docs/faq: add SELinux relabeling entry

This commit is contained in:
shyney7
2026-05-17 10:14:21 -05:00
committed by trapexit
parent 7ec6f8e2f2
commit 89b4046d11
@@ -149,6 +149,70 @@ It is generally recommended to not use user namespacing / id mapping
given the complication it introduces.
## Does mergerfs work with SELinux relabeling?
FUSE filesystems, including mergerfs, do not support per-inode
SELinux labels (see [Red Hat bug
1272868](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1272868) and the
[upstream fuse-devel
thread](https://sourceforge.net/p/fuse/mailman/fuse-devel/thread/CAN9vWDLGA4%3Dg3peKVWkX7gLRiVUUvJAQx9kiXHgqdeX6eh0MYA%40mail.gmail.com/)).
When a container runtime such as Podman or Docker is asked to relabel
a bind mount with the `:z` or `:Z` mount option, it first probes the
source for `security.selinux` xattr support. On a FUSE path that
probe returns `EOPNOTSUPP` and the runtime skips relabeling entirely.
Files inside the mount keep the `fusefs_t` type assigned by the
kernel. No tree walk is performed and no journal noise is produced at
default verbosity. The runtime logs `Labeling not supported on
"<path>"` only at debug level (for example
`podman --log-level=debug`). The flag is therefore a no-op against a
mergerfs mount; not harmful, but misleading.
Containers can still read and write a mergerfs pool without `:z`
because two independent access checks must succeed and both can be
satisfied without any relabel:
* **SELinux:** on Fedora, RHEL / CentOS Stream, and SUSE the shipped
[container-selinux](https://github.com/containers/container-selinux)
policy already permits the `container_t` process type to manage
files of type `fusefs_t`. See `container_selinux(8)`.
* **DAC:** the in-container UID and GID must still be able to read
and write the files on the underlying branches. With rootless
Podman this is most easily arranged by aligning the container UID
with the host owner of the branches (for example
`--userns=keep-id`, or Quadlet `UserNS=keep-id`).
The recommendation is to omit `:z` and `:Z` on bind mounts whose
source is a mergerfs (or any other FUSE) path, and to keep them on
bind mounts whose source is a regular local filesystem (ext4, btrfs,
xfs, etc.) where relabeling does real work. On distributions whose
container-selinux policy does not already include the `fusefs_t`
allow rule, the targeted fix is to set a single label at mount time
by adding `context="system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0"` to the
mergerfs mount options (for example in `/etc/fstab`). Files inside
the pool then appear as `container_file_t`, which container-selinux
permits `container_t` to manage everywhere. See [Red Hat's mounting
file systems
guide](https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/sect-security-enhanced_linux-working_with_selinux-mounting_file_systems).
This is preferred over the much broader
`--security-opt label=disable`, which removes SELinux confinement
from the container as a whole. The trade-off of `context=` is that
host-side processes touching the mount (rsync, backup tools, web
UIs, cron jobs) see `container_file_t` rather than `fusefs_t` and
may require a small SELinux policy adjustment.
To verify on your own system:
```
podman --log-level=debug run --rm \
-v /path/to/mergerfs:/data:z \
alpine true 2>&1 | grep -iE 'relabel|setfilecon|Labeling'
```
Expected output is a single line of the form
`Labeling not supported on "/path/to/mergerfs"` and nothing in
`ausearch -m AVC,SELINUX_ERR` for the mount.
## Can mergerfs be used with NFS root squash?
If mergerfs is pooling a NFS mount then root squash must be disabled