Files
ginuerzh de301e8cfb refactor(handler/http): drop govalidator dep, inline DNS name check
Replace the sole govalidator.IsDNSName call in normalizeRequest with a local
isDNSName helper that mirrors the library's exact behavior (empty/size guard,
net.ParseIP exclusion, and the same label regex), removing the
asaskevich/govalidator dependency from x.
2026-09-02 17:01:58 +08:00

162 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

package http
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"hash/crc32"
"net"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
)
// isDNSName reports whether host is a valid DNS name. It mirrors
// govalidator.IsDNSName (which was removed as a dependency): IP literals and
// empty hosts are not DNS names, the dot-stripped length is capped at 255,
// and each dot-separated label follows RFC-ish [A-Za-z0-9_-] rules.
func isDNSName(host string) bool {
if host == "" || len(strings.ReplaceAll(host, ".", "")) > 255 {
return false
}
return net.ParseIP(host) == nil && dnsNameRE.MatchString(host)
}
var dnsNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^([a-zA-Z0-9_]{1}[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{0,62}){1}(\.[a-zA-Z0-9_]{1}[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{0,62})*[\._]?$`)
// decodeServerName decodes a GOST v2 Gost-Target / X-Gost-Target header
// value. The encoding is: base64(CRC32(hostname) + base64(hostname)).
// It verifies the CRC32 checksum before returning the decoded hostname.
func decodeServerName(s string) (string, error) {
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if len(b) < 4 {
return "", errors.New("invalid name")
}
v, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(string(b[4:]))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if crc32.ChecksumIEEE(v) != binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]) {
return "", errors.New("invalid name")
}
return string(v), nil
}
// basicProxyAuth extracts the username and password from an HTTP Basic
// authentication Proxy-Authorization header value. It returns ok=false
// if the value is empty, not a Basic scheme, or not valid base64.
func basicProxyAuth(proxyAuth string) (username, password string, ok bool) {
if proxyAuth == "" {
return
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(proxyAuth, "Basic ") {
return
}
c, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(proxyAuth, "Basic "))
if err != nil {
return
}
cs := string(c)
username, password, ok = strings.Cut(cs, ":")
if !ok {
return
}
return username, password, true
}
// upgradeType returns the upgrade protocol token from an HTTP header.
// It returns "" if the Connection header does not include an "Upgrade"
// token or if the Upgrade header is absent.
func upgradeType(h http.Header) string {
if !httpguts.HeaderValuesContainsToken(h["Connection"], "Upgrade") {
return ""
}
return h.Get("Upgrade")
}
// normalizeHostPort ensures a host string includes a port. If the host
// already contains a port, it is returned unchanged. Otherwise the
// defaultPort is appended. IPv6 addresses are correctly handled: bare
// addresses get bracketed by net.JoinHostPort, and bracketed addresses
// are stripped of brackets before re-joining.
func normalizeHostPort(host, defaultPort string) string {
if _, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(host); port == "" {
return net.JoinHostPort(strings.Trim(host, "[]"), defaultPort)
}
return host
}
// buildConnectResponse returns the raw bytes of an HTTP 200 Connection
// established response with the given Proxy-Agent header.
func buildConnectResponse(proxyAgent string) []byte {
return []byte("HTTP/1.1 200 Connection established\r\n" +
"Proxy-Agent: " + proxyAgent + "\r\n\r\n")
}
// NormalizedRequest holds the parsed target address and network from an
// HTTP proxy request after URL inference, GOST v2 compatibility decoding,
// and host normalisation.
type NormalizedRequest struct {
Network string // "tcp" or "udp"
Addr string // host:port (default port appended when absent)
}
// setRequestHost applies a GOST v2 target-header override consistently. It
// updates req.Host (used by bypass checks, logging, and recorder state) and
// req.URL.Host (used by http.Transport to select the connection destination)
// so that policy evaluation and upstream dialing resolve to the same
// authority. Otherwise a target header could authorize one host while the
// transport connects to the absolute-URL host.
func setRequestHost(req *http.Request, host string) {
req.Host = host
if req.URL.Scheme == "" {
req.URL.Scheme = "http"
}
req.URL.Host = host
}
// normalizeRequest extracts the target address and network from an HTTP
// request. It infers the URL scheme when absent, decodes GOST v2
// compatibility headers (Gost-Target, X-Gost-Target), detects the
// transport protocol from X-Gost-Protocol, and normalises the host to
// include a port.
//
// The function mutates req.URL.Scheme and req.Host as side effects so
// that the caller's request reflects the inferred target.
func normalizeRequest(req *http.Request) *NormalizedRequest {
if !req.URL.IsAbs() {
host := req.Host
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
host = h
}
if isDNSName(host) || net.ParseIP(host) != nil {
req.URL.Scheme = "http"
}
}
network := req.Header.Get("X-Gost-Protocol")
if network != "udp" {
network = "tcp"
}
if v := req.Header.Get("Gost-Target"); v != "" {
if h, err := decodeServerName(v); err == nil {
setRequestHost(req, h)
}
}
if v := req.Header.Get("X-Gost-Target"); v != "" {
if h, err := decodeServerName(v); err == nil {
setRequestHost(req, h)
}
}
addr := normalizeHostPort(req.Host, "80")
return &NormalizedRequest{Network: network, Addr: addr}
}