Fresh Docker installs created the admin as admin@sub2api.local and accepted
any ADMIN_PASSWORD (e.g. "123456"), making them easy brute-force targets.
- Generate a random admin-<12 hex>@sub2api.local login email when
ADMIN_EMAIL is empty; drop the fixed default from .env.example and the
compose files, and have docker-deploy.sh write a random ADMIN_EMAIL.
- Validate user-supplied ADMIN_PASSWORD (8-72 bytes) and ADMIN_EMAIL on the
auto-setup path, only when an admin is actually about to be created, so
existing deployments are never blocked at startup.
- Align validateEmail with the login endpoint's email binding so setup can no
longer create an admin that can never log in (e.g. "a@b", "Name <a@b.com>").
- Cap validatePassword at bcrypt's 72-byte limit; the CLI reuses it and now
defaults to a random admin email instead of admin@example.com.
- Update READMEs/deploy docs to stop suggesting guessable credentials.
An order-creation signature (visible to the payer in popup submit.php
URLs) could be replayed as a payment-success notification, with no
merchant key required. Two compounding defects:
- CanonicalizeReturnURL kept client-supplied query parameters, so a
return_url ending in '&trade_status=TRADE_SUCCESS' entered the signed
order string verbatim;
- the sign base string concatenates values unescaped, so a callback that
decodes return_url only up to the smuggled pair re-sorts to a
byte-identical sign base and passes verification.
Fixes:
- CanonicalizeReturnURL now drops client query parameters entirely; the
server builds its own signed set and the client query has no
legitimate use;
- VerifyNotification rejects any parameter outside the genuine async
notify set (pid/trade_no/out_trade_no/type/name/money/trade_status/
param/sign/sign_type), failing closed against the whole smuggling
class regardless of the injection point.
Regression tests cover the PoC payload, full order-URL replay, genuine
callback acceptance, unknown-parameter rejection (including empty
values), and the return_url smuggling strip. Genuinely paid orders that
an exotic upstream variant might reject are still recovered through the
existing upstream QueryOrder reconcile path.
When an API key with quota or rate limits was deleted while a request was
still in flight, the key counter update matched no rows and returned
ErrAPIKeyNotFound, rolling back the whole billing transaction including the
balance/subscription charge. Skip the key-scoped counters in that case and
keep settling the user and account side as usual.
The create form shows the upstream billing auto-probe toggle for every
API-key platform and enables it by default. TypeSafe was added as an
API-key platform but not to IsUpstreamBillingProbeIdentity, so creating a
TypeSafe account with the default form state fails with
400 UPSTREAM_BILLING_PROBE_ACCOUNT_INVALID ("account is not an API key
account").
TypeSafe accounts store credentials.api_key/base_url like every other
API-key platform, which is all the probe reads. Add TypeSafe to the probe
identity set, and add typesafe.ai to the official API domains so accounts
on the default https://api.typesafe.ai base URL record "unsupported"
without sending the key to a path that cannot exist, matching the other
official providers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- R1-1: an explicit upstream "unavailable" answer now fences the organization
for 15 minutes (CLAUDE_RESET_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE) instead of 24h; ambiguous
outcomes keep the 24h fence. Frontend tells the operator to retry later.
- R1-2: rotate the idempotency key after definite pre-claim refusals (busy,
not available, unresolved, upstream unavailable); map IDEMPOTENCY_IN_PROGRESS
and IDEMPOTENCY_RETRY_BACKOFF to clear zh/en messages.
- R1-3: redeem reason and cleared windows pass only through explicit
allowlists, so upstream values can never echo a grant ID to clients.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /admin/accounts/:id/claude/reset-credits/redeem (Idempotency-Key
required, same middleware chain as the Codex reset-quota route). The server
re-queries eligibility and claims only the upstream next_grant_id when it is
redeemable; grant/org IDs never reach the client. Claims are serialized by
account and organization Redis leases, and a durable per-organization fence
in the idempotency table blocks further redemption after an unconfirmed
outcome (settles after 24h). Ported from upstream PR #7591.
Co-authored-by: korkin25 <eugeny.kuzakov@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Drop selection_token (unsalted hash of a short grant ID, reversible) and
claudeGrantSelection from the read-only DTO; assert it never serializes.
- query() returns only the projected result; no raw upstream block escapes.
- Clear a cooldown_until that is already past, using the same `now` as the
redeemable check; the cell also shows the cooldown only when in the future.
- Invalidate in-flight queries when account id, platform or type changes.
- Sort the earliest-expiry fallback by parsed timestamp, invalid/missing last.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Show resets held (sum of resets_left) on the count button, matching the
Codex count; flag "not usable now" when none is redeemable yet, instead
of showing 0 while a grant exists.
- Pick the redeemable (next) grant for the expiry chip, falling back to
the earliest expiry, rather than assuming credits[0] is next.
- Render a single ClaudeResetCreditsCell across usage states so a query
started while usage loads is not lost on remount.
- Drop an unrelated google/subcommands go.sum entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
shaw