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Commits
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 RustDesk
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e400bb7554 | Enforce lockfile during pub get in build script | ||
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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c0750fb50c |
fix(client): report one error when both WebRTC race legs fail (#16563)
Both legs of race_transports_prefer_webrtc send their own punch request to the same rendezvous server for the same peer, so a refusal there (offline, unknown ID, key mismatch, a server-supplied other_failure) fails both with the same text. Joining them as "WebRTC failed: X; fallback failed: X" showed it twice and broke the UI's whole-string matching: the offline auto-retry needs exactly "Remote desktop is offline", the message box translates the text as one string, and check_if_retry hides the retry button for any text containing "failed". Return the error of the leg that failed last, as select_ok did before the race existed, and log the other one once. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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0d36ac0cba |
fix(linux): stop using the window in onWindowClose once GTK destroyed it (#16561)
On Linux, GTK destroys the window on a close request unless prevent-close is on. When the main window is the last active one, onActiveWindowChanged() turns prevent-close off and calls close(), yet onWindowClose() still went on to hide() the destroyed window, and the close event that close() emits re-entered onWindowClose() to save the frame through isMaximized(). The cm and install windows never turn prevent-close on, so their window is always gone by the time onWindowClose() runs. With window_manager before cf4aef05 those calls segfaulted in gtk_window_is_maximized; since then they fail with an unhandled PlatformException(window_destroyed). Return early in both places instead. Other platforms and sub windows keep the old path. Fixes #16512 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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f1fa432bc8 |
Fix fdroid bridge version (#16560)
* fix(fdroid): generate the bridge with the Flutter version bridge.yml uses #15139 moved the bridge Flutter version from bridge.yml's env into its job matrix, so build_fdroid.sh read `.env.FLUTTER_VERSION` as "null". The F-Droid recipe worked around that by pinning it to 3.24.5, which equals ANDROID_FLUTTER_VERSION, and the script only generated the bridge when the two versions differed, so the build failed on the missing src/bridge_generated.rs. Read the version from the default bridge-artifact matrix entry (3.22.3), and always generate the bridge: the build needs it whether or not the two Flutter versions match. Fixes #16549 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * fix(fdroid): keep the recipe's version sed from overriding the bridge Flutter The F-Droid recipe works around the old "null" read with `sed 's/${FLUTTER_BRIDGE_VERSION}/<version>/'`, and its auto-update copies that line into every new version. The 1.5.0 recipe pinned 3.24.5 and then 3.47.7, but flutter_rust_bridge codegen only works with the Flutter version bridge.yml uses (3.22.3). Pass the unbraced variable to prepare_flutter so that sed no longer matches the call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * fix(fdroid): raise the Gradle heap for the AGP 8 build #15603 moved the Android build to Gradle 8.11.1 / AGP 8.10.1 with compileSdk 36 and desugaring. The first F-Droid 1.5.0 build got past the bridge and the Rust library, then failed in assembleRelease with "Gradle build daemon has been stopped: since the JVM garbage collector is thrashing", because gradle.properties still caps the heap at 1 GiB. CI has long raised it to 2g; do the same here. A recipe that already rewrites the -Xmx1024M setting keeps its own value. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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b1761ee676 |
Ci run all dart tests (#16328)
* ci: run every Dart test, not three files The step ran only the three cursor test files, so the other nine files under flutter/test (terminal, file model, autocomplete, ...) never ran on any pull request. With no path the runner takes the whole directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * ci: run the Rust tests CI could not reach cargo test --workspace runs with the default features on x86_64 Linux only, so the tests behind `windows`, `not(target_os = "linux")`, `unix-file-copy-paste` and drmtap_dl's `tests` module never ran: the platform, portable-service and audio tests, the clipboard crate's file copy-paste and Windows file-name tests, and the drmtap loader's. The macOS and Windows build jobs now run `cargo test --lib` after the build with the build's own feature set, plus the clipboard crate. The Linux job's list of named test runs gains drmtap_dl and the clipboard feature. AGENTS.md says where tests go and what CI runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R * ci: drop the skips for tests that no longer exist #16539 removed test_get_cursor_pos and test_get_key_state, the only tests these skips matched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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9997b7a3b8 |
test: remove tests that do not pin user-visible behavior (#16539)
* test: remove tests that do not pin user-visible behavior Apply the AGENTS.md test rules to the existing Rust and Flutter suites. A test is kept when it is the only coverage of user- or API-visible behavior, the regression test of a reported or fixed bug, a security boundary (one test per rejection class), or a check against an external reference. Tests that assert private state or the order of internal steps, pin review-round corner cases, or repeat what a kept test already covers are removed. Rust: 679 -> 298 tests. Dart: 118 -> 45 tests. Test-only helpers left without callers go with them (applyLastOnlineStateForTesting, terminalKeyboardRowWidth, debugBufferedInputCount, tokio's test-util dev feature), and cfg gates and visibility that existed only for the deleted tests are narrowed. Runtime behavior is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R * test: keep tests that pin security and user-visible behavior Restore six tests that review showed are the only coverage of their behavior: - update metadata rejects an artifact file name with path components; - ICE candidates from another session are dropped; - KCP delivers every multi-segment frame queued before a close; - set_files rejects an empty name in a multi-file transfer; - a lopsided elongated cursor keeps its centre hotspot (#16242); - toggling Show hidden during a pending same-path read issues a new read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R * test: keep offline update and key-exchange downgrade rejections Restore three tests that are the only coverage of their rejection class: - offline update metadata rejects a signed artifact with an http or credential-bearing URL; - offline verification rejects a renamed local file and a version that does not match the release; - a key-exchange pick lowered in transit leaves both sides unable to decrypt, so a v0 fallback after a failed v1 decrypt cannot pass unnoticed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R * test: keep the decomposed-grapheme and reconnect-cancel tests Each catches a plausible wrong change that passes every kept test: mapping the first scalar under a locked Ctrl turns é into \x05, and a reconnect that does not fail pending reads leaves them hanging until the 30 s timeout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0740063863 |
Keyboard shortcuts (#14933)
* fix web break introduced in
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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13e1278b4c |
fix: auto-login types the OS password only at the logon or lock screen (#16520)
* fix: auto-login types the OS password only at the logon or lock screen A remote-control login on Windows and macOS now reports is_logon_screen in platform_additions, and the client skips auto-login when the peer reports false. Peers that don't report it (older ones, Linux) keep today's behaviour, so this narrows the leak into the focused window without closing it: the value is a snapshot taken at login. Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 report the WTS lock flag reversed, so there only LogonUI.exe tells the lock screen apart. Refs #16510, #15261 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * windows: drop the LogonUI.exe check from is_logon_screen LogonUI.exe can outlive the unlock and is matched by name only, so its presence reported a lock screen on an unlocked desktop and let the password through. Only the WTS lock flag decides now; on Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2, which report it reversed, the result is inverted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * windows: count only a confirmed logon or lock screen for auto-login is_prelogin() reads a failed WTS user-name query as no user signed in, and on Windows 7 the inverted is_locked() read a failed lock-flag query as locked, so either failure let the password through. is_logon_screen now uses its own queries that keep a failed read apart, and reads LOCK and UNLOCK the other way round on Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2. The existing functions stay as they are for their callers. If the check task itself fails, the server reports false instead of leaving the key out, which old clients' peers would mean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * auto-login: ask the peer with a protobuf field instead of a JSON key The client sets the new LoginRequest.auto_login only when Auto Login would type the OS password, and the server runs the logon-screen check only then, so nothing new runs for any other login. The answer is the new PeerInfo.skip_auto_login: its default, false, is what an old or Linux server means, so those peers keep typing as before, and neither field is encoded unless set. The is_logon_screen key in platform_additions is gone. Windows is_locked() now reads the lock flag through is_session_locked_flag(), which handles the reversed LOCK/UNLOCK of Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2. Its only caller is the allow-logon-screen-password check, which on those systems accepted the permanent password on an unlocked desktop. Windows 8 and later read the same as before. The C is_session_locked() is removed and its WTS_CURRENT_SESSION guard moves into get_session_flags(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * auto-login: let the peer type the password, after checking its screen The login-time check left the whole time until the password arrived open: the screen could be unlocked during the click, the 1.2 s wait and two network trips, a second client's password landed on the desktop the first one had just unlocked, and turning Auto Login on mid-login skipped the check. Now the client still clicks and waits, then sends the password in a new Message.os_login (reusing OSLogin) to a Windows or macOS peer from 1.5.1. The peer checks for its logon or lock screen right then and types the password and Return only if it finds one; otherwise it drops them. Other peers get the keys as before, and the OS Password menu item is unchanged. The password goes out only after login, never in the login request. LoginRequest.auto_login and PeerInfo.skip_auto_login are removed, so nothing new runs unless os_login arrives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF * server: name os_login in scope-violation logs A rejected os_login was logged as message.other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P1grQ39ByRWPUtTBdTzEBF --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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4411d10f45 |
fix(linux): report the process user as the active user under Flatpak (#16519)
File transfer to a Flatpak peer always failed with "No active console user logged on", because PeerInfo.username came from loginctl, which the sandbox cannot reach: Flathub builds lack the org.freedesktop.Flatpak talk-name, so `flatpak-spawn --host` fails. A Flatpak instance only runs inside the logged-in user's own session, so that user is the active one. Fixes #16506 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WS1HTjp6UQuG43KEcQPq1R Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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08affc69c4 |
Fix clipboard range overflow (#16329)
* fix(clipboard): unix file server, bound range reads The Range request fields nPositionLow and cbRequested are UINT32s carried in i32 fields, but were sign-extended to u64. A negative cbRequested became a near-u64::MAX length, `offset + length` wrapped past the clamp, and the server tried to allocate a u64::MAX buffer, aborting the process. Sign-extending nPositionLow also rejected offsets whose low word is >= 2 GiB, breaking reads past 2 GiB in large files. - decode nPositionLow and cbRequested as u32 - clamp with `length > file.size - offset` (offset <= size is checked above) - allocate the read buffer fallibly and return an error instead of aborting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(enigo): win, scale absolute mouse moves without overflow mouse_move_to multiplied the peer-supplied coordinate by 65535 in i32, which overflows for large values, and divided by the virtual screen size, which panics if the metrics come back as 0. Scale in i64, clamp to i32, and skip the move when the virtual screen size is unavailable. Results for inputs that did not overflow are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): avoid unthrottled high-frequency debug logs Debug output is written to the log file, so per-packet / per-event log sites must use trace or hbb_common's throttled_log!. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): unix file server, reject range reads over the frame limit A response larger than MAX_FRAME_LENGTH (1 GiB) cannot be encoded for sending, yet the server allocated and read it first, then failed the send. Reject such requests before allocating, so a peer can no longer make the server allocate more than 1 GiB per request. Requests that work today are unaffected. Drop the extra allocation-failure log; the caller already logs the error. Tests cover the wire decoding through read_file_contents (negative cbRequested, nPositionLow past 2 GiB) and the frame-limit rejection. Tests that use the global CLIP_FILES now take a shared lock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): keep file transfers on the file list they started from A file-contents request names a file only by its index, and the side that owns the files resolved it against whatever it held at that moment. On Windows 10+ Explorer's clipboard also offers FileContents, which the owner re-read from the live clipboard for every chunk, so copying another file mid-transfer spliced the new file into the one being pasted (#16332). A second paste, or another connection's paste, replaced the list the same way, and on macOS/Linux sync_files replaced CLIP_FILES on every host copy. Each request now names its list in the existing clip_data_id field: an FNV-1a hash of the file-descriptor PDU, which both sides already hold. Owners keep the last 4 lists they sent and serve a request from the list it names; an unknown id fails instead of reading another file. Peers that send no id read the list last sent to their connection, and a Windows owner stops reading the live clipboard once it has changed since the list was built. Tests cover a host copy and a second paste during a transfer, a list id sent to another connection, and the hash's reference vectors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): unix file server, cap a single range read at 16 MiB A peer could still make the server allocate and read up to the 1 GiB frame limit per request. Cap the data a single range read returns at 16 MiB. The read is clamped to the rest of the file first, and a larger one is refused rather than shortened: a short response reads as end of file to IStream callers on Windows and would silently truncate the copy. macOS requests 4 MiB per range (BLOCK_SIZE) and FUSE reads are smaller. A Windows client forwards the application's IStream::Read size, so only an application reading more than 16 MiB in one call is affected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(enigo): win, warn (throttled) when a mouse move is skipped A missing virtual screen size is a fault that should show up in a user's log, but mouse_move_to runs per input event. Log it at warn at most once a minute via throttled_log! instead of at trace. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): review fixes for the file lists kept per transfer unix owner: - A retired list closes its files and 8 MiB read buffers; they reopen, from offset 0, on the next read. - The new list is built aside and swapped in only on success, so a failed rebuild leaves the current list in place. - A rebuild with an unchanged id keeps its peers on the new list instead of retiring a duplicate, so re-copying a directory no longer pushes out a list that a transfer is still reading. Windows: - One served-list slot per list, recording every connection it was sent to, so pastes of the same list do not use up slots. - A request for an earlier list is served before OleGetClipboard, so a busy clipboard cannot fail it. - An IStream read over 16 MiB is split into requests the unix file server accepts. Reads up to 16 MiB take the unchanged path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): give each copied file list its own id The list id hashed only the descriptors, so two copies with identical names, sizes and times (the same file in two folders) shared an id and a transfer could read the other copy's files. Each owner now writes a random nonce into the first descriptor's clsid, inside the reserved bytes every peer skips; no owner sets FD_CLSID. The paste side hashes what it received, so it needs no change, and older peers ignore the bytes. Re-sending the same paths with the same descriptors keeps the nonce, and the id. Windows owner: - Serve a request from its list before the ownership check when the list is no longer current or the host clipboard now holds files from a peer, so another controller copying onto the host no longer fails in-flight transfers. Only lists sent to that connection are served. - Evict the list sent least recently instead of in insertion order. unix owner: take everything from the crate in one use block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard,enigo): bound served-list reads, clamp absolute moves wf_cliprdr: the served-list branch runs before the ownership check, yet it allocated the peer's cbRequested (up to 4 GiB) before looking the list up. Accept only FILECONTENTS_SIZE or a range of at most 16 MiB there, which is all that clients sending an id ever request, and fail anything else before allocating. enigo: clamp the scaled absolute coordinate to 0..=65535, the range MOUSEEVENTF_ABSOLUTE takes, instead of to the i32 range. Coordinates on the virtual desktop give the same result as before; off-desktop ones now land on its edge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): keep a file list while it is being read, throttle read errors A unix paste side fetches every new file list as soon as the host copies, so each copy retires the previous list, and four copies during one long transfer evicted the list it was still reading. A kept list that serves a read now becomes the most recent (unix: back of the retired queue, Windows: last_served), so the next eviction takes a list nobody is reading. A failed file-contents read logged an error per request, and peers can now trigger new ones (an unknown list id, an over-limit range). Log it through throttled_log! instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): unix, keep retired lists in the order they were sent A peer that sends no list id is served the list last sent to its connection, found by searching the retired queue from the back. That only holds while the queue stays in retirement order, which is the order lists were sent. The previous commit moved a list to the back on every read, so another connection reading an older list could make a peer's next chunk come from that list: a transfer of B continued with A's bytes. Keep the queue in retirement order and track recency in a separate last_used stamp, set on retirement and on each read. A full queue evicts the list with the lowest stamp, so a list still being read is kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): unix, keep files being read open when their list is retired Retiring a list closed every file handle, so the next read of a file part-way through reopened it by path. If that path had been replaced meanwhile (an editor saving over it), the rest of the transfer came from the replacement: AAAABBBB arrived as AAAADDDD. Close only files that are not being read, such as the preloaded next file; a file part-way through keeps its handle and offset, and so its identity. Tests read two files of one list alternately, retire the list, replace both paths by rename, and check each file continues with its original bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): cap Windows ranges, expire idle kept lists, check file identity Windows owner: refuse every FILECONTENTS_RANGE over 16 MiB before allocating. Only the served-list branch was capped; requests without an id still allocated whatever the peer asked for, up to 4 GiB. Both owners: a kept (retired / non-current) file list that nobody has read for 5 minutes is dropped, with its open files; its transfer is over or its peer gone. The current list never expires, as before. On Windows, reads of the current list through the existing path now also refresh its kept copy, so a long transfer does not lose its list once a newer one is sent. Windows owner: old-list reads compare the file's size and last-write time with the descriptor that was sent, on the handle they read from, and fail on a mismatch instead of reading whatever file now has that path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(clipboard): unix, check list expiry without backdating an Instant an_idle_retired_list_expires backdated a timestamp with Instant::now().checked_sub(TTL + 1s), which is None while the monotonic clock is under about five minutes, as on a freshly booted CI machine; the list then never expired and the test failed. expire_retired now takes the current time, and the test passes a later one instead. Callers pass Instant::now(), so behavior is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): drop read-time refresh, idle expiry and rebuild reuse; tighten checks Remove the read-time recency and the 5-minute idle expiry on both owners, and the unix reuse of an unchanged rebuild (has_same_files). They covered corner cases, added state, and each brought regressions of its own. Kept lists are again evicted oldest first (unix) or least recently sent (Windows), 4 at most; a transfer that outlives 4 newer lists fails cleanly. Windows: serve kept lists after the existing ownership check again, so a request carrying a list id no longer bypasses it while the host clipboard holds files from another session. Refuse request types other than size or range before allocating. unix: a retired list's file must still match the size and modified time it was listed with, checked on the handle the read uses; a file replaced at its path before its read now fails instead of being served. Tests: drop the four tests of the removed behavior, add a_retired_list_refuses_a_file_replaced_before_its_read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): handle corner cases raised in review with small fixes or docs A refactor added to cover a corner case rarely converges: new counters, timestamps and expiry rules interact with state existing code relies on, and the next review round finds the problems they introduced. Fix a corner case when the fix is a few lines with no new state; otherwise document it as a known limit, and ask before anything larger. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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e9ddbd8f46 |
cursor: bound the decoded cursor caches on the Flutter client (#16304)
* cursor: name a shape by what it looks like, not by its handle A cursor id was the platform's handle for the shape: HCURSOR on Windows, the XFixes serial on X11. Apps mint a new handle for a shape they have shown before (Chrome, Electron, Qt custom cursors), and an X11 animated cursor gets one per frame, so one arrow arrived under thousands of ids over a session. The controlled side cached and sent it again under each, and the controller decoded, rendered and kept it again under each, and grew by gigabytes over weeks of connection. The controlled side now names a shape by an xxh3 hash of its size, hotspot and pixels, taken once when a handle is first seen, before the pixels are compressed. The per-connection send already sends a shape once and afterwards only its id, so a shape now crosses once however many handles it has. The id is opaque in the protocol, so controllers of any version accept it. The DRM backend already named shapes by content with FNV-1a; it uses the same hash now. A peer before 1.5.0 still names shapes by handle, and the fix has to work against every deployed peer. For those peers the controller hashes each CursorData's compressed colors with its geometry: one peer compresses the same pixels to the same bytes, so a shape seen before is recognised without being decompressed. The UI gets that shape once, under one id, and every later handle for it is passed on as a cursor_id of that id. The map from the peer's ids is kept for the connection, unbounded, since the peer sends a shape once and may select any id it named again; an entry is two integers. From 1.5.0 the controller passes the peer's ids through unchanged, on the old path. The web core in flutter/web does the same in its own tree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: hold a content id to what the web client can read The web client decodes a u64 into a JS number and throws on a value past 2^53, which drops the whole message. A full 64-bit xxh3 id is almost always past it, so a web client connected to a peer on this build would never have been given a cursor shape. DRM's ids were already full width, so web clients lost the cursor on DRM peers too; the controlled side now renames those as well. The id keeps the hash's low 53 bits. Two of ten thousand distinct shapes then collide with a chance of about one in two hundred million. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: hand the UI a shape's pixels as they are, not as text A shape's pixels went to the Flutter UI as a JSON array of integers inside the cursor_data event: the core serialised a 1 MiB shape into up to 4 MiB of text on the receive loop, and the UI parsed that into a million-element list and copied it into bytes, on the UI thread. The event, text and all, was then kept for the session so that a tab moved to another window could replay it, and a reconnect, on which the peer sends every shape again, appended another copy of each. The core now sends a shape as an EventToUI::Cursor variant carrying Vec<u8>, which flutter_rust_bridge hands to Dart as a Uint8List, on the same per-session stream as the events so that it keeps its order with the cursor_id events around it. The web core calls onCursorData with the Uint8Array, as it calls onRgba for a frame. The id stays text, since the peer's ids can exceed Dart's int. The replay keeps each shape's pixels once, by id, and encodes them as base64 only when a tab moves. A shape arriving is also recorded as the last one selected, since the replay goes in first-seen order; before, a tab moved right after a new shape came back on the previous one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: let a controller ask the peer for a shape again A peer sends each shape once per connection and afterwards only its id, so a controller must keep every shape it was sent for as long as it is connected. The controlled side now answers Misc::request_cursor_data with the CursorData of that id, from the shapes it has sent, and only to a connection the cursor service would send it to. A controller from 1.5.0 on can then bound what it keeps and ask again for a shape it let go. None asks yet: the peer has to have the answer before a controller can rely on it, and peers are updated last. The shapes are kept by content id, and every handle for a shape shares its one message, where each handle used to keep its own copy. They are dropped with the service's own cache. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep a shape as its ui.Image and nothing else Each shape the UI had been sent stayed in four copies for the session: the pixels for a tab move, an image package copy to resize from (on a macOS or Linux controller of a Windows or Linux peer, a second one decoded back from a PNG), the bytes handed to the native cursor, and the ui.Image painted when the peer moves the pointer. A shape now keeps only its ui.Image. The resize source and the native bytes exist while a native cursor is being registered and are dropped once it is; a shape shown again at a raster it was registered at needs neither. For a raster it lacks, the pixels are read back from the ui.Image, which returns them exactly as they came. A tab move reads every shape back the same way, and the moved window decodes them as it would have on arrival. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: pin that a released shape keeps neither its pixels nor its bytes The shape in use once registered, the shapes not in use, and the pixels read back for a moved tab are all dropped; the tests now say so, so that a later change keeping one of them fails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep one native cursor per shape, and each tab its own A shape got a native cursor for every raster it was shown at, and all of them stayed until the session ended, so every zoom or DPR change added a native cursor for each shape in use. A shape now keeps the one at its current raster; the one it replaces is deleted the next time a cursor already registered is built, by when its successor has been activated. A raster returned to before that takes its cursor back instead of registering another under the same name. The native cursors of a window's engine are shared by its tabs, and the predefined cursors had one name in all of them, so a tab closing deleted the default and forbidden cursors the other tabs still showed. Names are now scoped to the tab's cursor model. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep the shapes compressed in the core, and only the one in use in the UI The UI kept every shape as a ui.Image, one raw copy each, for as long as the session lasted, because the peer sends a shape once and a shape might have to be drawn again. The core receives the shapes compressed, at a few hundredths of that, and now keeps them so: Session::cursor_shapes holds each shape that decoded, as the peer sent it, under the id the UI knows it by. The colors are copied, since the message's may be a slice of a larger received buffer. The UI keeps a ui.Image for the shape in use alone. A shape shown again at a raster its native cursor has needs no pixels at all; for a raster it lacks, for painting it, or for the window a tab moved to, the UI asks the core through session_get_cursor_shape, which decompresses and checks the shape again with decode_cursor_data, the same size and decompression limits as on arrival. A shape the core cannot give is not asked for again until the peer sends it. A tab move now carries only the id in use, and nothing is read back from the GPU. The web core keeps the shapes the same way and gives them back through getCursorShape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: a decode that finishes after the session clears keeps nothing A shape asked of the core while a tab closed was decoded after the cursor model had been cleared and stored in it, where nothing disposed of its ui.Image again; a shape whose cache failed to build left its ui.Image undisposed as well. A clear now starts a new generation, and a fetch or decode from an earlier one disposes what it made. A shape the core gave but that did not decode is not asked for again on every frame it is painted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep a native cursor for the shape in use alone Every shape the peer showed kept a native cursor for the session, each a raster the size of the shape as displayed. A shape switched away from now gives its native cursor up the way a replaced raster does: deleted the next time a cursor already registered is built, taken back if the shape returns first. A shape shown again after that is rebuilt from the compressed copy the core keeps. The predefined cursors are not the peer's shapes and stay registered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep the native cursors of the 16 shapes used last Keeping a native cursor for the shape in use alone rebuilt one on nearly every switch, since the pointer moves among a few shapes: the arrow, text, hand, four resize arrows, wait. The native cursors of the peer's shapes are now kept in order of use, 16 of them, and the one used longest ago gives its cursor up the way a replaced raster does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: forget the native cursors a session clear deletes The clear deleted every registered native cursor but kept their names, so a cursor model used again, as the mobile client's is, took each name for registered and showed a cursor that no longer existed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: hold a native cursor to 512 pixels a side A native cursor could be registered up to 1024 pixels a side, four MiB of pixels each, which with sixteen kept made 64 MiB at worst. The largest cursor a system shows is 256 pixels (Windows' largest pointer size), so a raster twice that is shown no larger: the cursor is drawn smaller rather than rejected, and sixteen kept come to 16 MiB at most. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: a shape switched away from while it decodes is not marked lost A shape asked of the core was taken for undecodable when it was no longer kept once its decode finished, but a shape the peer switched away from in the meantime is let go on purpose, and marking it made every later request for it be skipped: its native cursor stayed deferred and its painted cursor missing for the rest of the session. The decode now reports whether it decoded, and only a failure marks the shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * flutter: leave two untouched signatures as they were dart format had rewrapped registerEventHandler and sessionSetCommon next to the cursor additions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: read a shape's pixels from where its view starts The pixels used to be copied out of the JSON event into a fresh list, so the list's buffer began at its first pixel. Now they come straight from the core, native or web, as whatever Uint8List it hands over, and img2's fromBytes takes the buffer, not the list, so a view into a larger buffer would have been read from the buffer's start. Neither core gives a view today; this stops depending on that. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: a DRM cache reset keeps the shape it was making room for The shape being sent was filed in CURSOR_SHAPES before the DRM ceiling cleared it with everything else, so a controller asking for the shape on screen got nothing until the next new shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: delete a replaced native cursor at the next build that shows one A replaced native cursor was deleted only by a build of a cursor already registered, so a run of new shapes, each shown once, left every replaced cursor registered: 16 on the books, all of them in the system. Now every build that shows a cursor deletes the ones replaced before it, right before it registers or takes one back; what replaced them was activated in an earlier frame, so they are off screen. A build that has to ask for pixels shows nothing new and deletes nothing, so a raster returned to right after being replaced still takes its cursor back; one returned to later registers again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: a shape that does not decode leaves no handle and no copy CursorDedupe named a handle as it hashed the shape, before the shape was checked, so a peer sending shapes that fail the checks under new handles grew the map with nothing the UI could ever select, and such a shape took over the handle of one that had decoded. The handle is now named once its shape decoded, or was shown before. The flutter build also copied a shape's compressed colors out of the message before the checks, so a message with a small size and huge colors was copied whole before being rejected. The copy is made once the shape decoded; until then the message's own bytes are held. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: remember the shape the core lacks only while it is in use Every id the core could not give was kept in a set for the session, so a peer sending cursor_id after cursor_id of shapes it never sent grew it by a string each, at a few bytes of traffic per entry. The mark exists so that painting does not ask for the shape in use on every frame, and the shape in use is one, so one mark is kept: the peer selecting another shape forgets it, and selecting a lost shape again asks once more. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: forget the shape the core lacks once the peer selects another The mark was replaced only by another shape the core lacked, so a lost shape selected again after a known one was still not asked for. Selecting any other shape now clears it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: leave the DRM cursor's own id as it was The wire id is cursor_content_id whatever the platform, set in run_cursor over the shape's pixels, so the id the DRM reader derives for itself only tells one hardware cursor from the next and keys the service's cache. Which hash it uses does not reach a controller; the change to xxh3 and the dependency it brought to scrap go. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: say the 1.5.0 gate means the release Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: say why the peer answers request_cursor_data with what it holds No controller sends it yet, and a review asked for it to go because a cache reset on the peer could leave a request unanswered. A shape the peer's cache dropped is rebuilt, and indexed again, the next time it is shown, before any connection names it by id, so the shape a controller has just been told to show is always there to give; that is the contract a future bounded controller relies on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: drop the tests nothing can fail a_handle_is_named_once_its_shape_is_shown dates from when `name` wrote the handle map. `name` is pure now, so its last assertion cannot fail, and the others repeat two neighbours. every_handle_the_peer_named_stays_for_the_connection fails only for a bound added on purpose, which the struct's doc rules out. The Dart arrival test is covered by the first test of its file. The kept-shape test now asserts what `cursor_shape` is for, a copy rather than a view of the received buffer, in place of the unknown fields it drops. The content-id test moves out from between two `use` lines. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: let the kept-shape tests run without the flutter feature CI's cargo test builds the default features, and the two functions under test are pure, so they compile for every test build and the module loses its feature gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep native cursors for every frame of an animated cursor An animated cursor is a shape per frame, 18 for the Windows busy cursor and 23 for KDE's wait cursor. With 16 native cursors a cycle longer than that missed on every frame: fetched from the core, decoded, registered again and the replaced cursor deleted, about thirty times a second for as long as the peer was busy. 64 holds two such animations and the everyday set besides. The tests settle in 10 ms instead of 100 ms, so the ones that fill the limit stay quick. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: release only the shapes that can hold pixels Selecting a cursor swept every shape of the session to release pixels, though only two can hold any: the shape selected before, and a shape that finished decoding after the peer moved on. Release those, so a cursor_id costs the same however many shapes the peer has shown. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: show the native cursor limit holds two animations and the everyday set 64 is a working set, not the longest animation: KDE's wait and progress cursors are 23 frames each, and a session that meets both plus a dozen static shapes must keep them all, or every turn rebuilds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: let the shape in use keep its pixels for a new raster Dropping them once the native cursor was registered meant every scale change, zooming with the cursor zoomed or crossing to a display of another scale, showed the system arrow while the core gave the shape back and it decoded again. The shape in use now keeps them and makes the new raster at once; a shape switched away from still keeps none. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: never fall back to the default cursor on a switch A switch to a shape without its image, or without a native cursor at its raster, showed the default arrow until the core gave the shape back and it decoded: the painted cursor on every switch back, the native one after an eviction or while a new shape decoded. - The shape shown before stays, image, hotspot and native cursor, until the one in use is ready. - Where the cursor is painted, on mobile or with the remote cursor shown, the images of the 64 shapes used last are kept, like the native cursors, so an animation does not decode a frame per turn. Elsewhere only the shape in use keeps one. - A shape that finishes decoding after the peer moved on is kept with them instead of dropped, so a fast animation fills them at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: name the dedupe's content-id set for what it holds `shown` read as the shape on screen. It is the shapes decoded and given to the UI, keyed by content id, so a shape arriving under a new handle is looked up once instead of scanning the handle map: `decoded`, `has_decoded`, and `record` for the call that fills both maps. The web mirror is renamed the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: keep native cursors for the session, as before Evicting native cursors and deleting a shape's replaced raster made Windows leak more than master. The engine's deleteCustomCursor/windows frees the HCURSOR with DeleteObject, which does not take a cursor, so a delete frees nothing and each cursor made again for a raster, or for a shape shown once more, leaks another handle. Keeping every raster of every shape until the session is cleared creates each one once, as master does. Fixing the engine instead is not cheap: x64 runs our fork on Flutter 3.24, where the fix is one more patch to rebuild and carry across every upgrade; arm64 runs the stock engine of a newer Flutter with the same code, where it means porting the fork and publishing an arm64 engine too, or waiting for an upstream fix to reach stable. Content ids keep the count to the shapes the peer really shows. The painted images, the compressed shapes in the core, and a switch showing the cursor shown before are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: record the Windows measurement behind keeping native cursors A measurement on Windows confirmed what the engine source implied: of 500 cursors made by CreateIconIndirect, DeleteObject freed none and left 500 USER objects alive, while DestroyCursor and DestroyIcon freed all 500. The comment now says so, that native cursors have no LRU for that reason only, and that one can come back once both engines destroy cursors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: look a native cursor up by the raster asked for The key ended in the raster made last. A shape switched away from keeps no pixels, so its raster stays where it was, and going back to a raster it was shown at before looked up the wrong key: A at 1.0, A at 0.5, then B, then A at 1.0 again missed the 32x32 cursor that was still there, fetched A from the core, and showed B meanwhile. With native cursors kept for every raster, the key now ends in the raster asked for; with pixels, that is the raster made, as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: let a shape keep its pixels until a native cursor holds them A shape switched away from, or decoded after the peer moved on, let its pixels go whether or not it had a native cursor, and a native cursor is made only for the shape in use. A shape whose restore kept finishing after the next switch, as an animation's frames can, was fetched and decoded again every time it came back and never got a native cursor. A shape without one now keeps its pixels until one is made, at most kRecentShapes of them, the one waiting longest let go first. Mobile only paints the cursor, so it lets them go as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * proto: keep cursor ids as strings in JS A Windows peer before 1.5.0 names a cursor by its handle, sign-extended above 2^53 when its top bit is set. The web client decodes u64 fields into JS numbers, and ts-proto throws on a value a number cannot hold, so each such cursor_data or cursor_id was dropped whole and the web cursor stayed on the shape before. [jstype = JS_STRING] makes ts-proto generate these two fields as strings; the wire format, the Rust code generated and every other client are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: wait for a native cursor at the raster asked for, not any raster A shape let its pixels go once it had a native cursor at some raster. After a zoom, or on a display of another scale, an animation's frames had native cursors at the old raster only; each was fetched again at the new one, and a restore that finished after the next switch let its pixels go at once, so the frames never got a native cursor at the new raster and the cursor stayed on the one shown before. A lookup that finds no native cursor at the raster asked for now counts the shape as waiting for one, so a late restore keeps its pixels until it has one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cursor: count a shape held again when its asked raster has a native cursor A lookup that missed took the shape out of _nativeIds, but one that hit did not put it back. A shape asked at a new raster, then at one it has a native cursor for, still counted as waiting: a restore finishing after the switch away kept its pixels in _awaitingNative instead of letting them go. The set now says whether the raster asked last has a native cursor, either way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * Revert "cursor: count a shape held again when its asked raster has a native cursor" This reverts commit |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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483cc10266 |
fix(appimage): build AppRun with bounded argument splitting (#16330)
* fix(appimage): build AppRun with bounded argument splitting AppRun v2.0.0, which appimage-builder downloads, copies each argument into a 1 KiB stack buffer in apprun_shell_split_arguments, so any argument of 1024 bytes or more aborts the AppImage with "buffer overflow detected" before RustDesk starts (e.g. --connect with a 10000-char id). Build AppRun from the v2.0.0 commit with a patch that sizes the buffer from the input and stops the quote/escape scanning at the terminating NUL, in ubuntu:16.04 like upstream's release, and put it where appimage-builder looks before downloading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(appimage): verify the patched AppRun is the one shipped Reset the split buffer by its first byte rather than zeroing all of it per argument, check the AppRun source tarball's sha256, pin the build image by digest, and fail the job if appimage-builder deployed anything other than the binary built here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
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f299fb9906 |
fix(clipboard): unix, check file transfer permission on incoming file… (#16333)
* fix(clipboard): unix, check file transfer permission on incoming file clipboard The Cliprdr arm served incoming file clipboard messages on Linux/macOS without checking the file transfer permission, which the controlled side can turn off mid-session. can_sub_file_clipboard_service() only gates the outgoing service, so a peer could keep pushing files in and keep requesting the host's copied file list and contents. Check file_transfer_enabled() on every message. It is the same permission the client and the Windows cm use for file copy-paste. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(clipboard): honor one-way file transfer on incoming file requests One-way file transfer was only enforced on the outgoing side: the host never announces its clipboard files. A controller could still send FormatDataRequest / FileContentsRequest directly, and the host answered them, from the live clipboard on Windows and from serv_files on Linux/macOS. Drop those two requests when one-way file transfer is on, before any platform handling. The messages that carry the peer's own files to this side are untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: drop redundant doc comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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58ff78a823 |
Hdr tonemap (#16033)
* scrap: tone-map HDR desktops to SDR in the Windows capturer With HDR enabled, Windows composes the desktop as linear scRGB in R16G16B16A16_FLOAT and places SDR white at the user's "SDR content brightness" (DISPLAYCONFIG_SDR_WHITE_LEVEL / 1000, e.g. 2.5 for 200 nits) rather than at 1.0. The legacy IDXGIOutput1::DuplicateOutput we used always converts that surface to BGRA8, and it does so by clipping, so everything above ~40% linear brightness lands on white. That is the washed-out / overexposed / high-contrast picture reported for HDR hosts in #5368, #9951, #12707 and discussion #7652. Ask for the desktop with IDXGIOutput5::DuplicateOutput1 and the format list [R16G16B16A16_FLOAT, B8G8R8A8_UNORM]. An SDR desktop still yields BGRA8 and takes the unchanged path. A float frame is converted on the GPU by a small pixel shader: divide by the SDR white level, clamp, apply the sRGB transfer. SDR content round-trips exactly, HDR highlights clip at white, the same result the local user sees. The white level is read per output through DisplayConfigGetDeviceInfo and refreshed once a second, so dragging the Windows slider tracks remotely. The converted BGRA8 texture feeds both the staging-copy (CPU) path and the vram (hwcodec texture) path; rotation is unchanged. Toggling HDR mid-session invalidates the duplication as before, and the recreated capturer re-detects the format. The shaders are compiled at runtime from a dynamically loaded d3dcompiler_47.dll so no new import is added to the binary. If the DLL, the compile or any D3D object creation fails, a process-wide flag makes later capturers fall back to the legacy DuplicateOutput, i.e. today's behaviour. This deliberately stops at SDR on the controlled side, with no option and no protocol change, which is how OBS, Sunshine (client without HDR) and macOS screen capture handle it. Real HDR pass-through would need 10-bit capture, Main10/AV1-10 encoders in the hwcodec fork, colour metadata on the wire and, decisively, an HDR output path on the controller: Flutter's desktop external textures are BGRA8888/RGBA8888 only on every platform, so nothing would be visible. When that changes it should follow the Sunshine/Moonlight pattern: an hdr capability bit advertised by the controller behind an explicit user toggle, negotiated like i444. Type-checked against x86_64-pc-windows-msvc (with and without the vram feature); not yet run on an HDR machine, which needs Windows 10 1703+ with HDR on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLb1dNdhFqUQExJPANjo1F (cherry picked from commit ca3c2f8ac7d1549a40855411b0539a69c82d7223) * scrap: stay on DXGI when the HDR conversion fails, load the compiler once Review follow-up: - A tone-map failure surfaced as a capture error, and the capture loop answers any DXGI error by switching the capturer to GDI for the rest of its life. The capturer now drops the tone-map, re-creates the duplication with the legacy DuplicateOutput (DXGI's clipped BGRA8, the pre-HDR behaviour) and returns WouldBlock, so the session stays on DXGI and simply fetches the next frame. - Only failures that cannot succeed anywhere in the process (no d3dcompiler_47.dll, shaders that do not compile) set the global UNAVAILABLE flag; D3D object creation failures stay with the capturer that hit them, so another adapter or a recreated capturer tries again. - D3DCompile is resolved once through a OnceLock instead of a LoadLibrary per capturer that was never freed. - The module doc now states what this pass is: normalization of an HDR desktop to SDR, with everything above SDR white clipping, not a tone map, and why a roll-off is deliberately not applied. The earlier claim that clipping matches what the local user sees was wrong for HDR content on an HDR display. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLb1dNdhFqUQExJPANjo1F * scrap: only apply the SDR white level to outputs DXGI reports as HDR Review follow-up: - An FP16 desktop is not necessarily HDR. Since Windows 11 22H2 an Advanced Color (WCG) SDR display is composed in FP16 scRGB too, and there 1.0 is the display's reference white, not 80 nits, so the SDRWhiteLevel scaling does not apply (Microsoft: "Reference white applies only to HDR displays"). Query IDXGIOutput6::GetDesc1 and treat the output as HDR only for DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_RGB_FULL_G2084_NONE_P2020, the documented Win32 check; a non-HDR FP16 frame now gets just the scRGB -> sRGB transfer. Without IDXGIOutput6 (before Windows 10 1803) FP16 can only mean HDR. - The SDR white level is now Option: a failed query or a reported 0 is "unknown" on both the initial and the refresh path, an HDR output with an unknown level logs a warning and keeps the 80-nit assumption until the periodic re-query succeeds. DISPLAYCONFIG_DEVICE_INFO_GET_SDR_WHITE_LEVEL needs Windows 10 1709, not 1703 as an earlier message said. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLb1dNdhFqUQExJPANjo1F * scrap: re-read the Advanced Color state while capturing, gate FP16 on IDXGIOutput6 Review follow-up: - The HDR/WCG decision was taken once when the conversion was created. HDR can be switched on or off, and a WCG desktop can turn into an HDR one, without the duplication being invalidated, so the choice between "divide by the SDR white level" and "no scaling" could go stale. The once-a-second refresh now re-reads it: it keeps an IDXGIFactory1, and when IsCurrent reports FALSE it creates a fresh factory and re-finds the output by GDI name, since a stale factory's outputs keep stale descriptions (this is the procedure the GetDesc1 docs require). On a change it switches modes, re-reads the white level and updates the shader constant; an unreadable level keeps the last known one. - Float frames are only requested when IDXGIOutput6 exists, as Microsoft's duplication sample does. That interface is also what tells HDR from WCG, so there is no longer a state where FP16 is requested without being able to interpret it. IDXGIOutput6 dates from Windows 10 1703, not 1803 as the previous commit said; 1803 added IDXGIFactory6. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLb1dNdhFqUQExJPANjo1F * scrap: replace the DXGI factory and output together when re-reading HDR state Review follow-up: when the fresh factory did not find the output by name, the refresh kept the new, current factory next to the old output, and because IsCurrent then reported TRUE it never enumerated again, so the stale output could stay forever. enumerate_output6 now returns both or neither, and the refresh only replaces the pair together; a null factory forces another enumeration on the next refresh while the old output is still read in the meantime. The constructor gets the same guarantee for free, since a failed lookup leaves the factory null there too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLb1dNdhFqUQExJPANjo1F * scrap: keep enumerate_output6's both-or-neither promise when IDXGIOutput6 is missing Review nit: a matched output whose IDXGIOutput6 query fails returned the fresh factory next to a null output, which let the constructor pair a current factory with the capturer's fallback output. Return neither in that case so the next refresh enumerates again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLb1dNdhFqUQExJPANjo1F * scrap: log DuplicateOutput1 failures before fallback Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * scrap: avoid null duplication after HDR fallback failure Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * scrap: load the D3D compiler securely from System32 Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * scrap: release the frame through the state machine when abandoning the tone-map master's FrameState machine is left at Acquired by the raw ReleaseFrame(), so the next release_frame() hits DXGI_ERROR_INVALID_CALL on the fresh duplication and the capture loop falls back to GDI -- the outcome the fallback exists to avoid. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5.5
|
e424b57fca |
Kx v1 (#16326)
* key exchange version 1 on the rendezvous and peer handshakes Bump hbb_common for key exchange version 1, one stream key per direction, and negotiate it on both handshakes. Rendezvous: `secure_tcp` reads the version the server advertises in `KeyExchange.version`, answers with the highest both speak, splits the key when that is at least 1, and arms the check of the server's echo on its first encrypted message. Peer: the controlled side advertises `KX_VERSION_LATEST` inside the signed `IdPk`, the controller answers in `PublicKey.kx_version` and both split the key when the pick is at least 1. A pick above what was offered is refused as a bug or tampering. `decode_id_pk_dtls` returns the advertised version along with the fingerprint. An absent field on either side is version 0, so any old peer or server keeps today's stream byte for byte. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * bump hbb_common: keep the advertisement check armed until an echo arrives Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * bump hbb_common: drop box_pk_of until something calls it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * key exchange: say 0 on WebRTC, where no stream key applies A WebRTC stream is encrypted by DTLS and `set_key_split` collapses to `set_key` on it, which sets nothing but `peer_verified`. Both sides still put 1 on the wire, the controlled peer in its signed identity and the controller in its pick, and agreed on a version neither applied. That held only because both fell into the same branch: the day one side splits keys on WebRTC and the other does not, they would agree on 1, derive different keys, and have no version mismatch to point at. The controlled peer now advertises 0 on WebRTC and refuses a pick above what it advertised rather than above the newest it speaks anywhere; the controller picks 0 there. What is on the wire is what runs. Also bumps hbb_common for the echo contract: the server tags every message after the exchange, not the first alone, so dropping one frame at a known position does not rid an attacker of the downgrade check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * key exchange: verify the server's signed version before trusting it bump hbb_common d9f519e: KeyExchange.signed_version A server that signs its version sets bit 255 of the ephemeral key inside the signed keys[0]. A client that sees that bit, or the field itself, verifies sign("rdkx-ver" || key || version LE) under the server's signing key before picking a version and refuses the exchange otherwise, so a version lowered in the clear is caught at the handshake rather than one frame pair later by the echo. A legacy server sends canonical keys and no field and takes the unchanged path; the echo still checks its version. Tests: version 1 keys match the server both ways; an advertisement lowered in transit is refused at the first echo; legacy, signed-1 and signed-3 servers each exchange application data; nine tamperings of the signed version are refused before the client replies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * key exchange: comments say what the fields and functions are bump hbb_common e3452ac: the same on the shared side. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * key exchange: drop the advertisement echo bump hbb_common 5194159: RendezvousMessage.kx_advertised and the check on decrypted frames are gone. signed_version settles the version inside the exchange, so the client arms nothing after it; the stub in the tests stops tagging its frames and the test of a lowered advertisement goes, the signed-version cases covering that refusal before any reply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * key exchange: verify KxParams, the server's signed structure bump hbb_common e74a188: KeyExchange.signed_params and KxParams. The client parses the signed bytes as KxParams and compares its fields to the key it verified and the version it was shown, rather than matching a fixed byte string, so a field added to KxParams later parses past an older client. The tamper cases now include a payload signed as the old byte string. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * key exchange: require the KxParams signing prefix before parsing bump hbb_common 26582e1: KX_PARAMS_DOMAIN. Without it a signed IdPk, which the server signs with the same key, parsed as a KxParams whose pk was the id and whose version was 0, so an id registered with the bytes of a marked ephemeral key could stand in for the params at version 0. Two tamper cases pin this: params signed without the prefix, and a signed IdPk in their place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * key exchange: one call sets the negotiated key bump hbb_common cbc8772: Stream::set_negotiated_key. The rendezvous client, the controller and the controlled side each branched on the picked version to choose between split and single keys. They now hand the transcript to Stream, which makes that choice once. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * Update hbb_common: refuse unknown key exchange versions, pin wire vectors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * client: prove the peer handshake picks its version and encrypts under it The rendezvous exchange had tests against a stub server; the peer handshake had none, so a controller that fell back to version 0 would still connect, still report secured, and pass every test. These run Client::secure_connection against a stub controlled peer and check the pick it sees and the application data both ways: new peers pick 1, a peer without versions gets 0, and a pick lowered in transit leaves the two sides unable to read each other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * Update hbb_common: pin the subkeys for an advertisement above the pick Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * Update hbb_common to main, with #614 merged Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * key exchange: name the picked version, say why the marker bit is safe Review follow-ups with no change in behaviour: the rendezvous pick is called picked, as in the peer handshake and KxTranscript; the marker comment says X25519 ignores the bit and the bytes stay as signed; the controlled side's refusal names the version it offered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDesk
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68a35e65f2 |
fix(unix): ignore SIGPIPE in native Flutter entry (#16322)
* fix(linux): ignore SIGPIPE in Flutter runner Initialize SIGPIPE before entering the Rust core so writes to closed IPC peers return EPIPE instead of terminating the server. Add a native-entry regression test for the failure reported in #16297. * test(linux): remove SIGPIPE runner test * fix(flutter): initialize SIGPIPE in the Rust native entry Share SIGPIPE initialization between the Linux and macOS native runners before core startup. Remove the Linux C++ initialization. * fix: share SIGPIPE initialization with Sciter startup Initialize SIGPIPE before global_init in core_main, shared by Flutter and Sciter on Linux and macOS. * fix(flutter): keep SIGPIPE setup in the native FFI entry Sciter already receives SIGPIPE initialization from the Rust runtime. Scope the missing startup initialization to native Flutter runners on Linux and macOS. |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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dd9b21cf86 |
server: hold an unauthenticated connection to a small message (#16254)
* server: hold an unauthenticated connection to a small message Until a peer authorizes it sends only a public key, a login request, a test delay and a close reason, none of them large. Nothing said so: a frame header could declare up to whatever the transport allowed, 1 GiB on TCP and WebRTC, and a connection holds its place for up to LOGIN_GRACE before it has to authorize. With MAX_UNAUTHORIZED_CONNS places to fill, that is 64 GiB of header-declared payload one peer could make us hold - or, on WebSocket, 1 GiB bought outright with a few hundred bytes of frame headers, because tungstenite reserves a frame's declared payload as soon as it passes max_frame_size. The cap goes on in create_tcp_connection, before the identity handshake, so that read is bounded too, and comes off once the login is settled. It comes off before connect_port_forward_if_needed rather than beside the rest of authorization: a multiplexed tunnel narrows the same knob again for its own framing and has to have the last word. 128 KiB is several times the largest login request anyone sends - a long hostname, an os_login, an avatar URL, a file-transfer path - and is also the read buffer tungstenite allocates per WebSocket connection whatever we do, so on that transport the bound costs nothing beyond a floor already paid. A server hands that avatar out as a URL; only a custom client that inlines an image into the avatar option instead can reach the bound at all. Together with MAX_UNAUTHORIZED_CONNS it holds every unauthorized connection to 8 MiB. Redis answered this same shape in CVE-2021-32675 with 16 KiB, tighter because a per-message bound is the only one it has; here the connection count is the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * server: test that the unauthenticated cap is on before the handshake reads hbb_common covers each transport's cap; nothing covered where the connection layer puts it. A header one byte over MAX_UNAUTHORIZED_MESSAGE, written to a connection stalled in the identity handshake, has to end the handshake on the header alone and release the connection's place: the test fails with the cap moved past the handshake or dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * client: hold the clipboard until this round's login is accepted The clipboard listener is one per process, started by the first session to log in, and its broadcast went to every session - one whose login was still waiting on a password, 2FA or the peer's consent included. What the user copied meanwhile went to a machine that had not admitted them; the peer drops it unread before authorization, but it is in that peer's hands. The check goes on the round, not the session: a session-level one reads a state and later a sender that a reconnect can have swapped in between, so a broadcast that passed for the round before could still queue on the next. Remote is the round - its queue, and is_connected set once its own PeerInfo is in - so a Clipboard or MultiClipboards that reaches handle_msg_from_ui before then is dropped there, on the line before it would go out. What the login itself sends through the same queue, Auth2FA among it, goes as before. The unauthenticated cap on the other side is how this came up: a clipboard over 128 KiB ended such a login with "Reset by the peer". The small case had always gone through quietly. A test drives a round's Remote over a loopback pair before any login: a clipboard does not reach the far end, a 2FA code does, and once the round is connected the clipboard does too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
|
7a367f7cc6 |
bump webrtc fork: one IPv6 host candidate per interface and prefix (#16263)
* bump webrtc fork: one IPv6 host candidate per interface and prefix ICE gathered every IPv6 address on every interface. Beside the temporary address that privacy extensions rotate, a prefix usually carries a stable one, often derived from the MAC, that the OS never picks as a source: a host candidate for it hands the peer an identifier that outlives every rotation and that nothing else this machine sends out ever shows. RFC 8445 §5.1.1.1 has the trackable addresses of an interface and prefix left out once a privacy one is gathered. There is no portable way to tell the two apart, so the fork's `local_interfaces` stands in for that rule with a best-effort approximation: of an interface's addresses in one prefix, it asks the OS which one it sends from - a UDP `connect` inside the group's own prefix, nothing sent, nothing outside this machine's own prefixes involved - and if the answer is one of them, keeps that one alone. If the answer is none of them, the whole group is kept, as it was: the probe is bound to no interface, so where Ethernet and Wi-Fi share a LAN the route picks one of them and the answer for the other is an address it does not hold, and the enumeration order would be no better a guess - on macOS its first address is the stable one. Every other interface and prefix keeps its address, a VPN's unique-local one among them. Two static addresses in one prefix keep one, the recorded price of the stand-in; the interface a shared prefix's route bypasses keeps both of its addresses, a gap the stand-in leaves open rather than a regression. The Windows enumeration, which named every adapter "" with no mask, now carries the adapter's name and on-link prefix, without which Ethernet and Wi-Fi on one LAN would have been a single group. That reaches IPv4 too: its addresses carry the adapter's name and mask where they were "" at /32, so the candidates gathered are the same but `interface_filter` sees the real names. hbb_common is untouched: its fe80::/10 filter still applies to what the fork keeps. Two more fork commits ride along, found by the same review. SCTP never reported a DATA chunk received again: `handle_data` asks `can_push` before `push`, and `push` was where a duplicate was noted, so the no-cwnd sender's reordering window, which widens on reported duplicates, never heard of one from another of these endpoints; and the SACK, its gap blocks and now its duplicates unbounded, could outgrow the MTU the DATA chunks keep to under a thousand chunks in flight with holes among them. Duplicates are now listed and SACKed at once (RFC 9260 §6.2), and the SACK reports the lowest gap blocks that fit (§6.7). And the Windows adapter struct, split into nested parts, read `Ipv6IfIndex` eight bytes late on x64 - only into a scope id that `Interface::convert` drops, so nothing gathered wrongly, but the field an interface-bound probe would need; it is flat now, with a compile-time check written for Rust 1.75, the version this crate builds with - `offset_of!` would have wanted 1.77. rustdesk-org/webrtc 80d5a20..49c89bd8, six commits: the heuristic, the fail-open it grew in review, its comments brought in line with that, the SCTP duplicates and SACK bound, the flat Windows adapter struct, and its check made to build on 1.75. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * pin hbb_common to main 7a5ad52 0eb1759..7a5ad52, six commits: the message cap's tests on WebSocket and WebRTC with the fragmented WebSocket message bounded too (e999dce, f0f1548); hyper_util's debug logs out of the default filters (#608); and `new_direct_udp_for_unverified`, the controller's UDP socket on the resolver's preferred address for the rendezvous server, with a second for the lookup and without the TCP connection `test_target` opens and drops to prove it - while `new_direct_udp_for`, `new_udp_for` and `rebind_udp_for`, which the controlled side's punch reply and its registration live on, keep that proof (f688d41, 0bc8336, 7a5ad52). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * ipv6 punch: ask the kernel for the route without resolving a name first `test_ipv6` is awaited on the connection path by both sides of a punch, and before it looked for a public IPv6 address in the background it resolved the STUN hosts' names inline - racing the four, so that one resolver that hangs would not decide. It could still: `select_ok` returns the first success or the last failure, so with no resolver answering the probe waits for the slowest lookup to give up, as long as the system resolver takes, once a minute, on the first connection of that minute. The name was never needed. `connect` on a UDP socket sends nothing; it has the kernel pick a route and a source address for the destination, and any global address serves, so the probe now names one - the one libwebrtc's QueryDefaultLocalAddress asks for - and touches no network at all: a bind, a connect, a local_addr. A machine without an IPv6 route learns so from the connect's error, at once, as before. Two smaller things beside it. The minute's gate read the timestamp under one lock and set it under another, so two connections arriving together both found it over and both probed; it is one critical section now. And the background STUN probe, bounded so far by the STUN client's own ten seconds and the resolver's, has a deadline of its own, five seconds: a probe that outlived the minute could write an earlier network's address over a later probe's. Test: the route probe completes within a second, an address found or not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * controller: the NAT test takes the resolver's address for the server `new_direct_udp_for` learned which address to send the UDP NAT test to by opening a TCP connection to the rendezvous server and dropping it - a handshake, one round trip, on every connection the controller starts, right before `_start_inner` opens the connection it keeps to the same host. The NAT test now takes the resolver's preferred address, `new_direct_udp_for_unverified`, which spends no round trip proving it and gives its lookup a second: an address the server does not answer on costs this connection its UDP punch, which the TCP punch and the relay cover, as they do whenever the test finds no port. The controlled side's punch reply keeps `new_direct_udp_for` and its proof - a reply sent to such an address is a device online and unreachable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
|
ea04f04f9d |
add hide-elevate-button-in-accept-window (#16271)
A portable client handed to standard users offers them "Accept and Elevate", which they have no credentials to complete. The builtin option takes that button out of the accept window and leaves elevation to the controlling side's "Request Elevation" during the session. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk-server-pro/discussions/1016 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
|
d4ac2c07b7 |
temporary password: rotate when a peer is let in, not when it leaves (#16080)
The one-time password was regenerated after the connection loop exited, so a remote desktop session kept it valid for hours and a port-forward tunnel for as long as its mapping lived. It now rotates the moment a connection becomes authorized. Reconnects and windows opened from a live session are unaffected: they log in on the password the session remembers, for 30 seconds past its last activity. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
|
0b3a1ddd80 |
rendezvous: cap unauthenticated punches in flight (#16256)
A PunchHole needs no authentication: anyone who knows this id can ask hbbs to have us open a punch, and each one hbbs sends is spawned without a limit. Every punch pays per request. punch_udp_hole binds a socket of its own and start_ipv6 another; the TCP punch opens a listener on the ephemeral port of its own connection to hbbs, with a punch of its own in flight beside it - `reuse` sets the socket flags, it shares no fd - and the LAN listen a FetchLocalAddr opens is that listener again. All of them then wait up to CONNECT_TIMEOUT for the peer, so a stream of requests holds as many sockets as it likes for as long as it keeps sending. Each takes a place in one of two pools of 32 - UDP over v4 and v6 in one, the TCP punch and the LAN listen in the other - and gives it back the moment the peer's session is up - the KCP accept, the TCP stream in hand - or when the wait ends without one: a place stands for a socket waiting for its peer and nothing past it, and from the session on the connection layer's own limits apply, the same handoff the WebRTC answerer's slot makes at its open data channel. At the limit an arrival is declined rather than an older punch cut short, since the places turn over on their own, within CONNECT_TIMEOUT and the few seconds the punch phases add to it, and cutting one short would drop a socket that may be a moment from carrying a session. Two pools rather than one, so that neither transport pays for the other's crowd: a connection costs a place in each, the controller's preferred request punching UDP and its TCP fallback request punching TCP, and the transports that lose the race hold theirs for the whole wait, so one pool of 32 would be about ten connections setting up at once and a crowd of UDP punches would decline a TCP punch that had nothing to do with it. A place is taken only for a punch that will be made: whether the v4 legs relay is decided first, since the relay branch runs the whole session and a place held across it would let ordinary relay traffic use the pool up. A declined LAN listen falls to the relay, as one that fails for any other reason does. Declined is the listen alone, never the reply. One PunchHoleSent carries the WebRTC answer, the v6 address and the relay server along with the v4 punch, and the controller sends one request for all of them and retries it three times before it fails outright, so a reply withheld for want of a v4 place would lose the transports that needed none. The reply goes out as before, on a socket that then goes at once, resends and all - a declined request is not worth a socket kept for its reply's sake, and the controller re-asks on its own - and what the controller loses is its v4 attempt at a mapping that no longer answers; its others go on. A request that carries a v6 address costs two places, and the v4 one is taken first: the v6 punch starts before the v4 one does, and taken in that order the last place would go to the transport the peer may have no route for and leave the one it can count on with none. A declined v6 punch leaves the v4 path to carry the connection, as it already does wherever this machine has no public IPv6 address. Each kind logs at most one line a minute, carrying the number of requests it stands for, since the peer decides how often it asks. Tests: the places are the bound and come back on drop; a full UDP pool leaves the TCP places alone; at the last place it is the v6 punch that goes without; a declined UDP punch still sends its PunchHoleSent, answer and v6 address intact, to a loopback stand-in for hbbs; a listen whose peer never probes gives its place back. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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4df7404a6c |
webrtc: cap concurrent answerer setups, pin the DTLS fingerprint binding with a test (#16225)
A WebRTC offer reaches the controlled side before any password or accept prompt, and answering one builds a peer connection that binds a socket per interface and runs ICE for up to CONNECT_TIMEOUT. A forged TCP punch reuses the mediator's local port for one connect; a forged offer costs all of that, and nothing bounded how many could be in flight at once. SESSIONS dedups by offer fingerprint, which only stops replays of one offer. spawn_webrtc_answerer now takes one of 16 slots before building the peer connection. The wait for the data channel is bounded by CONNECT_TIMEOUT, and what the slot stands for is the peer connection an unauthenticated offer had this machine build, ICE, DTLS and SCTP: on an open channel it is given back at once, and on a failed one it goes with the pc into the detached teardown and comes back when that has finished. pc.close() has no timeout of its own, so a slot freed where the task gives up would let a teardown that never finished pile pcs up unbounded with the count reading zero; held, a stuck teardown costs WebRTC capacity and the offers past the cap degrade to punch and relay. Every failure before the pc exists releases the slot through the guard's drop. From the open channel on the connection is one like any other, and the connection layer bounds unauthenticated connections in number and in time for every transport alike (#16237), a peer that stalls in the identity handshake or after it included. So this guard stays inside the WebRTC path, sized above what legitimate controllers reach at once in the seconds ICE takes. Past the cap the offer is declined with an empty answer, the reply the controller already gets from a peer without WebRTC, so it carries on over punch and relay. Declines log through the throttled-log macro. At the cap a re-sent PunchHole for a live session also gets an empty answer rather than the cached one, since the slot is taken before the cache is consulted; only reachable at the cap, where degrading is the point. The other change is regression coverage for the signed DTLS fingerprint binding, which is unchanged. The controller's defence against a rendezvous or relay that swaps SDP fingerprints is the fingerprint the controlled side signs into IdPk and the comparison in secure_connection, and neither had a test. The comparison moves into dtls_fingerprint_bound so it can have one, along with decode_id_pk_dtls: the fingerprint round-trips under the signature, another key or an edited payload yields nothing, empty never binds, and decode_id_pk still sees the same id and pk. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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f4808b71d4 |
webrtc: encrypt the signalling legs to the rendezvous server, or send no WebRTC signalling (#16224)
Three TCP connections carry WebRTC signalling to hbbs in the clear: the controller's punch connection, which carries the offer up and the answer and both sides' ICE candidates through it, and on the controlled side the short-lived connection that returns the answer and the one that trickles its candidates. Candidates are every interface address of both machines, and the controller is the side most often on a network it does not trust. `secure_tcp` is fail-open by design: a server that answers the first message with anything but a key exchange, or with nothing, leaves the stream in the clear and the call returns Ok, which the paths from before such servers rely on. That is not a channel WebRTC signalling may go out on. So the four legs use `secure_tcp_required`: Ok only once the server's key exchange has encrypted the stream, an error otherwise. WebSocket is treated as `secure_tcp` treats it, as a transport encrypted already. On the controller an error drops the offer, closes its peer connection through the guard and reconnects, then punches without WebRTC on the fresh socket, with the legacy condition applied to it as before; the failed exchange may have consumed a message on the old one. On the controlled side an error abandons that WebRTC attempt: the answer is not sent, or the candidates are not, and the controller falls back to its other transports. A relay response carrying an answer, which the symmetric-NAT and forced-relay branches send on a connection of their own, keeps the relay and loses only the answer: the response goes without it, on a fresh socket. Degrade to no WebRTC, never to WebRTC signalling in the clear. `secure_tcp` itself is unchanged; the exchange moves into `key_exchange`, which reports whether it happened. A punch without an offer is unchanged: the legacy secure condition takes this socket straight to the punch as before, and every other punch waits for the UDP NAT test as before. The exchange does not replace that wait, it spends part of the same budget, which now runs from before it: what is left is waited out, and a probe that has already answered is taken at once. Tests run a loopback stand-in for hbbs: a server that answers with another message, or closes, is refused where `secure_tcp` would carry on in the clear; a completed exchange is accepted and the stub decodes the reply with its ephemeral key. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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092a961b62 |
server: bound unauthenticated connections in number and in time (#16237)
A connection that never logs in costs whatever its transport costs, for as long as it keeps itself alive: the only limit was the 30s idle timeout, which any message resets. Nothing bounded how many such connections one machine holds, on any transport. The shape sshd_config answers with LoginGraceTime and MaxStartups. Every connection is admitted among the unauthorized ones before its identity handshake, in create_tcp_connection, and holds that place until it authorizes or ends: the count of live places is the bound, not a ledger beside the connections: the resource bound. One address may hold sixteen, a quarter of the room; a further connection from it is refused before the handshake. That share is a fairness cap against the cheapest flood, one host with one address, not a security boundary: any pool of addresses passes it, and the global limit is what holds. With 64 held in all, a further arrival is refused too, and the oldest connection is told to go, unless one is on its way out already: the handshake is raced against that eviction and ends at once, and the session loop has it as a branch of its select, so the place opens as soon as the connection has actually gone and not on a timer tick. The newcomer is not let in on a place still occupied; the controller retries on its own with backoff, and by then the place is free. At most one connection is ever on its way out, so a burst of refused arrivals clears no more room than a single one, and the retry that takes the freed place counts against its address's share: one address turns out at most as many connections as it may hold. One deadline, from the moment the connection starts, a branch of the session loop's select rather than a check on the TestDelay tick: a connection not authorized after 180s is closed, however alive it keeps itself, a wrong password, a pending 2FA, an accept prompt or an admin-terminal credential prompt left unanswered. The controller reconnects on its own and the prompt comes back. It closes with the Timeout reason the idle path uses, and that path still ends a connection that says nothing for 30s. There is no shorter deadline for the first login request: an admin-terminal controller shows its credential prompt before sending one, and a peer that wanted to dodge such a deadline would only have to send a login request, so it would bound nothing. The peer address is normalized with try_into_v4 before admission, the same form Connection::start keys the whitelist on, so an IPv4 peer and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 form are one address and not two shares. The WebRTC answerer's slot keeps bounding peer connection setup up to the open data channel; from there this covers it like every other transport. Tests cover the registry and the live bound: an address over its share is refused while others are admitted; at the limit the newcomer is refused, the oldest is told to go, nobody else is while it is on its way out, and its place frees only when it has; an address at the limit turns out no more connections than its share and is then refused without evicting anyone; and with the limit held by 64 connections stalled in the handshake, one more arrival is refused while the oldest handshake ends at once and only then is there a place again. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
|
851d2df88c |
fix(audio): three 100% CPU busy loops on the _pa path (#16229)
The Linux audio service in `--server` ignored the `Err` from `next_raw()`, so once the cm-side `_pa` peer closed, every iteration re-polled a dead socket: tokio-util's paused `Framed` issues one 0-byte read per poll and returns ready at once, never `Pending`. The thread never parked and burned a full core for the life of the process. Propagate instead, so `ServiceTmpl::run`'s existing backoff ends the inner loop and reconnects. Two sibling loops on the same audio path have the same shape: - `ipc::start_pa` (runs in `--cm`) ignored the `Err` from `psimple::Simple::read`, so a dead pulse handle spins there instead. - `start_voice_call`'s forwarding thread polls two channels with `try_recv` and has no blocking primitive at all: measured 99.8% of a core for the whole call, against 1.0% with a 1 ms pause (audio packets arrive every 10 ms). fix https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/16226 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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bac8323e5d |
Wayland portal staged errors (#16118)
* wayland: say which step of the portal handshake failed
The XDG portal handshake is four sequential requests, and every way it can end
badly -- the user declining, the request being dismissed, a timeout, the portal
being absent or dying mid-handshake, the stream list coming back empty -- left
`request_remote_desktop` through one `bail!` carrying one string.
`map_err_scrap` then guessed a cause by looking for "dbus" or "pipewire" in
that string. Since that string always mentions "PipeWire library", a decline
and a three-minute timeout both came out as "Wayland requires higher version of
linux distro. Please try X11 desktop or change your OS." On Ubuntu 21+, where
the mapping passes the text through untouched, they came out as raw English
pointing at an unrelated GitHub issue.
The response code and the D-Bus error were in hand at the moment of failure and
were being dropped: `handle_response` collapsed all of it into one
`AtomicBool`. Record it instead, tagged with the stage that produced it, and
let the app side look the tag up. `map_err_scrap` gains one leading branch;
anything untagged -- which is everything the capture loop reports -- takes the
existing path unchanged.
What the peer is told is chosen from the tag, and only from facts the tag
actually carries:
- A decline and an interaction that ended some other way are separate outcomes
and say so. The Request spec defines response 1 as the user cancelling, and
guarantees nothing more about 2 than that it ended -- libportal treats 2 as a
plain failure -- so 2 says the request ended without completing and does not
guess who ended it or why.
- A timeout says it timed out. It does not say nobody answered: RustDesk passes
a saved `restore_token` with `persist_mode` 2, and a restored session is
exactly the case where the portal shows no picker at all, so there may have
been no dialog for anyone to answer.
- Not reaching the session bus, a portal that answers but does not implement
what was called, and a grant that fails only when the PipeWire connection is
handed over, each get their own message. None of the three is fixed by
restarting the portal, so none of them is told to. Each says only what its
evidence supports: failing to open the session bus does not prove nobody is
logged in, and `UnknownMethod` on RemoteDesktop does not prove the portal
cannot capture a screen. Which interface was called is in the D-Bus message
that goes to the log; the message to the peer does not claim one.
- What is left -- the portal absent, silent, or failing mid-handshake -- keeps
the existing `xdp-portal-unavailable`, which is already translated everywhere
and carries the one remedy that fits: `systemctl --user restart
xdg-desktop-portal`.
- The Ubuntu-before-21 branch keeps every outcome that says something about the
machine and yields the three that say what happened to the request.
Two more say less than they could, for the same reason. `streams_from_response`
comes back empty when the response cannot be parsed as well as when there is
nothing in it, so the message says RustDesk did not obtain a usable screen
rather than that the portal offered none. `ElementFactory::make` fails the same
way for a plugin that is absent as for one that will not load, so the message
says the component could not be loaded rather than that it is missing.
The D-Bus error name and message, the portal response code and the GStreamer
factory's own error go to the log. Only the element name also reaches the peer,
because it is the one detail that says which package to look at.
`fill_displays` needs the tag resolved at its own call site: it opens a second
portal session for cursor-based display disambiguation, and its error returns
straight up `check_init` without passing through `map_err_scrap`, so a tag
would otherwise reach the peer verbatim.
Two existing paths change, both necessarily:
- `check_init` no longer wraps `Capturer::new` in `with_context`. The peer is
shown `format!("{}", err)` (connection.rs), which renders only the outermost
layer, so that context was replacing the mapped code with "Failed to create
capturer for display 0".
- The `std::process::exit(-1)` on libdbus' no-reply text is now reached only by
the capture loop, which is what that self-heal was written for. Every D-Bus
call in the handshake -- opening the session bus, `get_request_path`, the
`add_match` inside `handle_response`, `create_session`, and `conn.process` in
the wait loop -- carries a tag, so a no-reply there is reported rather than
fatal. It is worth saying plainly what that branch did before: the portal
proxy has a one-second timeout, so a portal slow to activate could take the
whole service down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* wayland: lang keys for the staged portal failures
Eight keys, appended to `template.rs` and to every `src/lang/*.rs`. `it.rs`
gets empty values, as AGENTS.md requires -- it is maintained by hand by its
translator. No `en.rs` entries: each key is already its own English display
text, which is also what an older peer falls back to.
One carries a `{}`, the name of the GStreamer element that could not be created
-- the one detail that tells a user which package to look at. `lang.rs`'s
`extract_placeholder` resolves a key by replacing the first `{...}` with `{}`,
which is why the server sends the value still inside the braces and why the
scrap side strips braces out of any detail before it gets there. Everything
else technical stays in the log: a D-Bus error name or a portal response code
in a dialog is noise to the person reading it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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f164c9a9df |
Dead peer recovery (#16117)
* webrtc: recover from a silent peer in about 8s instead of 30s A controlled peer that is killed, switched away by a user switch, or rebooted leaves no trace on a UDP transport: there is no reset to receive, so the session sees silence, and only the 30s inactivity timeout ends it. By then the remote machine may have finished rebooting and be reachable again, while the user has been watching a frozen frame the whole time and is then told the peer reset the connection. ICE already knows sooner. It reports Disconnected about 5s after it stops hearing from the peer, from its own task, so it stays accurate even while this loop is busy sending. That state is transient by design - a Wi-Fi roam or a sleep/wake recovers from it - so it is treated as suspicion, not as death: three more seconds with the transport receiving nothing, and the session reconnects. Receive progress cancels the suspicion, so a peer that is merely slow, or one ICE was late to clear, is not dropped. This only reaches the existing recovery sooner; it does not replace it. The first reconnect goes out immediately and, if it fails, falls into the same retry the UI already applies to any unexpected disconnect. The restart reconnect event is reused deliberately: it is what asks for exactly that, with no error dialog in front of it, and the UI shows "Connecting..." for it rather than anything about restarting. Its five-minute grace stays reserved for a restart the user actually asked for - silence is no evidence of a reboot. The 30s timeout is unchanged and still backs every transport. TCP and WebSocket are untouched. The controlled side is untouched: it detects a dead controller on the same 30s, which wastes some capture but nothing a user sees. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * kcp: recover from a silent peer on the endpoint's own clock KCP is the other transport with nothing to receive when the peer dies, and it was the slower of the two: its endpoint reaps a connection only after 60s without a packet, which is past the 30s inactivity timeout above it, so in practice nothing but that timeout ever noticed. The endpoint already tracks when each connection last heard from its peer and now exposes it, so this reads that rather than anything derived from the session loop - it keeps answering while that loop is busy sending. Its liveness ping now goes out about every 2s rather than every 10s, so silence means the peer rather than an idle link, and eight seconds of it is several missed pings. Same threshold and the same recovery as the WebRTC half, so a user sees the same thing on either transport. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * review: time the inactivity window off receive progress, bound the parting send Two things the review found, both on the controlling side. The 30s inactivity window still ran off completed messages alone, so the probe added for the fast path did not fix what it was added for: a message larger than the transport's fragment size yields nothing until its last fragment, and a peer sending one steadily was still timed out mid-transfer. It is now timed off whichever is later, a completed message or receive progress. Transports that report no progress leave that at its starting value, so nothing else moves. The parting close-reason send for KCP waited on send capacity with no deadline of its own, and a queue a dead peer will never drain held the finished session's thread until the endpoint reaped the connection a minute later. Bounded once the peer has been declared gone. Still attempted rather than skipped: if the loss was one-way the peer does receive it, and drops its side immediately instead of waiting out its own timeout - which is also the one case where the note below resolves itself. Recorded from the same review, for the case none of this targets - a peer that is alive behind a path that broke for five to ten seconds and then healed. Giving up cannot deliver a close there, because the path is still down at that moment, so the controlled side keeps the old connection until its own 30s expires. For up to twenty of those seconds it holds two authorised connections: its connection manager lists both, and the stale one reports a growing delay that pins the shared frame rate low for the new one. Input is unaffected throughout and both recover once the stale connection goes, so this trades twenty-two seconds of a frozen, uncontrollable session for a controllable one that looks wrong for a while. Closing the displaced connection is controlled-side work and belongs with the rest of it, not here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * review: reject a disconnected cached session, tidy the detector hbb_common: `is_reusable_for` now also rejects a session ICE reports Disconnected, so a caller is not handed one that already carries the hint; and the receive-progress test no longer races `next()` against a sleeping sibling. Here: the `is_some()` guard on the progress comparison was dead, since a transport answers `None` for its whole life and `None != None` is already false. The parting-send deadline is a `Duration` like every other constant around it rather than bare milliseconds. And the comments are cut back to what is not already evident from the code they sit on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * review: keep the legacy UI's retrying error when the peer goes silent `restarting-show` is a Flutter control event; Sciter has no case for it and falls through to a plain dialog, which `check_if_retry` marks non-retryable because its type is not `error`. So on that build the new detector would have replaced a timeout that reconnects on its own after 30s with a dialog waiting for a click at 8s - a regression for the one path this was meant to shorten. Send it the message the timeout already sends, so its behaviour is unchanged apart from arriving sooner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * review: keep the 30s watchdog hard, and let Android's picker hold the reconnect Timing the watchdog off receive progress gave away its upper bound. A fragment bumps the counter as it arrives, ahead of the framing checks that would reject it, so a peer sending one `FRAG_MORE` every twenty seconds and never a `FRAG_END` refreshed the deadline forever while the reassembly buffer grew toward `MAX_FRAME_LENGTH`, a gigabyte away. What it bought - a clipboard image that takes longer than thirty seconds to arrive is not a dead peer - is a pre-existing problem that predates this branch and can be fixed on its own. Receive progress goes back to the one job it was added for, which needs no deadline of its own: telling a transport that has gone quiet from one that is still delivering, so ICE's disconnected hint is not acted on mid-transfer. The Android document picker suppresses a `Connection Error` while it is open and remembers to reconnect once it closes. The peer-gone break reconnects under `restarting-show` with a `Connecting...` title, which matched neither half of that test, so an eight-second stall behind an open picker - Doze and background throttling produce them - threw a dialog up behind the picker and lost the deferred reconnect. It is now named there by its own title rather than by its type: an explicitly restarted remote device sends the same type from a path this leaves alone, on every transport, and deferring that one too would be a change to sessions this has no business touching. The two limits are still not hard upper bounds, and the comment saying so was wrong about why. A send is awaited inline in this loop, so one in progress delays the tick that checks them - bounded on WebRTC by the timeout the stream was built with, not bounded at all on KCP, whose framed stream is constructed with none. The 30s watchdog beside it shares the loop and the same delay. Left alone deliberately. `restarting-show` reconnects without the backoff its `restarting` sibling uses, which can loop while each round gets far enough to establish a session and then loses the transport within eight seconds; a cooldown there would also delay the recovery this exists for when a peer really does come back, and the loading it shows can be cancelled. And the KCP limit reads an accumulated silence rather than a transient hint, so unlike the WebRTC grace it needs no second sample to confirm - one would only move eight seconds to nine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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01dbb76499 |
server: do not lock the screen for a connection a reconnect replaced (#16124)
A controlling peer whose link dies without a close reconnects, while the
connection it left behind runs on here until its own 30s inactivity timeout.
That one then ends with `on_close("Timeout", true)`, and the lock is gated
only on `lock_after_session_end` and this connection's own `keyboard` - both
set by the very controller that is at that moment working in the session its
reconnect re-established. Nothing anywhere asks whether the session is still
being controlled, so the screen locks under a peer that came back twenty-odd
seconds earlier, and the operator's desk locks itself in front of them.
The lock now also requires that no newer remote control connection of this
session is authorized.
Newer, not merely other. A connection stays in `AUTHED_CONNS` until its
`AuthedConnID` drops, which is well after `on_close` returns, so a symmetric
test would have two of one session ending together each see the other and
neither lock. Ids come from a counter, so `>` orders them: of a session's
connections the last still locks, whether they end one after another or at
once.
Remote control only, and this session only. The other kinds do not keep a
screen in use, and `send_logon_response` clears `keyboard` for a file
transfer, a terminal and a camera view, so none of those reaches the gate at
all - a port forward keeps it, and is kept out only by the client not sending
`lock_after_session_end` on one. Another peer's
session is left exactly as it is: whether its ending locks the screen while
this one is connected is a separate question, and not one a timeout on this
side should start answering.
Every close that asked to lock, not only the timeout. A connection its own
peer has already replaced should not lock the session that replaced it
however it ends, and singling out one reason would leave the same race
reachable through the others.
Two things it does not cover. A reconnect that has not authorized yet is not
in `AUTHED_CONNS`, so a timeout landing while one waits at the accept prompt
or on 2FA locks as before. And the lock is skipped, not handed on: if the
connection that replaced this one later ends through a path that asks not to
lock - a failed send, a stopped service - nothing locks. That is what those
paths already choose for a connection dying of a network error, on the
assumption that the peer will retry, and it is the same assumption this makes.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
|
691830fe89 |
bump webrtc: revert the T3-rtx probe recovery (#16121)
The probe recovery merged as
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
|
b50fde6910 |
add the base crate and repoint the moved modules at it (#16107)
* add the base crate and repoint the moved modules at it `libs/base` (crate `base`) takes the parts of hbb_common that only this app uses: `fs`, `platform`, `keyboard`, `message.proto`, and 145 of the 177 `config::keys` constants. hbb_common keeps what the server names, and the 32 keys it reads itself are re-exported from `base::config::keys` so call sites still see the full set through one path. Sources move verbatim. The only edits inside them are `crate::` prefixes that now have to say `hbb_common::`; `keyboard.rs` and `platform/windows.rs` are byte-identical. The crate stays on edition 2018, the edition the moved code was written under. `log`, `lazy_static` and `anyhow` become direct dependencies so the bare paths in that code resolve exactly as before, and its winapi features are spelled out rather than left to feature unification. Two call sites outside Rust and Cargo had to follow the move: the Android protobuf source dir, which still pointed at hbb_common/protos for message.proto, and the three AGENTS.md entries that named hbb_common for options, protos and file transfer. `scrap`'s `drm` feature now forwards to `base/wayland_probe`. Left pointing at hbb_common it would still have compiled, silently dropping the Wayland socket-probe fallback, so that forward is verified by a build with and without the feature. `config::keys` carries a test asserting its names stay disjoint from the ones hbb_common kept: the glob re-export and the local constants share a namespace, and Rust prefers the local item silently, so a name added to both sides would otherwise let client and server disagree with no diagnostic. Verified: macOS and Linux, debug and release, `--all-targets`; the 177 key constants diffed name-for-name and value-for-value; the generated protobuf types compared before and after; every `#[cfg]` gate on a moved import checked against its original; and every file that was `rustfmt`-clean before this change still is, compared against master file by file. Windows is checked by inspection only -- it cannot be compiled here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * one `use` per crate, and write the rule down `fs.rs` came out of the move with two ungated `use hbb_common::` statements, because the original single `use crate::{...}` had to give up `message_proto` to the new crate and the rest was left in a second block. Fold it back into one. A scan of the whole tree for the same shape finds nothing else: every other file with more than one top-level `use base::` or `use hbb_common::` is split by a `#[cfg]` that does not cover the whole block, or by `pub use` next to `use`. Those are the cases that cannot merge, so AGENTS.md now states both the rule and the exemption. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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ae6af2de43 |
Webrtc (#15684)
* feat: add rendezvous WebRTC signaling fields * feat: route WebRTC ICE on controlled side * feat: race WebRTC as a direct transport enhancement * fix: route WebRTC ICE through rendezvous paths * feat: WebRTC transport racing, DTLS identity binding, and pc-leak fixes - prefer-P2P racing (race_transports_prefer_webrtc) across punch and RelayResponse; ICE bridge with 400ms candidate resend - controlled-side answerer and ICE routing; sign local DTLS fingerprint into SignedId, controller verifies the binding fail-closed - fix pc leaks: close_webrtc() on insecure-decline paths (io_loop, port_forward); compute direct before disarming the offerer guard - point hbb_common to the WebRTC data-plane commit 9f5a296 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: preserve WebRTC transport preference * feat: decouple WebRTC from UDP punch, route controlled signaling over TCP - the WebRTC offer now rides any punch request; only an offer-less request may close and reuse the rendezvous socket for TCP punching (request_allows_tcp_punch replaces the udp_port-based invariant), with a separate offer-less request racing as the TCP fallback - WebSocket mode no longer disables WebRTC — ws only tunnels the signaling/relay legs while ICE stays the only P2P path there; SOCKS proxy still disables it (ICE would bypass the proxy and leak the real IP) - controlled side: WebRTC-only punch replies and trickled ICE candidates go over dedicated TCP connections to the rendezvous server instead of the UDP mediator channel, for ws/TCP-only hbbs deployments; drop the now-redundant rz_sender plumbing and the 400ms candidate re-send on that leg - guard is_udp handling against responses to requests that advertised no udp_port; skip the IPv6 socket bind under force-relay - test_udp_uat: drop the STUN port race — the punch port must come from the rendezvous server's TestNatResponse observing this socket's mapping, a STUN probe from another socket can advertise an unreachable port - bump hbb_common (webrtc 0.13 MSRV pin rationale + upgrade checklist docs) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: KCP/UDP resilience to ICMP resets; optional KCP congestion control - treat ICMP-driven UDP socket errors (WSAECONNRESET 10054 on Windows, ECONNREFUSED on Linux) as packet loss in punch_udp and the KCP pump instead of tearing the session down; KCP retransmits through them and a truly dead link is still reaped by the pong/app-level timeouts - resolve STUN hostnames via tokio::net::lookup_host so DNS never blocks a runtime worker; fix the inverted non-IPv4 error message - add enable-kcp-congestion-control option (default on): switch the turbo profile to nc=0 so brief loss on constrained links no longer spirals into stalls; sender-side only, no wire negotiation - pin kcp-sys to the rustdesk-patches branch: upstream main lost the RustDesk patches on the EasyTier sync, and this branch also wires set_kcp_config_factory into connection setup, making the option effective Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry switch_code through WebRTC relay fallbacks after rebase The rebase onto master (switch-code feature) added an 8th request_relay parameter; pass the interface's switch code from both WebRTC->relay fallback paths so a role-swap session survives the fallback. Also drop a duplicate bindgen 0.72.1 entry the Cargo.lock merge produced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * fix: don't let the preferred branch's own relay preempt a direct fallback race_transports_prefer_webrtc committed any success from its first argument outright, on the assumption that it is the WebRTC connect. It is not: the call site passes a whole punch attempt, which internally falls back to request_relay when its direct transports fail. That relay was therefore committed instantly while the offer-less fallback's TCP punch was still in flight — inverting the preference this function exists to enforce, since the is_p2p predicate the caller already supplies was applied only to the `others` branch. Apply it to both branches: a direct result from either side still commits immediately, and a relayed result from either side is held for the window so the other side can land something direct. Also commit a held connection when the surviving branch errors, which the previous code only did on the first branch's failure path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * fix: evict the oldest pending ICE candidate, not the newest Candidates arrive in gathering order — host, then srflx, then relay — so a full buffer was discarding exactly the ones that traverse NAT while keeping host ones that only work on a shared LAN. Evict from the front instead. Also document why the controller's ICE bridge must not reconnect on error, in contrast to the controlled side's per-candidate retry: its socket address is the return route itself (mangled into PunchHole.socket_addr, echoed back in IceCandidate.socket_addr, resolved through tcp_punch), so a reconnect would arrive from an address no route points at, and the server drops the old entry when the connection closes. Once it dies both directions are dead, and abandoning WebRTC is the correct response rather than retrying. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * fix: bound log volume on sites whose rate a peer or retry loop controls Debug output goes to the log file, so a site that fires per received message or per retry lets someone else decide how much a machine writes to disk. The WebRTC work added the first such sites. - KCP io loop: absorbing ICMP errors as packet loss made a broken socket write ~100 lines a second for the 60s until the pong timeout reaps it. Log by run instead: one line when a run starts, one per ~5s while it persists so a stuck socket stays visible, and one on recovery with the total. - punch_udp: the recv error retries every 10ms for up to MAX_TIME, so one line per occurrence wrote thousands per punch. Log the first, report the count in the timeout message. - ICE candidate paths (client, mediator): the peer sets the candidate rate and the rendezvous route carrying them needs no prior punch, so throttle to one line a minute each with the suppressed count. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * fix: the KCP io throttle reset itself every cycle, so it never throttled The send and recv arms shared one counter, and an ICMP error on a connected socket is reported once and then cleared — so the steady state is an alternation: the send succeeds and clears the counter, the next recv reports the error and finds the counter at 1, and logs. Every error still wrote a line, at the ~100/s the previous commit set out to stop, while the persistent-failure and recovery branches were unreachable. Use one LogThrottle per direction instead of a hand-rolled counter. That removes the shared state the bug lived in, drops a third throttling mechanism in favour of the one already added, and leaves the surrounding `if let Err` untouched rather than reshaping it into a match. Also fix test_udp_uat's socket-error arm, the untreated twin of the punch_udp site: it had no backoff at all, so a persistent error re-armed recv immediately and spun the loop at CPU speed, one warn line per iteration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * bump kcp-sys: 14 review fixes on rustdesk-patches (6e44b93 -> fa51c15) Picks up the handshake-recovery work plus the review round on top of it: ABBA deadlock between the endpoint's two DashMaps, graceful-close tail truncation, mid-stream hole on ikcp_send failure, FIN retransmission for lost-FIN half-open hangs, SYN-ACK budget burned on dropped packets, spurious ConnectTimeout after a completed handshake, accept-backlog overflow stranding conns, aliasing UB in the output callback, and the log-facade/throttling cleanup (per-packet sites no longer reach the debug-level file logger, peer-rate warns throttled). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * ws: decouple ICE policy from force_relay — full-ICE WebRTC over WebSocket WebSocket support folds into force_relay because a ws tunnel kills classic TCP/UDP punching — but that conflated transport necessity with relay policy, and the WebRTC decisions keyed off the merged flag: a ws client built no offerer at all without TURN, and only a Relay-only-ICE one with it. ws deployments could never reach a direct WebRTC connection, which is exactly the path they are supposed to live on. Split the flag. LoginConfigHandler now tracks policy_relay (the force-always-relay option, an explicit relay request — /r ids and retry-via-relay included — and proxy) separately; force_relay stays policy_relay || use_ws() and keeps governing the classic paths, so non-ws behavior is unchanged everywhere: - the offerer's existence and ICE policy follow policy_relay: under pure ws the offer gathers every candidate type and may go direct; under relay-by-policy it stays Relay-only ICE, TURN-gated, exactly as before; - the RelayResponse race applies the prefer-P2P window under ws (a direct ICE path is worth delaying an already-ready relay for) while policy relay keeps first-success semantics; - the request carries webrtc_all_ice (hbb_common 64b54ab) so the controlled side knows the offer is full-ICE: it answers with full ICE and no TURN requirement, while offers without the bit keep today's relay-only answer path on every version-skew combination. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * bump kcp-sys: 7 review fixes on rustdesk-patches (fa51c15 -> 023a006) Reverts the connect/accept/add_conn changes that regressed concurrent connects (the state_map guard held across add_conn is load-bearing), states the single-conn contract on KcpEndpoint so shared-endpoint behaviour stops consuming review effort, pins the two invariants that keep truncated input from aborting under panic='abort', and fixes three findings from external review: sendwnd() echoing raw config instead of KCP's effective window (a non-positive factory value stalled sending forever), the passive closer's lost final FIN delaying EOF by up to ~20s, and the doubled window overflowing for extreme factory values. Lock-only change: cargo update -p kcp-sys also re-picked libloading's windows-targets between two versions already present in the lock; that was reverted to keep this commit to the one line it is about. cargo metadata --locked passes on the result. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ws: read the all-ICE declaration from the offer envelope, drop the proto field Companion to hbb_common 68d2729: the full-ICE declaration now lives as an `ice_policy: "all"` key inside the webrtc:// envelope, so the request assembly no longer sets webrtc_all_ice and the controlled side asks the envelope (endpoint_declares_all_ice) instead of a PunchHole field. The rendezvous server carries the offer opaquely — no forwarding to keep in sync. Skew behavior is unchanged: an unmarked or unparseable envelope reads as the old Relay-only semantics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * add enable-webrtc option; gate test_ipv6 under forced relay OPTION_ENABLE_WEBRTC (hbb_common 48c2d4d) follows the udp/ipv6 punch options end to end: default on against the public server, off against private ones, same settings UI placement on desktop and mobile, and the same bool2option local-option handling. Gates: - controller: should_create_webrtc_offerer checks it first — no pc, no STUN/TURN gathering, no offer in the request; - controlled: unlike the udp/ipv6 legs, which deliberately follow the request, answering builds a pc that gathers ICE from this host, so the answerer honors this machine's own switch too. Translations for "Enable WebRTC P2P connection" added to all 50 lang files next to the IPv6 entry (IPv6 and WebRTC are invariant terms in the same grammatical slot in every one of them). Also stop probing v6 reachability (test_ipv6) under any forced relay: the v6 punch socket is never bound there, so the probe was wasted work on every ws/proxy/relay connection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * kcp: client-side integration tests over real loopback sockets kcp-sys has been through two review rounds of behavioral fixes; the client wrapper (kcp_io pumps, connect/accept deadlines, framed-stream adaptation, guard lifetimes) had no tests pinning what rustdesk actually relies on. Four now do, each through real 127.0.0.1 UDP sockets and the BytesCodec framing sessions use: - handshake + bidirectional framed roundtrip + graceful close: the peer observes end-of-stream instead of hanging (guard outlives the framed stream so the FIN goes out); - a writer that queues 50 frames and closes immediately loses none of them - the client-side pin for the close-tail-drain semantics; - socket errors after the peer vanishes are treated as loss: writes keep succeeding, nothing tears down (ICMP is advisory on connected UDP); - the connect deadline holds when nothing answers. Mutation-checked: dropping inbound forwarding in kcp_io reddens exactly the three tests that need the pump, and the timeout test alone stays green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * ipc/auth: replace the local throttle with the shared throttled_log! auth.rs predated hbb_common's LogThrottle and grew its own equivalent: same shape (last_log_at + suppressed), same 5s interval, plus a helper and three OnceLock<Mutex<..>> statics. It also counted the other way - excluding the event being reported - so each of the three sites carried two near-identical log::warn! arms to avoid printing "suppressed 0". The shared macro covers all of it: one static per call site declared by the expansion, and the multiplicity suffix appears only when there is one, which is what those duplicated arms were for. 102 lines out, 27 in. Behavior difference, deliberate: a burst now reads "(x47)" - the total including this line - instead of "(suppressed 46 similar events)". One number, no arithmetic, and one convention across the codebase. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * kcp: make the congestion-control profile opt-in, not the default The branch had flipped KCP to nc=0 (built-in congestion window) for every session. That is a transport-behavior change for all users made on reasoning alone, and the reasoning does not decide it: which profile wins depends on why packets are being lost. nc=1 - what RustDesk has always shipped - never shrinks the send window, so on a genuinely congested uplink it deepens the loss it is reacting to. But nc=0's backoff is blunt: a fast retransmit halves the window while an RTO sets cwnd = 1 outright (ikcp.c) and recovery slow-starts from one packet, so on a link with random loss and no congestion - Wi-Fi interference, a long-haul path - it reads loss as congestion and can stall an interactive stream for seconds. That failure mode is also the more visible one to a remote-desktop user. No benchmark settles this either: a loopback A/B has no bottleneck queue, hence no congestion to control, and would flatter nc=1 by construction. Deciding it needs a shaped link or field data. So keep the profile users already run and let the other one be asked for ("enable-kcp-congestion-control" = "Y"). Flipping the default later is a one-line change once there is evidence. kcp-sys keeps its own test covering the nc=0 path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * android: define getifaddrs/freeifaddrs for the api-21 sysroot Turning on hbb_common's "webrtc" feature pulls webrtc-util into the android link, and its ifaces() -- reached from vnet::Net::new() on every ICE gather -- calls getifaddrs(). bionic exports getifaddrs/freeifaddrs only from API 24, while flutter/ndk_*.sh builds against --platform 21, so every abi failed to link on the undefined symbols. Raising the platform to 24 would have to drag minSdkVersion 22 with it and turn the link error into a load-time one on Android 5.1/6.0, so define the two symbols instead, using the RTM_GETLINK + RTM_GETADDR netlink dump bionic itself uses. The definition also shadows bionic's on API >= 24 rather than delegating to it, so the path that ships is the path every test device runs. Checked against synthesised netlink dumps on the host -- link/address parsing, prefix masks, point-to-point, ipv6 scope ids, malformed and truncated messages -- under UBSan and byte-exact guard malloc, with a deliberately unsigned remainder as the negative control. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix three ways ws + WebRTC could not work in practice Review of #15684 and hbb_common#579. Each of these left the code reading correct while the feature did not function. - The RelayResponse race classified P2P with `result.2 == "IPv6"`, but that site's futures are only ever the relay ("Relay"/"WebSocket") and the WebRTC branch's own "WebRTC" — so the predicate was constantly false. When the relay landed first the result was still right (the webrtc arm's `others_fut.is_none()` fallback), but when WebRTC connected FIRST it was parked as if it were a relay and the relay was committed on arrival, discarding a live direct connection. That is the LAN case: the better the network, the worse the outcome. Classify by what the label means, via is_direct_transport, and test both orderings — only the relay-first one was covered. - handle_peer_info wrote "force-always-relay=Y" into the peer's saved config whenever force_relay was set, which now includes the WebSocket transport. One ws session therefore turned the peer into a permanent relay-by-policy peer, and relay-by-policy means Relay-only ICE, so WebRTC could never go direct to it again — the flagship path worked exactly once. Persist policy_relay, which is the user's choice; the transport is a property of this client, not of the peer. - The answerer gated on this machine's enable-webrtc option, but that is LocalConfig: the UI process writes it and never syncs it over IPC, while handle_punch_hole runs in the server process, which on Windows resolves LocalConfig under a different profile and reads the private-server default of "N". The gate refused to answer in exactly the self-hosted deployments the transport exists for. Drop it: the answerer follows the request, like the udp/ipv6 legs, and the option still gates the feature where it can — an offer only exists because some controller had it enabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * webrtc: close without an await point; do not report an unknown path as direct - close_webrtc is no longer async (hbb_common 88f965f), so the ten call sites in port_forward and io_loop - all inside select! arms or futures the UI can abandon - can no longer be cancelled mid-teardown, which left the pc unclosable and its session entry stranded. Client's own spawn_close_webrtc went with it: the runtime-teardown guard it existed for now lives in close_detached, so both Drop paths share one implementation. - webrtc_relayed() returns None when no candidate pair is selected or the pc closed under a concurrent teardown, and both call sites read that as "not relayed", i.e. direct. A TURN-relayed session could therefore be shown to the user as peer-to-peer. Claiming a direct path needs evidence of one, so an unknown answer now counts as relayed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * scrap/benchmark: give the Duration divisor an explicit u32 The webrtc feature pulls time 0.3 into scrap's graph (hbb_common -> webrtc -> webrtc-dtls -> der-parser -> asn1-rs), and that crate carries an `impl Div<time::Duration> for std::time::Duration`. Orphan rules allow it because the RHS is its own type, and trait impls are visible across the whole dependency graph without a use, so std::time::Duration now has two Div candidates. `yuv_count as _` casts to a plain inference variable, which both candidates fit, so it stops resolving: error[E0282]: type annotations needed --> libs/scrap/examples/benchmark.rs:146:33 Only two of the four sites are reported - rustc emits one E0282 per function body - so all four are annotated. The already-explicit `as u32` at the hwcodec site and `start.elapsed() / cnt` are unaffected, the latter because an integer literal's variable can only unify with an integral type and rules the time impl out on its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * webrtc: judge the race by the resolved path, not the label; bound the ICE queue Third review round. Two of these are regressions from the previous one. - The RelayResponse race predicate was `is_direct_transport(result.2)`, which answers true for the label "WebRTC" - but WebRTC is only a direct path when ICE nominated a non-TURN pair. A TURN-relayed WebRTC result therefore committed instantly and cancelled the IPv6 attempt racing beside it, which is the same inversion the previous fix removed in the other direction. (That fix was also argued from a wrong premise: the site does carry an IPv6 future, pushed ~50 lines earlier than the relay one.) Each future now resolves whether its path is direct and the predicate reads that bool, matching the outer race, and the downstream recomputation goes away. - policy_relay still folded in Config::is_proxy(), and that is what gets persisted into the peer's config as force-always-relay - so one session through a proxy pinned the peer to relay forever and disabled WebRTC for it, exactly the latch the previous round fixed for WebSocket. Split out peer_relay: the saved option or an explicit request for THIS peer, and the only part written back. - The controlled side buffered remote ICE candidates in an unbounded channel while the controller caps the same buffer at 64, and draining one costs a JSON parse plus the ICE agent's lock. Whoever can reach a session's route could grow it without limit inside the long-lived service process. Bounded, with the overflow logged through the existing throttle. - That route was also removed by key alone when an answerer finished, so a punch retry that built a fresh answerer under the same fingerprint had its live sender deleted by the previous one's cleanup - after which it received no candidates at all. Evict only our own sender, the way the session cache already guards the analogous case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * webrtc: trim the comments to AGENTS.md length; drop is_direct_transport 386 added comment lines down to 287 across client, mediator, kcp_stream and common. Same rule as hbb_common 3d64e43: out go past-bug narration, rejected alternatives, measurements and restatements of the code; the non-derivable why stays. is_direct_transport goes with them. Judging the race by a transport label was replaced by the resolved direct flag, leaving it used only by its own test — and, having been inserted between the doc comment and race_transports_prefer_webrtc, it had also taken that function's contract with it. Removing it reattaches the doc where it belongs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * webrtc: fix race edge cases that discard or mislabel a direct connection Three correctness fixes in the transport race, plus three convention cleanups. - race_transports_prefer_webrtc committed a relayed result while a direct attempt was still in flight: the others arm returned on webrtc_fut.is_none() even with an unfinished direct future, and the WebRTC-error arm returned a held relay without checking others_fut. A relay is now committed only when nothing direct can still arrive (or the window expires); a parked relay is also preferred over composing an error when both sides fail. Three regression tests, mutation-checked. - connect()'s plain select_ok let a TURN-relayed WebRTC win as "first success", dropping still-racing UDP/IPv6 direct attempts and reporting the relayed pair as direct. It now runs through the same prefer-P2P race with each attempt carrying whether its path is direct, and the WebRTC future resolves is_relayed() so a TURN win is held behind direct attempts, not committed as one. - The RelayResponse path kept direct == true when a WebRTC win's DTLS handshake failed and it fell back to relay, so the relay was reported P2P. Clear the flag with the transport switch. - Trim the OffererGuard doc to the three-line max; move the new enable-webrtc localization key to the end of every lang list; the KCP option constant moved to hbb_common config::keys (0f663aa). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ * bump hbb_common: WebRTC peer connections own their I/O runtime Closing the controlling window left the controlled side waiting out ICE decay — ~25-30s in the peer's log, its disconnected/failed ladder running to completion — where TCP delivers a FIN at once. The session end closed the pc by spawning onto io_loop's own `#[tokio::main(flavor = "current_thread")]` runtime, which is dropped the moment io_loop returns, and nothing after that call yields: the task was never polled even once, so no DTLS close_notify ever left. Every attempt to fix that on the caller's side failed the same way, because the mismatch was never about where the close ran: a pc's UDP sockets register with the reactor, and its ICE/DTLS/SCTP pumps spawn on the runtime, that is current while it is built — so a pc created by a session outlives the only runtime that can drive its I/O, and a close driven anywhere else completes without reaching the wire. The bump homes them where they can outlive any caller: WebRTCStream builds on a process-lifetime runtime and every detached close runs there as its own never-cancelled task. io_loop keeps its plain close_webrtc() calls and only documents why nothing here may spawn or await the teardown on the dying session runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne * fix: give the UDP NAT test a real window when the TCP clock is faked The punch request carries udp_port only if the rendezvous server's TestNatResponse has arrived, and the wait for it was bounded by rtt / 2 — half the TCP connect time, on the assumption that TCP and UDP round trips are comparable and the test, started earlier, has already answered. A transparent TCP proxy breaks that assumption: a TUN-mode VPN on the host, or a redirect-mode proxy on the LAN gateway serving every device behind it, completes the handshake locally in ~3ms while the real UDP round trip is hundreds of ms. Log-confirmed against 5.161.65.208: ping 341ms, TCP connect 3.7ms, connect to a dead port there "succeeds" just as fast. The window collapsed to ~1.5ms, udp_port stayed 0 on every attempt, and UDP punch was never even requested — although UDP itself passes such gateways untouched. So use the TCP clock only when it is believable: below a plausible WAN round trip it says nothing about the UDP path, and a flat ceiling applies instead. The loop still exits the moment the port arrives, so a genuinely nearby server pays nothing and only a UDP-dead network waits out the ceiling — on the udp-carrying round alone, while the parallel pure-TCP round is unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne * feat: make the TCP punch a user option, with TCP as the backstop TCP punching was the one direct transport without a switch, while UDP, IPv6 and WebRTC each had one. Add "Enable TCP hole punching" above the UDP toggle on both desktop and mobile, default on — including on self-hosted servers, since unlike the other three (whose default-off there guards against an hbbs that cannot forward their fields) TCP punching has always been supported by every server. Turning all four off would leave no way to punch at all, so TCP runs regardless in that case. That backstop keys off the switches alone: a transport that is enabled but fails to materialize — no public v6 address, no NAT port, a failed offerer — is already covered by the relay fallback for a round that ends up with no usable direct transport. With the TCP punch off, the fallback request is skipped too: it exists only to carry that punch, and would otherwise reach connect() with nothing to try and merely open a second relay. Known cost, unchanged behavior for the peer: the request carries no field for this choice, so a peer that receives one with no udp_port and no offer still punches a TCP hole and listens for a connection the controller will not make. Representing the transport choice on the wire needs a proto field and the server forwarding it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne * bump hbb_common: name the punch by every transport it carries `get_local_endpoint_trickle` became `local_endpoint() -> &str`, which cannot fail, so both call sites lose an unreachable error arm — the mediator's closed a pc against a failure that no longer exists. `punch_type` named one transport, and picked it off `allow_tcp_punch`. A round carries several at once — a NAT port and a v6 address and an offer — and since the TCP punch became a switch it can carry none, so one name had to misreport both: the logs of the round that broke WebRTC read "#1 UDP punch attempt" while the request also carried the v6 address and the offer that was actually failing, and a round with nothing to punch with was labelled "WebRTC". List them instead — "UDP+IPv6+WebRTC" — and call the empty round "Relay", which is what it can still end as and what `typ` prints for it. The offer is moved into the request rather than cloned into it; that was its last use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3 * bump hbb_common: drop link-local IPv6 from ICE gathering Also pin webrtc-util to a fork of 0.11.0 carrying a Windows IPv6 enumeration fix. `ifaces` reads the adapter list's on-wire IPv6 bytes as host-order `[u16; 8]`, so on a little-endian host every group comes out byte-swapped and unbindable: a peer's real 240e:369:9606:4600:f52a:7a8d:2530:4de0 is enumerated as e24:6903:696:46:2af5:8d7a:3025:e04d, ::1 as ::100 and fe80:: as 80fe::. Each fails to bind with WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL, so ICE gathers no IPv6 host candidate at all on Windows - where a globally routable address is the one NAT-free path a CGNAT'd peer has. Never reported upstream; the unix twin of the same bug was fixed in webrtc-rs#475 (2023). Fork: rustdesk-org/webrtc, branch rustdesk-patches, tag webrtc-util-0.11.0-win-ipv6. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3 * bump hbb_common: name the family a WebRTC session runs over `stream_type` reaches the UI as the transport that won the race, and every other transport already carries the family in that label - the v6 punch reports `IPv6`. WebRTC does not: one label covers both families, and it is the one path whose real remote address can differ from the rendezvous-observed one the session is identified by. Refine it at the hand-off to the UI rather than at the source: five sites in client.rs compare `typ == "WebRTC"`, so widening the label there would silently move control flow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3 * bump hbb_common: one STUN list, and drop the dead IPv4 half `test_ipv6` kept its own hand-written copy of the STUN servers. It now reads `WebRTCStream::stun_servers()`, so an operator who points OPTION_ICE_SERVERS at their own server gets it on both paths instead of one. `test_bind_ipv6` sends nothing - `connect` only makes the kernel pick a route and a source address - so the whole cost is DNS. It races the lookups rather than betting this host's IPv6 support on whether the first entry happens to publish a AAAA where the user resolves from; google's does not, from a Chinese resolver, and it was the entry being bet on. `stun_ipv4_test`, `STUNS_V4` and `test_nat_ipv4` have had no callers since the punch stopped taking its port from a second socket, and go. `get_kcp_cc_enabled` reads the renamed option through `option2bool`, like every other one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3 * webrtc: take dcsctp's retransmission timings and IPv6-safe MTU webrtc-sctp ships RFC 4960's RTO.Initial/RTO.Min (3000/1000), TCP's values for arbitrary public paths. On this workload they set the recovery time outright: a request/response exchange keeps one chunk in flight, so no later SACK ever raises miss_indicator to the 3 that arms fast retransmit, and the T3 floor is the only way back. A single loss during a handshake or a first keyframe therefore costs whole seconds. The fork now carries dcsctp's numbers instead - the SCTP implementation Google wrote to replace usrsctp for Chrome's WebRTC data channels, the same realtime workload: rto_initial 500, rto_min 400, a 220ms floor under the RTT variance, and mtu 1191. INITIAL_MTU 1228 plus DTLS/UDP/IPv6 overhead is 1313, past the 1280 minimum, so every full-size chunk fragmented on an IPv6 path. Both patch entries move to the new branch, which also carries the Windows IPv6 byte-swap fix, so one rev matches the whole webrtc 0.13 stack. * udp: make the punch prove itself, and keep the listener answering punch_udp sent a zero-length datagram and called the hole open on whatever arrived next. The rendezvous NAT test's own leftover replies satisfy that immediately - connect() does not flush the receive queue - so the retry loop never ran and success meant nothing. The dead socket then cost KCP its full timeout to rediscover, which is how a failed punch came to take 18 seconds. Probes now carry a magic and a 64-bit transaction id, and both ends answer each other's probes, so returning is a fact: a reply echoing our own id is the one thing that proves the pair carries traffic both ways. With failure now distinguishable from 'not yet', the window drops from 20s to 3s. Two asymmetries fall out of that: Only the connector stops on its own acknowledgement, because only it has something to send next. An acknowledgement proves our probe came back, not that the peer's probe was answered - and after punch_udp returns nothing answers probes any more, since KCP's io loop drops anything shorter than its header. A listener that stopped there would go mute while a peer whose own probe or answer was lost - the normal state of a hole still opening - kept probing an endpoint that works, until it timed out. So the listener stops on the peer's first real packet instead, and hands that packet to KcpStream::accept as its init_packet: its arrival proves the pair as well as an acknowledgement would, and KCP never retransmits its SYN. * webrtc: correct the RTT variance floor to dcsctp's scaling The earlier commit took dcsctp's min_rtt_variance = 220 as a raw floor under rttvar. dcsctp divides the option by kHeuristicVarianceAdjustment = 8.0 first, a historical accident it kept because downstream users had measured good values with it, so the intended floor is 27.5ms of variance contributing 110ms to RTO. Flooring at 220 contributed 880ms instead, which on a 50ms path left RTO within 7% of the 1000ms default this change exists to escape. The fork also now records why T1/T2 share T3's RTO manager here, unlike dcsctp's separate control timers: RTO_INITIAL is the T3 value for the first DATA chunk, since no RTT sample exists before the first SACK. * webrtc: skip the controller's ICE re-send instead of queueing it twice The controller sends every candidate twice, because the server's hop to a peer registered over UDP can lose one. The ICE agent that dedups repeats sits downstream of the answerer's queue, so the answerer paid for both copies: a slot, a JSON parse, and the ICE agent's lock, once per repeat. Remember a digest of what was queued and skip the repeat. Recorded only once queued, so a candidate a full queue refused stays repairable by the re-send. The queue's depth is unchanged. A real peer gathers well under it - four STUN servers, link-local IPv6 filtered, one component - and the drain empties it as candidates trickle in, so what this removes is the redundant work, not an overflow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * tcp: repeat the punch across the controller's dial window The single punch leaves before hbbs has told the controller where to dial, so it is never in flight at the same time as the controller's SYN: it opens our NAT, meets nothing, and a gateway that answers it with RST takes the mapping down with it, leaving the listener waiting on a hole that no longer exists. Punch again while the controller may still be dialing, and race those punches against the accept. That is two ways in where there was one: the mapping is rebuilt if a RST took it, and once the controller sits in SYN_SENT one of the punches meets its SYN and completes as a simultaneous open - which a punch sent before the controller had been told anything never could. The crossing reaches the punch rather than the listener because the two sockets share the address but only the punch matches the four-tuple, which the tests now pin down. There is no instant to aim at, and no window either. `Client::connect` sizes the controller's dial only after our PunchHoleSent, from its own rendezvous time and the direct failures it has recorded for us: CONNECT_TIMEOUT between two known-asymmetric NATs that never failed, punch_time_used times three or six otherwise, floored at a second - so a peer that failed once dials for a second or two from then on, and none of that reaches this side. The repeats therefore cover our own ceiling instead, CONNECT_TIMEOUT, which is exactly as long as the accept has always been willing to take a connection through the hole, and back off across it: dense at the start, where every window begins and the short ones end, sparse afterwards, which is `punch_udp`'s shape for the same reason. A window past that ceiling was lost before this change too, and mostly to the controller's own kernel - Windows gives a SYN up at 21s, Linux's next re-send after 15s is at 31s; a window short of it costs a few SYNs to a port already closed. No punch is cut on a per-attempt timeout; one in flight is bounded only by the shared deadline plus PUNCH_GRACE. A punch is cancel-safe only while it is still in SYN_SENT; once the controller's SYN has crossed it the socket is half way through a handshake, and cutting it there cuts the connection the controller is opening - whose `connect` has already returned, so that attempt fails outright, there being no relay fallback after a failed TCP handshake. A timer cannot tell the two states apart, and none is needed: a gateway that answers with RST fails the connect at once and the loop punches again, while one that drops the SYN in silence leaves the socket in SYN_SENT, holding the mapping open while the kernel re-sends, which any SYN of the controller's then crosses - a second punch has nothing to add. The deadline decides whether another punch starts; one in flight runs a grace past it, enough for a crossing begun just before it to complete. The last sleep is cut at the deadline rather than run out past it, so the window ends on a punch given that grace and not on a gap of up to the backoff ceiling: the controller's window opened after ours, on the PunchHoleSent hbbs relayed, so one as long as ours is still open through our tail. Only the accept races the punch, never `accept_connection`: that one does not return until the session it goes on to run has ended, so racing it would tear a live session down. Whichever arrives first is the one connection the request produces. `meta` carries the control permissions hbbs granted for this one controller, so serving the loser as well would hand them to a second peer - and nothing about a connection tells the two apart before `create_tcp_connection` has spoken to it, least of all its address: a carrier NAT shares one between subscribers, and a NAT that pools its external addresses may dial us from a different one than hbbs saw the controller through. So the address is not checked, as `accept_connection` never checked it; the handshake says who arrived, and what holds the invariant is that there is no second serve. Those permissions are a ceiling and not a grant either way: `Connection` gates every message on `authorized`, and latches the login scope of the first request it accepts, so a peer that reached the hole still arrives with nothing. The accept loops rather than taking a single connection, so that a transient accept error does not spend the window the controller still has to arrive in. libp2p's DCUtR reaches the same place by having both peers dial at one instant agreed over the relay. Nothing we send reaches the controller directly, so we cover its dial window rather than name an instant inside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * hbb_common: bump to the webrtc branch rebased on main Picks up upstream's session-cache eviction by pc identity (#589, adopted without its unused insert-path helper), the 90-day log retention, and the wlroots output fixes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * webrtc: send over SCTP without a congestion window, as KCP does The same link that streams over KCP crawls over WebRTC. webrtc-sctp runs RFC 4960's AIMD: a fast retransmit halves cwnd, a T3 drops it to one MTU, and slow start only rebuilds it while data is queued behind it. Where the loss is random rather than congestion - a lossy long-haul link - the rate settles at the Mathis ceiling MSS/(RTT*sqrt(p)) however idle the link is: about 1.3 Mbps at 70ms RTT and 1% loss, 0.6 Mbps at 5%, while 1080p wants 2-5 Mbps. KCP's turbo profile (nc=1) has no congestion window at all. The fork now carries a switch that bypasses the two places gating sends on cwnd, and hbb_common turns it on for every peer connection unless `allow-webrtc-congestion-control` is set - the same opt-in KCP has in `allow-kcp-congestion-control`, for the reason at `get_kcp_cc_enabled`. Sender-side only; a browser or an older build on the other end interoperates. Measured over a simulated link (35ms one-way, random loss both ways, 12 KB frames at 30fps, 300 frames): at 1% loss the window stretches 9.9s of video to 20.7s with a mean latency of 5.5s; without it the stream stays realtime at a mean of 113ms. At 3%: 47s and 15s against 10.2s and 290ms. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * webrtc: take the fork's loss recovery for sending without a congestion window rustdesk-org/webrtc 825a0a48: without a congestion window a chunk is lost once three chunks sent after its latest transmission are acked, counted in send order so retransmitted chunks are covered too, and the fast retransmit sends every lost chunk at once, as KCP nc=1 does; before, a lost retransmission waited for T3-rtx. Also fixes the delayed SACK timer never re-arming, the switch applying to established associations, T3-rtx resending one chunk when the peer's window is full, and bounds new data to 1 MiB / 1024 chunks in flight like KCP's snd_wnd. Simulated 35ms one-way, random loss both ways, 30 fps, frames later than 200ms out of 1200: 12 KB at 5% loss 996 -> 55 (KCP 61); 40 KB at 2% loss 1183 -> 20 (KCP 39). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * bump hbb_common: decode TURN userinfo, add the webrtc_echo example Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JXJJGEGdgu26wgCppvUXdZ * web: show the WebRTC toggle and transport in the web UI The web client now speaks WebRTC, but the desktop settings page hides the punch options on web and the remote page opens without the session tab that carries the transport name. Let the existing "Enable WebRTC P2P connection" checkbox through on web (the other punch options stay native-only), and add a Transport row to the quality monitor for WebRTC sessions only (with "(TURN)" when ICE relayed), on every platform. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JXJJGEGdgu26wgCppvUXdZ * bump hbb_common: end the ICE forwarder at gathering complete, drop the closes Drop covers hbb_common now closes the local-candidate channel when gathering completes, so the controlled side's forwarder in spawn_webrtc_answerer ends there, and its signaling connection to hbbs with it, instead of sitting on a socket hbbs closed at 90s idle for the rest of the session. It also keeps the reassembly buffer across fragmented frames. Stream closes the WebRTC peer connection on drop (hbb_common b0b624d), so the close_webrtc() calls in port_forward and io_loop that sat immediately before a return or the end of scope did nothing Drop was not about to do, while the comments beside them still said a bare drop leaked the pc. Remove both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * bump hbb_common: quiet the webrtc-rs warnings that describe the race's normal outcome Cancelling the transport that lost the race, and trickle checking before it holds a pair, are what the design does on every session that connects - and webrtc-rs reports both at warn, 90 lines of a 386-line controlled-side log, beside connections that succeeded. agent_internal and peer_connection drop to error; agent_gather keeps warn, since an unreachable STUN server is the one upstream signal that explains a session which never connected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M54JAqUK4RynudFou89hod * port_forward: restore the `?` the close removal left as a match Dropping the explicit close_webrtc() from the parse-error arm left a match that only re-spells `?`; master just reworked this function, so the branch now leaves port_forward.rs untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * l10n: the two WebRTC keys were missing from Urdu Every other lang file on the branch carries them; ur.rs was skipped when they were added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * udp: make the punch deadline absolute, so a talking peer cannot defer it `select!` rebuilds every arm each iteration, so the relative retry sleep was restarted by each datagram that arrived before it fired. The peer sets that rate, and an old-build peer's empty datagrams match no arm and loop without even the recv-error pause, so MAX_TIME went unchecked and the retransmit was starved with it. `udp_nat_connect` awaits the punch ahead of the KCP timeout and nothing above it bounds the phase, so the punch held the direct race open and the relay fallback out of reach for as long as the peer kept sending. Absolute instants for both clocks. The new test floods empty datagrams for four times the deadline: the punch now ends at 3s where it ran the full 12s. Also note at the symmetric-NAT branch that WebRTC not following the legacy relay decision there is deliberate, so it is not later "fixed" into agreement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * bump webrtc fork: MTU-safe bundles, a reordering window, tail loss within the RTT rustdesk-org/webrtc cc6633bc, three commits on 825a0a48, all on the path that sends without a congestion window: Both bundlers counted a DATA chunk by its payload alone; with the header and padding counted, bundles of small chunks stay within the MTU, and the fragment payload rounds down to 1160 so a full chunk does too. A chunk is fast retransmitted at most five times, KCP's IKCP_FASTACK_LIMIT. A frame's chunks go out within microseconds of each other, so on a path that jitters the send-order rule resent every chunk that landed behind three of its siblings: 2.7x the payload on the wire at 10ms of jitter, and on a link without the room for that, a queue that fed on itself. A reordering window, RACK's, makes evidence count only from what was sent a quarter of an srtt after the chunk once the path is seen to reorder, widening on the duplicate TSNs the receiver reports. 5 Mbps, 1% loss, 20ms jitter: 600 of 600 frames at a 98ms mean where 290 arrived at 6.2s. A chunk lost at the tail of a burst has only T3-rtx, which ran from floors sized for a 200ms delayed ack and restarted only on the tail's predecessor's ack: 600ms and more. Every DATA chunk now carries the I bit, the floors are KCP's shape, and a fast retransmission restarts the timer. One 200-byte message per frame at 5% loss: 9 of 600 later than 200ms, from 42. Random loss without jitter is unchanged at every rate and frame size. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * bump webrtc fork: T3-rtx restarts only for the earliest chunk's fast retransmission rustdesk-org/webrtc 2b8e55bc. Sending without a congestion window, a fast retransmission of any chunk restarted T3-rtx, so a chunk past the fast retransmission cap - left to that timer - never reached it while later chunks kept being resent, which a lossy stream does every couple of frames. The timer is the earliest in-flight chunk's, and only its resend restarts it now. Nothing else changes; the benchmark is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns * bump webrtc fork: T3-rtx restart on fast retransmission while shutting down too rustdesk-org/webrtc 48100bf1. The restart for the earliest chunk's fast retransmission reached only the Established branch of the write loop; the shutdown states still carry data in flight and recover it the same way, so a closing association could still resend everything on a loss its fast retransmit had already recovered. Both branches share one helper now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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port forward shared conn (#16062)
* hbb_common: bump to the port-forward-mux proto Also latches PortForward.multiplex into login_scope_digest, which destructures PortForward's fields exhaustively by design (a new field must be latched or deliberately ignored to compile). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: window accounting and channel frame builders Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: fix RecvWindow counter overflow on long transfers Replace cumulative accounting (granted/received) with remaining credit tracking to prevent u32 overflow after 4 GiB of data on a single channel. Wire behavior is identical, but the fix allows large file transfers without mid-stream channel closure. Add regression test for 8 GiB transfer to verify fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: credit-windowed relay halves and channel coordinator Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * server: PortForwardMux channel table and per-channel tasks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * server: multiplexed port-forward connections stay in the protobuf loop Wire PortForwardMux into Connection: take the multiplexed path at login when the controller sets PortForward.multiplex, route PortForwardChannel frames to it from on_message, sweep the channel table's targets after open/close, and clean it up on connection close. Introduce is_port_forward() (socket-based or multiplexed) and use it at the four sites that classify the connection, so a multiplexed connection stays in the message loop, gets TestDelay keepalives, and reports features.port_forward_mux in PeerInfo. The three sites that break into the raw pipe loop or gate the keepalive still check port_forward_socket specifically, since a multiplexed connection must not take that path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * cm: update a port-forward row's targets as tunnel channels come and go Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: controller tunnel with a single-writer stream loop Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: publish Muxed before spawning the tunnel loop Publishing after spawn let a loop that dies immediately reset the state first, so the later publish pinned it at Muxed with a dead handle forever. Also adds a test pinning open-before-data ordering across many concurrently opened channels, and drops an unused Clone derive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: share one multiplexed tunnel across a window's listeners Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: fix round 1 review findings Drop the mux default-false assignment now that definite-assignment proves every path that reads it has set it; the enable-port-forward-mux config commit picks up the missing attribution trailers; the default-on test pins the enable- prefix itself rather than option2bool's weaker fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: end-to-end tests over a loopback tunnel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: fix bulk test's premature half-close, pin the half-close limitation many_channels_echo_concurrently_and_a_bulk_one_does_not_starve_them dropped its bulk write half as soon as writing finished, which shuts down the write side of the socket and, by design (see the design doc's TCP half-close non-goal; today's run_forward does the same), ends the whole channel. Keep the write half alive until the reader is done so the test measures starvation, not half-close. Add a_local_half_close_ends_the_whole_channel to pin that limitation in code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: cap send credit and other final review fixes Fix 1 (critical): clamp SendCredit to MAX_SEND_CREDIT (= CHANNEL_WINDOW) in both new() and add(), so a peer with tunnel permission can no longer advertise an unbounded window and force the controlled side's unbounded FrameSink::Direct sink to buffer unlimited target data per channel. Fix 2: rename the "starve" test to many_channels_echo_concurrently and drop its (untrue) starvation claim, since it opens every channel before the bulk transfer starts. Add a_channel_opened_during_a_bulk_transfer_ is_served_promptly, which opens the small channel while the bulk one is demonstrably mid-flight. Fix 3: only look up the tunnel permission for `open` frames in the PortForwardChannel arm of on_message, instead of once per data frame. Fix 4: two rustfmt deviations in connection.rs (matches! wrapping and a tuple literal), fixed by hand without a blanket cargo fmt run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: report a refused channel's reason as an error dialog The controlled side already answers a refused port-forward channel with opened { success: false, message }; on the multiplexed path TunnelHandle:: on_frame only logged that message at debug and closed the channel, so the user saw a closed connection with no explanation, worst on the RDP path where only the RDP client's own error remained. on_frame now returns the message the window should show, deduplicated per distinct reason (capped at MAX_REPORTED_OPEN_ERRORS) so one page load's dozen refused connections surface one dialog per reason instead of a dozen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * Use on_error for refused-channel dialog in tunnel_loop Redirect the refused-channel error through the standard on_error path instead of calling msgbox directly, for consistency with other errors in the port-forward flow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: apply the whole-branch review Correctness: - listen(): the Legacy arm is merged with the Claimed arm. On its own it ignored outcome.local_eof, so a client that hung up during login still got a target connect, an audit record and a CM row on the controlled side, and ignored outcome.mux, so a peer upgraded while a legacy window stayed open answered as a tunnel while the controller went raw. - Refusal dialogs are deduplicated per quiet spell (10 s) rather than per tunnel lifetime; the lifetime set went silent for the rest of a long-lived window after the first burst. - Android's CM listener handles UpdatePortForward; it fell into `_ => {}`. - relay_socket_to_tunnel reads into one scratch buffer per channel and sends an exact-size copy. A frame owning its 64 KiB read allocation pinned it until sent, once per byte on interactive traffic. Consistency and cleanups: - The controlled side's refusal text is the raw pipe's wording, RDP substitution included. - connection.rs: the PortForwardChannel arm is a one-line hook, the CM label is pushed from the 1 s tick alone, and the unreachable inner.tx fall-through is gone. - The Ready enum is removed; wait_ready() returns Option<Claim>. - SendCredit::add wakes with notify_one alone. - on_ui_command() replaces the two ui_receiver handlers in listen(). - TunnelHandle is no longer re-exported (unused-import warning). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a legacy window stays legacy until it is reopened Review: the merged `Claimed | Legacy` arm gave a legacy window a hot transition to a tunnel — every accept re-negotiated, and a peer upgraded while the window stayed open was promoted underneath live connections. The product does not need a mode switch inside a window's lifetime, and the transition was extra state-machine surface for nothing: reopening the window picks up an upgraded peer. The two arms are separate again. `Claimed` negotiates once and the peer's answer fixes the window's mode. `Legacy` logs in for every accept as before, asks for no tunnel — `LoginConfigHandler::port_forward_mux` carries the request per login, so the raw pipe never has to talk to a peer that thinks it agreed to multiplex — and ignores what the peer reports. Both arms keep skipping a local socket that hung up during login. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * hbb_common: bump to main with rustdesk/hbb_common#594 merged Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * server: admit only INITIAL_WINDOW on a channel before opened The demultiplexer accepted CHANNEL_WINDOW into a pending channel's unbounded queue, four times the bound the channel task enforces once it polls. The window now starts at INITIAL_WINDOW and is widened right before `opened` advertises the rest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: a tunnel ends when its window drops the Tunnel The loop held its own handle and state sender, so once the window closed nothing was left to stop it: it kept answering TestDelay and the peer connection, CM row included, lived on until the peer went away. `Tunnel` now owns a watch sender nobody sends on; the loop's receiver errors when the last `Tunnel` drops, and the loop ends. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: one tunnel per mapping, bound to the authenticated target The login latches `PortForward.host`/`port` into the session scope and approval is shown that target, but a window-wide tunnel let any later `open` name another target with only `enable-tunnel` rechecked. A tunnel now belongs to one listener and serves the one target its login authenticated: the controlled side refuses an `open` for any other target, and a window with several targets uses one connection each, approved on its own. With one owner per tunnel the claim needs no waiters: `Establishing`, `Claim::Wait` and `wait_ready` go, and `try_claim` becomes a plain read. The CM label that followed a tunnel's targets goes with them; a row shows its mapping's target, as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the legacy comment names the mapping, not the window Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: a window violation drops the channel on the spot Both demultiplexers only queued a `Violation` and left the entry until the channel task woke and exited, so a peer that kept sending past the window queued one more entry per frame in the meantime, bounded by nothing. The entry now goes the moment `accept` fails; later frames for that id are unknown-channel noise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the login's target travels with the accept, not the handler `listen()` wrote `lc.port_forward` (and, on this branch, `port_forward_mux`) into the window's shared `LoginConfigHandler` before connecting, and `create_login_msg` read them back only when the peer's `Hash` arrived. Two mappings logging in at the same time could therefore swap targets: on master that bridged a local socket to the wrong target, and with a tunnel bound to its login's target it also left the mapping refusing every later accept until it was recreated. The target is now a `PortForward` carried by the interface clone that handles one accept, passed explicitly down to `create_login_msg`; the handler no longer has a field to race on. No lock spans the login. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port_forward_mux: pin permission revocation and whole-tunnel failure in tests Both already hold; the review asked for them to be stated. `enable-tunnel` turned off mid-session refuses the next `open` while the live channel keeps relaying, and a dead tunnel ends every channel on it together, after which the next accept establishes again on the same `Tunnel`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the legacy comment names re-adding the mapping only Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the raw pipe runs the code it always ran The multiplexed login had replaced `connect_and_login`, so a mapping with the setting off, a peer without the feature, or a listener latched `Legacy` still went through the tunnel's state machine, the capped pre-read and the changed local-EOF rule. Feature off now means the old code: `listen()` keeps its accept arm and `connect_and_login` as they were, and the tunnel is a branch taken only when the setting is on, in `establish_tunnel` with its own `connect_and_login_mux`. The one line the raw path does differently is the target riding with the accept's interface clone instead of the shared handler. `get_port_forward_mux_enabled` had one caller and moves in here, so `common.rs` is untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a UI login answers the challenge its own connection was given `handle_login_from_ui` hashed the typed password against `lc.hash`, the window's shared handler field, and the window's password prompt is broadcast to every listener. With two mappings both waiting on that prompt, the `Hash` that arrived last had overwritten the other's, so one of the two answered the wrong challenge and failed to log in. Master shares the same state and broadcasts the same way. The `Hash` is now a parameter of the login; `Session` keeps it beside the connection it belongs to, and the per-accept clone that `with_port_forward` makes gets a slot of its own. `lc.hash` stays for `handle_peer_info`, which only needs the salt, and that is per peer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a mapping without its hash waits for it before answering the prompt The window's password prompt is broadcast to every mapping, and can reach one whose own connection has not received its `Hash` yet. That mapping used to answer anyway, with a digest over an empty challenge: the peer refused it and counted a failed attempt, and the empty-salt result was written into the shared `lc.password`, where the mapping that prompted had just stored the right one and the next `handle_peer_info` would persist whatever was there. The connection's challenge is now `Option<Hash>`, `None` until `handle_hash` runs, and `handle_login_from_ui` sends nothing without it. The mapping that prompted stores the salted password in the shared handler, and the waiting one logs in with that against its own challenge when its `Hash` arrives, without prompting again. Test: A answers its prompt, the same broadcast reaches B before its hash, B sends nothing, B's hash arrives and its login carries B's challenge and B's target with no dialog. It runs the real `handle_hash` for B. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the tunnel's login is the raw pipe's, asked for by a window flag Master's fix for the shared login slots (#16069) keeps the target and the challenge in the window's `LoginConfigHandler` and serializes the mappings' logins with a turn lock, all inside `port_forward.rs`. This branch had carried a broader shape of the same fix, a `with_port_forward` on `Interface` and the target and `Hash` as parameters through the login functions, which every caller had to follow. That is gone: `Interface`, `Session`, `create_login_msg`, `send_login`, `handle_hash` and `handle_login_from_ui` are as on master. What the tunnel needs on top is one bit in the login, `multiplex`. It is a window flag beside `port_forward` in the handler, set once in `io_loop` before the window's mappings start, so an accept's claim and its login read the same value; the setting takes effect for windows opened after it changes. `connect_and_login_mux` is now master's `connect_and_login` with the tunnel's three differences and the same `hash_arrived` and `login_from_ui` calls. The raw pipe is master's, line for line. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * hbb_common: bump to main with rustdesk/hbb_common#595 merged 840c8ec..f94e3fe is that one merge: the five local settings custom clients could not preset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the off switch gets a checkbox in Settings → General `enable-port-forward-mux` was readable only by editing the config file. It is a local setting of the controlling side, so it sits with the other outgoing ones, after "Open connection in new tab", with a tooltip saying what it does. The two new keys are translated in every language. The three that the mobile file manager added, "Export", "Export Logs" and "Import Folder", were empty everywhere but five languages; they are filled in too, and Korean's "xdp-portal-unavailable" with them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * Urdu: fill the backlog of empty and missing translations ur.rs had fallen behind: 104 keys carried an empty value and 35 keys the other languages have were absent altogether. Both are filled in, the missing ones in the order template.rs lists them. Eight entries stay empty on purpose. They are keys that only ur.rs still carries, absent from template.rs and from every other language, so their English source cannot be recovered and nothing reads them: remember_account_tip, os_account_desk_tip, another_user_login_*_tip, xorg_not_found_*_tip and no_desktop_*_tip. Twelve more dead keys keep the values they have; removing either group is a separate decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * Urdu: drop the keys template.rs no longer lists The twenty keys removed here are absent from template.rs and from every other language file; ur.rs was the only one still carrying them, eight of them with no value at all. They are leftovers of features that are gone: the plugin menu, the OS-account login prompts, the Xorg and no-desktop errors. ur.rs now holds exactly the template's key set, all of it translated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: closing the tunnel reaches channels parked on their socket A channel whose far end neither reads nor writes has both relays parked on the socket, not on the inbound queue, so `close_all` dropping the queue's sender woke neither: the socket and both tasks lived on until the far end hung up. Both sides now hold a per-tunnel teardown signal that `run_channel` selects on beside its own cancel, and `close_all` sends it after clearing the map. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a mapping latched to the raw pipe logs in without asking for the tunnel The login copied the window's `port_forward_mux` into `multiplex`, so a mapping that had latched to the raw pipe on an old peer kept asking for the tunnel. Once that peer was upgraded it answered with a tunnel while the controller switched to raw framing, and every later connection on the mapping was dead until it was re-added. The login now carries its own `port_forward_multiplex`, filled with the target under the turn lock: the probe asks, the raw pipe does not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a channel opened as its tunnel closes still gets the teardown `open` can straddle `close_all`: the claim passed, the frame receiver was still alive, and the channel subscribed after the signal had gone out. `watch::subscribe` marks earlier sends as seen, and the entry sits in a map that was already cleared, so nothing would ever end it. The signal is now a level: `close_all` raises it with `send_replace`, which stores even with no channel live, and `run_channel` waits for the value rather than for a change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the connect guard counts a live tunnel as connected `connect_port_forward_if_needed` returned early only for a raw-pipe socket; called again with a tunnel up it would have built a second `PortForwardMux` and dropped every channel of the first. Not reachable today, since the logon response is sent once, but the other checks in this change already read `is_port_forward()`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * Urdu: the two terminal clipboard keys master added Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a tunnel's TCP stream refuses packets over twice MAX_FRAME The codec takes a header declaring up to 1 GiB and hands the packet up only once it has all arrived, so the channel window bounded what the peer may send, not what this side buffers. Both sides now cap the codec at 2 * MAX_FRAME as soon as multiplexing is agreed: a data frame with its envelope and MAC fits with room to spare, and a header over the cap ends the tunnel before a byte of payload is read. TCP only; the WebSocket and WebRTC codecs carry caps of their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a channel id still live when the counter comes round is skipped The controller handed out `next_id` unchecked. 2^32 opens later it lands on a channel still up: the entry here was replaced, while the peer, which ignores an `open` for a live id, kept routing that id to the old socket, so the new local connection's bytes went into the old target connection. The id is now taken under the map's lock and advanced past any id in use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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c1a587cfa4 |
connection page: the Connect menu offers TCP tunneling, as the peer card does (#16075)
The dropdown beside Connect listed file transfer, camera and terminal but not port forwarding, so reaching it meant having a card for the peer. `connect` already takes `isTcpTunneling`; only the menu entry and the parameter that carries it were missing. Shown on desktop only. The peer card gates the same entry on `isDesktop` because `connect` routes a tunnel through the desktop path alone; on web it would have opened a plain remote session instead. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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9a1c8da143 |
Agents regression surface (#16070)
* AGENTS.md: require a regression-surface check before a change is done The minimal-invasiveness rules say what to prefer; nothing made an agent check the final diff against them, so a feature could still route the old path through its new code while every principle was "followed". This adds the gate: audit every modified existing path, keep feature-off on the old code, report the regression surface, and treat an unnecessarily rewritten legacy path as a review finding whatever the tests say. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * AGENTS.md: a scope check before shared code is touched The minimal-invasiveness rules are principles; this adds the stop condition that makes them mechanical. A fix for one path stays in that path, and an unrelated caller needing a placeholder argument to satisfy a changed signature is the signal that it did not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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978c901f49 |
port forward: a login's target and challenge travel with its own accept (#16069)
* port forward: mappings take turns at the window's login slots A window's mappings log in concurrently, and each login is built from the shared `LoginConfigHandler`: `create_login_msg` reads `port_forward`, which `listen()` set before connecting, and `handle_login_from_ui` reads `hash`, which the last `Hash` to arrive set. Two mappings logging in at once could swap targets, bridging a local socket to the other's target, and answer each other's challenge, failing one login. The window's password prompt is broadcast to every mapping, so one whose `Hash` had not arrived answered with whatever the handler held. Each mapping now fills `port_forward` and `hash` and sends its login under a per-window turn lock, and keeps its own `Hash` beside the connection: a password typed before it arrived is left to the mapping that prompted, which stores the salted password in the shared handler for the others to log in with. The fix stays in `port_forward.rs`. `LoginConfigHandler` gains the lock and a setter for its private `hash`; `Interface`, `Session` and the login functions keep their signatures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: the lock and the hash setter are crate-private; test the hash that arrives late on its real path Both exist only so `port_forward.rs` can reach the handler's private `hash`; neither is API. The test for a password typed before a connection's hash ended by answering the prompt again once the hash was there. What happens in the code is that the hash's arrival runs `handle_hash`, which logs in with the password the prompting mapping stored; the test now ends there, with no preset password. Answering the prompt with one's own challenge while the handler holds another's is a test of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * port forward: a password typed before the connection's hash answers it when it comes The previous commit dropped such a password, counting on the mapping that prompted having stored it in the shared handler by the time this connection's `Hash` arrived. The broadcast wakes both mappings at once and `select!` picks between a ready `Hash` and a ready password at random, so this one could reach `handle_hash` first, find the handler empty, and prompt again. The connection keeps the password until its `Hash` arrives and answers with it then. `login_from_ui` takes the challenge it answers; the wait is `connect_and_login`'s, in `hash_arrived`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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d453a19601 |
AGENTS.md: require a regression-surface check before a change is done (#16068)
The minimal-invasiveness rules say what to prefer; nothing made an agent check the final diff against them, so a feature could still route the old path through its new code while every principle was "followed". This adds the gate: audit every modified existing path, keep feature-off on the old code, report the regression surface, and treat an unnecessarily rewritten legacy path as a review finding whatever the tests say. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5.1
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50c4e435de |
connection: apply the non-video send timeout once the type is known (#16063)
* connection: apply the non-video send timeout once the type is known `Connection::start` set the send timeout before the login request had arrived, when `file_transfer`, `port_forward_socket` and `terminal` were all still unset, so every connection got `SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO` (12 s) and the `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` branch never ran. A file transfer, terminal or port forward whose peer stopped draining for 12 s — a Wi-Fi roam, a VPN reconnect — was dropped. The type-specific timeout is now set in `on_message` right after the login request's union has been matched; `start` keeps the video figure for the login phase. `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` also drops from 120 s to 30 s, the same horizon as the 30 s read timeout: the timeout wraps a single `send`, so it only fires when the peer makes no progress at all for that long, and beyond 30 s the read check would declare the same peer dead anyway. The raw port-forward pipe's write to its local target shares the constant and moves with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * connection: keep the raw port-forward local write at 120 s `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` also bounded `forward.send` in `try_port_forward_loop`, the write to the local target, whose own idle timeout is an hour. Lowering it to 30 s made a target that stops draining for half a minute drop the whole tunnel. That write gets its own constant at the value it always had. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab * connection: keep the non-video send timeout at its long-standing 120 s Lowering `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` to 30 s was a policy change on top of the bug fix, argued from the 30 s read timeout, which measures something else and cannot even run while a send is blocked. The constant goes back to `SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO * 10`, where it has been since 2021, and the raw port-forward loop's local write shares it again. What remains is the fix alone: the type-specific timeout is chosen once the login request has said what the connection is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0fd1a0eecb |
Custom client no rebuild (#15774)
* feat(portable): load per-customer payload from a PE resource
Customizing a Windows client recompiled the packer for every customer,
because data.bin was baked in with include_bytes!. The generic payload is
identical across customers, so only the small per-customer delta needs to
vary: the branded runner exe, custom.txt and the icons.
The packer now also reads an RDPKG RCDATA resource holding a second blob in
the same format, and folds it over the compiled-in payload. A build can then
inject that resource into a prebuilt template instead of running cargo.
The executable to launch comes from the package trailer, and the extraction
directory follows its stem, which replaces the sed of APP_PREFIX. Where the
executable itself is not customized (sciter x86) it stays in the generic
payload and is only renamed, so the merge covers both shapes.
custom.txt keeps being written to disk next to the app: that is what the
client reads at startup and what the updater stages so a customization
survives an upgrade to a stock build.
Also fixes generate.py restoring os.curdir (the literal ".") instead of the
previous working directory, which left it inside the source folder.
CI: ship windows-aarch64 in the unsigned tarball, so ARM custom clients have
a template to build from.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* ci: publish msi templates for custom client builds
Custom clients rebuild the msi through WiX for every customer, though the
package only differs by the app name, a few GUIDs and four files.
Build the msi once more per release with a __RDAPPNAME__ placeholder and ship
it unsigned in the unsigned tarball, so a customer's build can patch it rather
than run msbuild. It stays unsigned because patching would invalidate a
signature anyway.
Doing this in CI is what makes ARM custom clients possible: preprocess.py runs
the packaged exe to read its version and build date, so an arm64 msi can only
be produced on a native arm64 machine, which the runner already is and the
build agents are not. Patching runs no exe, so an x64 agent can then patch the
arm64 template.
preprocess.py rewrites res/msi in place and locates the app as <app-name>.exe
inside the dist, so the tree is reset around the second build and the dist copy
is renamed to match. Sciter x86 ships no msi and is untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* refactor(msi): pass the app name to the printer custom actions
preprocess.py rewrote the CustomActions sources per customer so the printer
carried the app name, which meant the dll was recompiled for every custom
client and, worse, left the app name baked into a compiled binary.
Pass it through CustomActionData instead. Only the printer and its port ever
varied: the INF path and the driver name ship under their stock names and
preprocess.py already forced the driver name back to RustDesk, so a single
build of the dll now serves every custom client.
Both actions treat the name as optional and fall back to the stock name, so a
package built before this still installs and uninstalls its printer.
This also unblocks patching a prebuilt msi template, which cannot work while a
compiled dll contains the app name: replacing a string inside a PE would shift
everything after it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* ci: use an 8.3-safe placeholder for the msi template
WiX derives a short name for any name that is not valid 8.3, and a patch
cannot rewrite a truncated placeholder, so a long placeholder would leave the
package's short names pointing at it. RDAPPNAM is eight characters like
"RustDesk" and needs no short name, keeping the template as close to the
shipped package as the mechanism allows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* feat(msi): give a template its own cabinet for per-customer files
Rebranding recompressed the whole ~100MB payload because one cabinet held
everything. In template mode preprocess.py puts the handful of files a custom
client replaces on a second cabinet, so a patch rebuilds a few hundred KB and
leaves the payload cabinet alone. The shipped msi is built without template
mode and keeps its single cabinet.
The branding assets need conditional components. A stock build ships none of
them -- there is no icon.ico, icon.png or logo*.png, only icon.svg -- so the
template has to carry placeholders for the File rows to exist, and a customer
supplies whichever they want. Installing a placeholder unconditionally would
give a customer with no logo a placeholder image, where today a missing asset
means no logo at all: the client tries each candidate and treats the failure as
absence. So each optional asset installs only when its property says the
customer supplied one.
CI creates those placeholders and builds the template with the new mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* ci: build the msi template with a sentinel revision
preprocess.py appends a build-time revision as the fourth version field, so a
template built without one would bake the CI clock into every customer's
package. Revision 0 marks the field as the patcher's to fill in, and makes the
template deterministic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* fix(portable): delete files a later package no longer carries
The extraction directory is wiped only when the packer's compiled-in timestamp
changes. That used to be per customer, because generate.py ran for each build;
now the packer is compiled once per release, so every customer and every
rebuild within a release share one timestamp and nothing is ever wiped.
A customer who removes their logo and rebuilds would therefore keep showing it:
the new package simply omits logo.png, and md5 skipping only covers files that
are still present. Record the package's paths in the extraction's meta file and
delete the ones a later package drops.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* fix(portable): build the dropped-file path from plain components
meta.toml lives in a user-writable directory and now drives deletion, but the
traversal guard tested the normalised string while the join used the raw one.
Path::join replaces the base outright when handed an absolute path, so an
edited meta.toml could point remove_file anywhere.
The path is now rebuilt from Normal components only. A colon is rejected
explicitly rather than left to the host's parser: a drive-relative "C:x" parses
as a Normal component everywhere, and only a Windows host reads "C:/..." as a
prefix, so the same input escaped when the logic was exercised off-Windows --
which is what the new test catches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* fix(msi): pass the printer name in a format the custom action can read
[~] is MSI's escape for a NUL character, not the delimiter WcaReadStringFromCaData
splits on -- that is a literal wide char 128, which a Formatted property value
cannot carry -- and WcaGetProperty returns a null-terminated string anyway. So
the second field was unreachable: InstallPrinter always fell back to the stock
name and installed a printer and port called "RustDesk Printer" inside a
customer's branded package, while UninstallPrinter, whose data is a single field
and parsed fine, went looking for "Acme Printer" and left the real one behind
for good.
Both actions now read CustomActionData directly and split on a character that
cannot occur in a Windows path or in a validated app name. A package built
before this carries no separator and keeps the stock name, as it did.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7fBdTwziR5BHTkSz7Tzcm
* fix(portable): retry failed stale branding cleanup
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
* fix(portable): reject malformed RDPKG resources
Distinguish an absent customer package from an invalid resource and
propagate package errors instead of launching the stock payload.
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
* refact: format 2 files
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
* fix(msi): match process names case-insensitively during uninstall
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
* fix(custom-client): validate portable exclusion and MSI action data
Fail when --exclude-exe does not match a file, and propagate MSI
CustomActionData read failures while preserving legacy fallback behavior.
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
* fix: generate.py, exclude-exe
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
* Revert "fix: generate.py, exclude-exe"
This reverts commit
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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66ab0b87f6 |
Linux drop shell from service loop (#15979)
* perf(linux): stop the service loop from forking a shell per environment variable The service loop re-derives the desktop every 500 ms, and every lookup on that path forks. A healthy GNOME session spends ~104 process spawns a second, 8 full `ps -u <uid>` scans and 2 full `ps aux` scans, to re-answer a question whose answer has not changed. `get_env` alone is a `sh -c` pipeline of ~12 processes per variable. `get_envs` already reads `/proc` directly and was documented as the intended replacement, so move the remaining `get_env` callers to it and delete it. The xwayland probe drops from 4 pipelines (~48 processes) to one `/proc` walk, and the pathological walk that #15952 was about drops from ~2900 processes to at most 60 `/proc` walks. `get_cm` and `is_xwayland_running` read `/proc` instead of forking `ps aux` and `pgrep -a`; `get_cm` also called `current_exe()` once per line of `ps` output. Selection semantics are preserved where they were load-bearing: * `get_envs_of_newest` reproduces the `ps ... | tail -1` the removed pipelines used, so a variable the newest matching process does not have means moving on to the next pattern, never on to an older process that may belong to a session which has since logged out. * `get_envs` keeps its own order (readdir) and its all-process ranking, so the existing `get_display_xauth_wayland` caller is unaffected. Only its handling of an exported-but-empty value changes: `DISPLAY=` no longer counts as found, where it used to satisfy a single-name query and return the empty value before a process holding a real one was examined. * `get_envs_where` lets the caller state what a complete answer is. Ranking by how many of the requested names a process carries cannot know that `DISPLAY` is mandatory and the rest interchangeable, so it could rank a process holding three optional values above the one holding the pair that matters. `is_xwayland_running` is scoped to the session's uid. The compositor starts Xwayland as the session user, so another user's Xwayland -- a switched-away session, a second seat -- used to route a pure-Wayland session into the Xwayland probe, which has no display for it to find there. Not addressed: this discovery path has never had any notion of the active session, and filters by uid alone. Constraining candidates to the active session is not possible for the most important one, since `xdg-desktop-portal` and its backends run under `user@<uid>.service`, which spans sessions and carries no `XDG_SESSION_ID`, no session cgroup and no audit sessionid. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q5egQpH4q4GoXJiuMoTJ5t * fix(linux): the newest-process walk must not answer with a grep or an older PID Three findings from review of the commit before this one. `/proc/<pid>/environ` failing to read left the walk on to the next PID, which in `newest_first` mode is an older process -- possibly of a session that has since logged out -- where the `ps ... | tail -1` pipeline this replaces stopped at the one PID it had already picked. A read that fails is a process carrying none of the requested names, not a process to skip. The `seen` latch that was meant to hold the newest process is deleted: `accept` is reached once per matching process, so returning on the first is what it already did. The regex is matched against the whole `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, where the pipeline had a `grep -v 'grep'`. A user running `grep Xwayland` is otherwise the newest match for that pattern and answers with whatever environment their shell had -- an X forwarding endpoint over ssh, say. This is the one place the walk still differs from the `get_envs` it grew out of, which never had that filter and could take an ssh `grep` over the portal it was looking for. `get_envs` is left exactly as it was. Its completeness test was every requested name *present*; stating it through `accept` turned it into every name *non-empty* and, with the empty-value change that went with it, moved which process the existing `get_display_xauth_wayland` caller settles on. `accept` is now told the count and asks the question the loop it replaced asked. This supersedes the `get_envs` bullet of the previous commit message: an exported-but-empty value counts as found again, as it always did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019QgsYAUYKDei1AM5yHJsMX --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDesk
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1fe451c2e8 |
chore(flutter): bump desktop_multi_window for show recovery (#15959)
Pick up rustdesk-org/rustdesk_desktop_multi_window#37, which re-arms the existing bounded redraw timer whenever a secondary window is shown, including when its first frame was generated while hidden but not presented. This may perform one delayed child refresh on each show. It intentionally does not add a presentation-complete flag: Flutter reports frame generation rather than successful presentation, so recording success after a synthetic refresh could suppress later self-recovery without a reliable success signal. |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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7220f00410 |
fix(linux): a Wayland session without XAUTHORITY is not incomplete (#15978)
Fixes #15952. Hyprland runs Xwayland without exporting `XAUTHORITY`, and `get_display_xauth_xwayland` only returns once it has both `DISPLAY` and `XAUTHORITY`. On such a session that condition is never met, so every refresh runs the retry loop to the end: 10 rounds x 6 process patterns x 4 variables = 240 `get_env` calls, each a `sh -c` pipeline of ~12 processes starting with a full `ps -u <uid> -f`. That is ~2900 fork/exec per refresh, and the service loop repeats every 500 ms. The reporter measured a full core on a low-end laptop and ~60% of a core on a 13600KF. The Wayland side answers for such a session, so accept `DISPLAY` together with either `XAUTHORITY` or `WAYLAND_DISPLAY` + `DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`. The portal answers on the first pattern, which ends the walk there, as it already did on desktops that do export an xauth. The loop also assigned all four variables unconditionally per pattern, so the patterns that do not run on a given desktop blanked out what an earlier one had answered with -- the portal's valid `DISPLAY=:1` included. That is why the `--server` was then started with no `WAYLAND_DISPLAY` and no `DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`. Candidates are now taken from one pattern as a whole and ranked, so a later pattern replaces an earlier answer only by being better, and a session that can only offer a compositor and a bus still keeps them. A compositor that starts Xwayland on demand shows the same shape from the other side: the portal came up before Xwayland did, so its environment carries a valid `WAYLAND_DISPLAY` and `DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS` but no `DISPLAY`, and no pattern here may ever produce one. That pair alone is a session the child server can be started against -- it is exactly what `get_display_xauth_wayland` returns on -- so it outranks a bare `DISPLAY` and ends the retrying, while the rest of the round still looks for something that completes the session. Not specific to the drm build: the function is not feature-gated, and the commit the report points at does not touch it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q5egQpH4q4GoXJiuMoTJ5t Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDesk
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7423dced37 | Update reference from AGENTS.md to @AGENTS.md | ||
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RustDesk
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798b73beb1 | Update common.rs (#15924) | ||
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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1984678785 |
Hide printer tab when settings disabled (#15901)
* fix: hide the printer settings tab when settings are disabled The Security and Network tabs already honour `disable-settings`, but the Printer tab was gated only on `hide-remote-printer-settings`, so custom clients built with settings disabled still exposed it. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk-server-pro/issues/1001 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add hide-general-settings builtin option Hides the General tab of the settings page. Unlike the other hide-*-settings options this one is still useful when settings are disabled, since `disable-settings` does not cover the General tab. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk-server-pro/issues/1001 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDesk
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9b1b810d3a | Delete .github/dependabot.yml (#15888) | ||
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5
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6a27910f34 |
fix(wayland): back off the polling display lookups after a failure (drm) (#15865)
* fix(wayland): back off the polling display lookups after a failure (drm) In drm builds an enumeration that fails with no endpoint named in the environment falls back to the socket probe, which forks a child bounded by seconds, and the display service asks again every 300 ms -- at a greeter with no reachable compositor that is a probe child per turn, forever. Such a failure now stamps a shared 5 s backoff, and only the polling callers honor it: the 300 ms displays-changed check skips its turn and the 1.5 s live layout poll returns no answer for that turn. Only the failure that would fork stamps. A session server is spawned with WAYLAND_DISPLAY set, so its failed connect bails in-process before any fork; stamping there would buy nothing and cost recovery latency, so live sessions keep master's behavior exactly. The stamp also survives clear_wayland_displays_cache: it describes the seat, not the cache, and the ~1/s capturer rebuild loop clears on every teardown -- dropping the stamp with the cache would let that loop defeat the backoff and would turn every post-hotplug failure into a "first" one forever. The displays-changed check weighs the backoff against what is already published. With nothing synced yet it always populates -- an unaugmented DRM list beats the empty broadcast the send path would otherwise emit. With a synced layout, a suppressed turn keeps it, and a fresh first failure keeps it too; only a failure that persists across a backoff replaces it with the DRM stack, so a hotplug at a failing seat converges within one backoff while a transient failure never tears down a good layout. One-shot callers -- session init, pipewire stream setup, capturer info -- keep probing fresh through get_displays, whose failure semantics are unchanged: replaying a transient failure there would latch an empty answer into session-long state. Non-drm builds compile none of this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(wayland): log DRM lookup failure once * fix(wayland): reset lookup warning after recovery --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5a78be03e3 |
feat(rdp): title the mstsc window after the peer instead of "localhost" (#15781)
* feat(rdp): title the mstsc window after the peer instead of "localhost" The RDP tunnel launched `mstsc /v:localhost:<port>`, so with several sessions open every window is titled "localhost" and servers cannot be told apart. mstsc titles the session window after the launched .rdp file's base name, so write a temp .rdp file (containing only the tunnel address) named after the peer alias, cached hostname, or id, and launch that instead. Falls back to the old /v: form when no usable name remains after filename sanitization or the file cannot be written. Credential handling is unchanged: cmdkey targets "localhost", which is still the host mstsc resolves credentials against. Fixes rustdesk/rustdesk#15775 (discussion) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rdp): set mstsc title without temporary files Keep launching mstsc with /v so Default.rdp settings are preserved and unsigned RDP file warnings and policy restrictions are avoided. Track the launched mstsc process and reapply the peer name when the window title is reset during connection or reconnection. Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * docs(rdp): clarify mstsc title limitation Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * feat(rdp): show peer identity with hostname in mstsc title Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> |
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7aa98d43cf |
Refact/plugin removal leftovers (#15864)
* fix(flutter): dispose the settings PageController and order dispose() correctly `dispose()` began with `super.dispose()`, so the mixin chain marked the State defunct before the WidgetsBindingObserver registration and the periodic timer were released. The `PageController` was never disposed at all: `Get.delete` only runs `onDelete()` for a `GetLifeCycleBase`, and a plain `ChangeNotifier` is not one, so every open/close of the Settings tab leaked one controller with its listener still attached. Also guard `switch2page` on the `Rx<SettingsTabKey>` registration it actually reads rather than only the `PageController` — now that both are really deleted, a partial teardown would throw into the catch and silently open the wrong tab — and re-check `mounted` after the await in the `_videoConnTimer` tick, which `Timer::cancel` cannot stop once the body has started. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refact: finish the plugin-framework removal sweep #15854 removed the feature but stopped short of its leftovers: - `Uninstall`, `Enable`, `Disable`, `Options` and `Please install plugins` were consumed only by the deleted `flutter/lib/plugin/**`; drop them from template.rs and the 50 locale files (250 dead entries). `Update` and `Install` stay, still used by desktop_home_page.dart. - The server no longer sends `PrvOnFailedPlugin`, and the client no longer offers to install plugins when privacy mode fails to turn on. - Drop the MSI `F_Client_Plugins` / `F_Server_Plugins` localization strings; no `.wxs` references them. - `_DisplayMenu`'s constructor became a pure pass-through once `pluginItem` was removed, and the cfg inside `handle_input` repeats the one on the function itself. - Normalize `src/lang/sl.rs` to 0644, the only executable file under src/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): handle legacy privacy mode plugin failures Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> |
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RustDesk
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10bcf976f7 |
Revert "fix: upgrade fuser to 0.16.0 (GHSA-cvmj-47v9-35m9) (#15834)" (#15841)
This reverts commit
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5
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ff07ff7f13 |
fix(terminal): send SGR mouse wheel reports with the button codes app… (#15817)
* fix(terminal): send SGR mouse wheel reports with the button codes apps expect xterm.dart 4.0.0 encodes the wheel buttons as 64+4..64+7 rather than 64+0..64+3, so the low bits land on the modifier field and every wheel report the terminal emits reads as wheel-with-Shift. Strict full-screen applications reject the modified event, which is why neither the mouse wheel nor the trackpad scrolls anything once the peer application takes over the alternate screen. Install a mouse handler that keeps every upstream reporting decision and only re-encodes the wheel buttons as 64..67. Non-wheel reports pass through untouched, and the emitted bytes stay identical once upstream ships the same fix, so this can be dropped without a behavior change. Upstream: TerminalStudio/xterm.dart#238 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(terminal): correct the wheel report row, drop the wasted report build Address review feedback on the wheel button fix: - The X10/utf row was encoded as `32 + y + 1` while y is already 1-based, so every normal-mode report pointed one row too low and the `y > limit` guard disagreed with what it emitted. - Gate the wheel path on `mouseMode.reportScroll` and the button state instead of building and discarding a full report string from `defaultMouseHandler` on every scroll tick. This also makes the hardcoded SGR 'M' provably right, since a wheel release now returns before the report is built. - Derive the wire code as `id - 4` and drop `_wheelButtonId`, whose `default` branch was unreachable and defeated enum exhaustiveness. - Assign `mouseHandler` after construction so the `Terminal(...)` line stays untouched. Cover the utf, urxvt, null-byte overflow and click-only branches, and assert that TerminalModel actually installs the handler. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d407db9fae |
fix(client): allow switch-sides back-connection in incoming-only mode (#15780)
* fix(client): allow switch-sides back-connection in incoming-only mode "Switch sides" makes the controlled client run `--connect <peer> --switch_uuid <uuid>`, which Client::_start rejected outright in incoming-only custom clients, so the feature silently dropped the session and never switched. Exempt exactly that back-connection: a default-conn session carrying a switch uuid may proceed. The uuid is then verified against the local server process in handle_hash(); if it is missing there (forged or expired), an incoming-only client now aborts with an error instead of falling through to password login, so the outgoing-connection restriction cannot be bypassed with a crafted --switch_uuid. Fixes rustdesk/rustdesk#11200 (discussion) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): validate switch-back grants before connecting - check pending peer/UUID grants before bypassing incoming-only mode - close rejected switch-back connections and suppress retries - keep grant consumption in handle_hash and test non-consuming checks Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix(client): prevent switch-back UUID reuse - claim pending switch-back grants before connecting - retain claimed grants to reject duplicate requests - bind authorization to the peer ID and UUID - use a shared TTL for switch-back grants Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix(client): defer switch UUID consumption until authentication Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix(client): reject repeated hash login in incoming-only mode Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> |
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RustDesk
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7c23fd3073 |
Revert "fix(linux): bound the xrandr call in the wayland primary-display look…" (#15806)
This reverts commit
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4234b99029 |
WebClient: 3.44 webcodecs offline (#15722)
* feat(web): zero-readback WebCodecs video path Decoded VideoFrames from js/src/webcodecs.js are handed to Flutter via window.onVideoFrame and imported GPU-side with createImageFromTextureSource; any failure unregisters the hook so the JS side falls back to RGBA readback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): load bundled terminal font when Google CDNs are unreachable In air-gapped deployments GoogleFonts.robotoMono() cannot download the terminal font; when index.html signals offline mode, load the copy bundled with the web app under the family name google_fonts registers. Part of the fix for rustdesk/rustdesk-server-pro#996. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: bump windows arm64 to Flutter 3.44.8, add web build patch script apply_flutter_3.44_web_patches.sh prepares a 3.44.x web build on top of the shared source patches: qr_code_scanner's web impl needs dart:ui_web for the removed platformViewRegistry, and flutter/web/fonts is refreshed to the font paths the 3.44 engine requests. The disabled build-rustdesk-web job runs it automatically once FLUTTER_VERSION moves to 3.44.x, and version-guarded 'Patch flutter' steps no longer fail when the guard does not match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): prevent stale WebCodecs frames across sessions Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(web): harden WebCodecs reconnect and Flutter 3.44 patches Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(ci): harden Flutter 3.44 patch input validation Validate required files before checking patch state, parameterize the theme-range validator, and prevent missing inputs from satisfying NO_MATCHES checks. Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * Remove unused code Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(web): retry font loading and dispose stale decoded images Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * remove unused code Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(web): Bad state: RenderBox was not laid out Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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9a81c8a138 |
Drm deb in release workflow (#15776)
* docs(agents): add a comment-length rule Comments were growing to document rejected alternatives, past bugs and measurements. That belongs in the commit message, not the source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(drm): build the unattended-wayland deb in the release workflow The deb was built by a separate drm-capture workflow on a plain runner, so it diverged from every other Linux deb: different base, different vcpkg/ffmpeg, different toolchain. Move it into flutter-build.yml as build-rustdesk-linux-drm, mirroring build-rustdesk-linux's x86_64 path -- same ubuntu18.04 container, same vcpkg install, same rust and flutter. libdrmtap is built on the runner first and handed to the container via DRMTAP_PREBUILT_DIR, because bionic's meson is too old to build it. The job is ungated, so the --drm packaging path is exercised on every PR; only publishing stays gated on upload-artifact. drm-capture.yml is deleted along with docs/DRM_CAPTURE_SECURITY.md -- the 29 drm unit tests that workflow ran are no longer executed by CI. Three bugs the move exposed: - build.py anchored the libdrmtap paths on abspath(__file__), which is only cwd-independent on Python >= 3.9 (bpo-20443). The packaging container runs 3.6 and chdir's into flutter/, so the ABI-gate cross-check resolved one directory off and every --drm packaging run would have died with FileNotFoundError. Captured as REPO_ROOT at import instead. - DRMTAP_PREBUILT_DIR no longer needs DRMTAP_ALLOW_UNPINNED. A prebuilt dir inside the repo's own third_party/libdrmtap at the pinned sha is the pinned object, not an override, and is now verified as such. - The variant's Depends carried a bare libdrm2. libdrmtap needs drmModeGetFB2, so it is libdrm2 (>= 2.4.95); below that the package installed and could never capture. The loader also logs the dlerror now instead of discarding it, so a soname or glibc mismatch is named rather than surfacing as a generic "libdrmtap not available". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(drm): declare the unattended-wayland deb's real libc6 and libdrm floors libdrmtap is built on the ubuntu-22.04 runner while the rest of the deb comes from the ubuntu18.04 container, so the package has a mixed glibc floor and declared neither half. It installed happily on Ubuntu 20.04 / Debian 11 (glibc 2.31), then dlopen failed on GLIBC_2.34 and capture degraded to the PipeWire portal -- the one thing this variant exists to avoid. Measure the floor off the staged objects and put it in Depends, so apt refuses with a reason instead of handing over a package that can never capture. Measured rather than written down: the number moves whenever either base does, and it lands exactly on RHEL/Rocky 9 (glibc 2.34), where one off-by-one decides whether that whole family can install. drmModeGetFB2 landed in libdrm 2.4.101, not 2.4.95 -- checked against the libdrm tags, xf86drmMode.h first declares it in 2.4.101. The old floor admitted Debian 10 (2.4.97), where the .so is linked -z now and dies on an undefined symbol at dlopen. libdrmtap's own meson.build carries the same wrong number. Upload the deb on always(): the run that fails the drm check is the one whose artifact is most worth downloading. Publish stays gated on success, so an unverified build still cannot reach a release. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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7eb9150116 |
Audit retry nonce (#15759)
* fix: retry audit posts and add per-record nonce A single post_request attempt meant any transient failure (timeout, DNS, connection reset) silently dropped the audit record. Retry up to 3 times with backoff and log at error level when a record is finally dropped. Retries (and the existing TCP-proxy fallback) can deliver the same record twice; attach a per-record nonce so the api server can dedup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fail audit posts on http error status post_request discards the status code, so a 5xx from a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx answering 502 while hbbs restarts) or any 4xx rejection was treated as success and the audit record silently dropped without a log line. Add post_request_with_status (same semantics and TCP-proxy fallback as post_request, status preserved; existing callers untouched) and use it for audit posts: 2xx succeeds, transport errors and 5xx retry, 4xx fails immediately since retrying a deterministic rejection cannot help. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: report audit posts rejected with 200 error body hbbs maps handler failures (e.g. a database write error) to HTTP 200 with an {"error": ...} body (WebError::ServerError), so the client treated them as success and the audit record was silently dropped. Detect the error body and fail visibly. No retry: the server already consumed the nonce, and persistence failures are the server's job to solve; the client's job is to make the loss visible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: give audit retries a delay long enough to outlive a restart The backoff was 1s then 2s, so all three attempts landed within about three seconds. That does not cover the case the retry exists for: a reverse proxy answering 502 while the api server restarts fails fast, so every attempt hits the same outage and the record is dropped anyway. Use 10s and 30s instead. The window is bounded on the other side - the api server dedups by nonce for five minutes, and a retry arriving after that expired would be stored twice - so the worst case is now about three minutes, leaving room under that limit. Derive the attempt count from the delay table so the two cannot drift apart. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: retry audit posts the server answered with an error body hbbs reports handler failures as 200 with an {"error": ...} body, and this treated them as final on the grounds that the server had already consumed the record's nonce. That is no longer how the server behaves: it releases the nonce when the write fails, and answers a post whose earlier attempt is still being written with an error as well. Both are exactly the cases where trying again is what gets the record stored, so giving up after the first attempt drops audit records the retry was added to save. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: bound audit retries by elapsed time, and retry 408 and 429 The comment claimed the retry window fit inside the server's five-minute nonce memory with room to spare, and that was wrong: one attempt is up to 84s, not 12s, because post_request_ retries the TLS handshake up to four times at 12s each before the 36s TCP-proxy fallback. Three of those plus the delays is 292s against a 300s window, and a suspend between attempts stretches the wall clock without any bound at all, so counting attempts cannot bound this. Stop by elapsed time instead: no new attempt starts past 120s, which leaves the last one room to finish well inside the server's window. Also retry 408 and 429. Both are transient - the request timed out upstream, or a proxy is shedding load - but the 5xx test dropped the record after the first attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: only an empty 2xx body counts as a stored audit The success check was inverted: any 2xx body that failed to parse as an {"error": ...} object was reported as stored. A proxy interposing a 2xx maintenance page, or a malformed error value, therefore ended the retry loop with success and silently dropped the record - the exact loss the retry was added to prevent. The audit handlers' success contract is an empty body, so treat exactly that as success. A nonempty body with a valid error message stays a retryable server error; any other nonempty body is now a retryable "unexpected response body" instead of an accepted store. Both old and new hbbs answer success with an empty body, and no caller reads the returned text, so nothing depends on the previous acceptance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: do not start an audit retry past the deadline The deadline was only checked after an attempt returned, so an attempt could still begin up to one backoff delay past it - starting as late as ~150s and landing at ~234s, while the comment claimed no attempt starts past 120s. Re-check after the delay so the stated bound actually holds: the last attempt now starts before 120s and lands by ~204s, inside the server's five-minute nonce window with margin restored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: drop a retry rationale the server no longer backs The comment claimed hbbs answers a post whose earlier attempt is still being written with an error, so that retrying it is what stores the record. That stopped being true: hbbs now answers a concurrent duplicate as already stored rather than as retryable, having dropped the in-flight rejection along with the claim state machine it needed. Nothing in the handling changes - a 2xx carrying an {"error": ...} body is still retried, and that is still right, because the server releases the record's nonce when its write fails. Only the half of the rationale the server no longer backs is gone, since this comment is where the contract between the two repos is written down. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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e6dd925ab0 |
fix(android): close outgoing sessions when the task is swiped away (#15753)
* fix(android): close outgoing sessions when the task is swiped away
Swiping RustDesk away from recents destroys the UI but does not
necessarily end the process: when MainService is running (screen share
enabled, or started at boot) the process survives, and with it the
native io_loop of any active outgoing session.
That orphaned io_loop keeps echoing TestDelay (client.rs handle_test_delay
runs entirely on the network thread, no UI involved), which keeps
refreshing last_recv_time on the controlled side. Its 30s inactivity
timeout in server/connection.rs therefore never fires, so the remote
session stays established with no UI left to close it, and the peer
cannot be reconnected to.
Close client sessions from Service.onTaskRemoved, which fires only on
explicit task removal -- not on Home or backgrounding, so ordinary
backgrounding is unaffected. The service itself keeps running, so
incoming connections and the device staying reachable are unchanged.
This complements
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d752823b8c |
swtich_code for hbbs (#15615)
* swtich_code for hbbs to bypass ACL * improve register_switch_grant: skip public server, log at error level Also document why registration is fire-and-forget with no retry: the peer connects within seconds, so a late retry would land after its punch request was already rejected; a failed switch is recovered by the user triggering it again, which registers a fresh grant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * add timestamp Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix(switch-sides): handle grant registration clock skew - retry registration once with the server-provided timestamp - require an explicit accepted response from hbbs - report malformed or incomplete responses Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix(switch-sides): register grants with code verifiers - send a derived verifier instead of the raw switch code - use detached signatures for grant registration - add verifier and signed-message tests Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ffe20bb297 |
Login options error feedback (#15727)
* fix(flutter): show error and retry when fetching login options fails The third-party login section of the login dialog was silently hidden whenever /api/login-options could not be fetched (e.g. TLS handshake aborted by a router/ISP scam filter, discussion #15700), leaving users staring at a dialog with no feedback. The pure-Dart HTTP path also had no timeout, so a black-holed connection could hang indefinitely. - let transport errors propagate from queryOidcLoginOptions instead of swallowing them; a non-JSON response still means "no third-party login" so self-hosted servers without this API keep the old behavior - show network_error_tip, a Retry button, and the underlying error in the login dialog so users and supporters can see what failed - bound the Dart HTTP branch with a 15s timeout; the Rust branch keeps its own bounded per-attempt timeouts and is awaited to completion so a retry never races the URL-keyed ASYNC_HTTP_STATUS entry of an abandoned in-flight request Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flutter): surface currentUser refresh failures that were only logged Non-transport failures of the token auto-login (/api/currentUser) -- a bad HTTP status, a filter's HTML block page, or an error field in the body -- were only debugPrinted, so the address book / group tabs showed nothing and offered no retry. Reuse the existing networkError channel so netWorkErrorWidget shows the error with its Retry button. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flutter): keep retry row visible with progress while refetching login options Review follow-ups: clicking Retry used to clear the error and hide the row with no pending feedback, which could read as a dead click while the Rust fallback chain runs; keep the row, disable the button, and show the usual LinearProgressIndicator instead. Also raise the Dart HTTP branch timeout to 30s so large web address book pulls on slow links do not newly time out; it still bounds the previously unbounded hang and stays above the Rust side's 12s per-attempt timeout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update webpki-roots to latest Mozilla root store 0.26.9 -> 0.26.11 (now a forwarding shim over 1.x, used by tungstenite) 1.0.4 -> 1.0.9 (used by reqwest / hyper-rustls / hbb_common) The 0.26.9 line carried its own root snapshot frozen in early 2025, so the websocket TLS path was building against a stale bundle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: weekly workflow to PR webpki-roots root store updates webpki-roots is a transitive dependency, so dependabot's cargo version updates would not cover it. A scheduled job runs cargo update for every webpki-roots instance in each lockfile and opens a PR when the pinned Mozilla root snapshot is behind, keeping root store changes reviewable instead of baking them silently into release builds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flutter): hide network tip for server-reported currentUser errors Review follow-up: when /api/currentUser fails with an error the server itself reported (an error field in a JSON body, or an unexpected schema), "Please check your network connection" was misleading. Track whether the surfaced error came from a server response and skip the network tip for those; FormatException (a non-JSON body such as a filter's block page) keeps it, since that still indicates a network or middlebox problem. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flutter): close timed-out HTTP clients * fix(flutter): flag server-reported errors at the throw site Review follow-up (CodeRabbit). Classifying by `e is! FormatException` mislabeled ambiguous failures: a middlebox block page returning 200 with valid-but-wrong-shape JSON throws a TypeError from fromJson and was shown without the check-your-network tip, though it is a network artifact. Set networkErrorFromServer only at the one site that is certainly server-reported (an error field in the body); every other failure keeps the network tip plus the raw error text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: serialize webpki-roots update runs, null-delimit lockfile paths Review follow-up (CodeRabbit). A manual dispatch overlapping the weekly cron could have an older run force-push over the newer branch state; queue runs via a concurrency group without cancel-in-progress. Also iterate lockfiles with git ls-files -z so a path with spaces cannot be word-split, and keep the loop failing the step on any cargo error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flutter): improve login retry feedback Use the theme primary color for the Retry button and hide stale error messages while a retry is in progress. Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(flutter): surface login option response errors Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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a5018a022b |
chore(ios): remove unused GoogleService-Info.plist (#15752)
Leftover from an abandoned Firebase integration. The file is not referenced anywhere in the repository and is not listed in Runner.xcodeproj, so it was never copied into the app bundle. No Firebase or Google Sign-In pod is present in Podfile/Podfile.lock, nothing calls FirebaseApp.configure(), Info.plist declares no REVERSED_CLIENT_ID URL scheme, and on the Dart side both Firebase.initializeApp() and firebase_analytics stay commented out. Note the values it held were Firebase client configuration (project identifiers and a public OAuth client id), which are public by design and ship inside client binaries -- not secrets. This removes dead weight, it is not a credential rotation. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5
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006b9737e4 |
fix(linux): load librustdesk.so relative to the executable (#15719)
* fix(linux): load librustdesk.so relative to the executable The runner and the Dart FFI init loaded the core library by bare name, relying on the runner's $ORIGIN/lib RPATH. Repackaged installs (CachyOS repo, AUR) can lose that RPATH, making the app fail to start with "Failed to load librustdesk.so" unless users add the lib directory to ld.so.conf. Resolve lib/librustdesk.so next to the executable first, then fall back to the loader search path. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/discussions/14407 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(linux): harden bundled librustdesk.so resolution Address review: bail out when readlink() may have truncated the executable path, and widen the Dart try block so any failure probing the bundled library falls back to the loader search path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5
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e63df74715 |
fix(linux): make quit_cm actually quit the connection manager (#15718)
quit_gui() ends the process on Windows (std::process::exit) and macOS (NSApp terminate), but on Linux it calls gtk_main_quit(), which has no effect in the Flutter connection manager: flutter/linux/main.cc runs g_application_run() (GtkApplication), so gtk_main() is never called and the assertion inside gtk_main_quit() just fails. quit_cm() is the only caller that relies on quit_gui() to end the process. The main window path in ipc.rs calls std::process::exit(-1) right after it, and the two remaining call sites are in the Sciter UI, which is not compiled for flutter builds. So a connection manager reaching quit_cm() on Linux kept running while no longer serving the `_cm` ipc endpoint, which also stops the server from reusing it, so the next connection spawns one more. NOTE: this is a fallback, not an explanation for the stale processes of #15698: a client merely disconnecting does not reach quit_cm(), the Flutter side closes the window instead. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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9aeb54cf33 |
Fix flutter white window forceredraw (#15717)
* fix(flutter/windows): heal the white window left by a resize around the first frame If the window is resized between the creation of the Flutter surface and the present of the first frame - which is what the PowerToys FancyZones option "Move newly created windows to their last known zone" does - the embedder's resize synchronization enters kResizeStarted and from then on only presents frames that match the new size. A frame already generated for the old size is rejected, nothing schedules a matching one, and the window stays white until a real resize re-enters OnWindowSizeChanged, which resets the resize target and resends the window metrics. Sciter is unaffected: it repaints synchronously on WM_PAINT and has no such handshake. Upstream has no fix (flutter/flutter#159630, open at P3). Recover with a timer armed at creation and re-armed on WM_SHOWWINDOW (covers windows created hidden and shown much later, e.g. the connection manager): until the first frame arrives, kick the engine - first with the cheap ForceRedraw(), which only helps when no resize is pending (it is gated on resize_status_ == kDone), then by nudging the Flutter child window by 1px and back, which re-enters OnWindowSizeChanged and heals the wedge the same way minimize/restore does. Because the first-frame callback fires on frame generation even when the present is rejected, a resize observed before the first frame forces one final child refresh - in practice nearly every window sees a pre-first-frame WM_SIZE, so this acts as a cheap unconditional guarantee. Giving up after 5s is logged. The remote session windows get the same fix in rustdesk_desktop_multi_window. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/6756 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(flutter): bump desktop_multi_window for the white-window fix Picks up rustdesk-org/rustdesk_desktop_multi_window#33 (340ca43), the session-window side of the FancyZones white-window workaround. Only the resolved-ref of this one dependency is moved; nothing else is upgraded. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/6756 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flutter/windows): drop a dead guard and log where users can see it Two follow-ups on the force-redraw timer. The resized_before_first_frame_ guard never discriminated. CreateWindow() sends a WM_SIZE before it returns, and WM_NCCREATE has already installed the window pointer by then, so the flag was set during construction - before OnCreate() even arms the timer - and was therefore always true when the first frame arrived. Drop the flag and do the final child refresh unconditionally, which is what the code already did, and say so instead of implying there is an exceptional case. The give-up message went to std::cerr, which lands nowhere on the machines that hit this: main.cpp only attaches a console when the process is started from one or runs under a debugger. Use OutputDebugString so it is actually readable with DebugView in the field. Also note in the comment that the "callback fires on frame generation" premise is not load-bearing - if it only fired on a successful present, the timer would simply keep nudging - so the redundancy is not mistaken for duplication and removed later. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(flutter): bump desktop_multi_window to pick up the follow-ups Moves the pin from the #33 merge (340ca43) to current master (f8c4fce), which adds #34: the dead resized_before_first_frame_ guard is gone and the give-up message goes to OutputDebugString instead of a stderr nobody sees. Keeps the sub-window fix in step with the runner fix in this branch; without it the two would ship the same logic in two different states. Edited by hand, not via pub upgrade - that re-resolves unrelated packages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Opus 5
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12f2de5959 |
chore(flutter): point window_manager at the post-revert main (#15709)
The lock still pinned 7d9a674, the commit rustdesk-org/window_manager#8 reverted. Move it to current main (cf4aef0), which carries the reworked guard for methods called after the toplevel window is destroyed. Edited by hand rather than via pub upgrade: upgrading re-resolved 17 packages, downgrading some and pulling flutter_test and its leak_tracker tree in as new entries, none of which belongs in this change. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/15703 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDeskandClaude Fable 5
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85a5fefab8 |
fix(windows): prevent ghost and duplicate tray icons (#15689) (#15690)
* docs(agents): require minimally invasive, additive-first patches Codify the review feedback from the tray ghost-icon fix: fixes should add self-contained code around existing lines instead of restructuring them, keep platform-specific logic in src/platform/ with fn-local imports, and leave only thin one-line hooks in shared files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(windows): stop duplicate tray icons from piling up (#15689) `check_process("--tray", ..)` is used to decide whether a tray process needs to be spawned, but it can miss one that is already running: it cannot read the command line of an elevated process from a non-elevated one (the installer spawns the tray elevated), and wmic, used by 32-bit builds since #11638, is gone from newer Windows 11. `connection.rs` runs that check once per incoming connection, so every miss added another tray icon and they kept piling up, which is the same blind spot behind #6692. Hold a named mutex in the session namespace as the authoritative single instance guard, so a redundant tray process exits before creating an icon. `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` also counts as "already running", since it means the mutex belongs to a tray we may not touch. Also remove the icon before the tray menu's "Stop service" calls uninstall_service(): on success it ends the process with std::process::exit, which skips the destructor that would call Shell_NotifyIcon(NIM_DELETE), so every click left a ghost icon behind. The icon is shown again if stopping the service failed or was cancelled. Ghost icons from the taskkill in the install/update/service flows are left alone here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(windows): note that update_me's pid lookup can silently find nothing The pids are matched by command line, which comes back empty for a 32-bit build reading 64-bit processes (hence the `wmic` fallback of #11638, and `wmic` is no longer installed by default since Windows 11 24H2) and for a non-elevated process reading an elevated one. `taskkill` matches by image name and still works, but the session lists are then empty, so the restore guard silently restores nothing and the update leaves the user without a tray icon and main window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(windows): record the confirmed cause of the duplicate tray icons Process Explorer output in #15689 pinned it down: run_after_run_cmds() spawns the tray in the caller's own context, so installing or toggling the service from a RustDesk that was itself started elevated leaves a high integrity tray behind, which a medium integrity main window cannot inspect afterwards. Record where the detection fails exactly, so the next reader doesn't have to rediscover that the executable path, not the command line, is what comes back empty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d6ea170061 |
Id whitelist (#15586)
* id whitelist * hbb_common * Update flutter/lib/common/widgets/dialog.dart Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * support wss:// for web client Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix: handle ID copying separately and remove whitelist logs Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix en translation Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix: check switch-side ID whitelist after login initialization Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * track pending 2FA challenge state Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * support Unicode IDs in whitelist settings Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * refactor: unify client ID resolution Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> |
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RustDesk
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082a5a2a4e |
Revert "Fix Adjust Window sizing across DPI (#15592)" (#15620)
This reverts commit
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RustDesk
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12b5cc7f72 |
Revert "fix: ci: macos: allow signed but not notarized dmg (#15530)" (#15551)
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e2149974cc |
harden wf_cliprdr.c (#15515)
* harden wf_cliprdr.c * fix copilot review * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix review * fix review * condense hardening comments, fix style in wf_cliprdr.c Comment-only cleanup of the review-justification comments; also move the mutex wait result declaration to the top of the block and fix continuation-line indentation. No behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * add invariant tests for file contents request/response hardening Cover the zeroed optional request fields, stream ID filtering, oversized/NULL response rejection and the zero-byte EOF path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * address copilot review findings in wf_cliprdr.c - Reject a negative FILECONTENTS_SIZE result: m_lSize is unsigned, so a negative value became a huge bogus stream size that keeps reads going. - Use a unique per-stream counter as the CLIPRDR streamId instead of a truncated IStream pointer, which could collide or be reused after free (and leaked heap addresses to the peer). - Add req_f_request_mutex to serialize whole file-contents request/response cycles, enforcing the previously assumed one-outstanding-request invariant when multiple streams are read concurrently. Bounded acquire so a wedged request fails the read instead of hanging a consumer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * serialize file-contents request state and poison streams after timeout - Extract lock_mutex() for the WAIT_OBJECT_0/WAIT_ABANDONED idiom shared by take_req_fdata, the request-serialization acquire, and the response handler. - Collapse the acquire/send/take/release cycle into cliprdr_request_filecontents_sync(), used by CliprdrStream_Read and the size probe in CliprdrStream_New. - Publish req_f_stream_id_expected/req_f_size_requested under req_f_mutex in the sender and read them under the same lock in the response handler, removing the cross-thread data race on those fields. - Poison a stream (m_failed) after a request fails/times out, so a late response carrying a previous offset's bytes cannot satisfy a later same-stream read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * key the responder stream cache on connID as well as streamId Per-stream ids restart from 1 in each peer process, so two connections can emit the same streamId. The process-static pStreamStc cache keyed only on streamId could then serve one peer the IStream cached for another peer (a different file), silently returning wrong-file bytes. Add connID to the key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * harden the format-data path against late/duplicate responses The format-data rendezvous had the same single-slot race the file-contents path just fixed: the channel thread rewrote clipboard->hmem with no lock while explorer-thread consumers read/freed it, nothing serialized concurrent requests, and no flag told an expected response from a stray one. - Add format_request_mutex (serializes the whole request/response cycle) and hmem_mutex (guards the hmem hand-off and formatDataRespExpected). - cliprdr_send_data_request now takes ownership of the response buffer under hmem_mutex and returns it to the caller, so a later response cannot touch a buffer a consumer is using. All three consumers (GetData, WM_RENDERFORMAT, DELAYED_RENDERING) and the WM_CLIPBOARDUPDATE cleanup use the returned/taken handle instead of the shared slot. - The response handler drops any response arriving while formatDataRespExpected is clear (late/duplicate/unsolicited), consumes the flag on the first response, and no longer dereferences a NULL clipboard in the SetEvent path. Pre-existing issue, not introduced by this branch; generalizes the file-contents hardening to the format-data path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * remove the dedicated wf-cliprdr CI workflow Drop .github/workflows/wf-cliprdr-ci.yml on this branch as requested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * remove wf-cliprdr invariant tests Drop tests/test_invariant_wf_cliprdr.c on this branch as requested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor and simplify, remove mutex which is dangeours * fix copilot false report * fix review * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDesk
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dcc64cdeae | cjk (#15379) | ||
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RustDesk
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2747d3d8b4 |
Revert "fix(arm64-linux): fix CJK font rendering on flutter-elinux (#15324)" (#15377)
This reverts commit
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RustDesk
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a658e987b7 |
Revert "Feature: Add monitor-switch buttons to remote toolbars (#15314)" (#15338)
This reverts commit
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RustDesk
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f4a0535289 |
autocomplete online (#15313)
* autocomplete online * review fix * review fix * remove literalInput |
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RustDesk
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6665242edf |
Revert "refact: privacy mdoe 1, multi-monitors (#15318)" (#15320)
This reverts commit
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RustDesk
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1fc33218dc |
Revert "fix(iPad): keep touch gestures with external mouse (#14652)" (#15288)
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RustDesk
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32c6e32e04 |
Revert "Revert "fix: add integer overflow check in wf_cliprdr.c (#15142)" (#1…" (#15166)
This reverts commit
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RustDesk
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c55b1f3359 |
Revert "fix: add integer overflow check in wf_cliprdr.c (#15142)" (#15160)
This reverts commit
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RustDeskandCopilot Autofix powered by AI
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472c4fc03a |
--deploy, reuse the device token (#15035)
* --deploy, reuse the device token
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix review
* no id validation in deploy, so to keep the same behavior in udp register
pk
* Fix collapsed toolbar drag preview sizing
* Revert "Fix collapsed toolbar drag preview sizing"
This reverts commit
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RustDeskandfufesou
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6c20fc936d |
Terminal utf8 and reconnect (#14895)
* fix: handle incomplete UTF-8 sequences in terminal output, rework on https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/pull/14736 * Fix terminal auto-reconnect freeze: reconnect resumes terminal output, while multi-tab reconnect avoids restoring duplicate tabs for terminals that are already open. * fix(terminal): subtract with overflow ``` thread '<unnamed>' panicked at src\server\terminal_service.rs:476:17: attempt to subtract with overflow note: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace thread 'tokio-runtime-worker' panicked at src\server\terminal_service.rs:1576:50: called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: PoisonError { .. } [2026-04-25T07:17:34Z ERROR librustdesk::server::service] Failed to join thread for service ts_9badd3fe-2411-4996-9f40-93c979009edd, Any { .. } ``` Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix ios enter: https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/14907 * fix(terminal): reconnect, error handling 1. Terminal shows "^[[1;1R^[[2;2R^[[>0;0;0c" 2. NaN ``` [ERROR:flutter/runtime/dart_vm_initializer.cc(41)] Unhandled Exception: Converting object to an encodable object failed: NaN ... ``` Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): dialog, close window Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): close terminal window on disconnect dialog Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): merge reconnect backlog into replay output Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): avoid reconnect stalls and delayed layout writes Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): remove invalid test Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): schedule frame before flushing buffered output Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): windows&macos, charset utf-8 Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): reconnect suppress next output Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix: cap terminal reconnect replay output - split reconnect replay backlog into capped chunks - mark terminal data replay chunks for client-side suppression - avoid using open-message text to suppress xterm replies - reuse default terminal padding value - remove misleading Enter-key normalization PR link Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): env en_US.UTF-8 Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): reconnect, refactor Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): flag, retry output Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): update hbb_common Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): comments Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): comments utf-8 chunk accumulator Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(terminal): update hbb_common Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> |
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RustDesk
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5fd20f808c | fix safari-oidc https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/14861 (#14867) | ||
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4e30ee8d1c |
tcp proxy (#14633)
* tcp proxy * fix per review * fix per review * Suppress secure_tcp info logs for TCP proxy requests Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * copilot review: redact tcp proxy logs, dedupe headers, and avoid body clone Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * format common.rs Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * copilot review: test function name Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * copilot review: format IPv6 tcp proxy log targets correctly Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * copilot review: normalize HTTP method before direct request dispatch Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * review: extract fallback helper, fix Content-Type override, add overall timeout - Extract duplicated TCP proxy fallback logic into generic `with_tcp_proxy_fallback` helper used by both `post_request` and `http_request_sync`, eliminating code drift risk - Allow caller-supplied Content-Type to override the default in `parse_simple_header` instead of silently dropping it - Take body by reference in `post_request_http` to avoid eager clone when no fallback is needed - Wrap entire `tcp_proxy_request` flow (connect + handshake + send + receive) in an overall timeout to prevent indefinite stalls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * review: make is_public case-insensitive and cover mixed-case rustdesk URLs Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * oidc: route auth requests through shared HTTP/tcp-proxy path while keeping TLS warmup Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * refactor: replace unused TryFrom<Response> with HbbHttpResponse::parse method Remove TryFrom<Response> impl that was never called and replace the private parse_hbb_http_response helper in account.rs with a public parse() method on HbbHttpResponse, eliminating code duplication. Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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RustDesk
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0388d00ad3 |
Revert "Update tray-icon crate to fix Linux tray icon collision (#14530)" (#14538)
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RustDeskand21pages
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ab64a32f30 |
avatar (#14440)
* avatar
* refactor avatar display: unify rendering and resolve at use time
- Extract buildAvatarWidget() in common.dart to share avatar rendering
logic across desktop settings, desktop CM and mobile CM
- Add resolve_avatar_url() in Rust, exposed via FFI (SyncReturn),
to resolve relative avatar paths (e.g. "/avatar/xxx") to absolute URLs
- Store avatar as-is in local config, only resolve when displaying
(settings page) or sending (LoginRequest)
- Resolve avatar in LoginRequest before sending to remote peer
- Add error handling for network image load failures
- Guard against empty client.name[0] crash
- Show avatar in mobile settings page account tile
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
* web: implement mainResolveAvatarUrl via js getByName
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
* increase ipc Data enum size limit to 120 bytes
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
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RustDeskandfufesou
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52b66e71d1 |
Move port mapping afterwards (#14448)
* move port mapping after auth in port forwarding * fix(port-forward): try connect after 2fa Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * fix(security): gate port-forward connect on full auth and clarify login flow semantics Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> * refact(port-forward): comments and logs Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com> |
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RustDesk
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6aee70fa18 | fix https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/issues/609#issuecomment-3931613118 (#14364) | ||
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RustDeskand21pages
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6c3515588f |
- UI display: display_name first (#14358)
* - UI display: display_name first
- Fallback: name
- Technical identity: still name
### What changed
- Added account display helpers and display_name state in user model:
- flutter/lib/models/user_model.dart:16
- Account/logout label now uses display_name (@name) when both exist:
- flutter/lib/mobile/pages/settings_page.dart:689
- flutter/lib/desktop/pages/desktop_setting_page.dart:2016
- flutter/lib/desktop/pages/desktop_setting_page.dart:2135
- Desktop Account info now shows both when applicable:
- Display Name: ...
- Username: ...
- flutter/lib/desktop/pages/desktop_setting_page.dart:2039
- Previously done group-list behavior remains:
- group user list displays display_name with name fallback
- flutter/lib/common/widgets/my_group.dart:187
- Persistence path for display_name remains enabled (including group cache/submodule field):
- libs/hbb_common/src/config.rs:2347
- src/client.rs:2630
- LoginRequest.my_name now resolves as:
1. OPTION_DISPLAY_NAME (manual override)
2. user_info.display_name
3. user_info.name
4. OS username fallback
* 1. GUID key (...Uninstall\{GUID}) is MSI-native metadata generated by Windows Installer.
2. Non-GUID key (...Uninstall\RustDesk) is explicitly written by RustDesk’s MSI compatibility component in res/msi/Package/Components/Regs.wxs:44, populated by preprocess.py --arp from .github/workflows/
flutter-build.yml:262.
So they were not using the same EstimatedSize logic:
- MSI GUID key: MSI-calculated size (KB).
- RustDesk key: custom script value from res/msi/preprocess.py:339 (previously bytes, now fixed to KB).
That mismatch is exactly why you saw different sizes.
* improve display name handling
- Append (@username) when multiple users share the same display name
- Trim whitespace from display_name before comparison and display
- Add missing translate() for Logout button on desktop
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
* group peer filter match both user's display name and user's name
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
* case-insensitive search in group peer filter
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com>
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RustDesk
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4ae577c3c4 |
Revert "Updated tr.rs (#14115)" (#14158)
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RustDesk
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ceffcce20e | fix hide-tray=Y causing The application “RustDesk.app” is not open anymore. https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/discussions/10210 (#14127) | ||
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21a7cef98a |
keep-awake-during-incoming-sessions (#14082)
* keep-awake-during-incoming-sessions * Update flutter/lib/desktop/pages/desktop_setting_page.dart Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update flutter/lib/common.dart Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update flutter/lib/mobile/pages/settings_page.dart Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update common.dart * wakelock Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * fix build Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> * Update server_model.dart --------- Signed-off-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: 21pages <sunboeasy@gmail.com> |
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RustDesk
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b69e871f9a |
Revert "fix: set TERM env variable for terminal to fix Delete key not working…" (#13894)
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RustDesk
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692e90f779 | Update flutter-build.yml (#13817) | ||
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RustDesk
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e4faedcb62 | Update flutter-build.yml (#13815) | ||
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RustDesk
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da2c678fb3 |
Revert "Disable signing commands in flutter-build.yml (#13750)" (#13808)
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RustDesk
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822b6d1baf |
Disable signing commands in flutter-build.yml (#13750)
Comment out signing commands in the Flutter build workflow. |
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RustDesk
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3c0be4e40e |
Revert "feat: macos, update dmg (#13539)" (#13577)
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RustDesk
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d03a9e2baf |
Fix macos bigsur cvbuffer crash (#13392)
* Fix macOS Big Sur crash with CVBufferCopyAttachments Add FFmpeg patch to use weak_import for CVBufferCopyAttachments API to prevent dyld crash on macOS Big Sur (11.x). The CVBufferCopyAttachments function is only available on macOS 12+. Even though FFmpeg has a runtime check with __builtin_available, the symbol is still resolved at load time, causing immediate crash on older macOS versions. With weak_import attribute, the function pointer will be NULL on macOS < 12, allowing the code to safely fall back to the deprecated CVBufferGetAttachments API. Fixes: #13377 * update common |
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RustDesk
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0c2b86c8e7 |
Revert "Create Hi.rs (#12482)" (#12700)
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RustDesk
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53efaf125c |
Revert "Feat: file transfer, resume (#12557)" (#12620)
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RustDesk
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1954790808 | try tcp and udp both | ||
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RustDesk
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e9692b94ca |
Revert "Fix/printer printable area (#12433)" (#12441)
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RustDesk
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f3819e19d4 |
improve sas (#12226)
* improve sas * Update windows.rs |