK.lock().await;
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path.clone());
let key = test_server_public_key();
install_fake_prompt_gateway(ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer::Accept { remember: false });
let mut client =
SshClient { host_key_verifier: Arc::new(verifier), host: "db.example.com".to_string(), port: 22 };
let trusted = client.check_server_key(&key).await.unwrap();
assert!(trusted, "accepted host key should be trusted for the session");
// remember=false -> key is NOT persisted.
assert!(
!path.exists() || std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap_or_default().is_empty(),
"key must not be persisted when remember=false"
);
ssh_prompt::clear_ssh_prompt_gateway();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_host_prompt_reject_aborts_handshake() {
let _guard = PROMPT_TEST_LOCK.lock().await;
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path.clone());
let key = test_server_public_key();
install_fake_prompt_gateway(ssh_prompt::SshPromptAnswer::Reject);
let mut client =
SshClient { host_key_verifier: Arc::new(verifier), host: "db.example.com".to_string(), port: 22 };
let trusted = client.check_server_key(&key).await.unwrap();
assert!(!trusted, "rejected host key must not be trusted");
// Rejected -> never persisted.
assert!(
!path.exists() || std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap_or_default().is_empty(),
"rejected key must not be persisted"
);
ssh_prompt::clear_ssh_prompt_gateway();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_host_without_gateway_fails_closed() {
let _guard = PROMPT_TEST_LOCK.lock().await;
// Ensure no gateway is installed so request_ssh_prompt returns None.
ssh_prompt::clear_ssh_prompt_gateway();
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path);
let key = test_server_public_key();
let mut client =
SshClient { host_key_verifier: Arc::new(verifier), host: "db.example.com".to_string(), port: 22 };
let trusted = client.check_server_key(&key).await.unwrap();
// No UI to confirm -> fail-closed, host is not trusted.
assert!(!trusted, "without a gateway, an unknown host must be rejected (fail-closed)");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn trusted_host_skips_prompt() {
let _guard = PROMPT_TEST_LOCK.lock().await;
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(path);
let key = test_server_public_key();
// Pre-seed the store so the host is already trusted.
verifier.learn("db.example.com", 22, &key).unwrap();
// No gateway installed, but the host is trusted so no prompt is needed.
ssh_prompt::clear_ssh_prompt_gateway();
let mut client =
SshClient { host_key_verifier: Arc::new(verifier), host: "db.example.com".to_string(), port: 22 };
let trusted = client.check_server_key(&key).await.unwrap();
assert!(trusted, "a known-trusted host must be accepted without a prompt");
}
// --- key+password fallback policy ------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn password_fallback_only_when_server_offers_it() {
// Server offers only publickey: never leak the password.
let only_key = MethodSet::from(&[MethodKind::PublicKey][..]);
assert!(!server_offers_password(&only_key));
// Server offers password too: safe to fall back.
let with_pw = MethodSet::from(&[MethodKind::PublicKey, MethodKind::Password][..]);
assert!(server_offers_password(&with_pw));
// No methods advertised at all: do NOT send the password, even if a
// `partial_success` flag were present — we intentionally ignore it and
// rely solely on the advertised method list (RFC 4252 §5.1).
let empty = MethodSet::empty();
assert!(!server_offers_password(&empty));
}
// --- MITM hardening: a changed/unknown host never receives the password ---
const TEST_SERVER_KEY_PEM: &str = r#"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
QyNTUxOQAAACAVDlhwKBk+QMZN+WNAUKL6qLr3hf3S5p1TdSK4hMhLxwAAAJD9wI28/cCN
vAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAVDlhwKBk+QMZN+WNAUKL6qLr3hf3S5p1TdSK4hMhLxw
AAAEDxqdMQX37UdhziSi5Br3kyRM/Xrpo9ZcXoguYkeogq0hUOWHAoGT5Axk35Y0BQovqo
uveF/dLmnVN1IriEyEvHAAAACGRieC10ZXN0AQIDBAU=
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----"#;
/// Minimal SSH server used to prove the client never sends a password to a
/// host whose key does not match the known-hosts store. `auth_password`
/// flips `password_attempted` so the test can assert it was never called.
struct MitmServer {
password_attempted: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl server::Server for MitmServer {
type Handler = MitmHandler;
fn new_client(&mut self, _peer: Option<std::net::SocketAddr>) -> MitmHandler {
MitmHandler { password_attempted: self.password_attempted.clone() }
}
}
struct MitmHandler {
password_attempted: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl server::Handler for MitmHandler {
type Error = russh::Error;
async fn auth_password(&mut self, _user: &str, _password: &str) -> Result<Auth, Self::Error> {
self.password_attempted.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(Auth::reject())
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_host_without_persist_permission_does_not_leak_password() {
let _guard = PROMPT_TEST_LOCK.lock().await;
// This test proves the client never sends a password to an untrusted
// host. It must run with NO prompt gateway installed so the handshake
// fails closed (no UI to confirm the key -> reject before auth).
ssh_prompt::clear_ssh_prompt_gateway();
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::time::Duration;
let password_attempted = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let server_key = decode_secret_key(TEST_SERVER_KEY_PEM, None).expect("decode test server key");
// Advertise password auth so it *would* be attempted if the handshake
// ever reached the authentication phase.
let server_config = server::Config { keys: vec![server_key], methods: MethodSet::all(), ..Default::default() };
let port = portpicker::pick_unused_port().expect("no free port");
let mut server = MitmServer { password_attempted: password_attempted.clone() };
let server_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = server.run_on_address(Arc::new(server_config), ("127.0.0.1", port)).await;
});
// Let the listener bind before the client connects.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
// Point the verifier at a path whose parent is a file, so the unknown
// host key can NEVER be persisted. dbx must fail-closed: abort the
// handshake and never send a password to an untrusted endpoint (the
// old store silently trusted it in memory — this must not happen).
let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
let frozen = dir.path().join("frozen");
std::fs::write(&frozen, b"not a directory").unwrap();
let verifier = HostKeyVerifier::new(frozen.join("known_hosts"));
let handler = SshClient { host_key_verifier: Arc::new(verifier), host: "127.0.0.1".to_string(), port };
let client_config = Arc::new(ssh_client_config());
let connect_result =
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), client::connect(client_config, ("127.0.0.1", port), handler))
.await;
// The handshake must abort at the host-key check, so the server must
// never have been asked for a password.
assert!(
!password_attempted.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
"password auth must NOT be attempted for an untrusted host when the key cannot be persisted"
);
// And the connection itself must not succeed.
assert!(
connect_result.is_err() || connect_result.unwrap().is_err(),
"connection should fail when the host key cannot be verified/persisted"
);
server_task.abort();
}
}