Review follow-ups on the reset-credit caching flow:
- Recover account state BEFORE (and independently of) the reset-credit
display cache. A failed cache refresh could previously abort the run and
leave the account rate-limited — the very reason the credit was spent
(#3672 / #3740). The recovered account row is now returned even when the
cache refresh fails.
- Run the post-reset bookkeeping on a detached, time-boxed context and give
the panel reset call a larger timeout. A client abort no longer strands a
consumed (non-refundable) credit with an unrecovered account, and the
chained upstream calls can no longer exceed the client timeout and invite a
retry that spends a second credit.
- Persist the reset-credit snapshot through POST /accounts/:id/quota/refresh
instead of a side-effecting GET flag, so the write is covered by the audit
middleware. A rejected snapshot write now degrades to cache_persisted=false
instead of turning a successful upstream read into a 502 that left the card
without a credit count and the reset button permanently disabled.
- Reject snapshots whose positive count carries no expiration entries, and
drop expired credits (clamping the count) when rehydrating, so a stale
cache can no longer light up the reset button.
- Keep nil quota / rate-limit services nil in the handler's interface fields;
storing a nil *Service made the "not enabled" guards non-nil.
- Time-box the usage-refresh suppression and reuse handleAccountUpdated so the
patched row also enters the auto-refresh silent window.
Implements #2646: the risk-control content audit can now send OpenAI
Moderations requests through a proxy from IP Management - Proxy Servers.
Backend:
- ContentModerationConfig gains proxy_id (nil = direct, unchanged default)
- update semantics: null keeps, 0 clears, >0 selects (validated to exist)
- moderation calls build the client via the shared httpclient pool; proxy
resolution failure surfaces as a moderation error and never silently
falls back to direct connection
- proxy_id -> URL resolution cached 60s (single-entry, invalidated on
config save) so the pre-block hot path does not hit the DB per request
- test-key endpoint accepts proxy_id too (null = saved config's proxy,
0 = force direct), so input-key/saved-key tests exercise the same path
- proxy usage/inactivity logged (content_moderation.proxy_enabled /
proxy_not_active) without leaking credentials
Frontend:
- ProxySelector in the risk-control basic settings tab, proxy list loaded
non-blockingly; save and test payloads carry proxy_id; zh/en i18n
- Add compact_home_enabled setting to provide a minimal landing page
- Preserves custom home_content priority over compact mode
- Renders only site identity, navigation, and login/dashboard link
- Avoids marketing copy that triggers anti-fraud systems
- Includes focused backend/frontend tests and i18n support
Fixes#5065
The in-place update ran entirely inside c.Request.Context(). Browsers and
reverse proxies commonly abort long-idle requests (axios global timeout
30s, nginx proxy_read_timeout 60s by default), which canceled the request
context mid-download and killed every slow update with
'download failed: context canceled' while the version stayed unchanged.
Users behind slow GitHub links saw the update button fail at a wall-clock
ceiling (~60s) on every attempt (#4504).
- Run PerformUpdate and RollbackToVersion on a context detached from the
request (context.WithoutCancel) and bounded by a 15-minute deadline so
the 10-minute GitHub download client owns its own timeout. A client
disconnect no longer aborts the binary swap; retries then hit the
system operation lock or report 'Already up to date'.
- Raise the frontend timeout for the update/rollback calls from the
global 30s axios default to 15 minutes so the browser can actually
wait for the result.
Fixes#4504
Admins often recreate groups with the same pricing, routing, and account membership. A server-side duplicate creates an inactive copy for review, preserves eligible account priorities, and recovers ambiguous retries without creating extra groups.
Constraint: Group has no neutral JSON metadata field for durable operation recovery
Constraint: Model routing references account IDs, so copied configuration requires matching bindings
Rejected: Rebuild from the list response | it omits configuration and account priority details
Rejected: Store operation identity in business configuration | it would pollute real group settings
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated groups inactive until an administrator reviews the copied configuration
Tested: Go unit and full tests, go vet, integration-tag compile, frontend Vitest, lint, typecheck, production build, and Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
Admins often recreate monitors with the same endpoint, model, and request settings. A server-side duplicate keeps the stored API key out of the browser, creates a disabled copy for review, and uses stable operation identity to recover ambiguous retries without creating extra rows.
Constraint: Stored monitor API keys must never be returned to the browser
Constraint: Applying a request template must preserve internal duplicate recovery metadata
Rejected: Rebuild the monitor from list data | list responses only contain a masked API key
Rejected: Copy runtime state and history | a duplicate should start as an unverified configuration
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated monitors disabled until an administrator reviews and enables them
Tested: Go unit tests for repository, service, and admin handler; integration-tag compile; go vet; golangci-lint v2.9; frontend Vitest, ESLint, typecheck, production build; Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
Ambiguous idempotency-store failures can occur after the account transaction commits. Scope durable recovery markers to the authenticated admin, retain the operation key across reloads, and recover only an already committed copy without rerunning active work.
Constraint: Generic idempotent handlers may legitimately remain active while a recovery lookup is attempted
Rejected: Reclaim or rerun an in-progress duplicate request | can execute account creation concurrently
Rejected: Recover by source account and key alone | allows another admin to observe the committed copy
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep ambiguous-response recovery read-only and bind durable operation markers to the authenticated actor
Tested: Full Go unit suite, go vet, server build, integration-test compilation; frontend lint, typecheck, 1,030 Vitest tests, and production build
Not-tested: Docker-backed PostgreSQL integration runtime because Docker is unavailable
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#1379
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#2928
Admins often need another account with the same provider and routing configuration. Duplicate on the server so credentials never return to the browser, preserve exact group priorities atomically, start the copy paused, and recover the same copy after ambiguous idempotency-store failures.
Constraint: Admin account responses redact credentials, so duplication must remain server-side
Constraint: OAuth and setup-token credentials rotate and must not be shared across account rows
Rejected: Copy raw account JSON to the clipboard | exposes credentials outside the server
Rejected: Duplicate rotating credentials | account-scoped refresh locks can race token rotation
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep copies paused, avoid automatic upstream probes, and exclude rotating credential types unless token ownership is redesigned
Tested: Targeted Go tests, Go vet, server build; frontend lint, typecheck, Vitest suite, production build; integration test compiled
Not-tested: Docker-backed PostgreSQL execution because Docker is unavailable
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#1379
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#2928
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