glm-5.2 has no entry in the fallback table, so getFallbackPricing falls
through to `strings.Contains(modelLower, "glm-5")` and prices it at
GLM-5 rates ($1.00 in / $3.20 out per MTok) instead of the official
z.ai rates ($1.40 / $4.40) — roughly 27% under.
LiteLLM carries no bare `glm-5.2` key either (only provider-prefixed
`cloudflare/@cf/zai-org/glm-5.2` and `fireworks_ai/.../glm-5p2`, which
the lookup candidates never match), so the request always lands on the
fallback path and the discrepancy shows up directly in usage logs.
Add the glm-5.2 entry (same price as glm-5.1 per docs.z.ai) and match it
before the bare `glm-5` branch, with a note that dotted variants must
precede it. The existing regression test asserting the old glm-5 price
is updated accordingly.
Source: https://docs.z.ai/guides/overview/pricing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The count_tokens path now strips max_tokens; this sibling test also
exercises ForwardCountTokens but still asserted max_tokens preservation.
Flip its assertion to expect the field is filtered, matching
CountTokensFiltersGenerationFields.
- Move pool mode check before the status switch so 401/402/403/5xx
all skip tempUnschedule consistently
- Skip rateLimitGrok in updateGrokUsageSnapshot for pool mode
- Expand test coverage to all affected status codes
The proxy stream circuit introduced in v0.1.164 (#4749) removes every
account behind a quarantined proxy from scheduling. When all schedulable
accounts share one proxy (a common deployment), two mid-stream
disconnects within a minute zeroed out capacity for 10 minutes and every
request failed with 502. One HTTP/2 connection loss also killed all
multiplexed streams at once, tripping the threshold from a single event.
- Quarantine now degrades to a preference: when the only reason no
account is available is proxy quarantine, selection retries once with
the quarantine bypassed, so capacity can never reach zero.
- Disconnects within 3s per proxy collapse into one failure event.
- Add gateway.openai_proxy_stream_circuit.disabled escape hatch.
- A completed stream still clears the quarantine immediately; TTL,
thresholds and recording guards are unchanged.
Real claude-cli/2.1.220 samples insert <category>...</category> between
</block> and <reason>, breaking the previous literal marker.
Also fix an unchecked type assertion in the test suite.
UserRepository.Update and APIKeyRepository.Update rewrote the whole row on
every call, regardless of which fields the caller meant to change. Several
columns on those tables are maintained by dedicated atomic paths (balance
deduction, quota and rate-limit counters, limit adjustments, activity
timestamps), so a caller holding a slightly older snapshot could silently
roll them back - a lost update.
Both methods now take an explicit column mask and persist only the columns
the caller declares; everything else keeps its current database value.
- All user and API-key call sites declare exactly what they mutate, which
turns admin edits and profile saves into genuine partial updates.
- Email uniqueness locking/lookup and allowed_groups sync only run when
those fields are part of the update.
- UserUpdateFields deliberately has no balance/total_recharged members, so
Update cannot touch them. New AdjustBalance/SetBalance apply the change in
a single statement and return before/after values; admin balance
adjustment uses them instead of read-modify-write.
- promo_codes.used_count is no longer written by Update; it is only ever
incremented by the redemption path.
- The billing hot path that marks an API key quota-exhausted writes only
status.
- Dropped a no-op row write in RevokeAllUserTokens: users has no
token_version column, so it persisted nothing while still overwriting
concurrently-updated columns.
Adds integration coverage that a stale snapshot cannot revert concurrent
atomic writes, and unit coverage pinning the column set each entry point
declares.
A hijacked session must not be able to silently add a passkey as a
persistent backdoor or remove the victim's credentials. Registration
(begin) and deletion now verify the account password server-side,
reusing the existing PASSWORD_REQUIRED / PASSWORD_INCORRECT errors.
The password is used instead of TOTP step-up so the guard also protects
deployments that never configured a TOTP encryption key. The password
key in both request bodies is covered by the audit middleware's
key-substring redaction, so no credential material reaches audit_logs.
Frontend: the add-passkey form gains a current-password field, and the
delete confirmation is now a dialog with a password input (replacing
window.confirm), mirroring the TOTP disable dialog. Backend error
messages (e.g. wrong password) are surfaced instead of the generic
failure toast. Rename remains password-free as it is cosmetic.
- parseSettings now reports passkey_enabled=false whenever the WebAuthn
deployment config is absent: a stale "true" row left behind after the
config is removed previously made the admin update gate reject every
settings save while the UI toggle was disabled, leaving no recovery
path from the admin panel. Added a regression test.
- update the admin settings API contract goldens with the new
passkey_enabled/passkey_configured/passkey_rp_id/passkey_rp_origins
fields.
- errcheck: check rows.Close in passkey repository (repo convention).
- staticcheck QF1001: apply De Morgan's law in WebAuthn origin scheme
validation.
Zven