Files
Max P. a4908d4af4 enhance(actions): add OIDC workload identity support (#39052)
Adds OpenID Connect workload identity to Gitea Actions: jobs declaring
`id-token: write` can request short-lived tokens to authenticate to
cloud providers and other services without stored secrets. Tokens follow
GitHub's format, so clients like `@actions/core` and existing trust
policies carry over.

- Issuer at `/api/actions/oidc` with discovery and JWKS, signed with a
dedicated RS256 key
- GitHub's claims, including `workflow_ref`, `job_workflow_ref` and the
immutable `repo:owner@id/repo@id:ref:...` subject
- `id-token: write` or `write-all` grant it, default permissions and
fork pull requests never get it, owner and repository maximum
permissions can disable it
- Reusable workflows record the exact ref they were loaded from, and
dispatch rejects refs that only resolve through a same-named tag
- Generated signing keys are written atomically, and generated ES384 and
ES512 OAuth2 keys use their own curves instead of P-256
- `github.ref_type` is `branch` for pull request runs, like on GitHub

Fixes https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/26383
Fixes https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/33681
Docs: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/526
Assisted-by: ChatGPT:gpt-5.6-sol, Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
2026-10-18 07:08:55 +00:00

113 lines
2.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2024 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package actions
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"gitea.dev/modules/json"
"gitea.dev/modules/log"
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
)
const idTokenRequestScope = "Actions.IDTokenRequest" // separate from the runtime token, which runners also send to cache servers
type actionsClaims struct {
jwt.RegisteredClaims
Scp string `json:"scp"`
TaskID int64
RunID int64
JobID int64
Ac string `json:"ac"`
}
type actionsCacheScope struct {
Scope string
Permission actionsCachePermission
}
type actionsCachePermission int
const (
actionsCachePermissionRead = 1 << iota
actionsCachePermissionWrite
)
func CreateAuthorizationToken(taskID, runID, jobID int64) (string, error) {
ac, err := json.Marshal(&[]actionsCacheScope{
{
Scope: "",
Permission: actionsCachePermissionWrite,
},
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return signActionsClaims(actionsClaims{
Scp: fmt.Sprintf("Actions.Results:%d:%d", runID, jobID),
Ac: string(ac),
TaskID: taskID,
RunID: runID,
JobID: jobID,
})
}
func signActionsClaims(claims actionsClaims) (string, error) {
now := time.Now()
claims.RegisteredClaims = jwt.RegisteredClaims{
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(1*time.Hour + setting.Actions.EndlessTaskTimeout)),
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
}
return jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims).SignedString(setting.GetGeneralTokenSigningSecret())
}
func ParseAuthorizationToken(req *http.Request) (int64, error) {
h := req.Header.Get("Authorization")
if h == "" {
return 0, nil
}
parts := strings.SplitN(h, " ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
log.Error("split token failed: %s", h)
return 0, errors.New("split token failed")
}
return TokenToTaskID(parts[1])
}
// TokenToTaskID returns the TaskID associated with the provided JWT token
func TokenToTaskID(token string) (int64, error) {
return taskIDFromToken(token, false)
}
func taskIDFromToken(token string, idTokenRequest bool) (int64, error) {
parsedToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(token, &actionsClaims{}, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", t.Header["alg"])
}
return setting.GetGeneralTokenSigningSecret(), nil
})
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
claims, ok := parsedToken.Claims.(*actionsClaims)
if !parsedToken.Valid || !ok {
return 0, errors.New("invalid token claim")
}
if (claims.Scp == idTokenRequestScope) != idTokenRequest {
return 0, errors.New("unexpected token scope")
}
return claims.TaskID, nil
}