Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into agent/fix-4326-async-image-object-storage

# Conflicts:
#	backend/cmd/server/wire_gen.go

backend/cmd/jwtgen/main.go

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func main() {
 		log.Fatalf("failed to resolve admin user: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	token, err := authService.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := authService.GenerateToken(ctx, user)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Fatalf("failed to generate token: %v", err)
 	}

backend/cmd/server/wire.go

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ func provideCleanup(
 	channelMonitorRunner *service.ChannelMonitorRunner,
 	quotaFlusher *service.UserPlatformQuotaUsageFlusher,
 	upstreamBillingProbe *service.UpstreamBillingProbeService,
+	auditLog *service.AuditLogService,
 ) func() {
 	return func() {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
@@ -134,6 +135,12 @@ func provideCleanup(
 				}
 				return nil
 			}},
+			{"AuditLogService", func() error {
+				if auditLog != nil {
+					auditLog.Stop()
+				}
+				return nil
+			}},
 			{"OpsAlertEvaluatorService", func() error {
 				if opsAlertEvaluator != nil {
 					opsAlertEvaluator.Stop()

backend/cmd/server/wire_gen.go

@@ -250,8 +250,11 @@ func initializeApplication(buildInfo handler.BuildInfo) (*Application, error) {
 	paymentHandler := admin.NewPaymentHandler(paymentService, paymentConfigService)
 	affiliateHandler := admin.NewAffiliateHandler(affiliateService, adminService)
 	complianceHandler := admin.NewComplianceHandler(settingService)
+	auditLogRepository := repository.NewAuditLogRepository(db)
+	auditLogService := service.ProvideAuditLogService(auditLogRepository, settingService)
+	auditLogHandler := admin.NewAuditLogHandler(auditLogService, totpService)
 	upstreamBillingProbeService := service.ProvideUpstreamBillingProbeService(accountRepository, accountTestService, settingService, leaderLockCache, db)
-	adminHandlers := handler.ProvideAdminHandlers(dashboardHandler, adminUserHandler, groupHandler, accountHandler, adminAnnouncementHandler, dataManagementHandler, backupHandler, oAuthHandler, openAIOAuthHandler, geminiOAuthHandler, antigravityOAuthHandler, grokOAuthHandler, proxyHandler, adminRedeemHandler, promoHandler, settingHandler, opsHandler, systemHandler, adminSubscriptionHandler, adminUsageHandler, userAttributeHandler, errorPassthroughHandler, tlsFingerprintProfileHandler, adminAPIKeyHandler, scheduledTestHandler, channelHandler, channelMonitorHandler, channelMonitorRequestTemplateHandler, contentModerationHandler, paymentHandler, affiliateHandler, complianceHandler, upstreamBillingProbeService)
+	adminHandlers := handler.ProvideAdminHandlers(dashboardHandler, adminUserHandler, groupHandler, accountHandler, adminAnnouncementHandler, dataManagementHandler, backupHandler, oAuthHandler, openAIOAuthHandler, geminiOAuthHandler, antigravityOAuthHandler, grokOAuthHandler, proxyHandler, adminRedeemHandler, promoHandler, settingHandler, opsHandler, systemHandler, adminSubscriptionHandler, adminUsageHandler, userAttributeHandler, errorPassthroughHandler, tlsFingerprintProfileHandler, adminAPIKeyHandler, scheduledTestHandler, channelHandler, channelMonitorHandler, channelMonitorRequestTemplateHandler, contentModerationHandler, paymentHandler, affiliateHandler, complianceHandler, auditLogHandler, upstreamBillingProbeService)
 	usageRecordWorkerPool := service.NewUsageRecordWorkerPool(configConfig)
 	userMsgQueueCache := repository.NewUserMsgQueueCache(redisClient)
 	userMessageQueueService := service.ProvideUserMessageQueueService(userMsgQueueCache, rpmCache, configConfig)
@@ -280,10 +283,12 @@ func initializeApplication(buildInfo handler.BuildInfo) (*Application, error) {
 	idempotencyCoordinator := service.ProvideIdempotencyCoordinator(idempotencyRepository, configConfig)
 	idempotencyCleanupService := service.ProvideIdempotencyCleanupService(idempotencyRepository, configConfig)
 	handlers := handler.ProvideHandlers(authHandler, userHandler, apiKeyHandler, usageHandler, redeemHandler, subscriptionHandler, announcementHandler, channelMonitorUserHandler, adminHandlers, gatewayHandler, openAIGatewayHandler, handlerSettingHandler, totpHandler, handlerPaymentHandler, paymentWebhookHandler, availableChannelHandler, asyncImageHandler, batchImageHandler, idempotencyCoordinator, idempotencyCleanupService)
-	jwtAuthMiddleware := middleware.NewJWTAuthMiddleware(authService, userService)
-	adminAuthMiddleware := middleware.NewAdminAuthMiddleware(authService, userService, settingService)
+	jwtAuthMiddleware := middleware.NewJWTAuthMiddleware(authService, userService, settingService, auditLogService)
+	adminAuthMiddleware := middleware.NewAdminAuthMiddleware(authService, userService, settingService, auditLogService)
 	apiKeyAuthMiddleware := middleware.NewAPIKeyAuthMiddleware(apiKeyService, subscriptionService, configConfig)
-	engine := server.ProvideRouter(configConfig, handlers, jwtAuthMiddleware, adminAuthMiddleware, apiKeyAuthMiddleware, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, redisClient)
+	auditLogMiddleware := middleware.NewAuditLogMiddleware(auditLogService)
+	stepUpAuthMiddleware := middleware.NewStepUpAuthMiddleware(totpService, userService)
+	engine := server.ProvideRouter(configConfig, handlers, jwtAuthMiddleware, adminAuthMiddleware, apiKeyAuthMiddleware, auditLogMiddleware, stepUpAuthMiddleware, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, redisClient)
 	httpServer := server.ProvideHTTPServer(configConfig, engine)
 	opsMetricsCollector := service.ProvideOpsMetricsCollector(opsRepository, settingRepository, accountRepository, concurrencyService, db, redisClient, configConfig)
 	opsAggregationService := service.ProvideOpsAggregationService(opsRepository, settingRepository, db, redisClient, configConfig)
@@ -298,7 +303,7 @@ func initializeApplication(buildInfo handler.BuildInfo) (*Application, error) {
 	paymentOrderExpiryService := service.ProvidePaymentOrderExpiryService(paymentService, leaderLockCache, db)
 	channelMonitorRunner := service.ProvideChannelMonitorRunner(channelMonitorService, settingService)
 	userPlatformQuotaUsageFlusher := service.ProvideUserPlatformQuotaUsageFlusher(configConfig, billingCache, serviceUserPlatformQuotaRepository, timingWheelService)
-	v := provideCleanup(client, redisClient, opsMetricsCollector, opsAggregationService, opsAlertEvaluatorService, opsCleanupService, opsScheduledReportService, opsSystemLogSink, schedulerSnapshotService, tokenRefreshService, accountExpiryService, proxyExpiryService, subscriptionExpiryService, usageCleanupService, idempotencyCleanupService, batchImageCleanupService, batchImageWorkerRuntime, pricingService, emailQueueService, billingCacheService, usageRecordWorkerPool, subscriptionService, oAuthService, openAIOAuthService, geminiOAuthService, antigravityOAuthService, grokOAuthService, openAIGatewayService, scheduledTestRunnerService, backupService, paymentOrderExpiryService, channelMonitorRunner, userPlatformQuotaUsageFlusher, upstreamBillingProbeService)
+	v := provideCleanup(client, redisClient, opsMetricsCollector, opsAggregationService, opsAlertEvaluatorService, opsCleanupService, opsScheduledReportService, opsSystemLogSink, schedulerSnapshotService, tokenRefreshService, accountExpiryService, proxyExpiryService, subscriptionExpiryService, usageCleanupService, idempotencyCleanupService, batchImageCleanupService, batchImageWorkerRuntime, pricingService, emailQueueService, billingCacheService, usageRecordWorkerPool, subscriptionService, oAuthService, openAIOAuthService, geminiOAuthService, antigravityOAuthService, grokOAuthService, openAIGatewayService, scheduledTestRunnerService, backupService, paymentOrderExpiryService, channelMonitorRunner, userPlatformQuotaUsageFlusher, upstreamBillingProbeService, auditLogService)
 	application := &Application{
 		Server:  httpServer,
 		Cleanup: v,
@@ -359,6 +364,7 @@ func provideCleanup(
 	channelMonitorRunner *service.ChannelMonitorRunner,
 	quotaFlusher *service.UserPlatformQuotaUsageFlusher,
 	upstreamBillingProbe *service.UpstreamBillingProbeService,
+	auditLog *service.AuditLogService,
 ) func() {
 	return func() {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
@@ -388,6 +394,12 @@ func provideCleanup(
 				}
 				return nil
 			}},
+			{"AuditLogService", func() error {
+				if auditLog != nil {
+					auditLog.Stop()
+				}
+				return nil
+			}},
 			{"OpsAlertEvaluatorService", func() error {
 				if opsAlertEvaluator != nil {
 					opsAlertEvaluator.Stop()

backend/cmd/server/wire_gen_test.go

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ func TestProvideCleanup_WithMinimalDependencies_NoPanic(t *testing.T) {
 		nil, // channelMonitorRunner
 		nil, // quotaFlusher
 		nil, // upstreamBillingProbe
+		nil, // auditLog
 	)
 
 	require.NotPanics(t, func() {

backend/internal/handler/admin/audit_log_handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+package admin
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/ip"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/response"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/server/middleware"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// AuditLogHandler 操作审计日志管理接口。
+// 审计日志仅管理员可见；不提供单条删除，仅支持带 TOTP 验证的全量清空。
+type AuditLogHandler struct {
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService
+	totpService  *service.TotpService
+}
+
+// NewAuditLogHandler 创建审计日志处理器。
+func NewAuditLogHandler(auditService *service.AuditLogService, totpService *service.TotpService) *AuditLogHandler {
+	return &AuditLogHandler{
+		auditService: auditService,
+		totpService:  totpService,
+	}
+}
+
+// List 分页查询审计日志。
+// GET /api/v1/admin/audit-logs
+func (h *AuditLogHandler) List(c *gin.Context) {
+	page, pageSize := response.ParsePagination(c)
+	if pageSize > 200 {
+		pageSize = 200
+	}
+
+	filter := &service.AuditLogFilter{
+		Page:       page,
+		PageSize:   pageSize,
+		ActorEmail: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("actor_email")),
+		AuthMethod: strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("auth_method")),
+		Action:     strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("action")),
+		Method:     strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("method")),
+		ClientIP:   strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("client_ip")),
+		Query:      strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("q")),
+	}
+
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("actor_user_id")); v != "" {
+		id, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64)
+		if err != nil || id <= 0 {
+			response.BadRequest(c, "Invalid actor_user_id")
+			return
+		}
+		filter.ActorUserID = &id
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("start_time")); v != "" {
+		t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, v)
+		if err != nil {
+			response.BadRequest(c, "Invalid start_time, expect RFC3339")
+			return
+		}
+		filter.StartTime = &t
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("end_time")); v != "" {
+		t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, v)
+		if err != nil {
+			response.BadRequest(c, "Invalid end_time, expect RFC3339")
+			return
+		}
+		filter.EndTime = &t
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("success")); v != "" {
+		success := v == "true"
+		filter.Success = &success
+	}
+
+	result, err := h.auditService.List(c.Request.Context(), filter)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	response.Paginated(c, result.Logs, int64(result.Total), result.Page, result.PageSize)
+}
+
+// Get 查询单条审计日志详情（含脱敏后的请求体）。
+// GET /api/v1/admin/audit-logs/:id
+func (h *AuditLogHandler) Get(c *gin.Context) {
+	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id")), 10, 64)
+	if err != nil || id <= 0 {
+		response.BadRequest(c, "Invalid audit log id")
+		return
+	}
+	item, err := h.auditService.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), id)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	response.Success(c, item)
+}
+
+type auditLogClearRequest struct {
+	TotpCode string `json:"totp_code" binding:"required"`
+}
+
+// Clear 全量清空审计日志。
+// POST /api/v1/admin/audit-logs/clear
+//
+// 安全要求（与需求对齐）：
+//  1. 每次清空都必须现场验证 TOTP 码（不复用 step-up sudo 窗口）
+//  2. 未启用 TOTP 的管理员不允许清空
+//  3. admin API key（机器凭证）不允许清空
+//  4. 清空完成后同步写入一条留痕记录（操作者、IP、UA、删除行数）
+func (h *AuditLogHandler) Clear(c *gin.Context) {
+	if c.GetString("auth_method") == service.AuditAuthMethodAdminAPIKey {
+		response.ErrorWithDetails(c, http.StatusForbidden,
+			"Admin API key cannot clear audit logs; a two-factor verified admin session is required",
+			"STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN", nil)
+		return
+	}
+
+	subject, ok := middleware.GetAuthSubjectFromContext(c)
+	if !ok || subject.UserID <= 0 {
+		response.Unauthorized(c, "Unauthorized")
+		return
+	}
+
+	var req auditLogClearRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		response.ErrorWithDetails(c, http.StatusBadRequest,
+			"TOTP code is required to clear audit logs", "TOTP_CODE_REQUIRED", nil)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// 校验 TOTP：未启用（ErrTotpNotSetup）、码错误、尝试过多均在此拦截。
+	if err := h.totpService.VerifyCode(c.Request.Context(), subject.UserID, strings.TrimSpace(req.TotpCode)); err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	uid := subject.UserID
+	role, _ := middleware.GetUserRoleFromContext(c)
+	trace := &service.AuditLog{
+		ActorUserID:      &uid,
+		ActorEmail:       c.GetString(middleware.ContextKeyAuthEmail),
+		ActorRole:        role,
+		AuthMethod:       c.GetString("auth_method"),
+		CredentialMasked: middleware.MaskedRequestCredential(c),
+		Method:           http.MethodPost,
+		Path:             c.FullPath(),
+		ClientIP:         ip.GetTrustedClientIP(c),
+		UserAgent:        c.Request.UserAgent(),
+		StatusCode:       http.StatusOK,
+	}
+	if requestID := c.Writer.Header().Get("X-Request-ID"); requestID != "" {
+		trace.RequestID = requestID
+	}
+
+	deleted, err := h.auditService.ClearAll(c.Request.Context(), trace)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// 留痕记录已同步落库，跳过异步审计中间件的重复记录。
+	middleware.SkipAudit(c)
+	response.Success(c, gin.H{"deleted": deleted})
+}

backend/internal/handler/admin/setting_handler.go

@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ func (h *SettingHandler) GetSettings(c *gin.Context) {
 		InvitationCodeEnabled:                                  settings.InvitationCodeEnabled,
 		TotpEnabled:                                            settings.TotpEnabled,
 		TotpEncryptionKeyConfigured:                            h.settingService.IsTotpEncryptionKeyConfigured(),
+		SessionBindingEnabled:                                  settings.SessionBindingEnabled,
+		AuditLogRetentionDays:                                  settings.AuditLogRetentionDays,
 		LoginAgreementEnabled:                                  settings.LoginAgreementEnabled,
 		LoginAgreementMode:                                     settings.LoginAgreementMode,
 		LoginAgreementUpdatedAt:                                settings.LoginAgreementUpdatedAt,

backend/internal/handler/admin/setting_handler_update.go

@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ type UpdateSettingsRequest struct {
 	PasswordResetEnabled             bool                         `json:"password_reset_enabled"`
 	FrontendURL                      string                       `json:"frontend_url"`
 	InvitationCodeEnabled            bool                         `json:"invitation_code_enabled"`
-	TotpEnabled                      bool                         `json:"totp_enabled"` // TOTP 双因素认证
+	TotpEnabled                      bool                         `json:"totp_enabled"`             // TOTP 双因素认证
+	SessionBindingEnabled            bool                         `json:"session_binding_enabled"`  // 会话 IP/UA 绑定
+	AuditLogRetentionDays            int                          `json:"audit_log_retention_days"` // 审计日志保留天数
 	LoginAgreementEnabled            bool                         `json:"login_agreement_enabled"`
 	LoginAgreementMode               string                       `json:"login_agreement_mode"`
 	LoginAgreementUpdatedAt          string                       `json:"login_agreement_updated_at"`
@@ -1179,6 +1181,8 @@ func (h *SettingHandler) UpdateSettings(c *gin.Context) {
 		FrontendURL:                      req.FrontendURL,
 		InvitationCodeEnabled:            req.InvitationCodeEnabled,
 		TotpEnabled:                      req.TotpEnabled,
+		SessionBindingEnabled:            req.SessionBindingEnabled,
+		AuditLogRetentionDays:            req.AuditLogRetentionDays,
 		LoginAgreementEnabled:            req.LoginAgreementEnabled,
 		LoginAgreementMode:               loginAgreementMode,
 		LoginAgreementUpdatedAt:          loginAgreementUpdatedAt,
@@ -1705,6 +1709,8 @@ func (h *SettingHandler) UpdateSettings(c *gin.Context) {
 		InvitationCodeEnabled:                                  updatedSettings.InvitationCodeEnabled,
 		TotpEnabled:                                            updatedSettings.TotpEnabled,
 		TotpEncryptionKeyConfigured:                            h.settingService.IsTotpEncryptionKeyConfigured(),
+		SessionBindingEnabled:                                  updatedSettings.SessionBindingEnabled,
+		AuditLogRetentionDays:                                  updatedSettings.AuditLogRetentionDays,
 		LoginAgreementEnabled:                                  updatedSettings.LoginAgreementEnabled,
 		LoginAgreementMode:                                     updatedSettings.LoginAgreementMode,
 		LoginAgreementUpdatedAt:                                updatedSettings.LoginAgreementUpdatedAt,

backend/internal/handler/auth_handler.go

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) respondWithTokenPair(c *gin.Context, user *service.User) {
 	if err != nil {
 		slog.Error("failed to generate token pair", "error", err, "user_id", user.ID)
 		// 回退到只返回Access Token
-		token, tokenErr := h.authService.GenerateToken(user)
+		token, tokenErr := h.authService.GenerateToken(c.Request.Context(), user)
 		if tokenErr != nil {
 			response.InternalError(c, "Failed to generate token")
 			return

backend/internal/handler/auth_linuxdo_oauth_test.go

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ func TestLinuxDoOAuthBindStartAcceptsAccessTokenCookie(t *testing.T) {
 		Save(context.Background())
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	token, err := handler.authService.GenerateToken(&service.User{
+	token, err := handler.authService.GenerateToken(context.Background(), &service.User{
 		ID:           user.ID,
 		Email:        user.Email,
 		Username:     user.Username,

backend/internal/handler/auth_oauth_pending_flow_test.go

@@ -3360,6 +3360,14 @@ func (s *oauthPendingFlowTotpCacheStub) ClearVerifyAttempts(_ context.Context, u
 	return nil
 }
 
+func (s *oauthPendingFlowTotpCacheStub) SetStepUpGrant(_ context.Context, _ int64, _ string, _ time.Duration) error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *oauthPendingFlowTotpCacheStub) HasStepUpGrant(_ context.Context, _ int64, _ string) (bool, error) {
+	return false, nil
+}
+
 type oauthPendingFlowTotpEncryptorStub struct{}
 
 func (oauthPendingFlowTotpEncryptorStub) Encrypt(plaintext string) (string, error) {

backend/internal/handler/dto/settings.go

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ type SystemSettings struct {
 	InvitationCodeEnabled            bool                     `json:"invitation_code_enabled"`
 	TotpEnabled                      bool                     `json:"totp_enabled"`                   // TOTP 双因素认证
 	TotpEncryptionKeyConfigured      bool                     `json:"totp_encryption_key_configured"` // TOTP 加密密钥是否已配置
+	SessionBindingEnabled            bool                     `json:"session_binding_enabled"`        // 会话 IP/UA 绑定
+	AuditLogRetentionDays            int                      `json:"audit_log_retention_days"`       // 审计日志保留天数
 	LoginAgreementEnabled            bool                     `json:"login_agreement_enabled"`
 	LoginAgreementMode               string                   `json:"login_agreement_mode"`
 	LoginAgreementUpdatedAt          string                   `json:"login_agreement_updated_at"`

backend/internal/handler/handler.go

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ type AdminHandlers struct {
 	Payment                *admin.PaymentHandler
 	Affiliate              *admin.AffiliateHandler
 	Compliance             *admin.ComplianceHandler
+	AuditLog               *admin.AuditLogHandler
 }
 
 // Handlers contains all HTTP handlers

backend/internal/handler/totp_handler.go

@@ -179,3 +179,42 @@ func (h *TotpHandler) SendVerifyCode(c *gin.Context) {
 
 	response.Success(c, gin.H{"success": true})
 }
+
+// TotpStepUpRequest represents the request to verify a step-up TOTP code
+type TotpStepUpRequest struct {
+	Code string `json:"code" binding:"required"`
+}
+
+// TotpStepUpResponse represents the step-up verification response
+type TotpStepUpResponse struct {
+	Verified  bool  `json:"verified"`
+	ExpiresIn int64 `json:"expires_in"` // 授权剩余有效期（秒）
+}
+
+// StepUp 敏感操作二次验证：校验 TOTP 码并为当前会话授予一段时间的 step-up 权限。
+// POST /api/v1/user/totp/step-up
+func (h *TotpHandler) StepUp(c *gin.Context) {
+	subject, ok := middleware2.GetAuthSubjectFromContext(c)
+	if !ok {
+		response.Unauthorized(c, "User not authenticated")
+		return
+	}
+
+	var req TotpStepUpRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		response.BadRequest(c, "TOTP code is required")
+		return
+	}
+
+	sessionKey := middleware2.StepUpSessionKey(c, subject.UserID)
+	ttl, err := h.totpService.VerifyStepUp(c.Request.Context(), subject.UserID, sessionKey, req.Code)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	response.Success(c, TotpStepUpResponse{
+		Verified:  true,
+		ExpiresIn: int64(ttl.Seconds()),
+	})
+}

backend/internal/handler/wire.go

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ func ProvideAdminHandlers(
 	paymentHandler *admin.PaymentHandler,
 	affiliateHandler *admin.AffiliateHandler,
 	complianceHandler *admin.ComplianceHandler,
+	auditLogHandler *admin.AuditLogHandler,
 	upstreamBillingProbe *service.UpstreamBillingProbeService,
 ) *AdminHandlers {
 	accountHandler.SetUpstreamBillingProbeService(upstreamBillingProbe)
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ func ProvideAdminHandlers(
 		Payment:                paymentHandler,
 		Affiliate:              affiliateHandler,
 		Compliance:             complianceHandler,
+		AuditLog:               auditLogHandler,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ var ProviderSet = wire.NewSet(
 	admin.NewPaymentHandler,
 	admin.NewAffiliateHandler,
 	admin.NewComplianceHandler,
+	admin.NewAuditLogHandler,
 
 	// AdminHandlers and Handlers constructors
 	ProvideAdminHandlers,

backend/internal/repository/audit_log_repo.go

@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+package repository
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+	"github.com/lib/pq"
+)
+
+// auditLogRepository 审计日志仓储（raw SQL，append-only）。
+// 刻意不实现单条删除：审计日志只允许追加、按保留期批量清理、以及带 2FA 的全量清空。
+type auditLogRepository struct {
+	db *sql.DB
+}
+
+// NewAuditLogRepository 创建审计日志仓储。
+func NewAuditLogRepository(db *sql.DB) service.AuditLogRepository {
+	return &auditLogRepository{db: db}
+}
+
+const auditLogInsertColumns = `created_at, actor_user_id, actor_email, actor_role, auth_method,
+credential_masked, action, method, path, request_id, client_ip, user_agent,
+request_body, status_code, latency_ms, extra`
+
+func auditLogInsertValues(log *service.AuditLog) []any {
+	createdAt := log.CreatedAt
+	if createdAt.IsZero() {
+		createdAt = time.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	extraJSON := "{}"
+	if len(log.Extra) > 0 {
+		if encoded, err := json.Marshal(log.Extra); err == nil {
+			extraJSON = string(encoded)
+		}
+	}
+	return []any{
+		createdAt.UTC(),
+		nullInt64Ptr(log.ActorUserID),
+		truncateString(log.ActorEmail, 255),
+		truncateString(log.ActorRole, 32),
+		truncateString(log.AuthMethod, 32),
+		truncateString(log.CredentialMasked, 160),
+		truncateString(log.Action, 128),
+		truncateString(log.Method, 16),
+		truncateString(log.Path, 512),
+		truncateString(log.RequestID, 64),
+		truncateString(log.ClientIP, 64),
+		truncateString(log.UserAgent, 512),
+		log.RequestBody,
+		log.StatusCode,
+		log.LatencyMs,
+		extraJSON,
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) BatchInsert(ctx context.Context, logs []*service.AuditLog) (int64, error) {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	if len(logs) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	stmt, err := tx.PrepareContext(ctx, pq.CopyIn(
+		"audit_logs",
+		"created_at", "actor_user_id", "actor_email", "actor_role", "auth_method",
+		"credential_masked", "action", "method", "path", "request_id", "client_ip", "user_agent",
+		"request_body", "status_code", "latency_ms", "extra",
+	))
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = tx.Rollback()
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	var inserted int64
+	for _, log := range logs {
+		if log == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, err := stmt.ExecContext(ctx, auditLogInsertValues(log)...); err != nil {
+			_ = stmt.Close()
+			_ = tx.Rollback()
+			return inserted, err
+		}
+		inserted++
+	}
+
+	if _, err := stmt.ExecContext(ctx); err != nil {
+		_ = stmt.Close()
+		_ = tx.Rollback()
+		return inserted, err
+	}
+	if err := stmt.Close(); err != nil {
+		_ = tx.Rollback()
+		return inserted, err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return inserted, err
+	}
+	return inserted, nil
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) Insert(ctx context.Context, log *service.AuditLog) error {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	if log == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("nil audit log")
+	}
+	query := `INSERT INTO audit_logs (` + auditLogInsertColumns + `)
+VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11,$12,$13,$14,$15,$16)`
+	_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, auditLogInsertValues(log)...)
+	return err
+}
+
+func buildAuditLogsWhere(filter *service.AuditLogFilter) (string, []any) {
+	clauses := make([]string, 0, 10)
+	args := make([]any, 0, 10)
+	clauses = append(clauses, "1=1")
+
+	if filter.StartTime != nil {
+		args = append(args, filter.StartTime.UTC())
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.created_at >= $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if filter.EndTime != nil {
+		args = append(args, filter.EndTime.UTC())
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.created_at <= $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if filter.ActorUserID != nil {
+		args = append(args, *filter.ActorUserID)
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.actor_user_id = $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(filter.ActorEmail); v != "" {
+		args = append(args, "%"+escapeLikePattern(v)+"%")
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.actor_email ILIKE $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(filter.AuthMethod); v != "" {
+		args = append(args, v)
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.auth_method = $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(filter.Action); v != "" {
+		args = append(args, "%"+escapeLikePattern(v)+"%")
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.action ILIKE $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(filter.Method); v != "" {
+		args = append(args, strings.ToUpper(v))
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.method = $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(filter.ClientIP); v != "" {
+		args = append(args, v)
+		clauses = append(clauses, "l.client_ip = $"+itoa(len(args)))
+	}
+	if filter.Success != nil {
+		if *filter.Success {
+			clauses = append(clauses, "l.status_code < 400")
+		} else {
+			clauses = append(clauses, "l.status_code >= 400")
+		}
+	}
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(filter.Query); v != "" {
+		args = append(args, "%"+escapeLikePattern(v)+"%")
+		idx := itoa(len(args))
+		clauses = append(clauses, "(l.path ILIKE $"+idx+" OR l.action ILIKE $"+idx+" OR l.actor_email ILIKE $"+idx+")")
+	}
+
+	return "WHERE " + strings.Join(clauses, " AND "), args
+}
+
+const auditLogSelectColumns = `
+  l.id,
+  l.created_at,
+  l.actor_user_id,
+  COALESCE(l.actor_email, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.actor_role, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.auth_method, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.credential_masked, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.action, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.method, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.path, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.request_id, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.client_ip, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.user_agent, ''),
+  COALESCE(l.request_body, ''),
+  l.status_code,
+  l.latency_ms,
+  COALESCE(l.extra::text, '{}')`
+
+func scanAuditLogRow(scan func(dest ...any) error) (*service.AuditLog, error) {
+	item := &service.AuditLog{}
+	var actorUserID sql.NullInt64
+	var extraRaw string
+	if err := scan(
+		&item.ID,
+		&item.CreatedAt,
+		&actorUserID,
+		&item.ActorEmail,
+		&item.ActorRole,
+		&item.AuthMethod,
+		&item.CredentialMasked,
+		&item.Action,
+		&item.Method,
+		&item.Path,
+		&item.RequestID,
+		&item.ClientIP,
+		&item.UserAgent,
+		&item.RequestBody,
+		&item.StatusCode,
+		&item.LatencyMs,
+		&extraRaw,
+	); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if actorUserID.Valid {
+		v := actorUserID.Int64
+		item.ActorUserID = &v
+	}
+	extraRaw = strings.TrimSpace(extraRaw)
+	if extraRaw != "" && extraRaw != "null" && extraRaw != "{}" {
+		extra := make(map[string]any)
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(extraRaw), &extra); err == nil {
+			item.Extra = extra
+		}
+	}
+	return item, nil
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *service.AuditLogFilter) (*service.AuditLogList, error) {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	if filter == nil {
+		filter = &service.AuditLogFilter{}
+	}
+
+	page := filter.Page
+	if page <= 0 {
+		page = 1
+	}
+	pageSize := filter.PageSize
+	if pageSize <= 0 {
+		pageSize = 50
+	}
+	if pageSize > 200 {
+		pageSize = 200
+	}
+
+	where, args := buildAuditLogsWhere(filter)
+	countSQL := "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_logs l " + where
+	var total int
+	if err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, countSQL, args...).Scan(&total); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	offset := (page - 1) * pageSize
+	argsWithLimit := append(args, pageSize, offset)
+	query := "SELECT" + auditLogSelectColumns + "\nFROM audit_logs l\n" + where + `
+ORDER BY l.created_at DESC, l.id DESC
+LIMIT $` + itoa(len(args)+1) + ` OFFSET $` + itoa(len(args)+2)
+
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, argsWithLimit...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+
+	logs := make([]*service.AuditLog, 0, pageSize)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		item, err := scanAuditLogRow(rows.Scan)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		// 列表页不返回 body，降低载荷；详情接口返回完整记录。
+		item.RequestBody = ""
+		logs = append(logs, item)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &service.AuditLogList{
+		Logs:     logs,
+		Total:    total,
+		Page:     page,
+		PageSize: pageSize,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) GetByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*service.AuditLog, error) {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	query := "SELECT" + auditLogSelectColumns + "\nFROM audit_logs l WHERE l.id = $1"
+	row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, id)
+	item, err := scanAuditLogRow(row.Scan)
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+			return nil, service.ErrAuditLogNotFound
+		}
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return item, nil
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) Count(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	var total int64
+	if err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_logs").Scan(&total); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return total, nil
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) TruncateAll(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, "TRUNCATE TABLE audit_logs")
+	return err
+}
+
+func (r *auditLogRepository) DeleteBefore(ctx context.Context, cutoff time.Time, batchSize int) (int64, error) {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("nil audit log repository")
+	}
+	if batchSize <= 0 {
+		batchSize = 5000
+	}
+	res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+WITH batch AS (
+  SELECT id FROM audit_logs WHERE created_at < $1 ORDER BY id LIMIT $2
+)
+DELETE FROM audit_logs WHERE id IN (SELECT id FROM batch)`, cutoff.UTC(), batchSize)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return res.RowsAffected()
+}
+
+func nullInt64Ptr(v *int64) any {
+	if v == nil || *v <= 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return *v
+}
+
+func truncateString(s string, max int) string {
+	s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
+	if len(s) <= max {
+		return s
+	}
+	// 按字节截断可能切断多字节字符，按 rune 处理。
+	runes := []rune(s)
+	for len(string(runes)) > max && len(runes) > 0 {
+		runes = runes[:len(runes)-1]
+	}
+	return string(runes)
+}

backend/internal/repository/backup_s3_store.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"path"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3"
@@ -83,9 +84,13 @@ func (s *S3BackupStore) Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
 
 func (s *S3BackupStore) PresignURL(ctx context.Context, key string, expiry time.Duration) (string, error) {
 	presignClient := s3.NewPresignClient(s.client)
+	// 强制 attachment disposition：浏览器同页导航该 URL 时直接触发下载而非渲染，
+	// 前端无需依赖会被弹窗拦截的新标签页。
+	disposition := fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", path.Base(key))
 	result, err := presignClient.PresignGetObject(ctx, &s3.GetObjectInput{
-		Bucket: &s.bucket,
-		Key:    &key,
+		Bucket:                     &s.bucket,
+		Key:                        &key,
+		ResponseContentDisposition: &disposition,
 	}, s3.WithPresignExpires(expiry))
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("presign url: %w", err)

backend/internal/repository/totp_cache.go

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ const (
 	totpSetupKeyPrefix    = "totp:setup:"
 	totpLoginKeyPrefix    = "totp:login:"
 	totpAttemptsKeyPrefix = "totp:attempts:"
+	totpStepUpKeyPrefix   = "totp:stepup:"
 	totpAttemptsTTL       = 15 * time.Minute
 )
 
@@ -147,3 +148,24 @@ func (c *TotpCache) ClearVerifyAttempts(ctx context.Context, userID int64) error
 	key := fmt.Sprintf("%s%d", totpAttemptsKeyPrefix, userID)
 	return c.rdb.Del(ctx, key).Err()
 }
+
+func totpStepUpKey(userID int64, sessionKey string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s%d:%s", totpStepUpKeyPrefix, userID, sessionKey)
+}
+
+// SetStepUpGrant 记录一次 step-up 验证通过（sudo 窗口），绑定用户+会话。
+func (c *TotpCache) SetStepUpGrant(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey string, ttl time.Duration) error {
+	return c.rdb.Set(ctx, totpStepUpKey(userID, sessionKey), "1", ttl).Err()
+}
+
+// HasStepUpGrant 检查 step-up 授权是否仍在有效期内。
+func (c *TotpCache) HasStepUpGrant(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey string) (bool, error) {
+	_, err := c.rdb.Get(ctx, totpStepUpKey(userID, sessionKey)).Result()
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == redis.Nil {
+			return false, nil
+		}
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("get step-up grant: %w", err)
+	}
+	return true, nil
+}

backend/internal/repository/wire.go

@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ var ProviderSet = wire.NewSet(
 	NewDashboardAggregationRepository,
 	NewSettingRepository,
 	NewOpsRepository,
+	NewAuditLogRepository,
 	NewUserSubscriptionRepository,
 	NewUserAttributeDefinitionRepository,
 	NewUserAttributeValueRepository,

backend/internal/server/api_contract_test.go

@@ -708,6 +708,8 @@ func TestAPIContracts(t *testing.T) {
 						"frontend_url": "",
 						"totp_enabled": false,
 						"totp_encryption_key_configured": false,
+						"session_binding_enabled": true,
+						"audit_log_retention_days": 180,
 						"login_agreement_enabled": false,
 						"login_agreement_mode": "modal",
 						"login_agreement_updated_at": "2026-03-31",
@@ -1020,6 +1022,8 @@ func TestAPIContracts(t *testing.T) {
 						"invitation_code_enabled": false,
 						"totp_enabled": false,
 						"totp_encryption_key_configured": false,
+						"session_binding_enabled": true,
+						"audit_log_retention_days": 180,
 						"login_agreement_enabled": false,
 						"login_agreement_mode": "modal",
 						"login_agreement_updated_at": "2026-03-31",

backend/internal/server/http.go

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ func ProvideRouter(
 	jwtAuth middleware2.JWTAuthMiddleware,
 	adminAuth middleware2.AdminAuthMiddleware,
 	apiKeyAuth middleware2.APIKeyAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog middleware2.AuditLogMiddleware,
+	stepUpAuth middleware2.StepUpAuthMiddleware,
 	apiKeyService *service.APIKeyService,
 	subscriptionService *service.SubscriptionService,
 	opsService *service.OpsService,
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ func ProvideRouter(
 		service.SetWebSearchManager(websearch.NewManager(configs, redisClient))
 	})
 
-	return SetupRouter(r, handlers, jwtAuth, adminAuth, apiKeyAuth, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, cfg, redisClient)
+	return SetupRouter(r, handlers, jwtAuth, adminAuth, apiKeyAuth, auditLog, stepUpAuth, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, cfg, redisClient)
 }
 
 // ProvideHTTPServer 提供 HTTP 服务器

backend/internal/server/middleware/admin_auth.go

@@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ func NewAdminAuthMiddleware(
 	authService *service.AuthService,
 	userService *service.UserService,
 	settingService *service.SettingService,
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService,
 ) AdminAuthMiddleware {
-	return AdminAuthMiddleware(adminAuth(authService, userService, settingService))
+	return AdminAuthMiddleware(adminAuth(authService, userService, settingService, auditService))
 }
 
 // adminAuth 管理员认证中间件实现
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ func adminAuth(
 	authService *service.AuthService,
 	userService *service.UserService,
 	settingService *service.SettingService,
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService,
 ) gin.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(c *gin.Context) {
 		// WebSocket upgrade requests cannot set Authorization headers in browsers.
@@ -36,7 +38,7 @@ func adminAuth(
 		//   Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sub2api-admin, jwt.<token>
 		if isWebSocketUpgradeRequest(c) {
 			if token := extractJWTFromWebSocketSubprotocol(c); token != "" {
-				if !validateJWTForAdmin(c, token, authService, userService) {
+				if !validateJWTForAdmin(c, token, authService, userService, settingService, auditService) {
 					return
 				}
 				c.Next()
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ func adminAuth(
 					AbortWithError(c, 401, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Authorization required")
 					return
 				}
-				if !validateJWTForAdmin(c, token, authService, userService) {
+				if !validateJWTForAdmin(c, token, authService, userService, settingService, auditService) {
 					return
 				}
 				c.Next()
@@ -146,6 +148,7 @@ func validateAdminAPIKey(
 		Concurrency: admin.Concurrency,
 	})
 	c.Set(string(ContextKeyUserRole), admin.Role)
+	c.Set(ContextKeyAuthEmail, admin.Email)
 	c.Set("auth_method", "admin_api_key")
 	return true
 }
@@ -156,6 +159,8 @@ func validateJWTForAdmin(
 	token string,
 	authService *service.AuthService,
 	userService *service.UserService,
+	settingService *service.SettingService,
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService,
 ) bool {
 	// 验证 JWT token
 	claims, err := authService.ValidateToken(token)
@@ -187,6 +192,11 @@ func validateJWTForAdmin(
 		return false
 	}
 
+	// 会话绑定校验：IP/UA 任一变化即撤销会话（功能可在系统设置中关闭）
+	if !enforceSessionBinding(c, authService, settingService, auditService, claims) {
+		return false
+	}
+
 	// 检查管理员权限
 	if !user.IsAdmin() {
 		AbortWithError(c, 403, "FORBIDDEN", "Admin access required")
@@ -198,6 +208,8 @@ func validateJWTForAdmin(
 		Concurrency: user.Concurrency,
 	})
 	c.Set(string(ContextKeyUserRole), user.Role)
+	c.Set(ContextKeyAuthEmail, user.Email)
+	c.Set(ContextKeySessionID, claims.SessionID)
 	c.Set("auth_method", "jwt")
 
 	return true

backend/internal/server/middleware/admin_auth_test.go

@@ -43,13 +43,13 @@ func TestAdminAuthJWTValidatesTokenVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	userService := service.NewUserService(userRepo, nil, nil, nil)
 
 	router := gin.New()
-	router.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(NewAdminAuthMiddleware(authService, userService, nil)))
+	router.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(NewAdminAuthMiddleware(authService, userService, nil, nil)))
 	router.GET("/t", func(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
 	})
 
 	t.Run("token_version_mismatch_rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
-		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(&service.User{
+		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(context.Background(), &service.User{
 			ID:           admin.ID,
 			Email:        admin.Email,
 			Role:         admin.Role,
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func TestAdminAuthJWTValidatesTokenVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	t.Run("token_version_match_allows", func(t *testing.T) {
-		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(&service.User{
+		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(context.Background(), &service.User{
 			ID:           admin.ID,
 			Email:        admin.Email,
 			Role:         admin.Role,
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestAdminAuthJWTValidatesTokenVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	t.Run("websocket_token_version_mismatch_rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
-		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(&service.User{
+		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(context.Background(), &service.User{
 			ID:           admin.ID,
 			Email:        admin.Email,
 			Role:         admin.Role,
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func TestAdminAuthJWTValidatesTokenVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	t.Run("websocket_token_version_match_allows", func(t *testing.T) {
-		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(&service.User{
+		token, err := authService.GenerateToken(context.Background(), &service.User{
 			ID:           admin.ID,
 			Email:        admin.Email,
 			Role:         admin.Role,

backend/internal/server/middleware/audit_log.go

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/ctxkey"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/ip"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// AuditLogMiddleware 管理面操作审计中间件类型（用于 wire 注入区分）。
+type AuditLogMiddleware gin.HandlerFunc
+
+// 审计相关 gin context 覆写键：handler / 认证中间件可通过这些键补充审计信息。
+const (
+	auditCtxKeyAction     = "audit_action"
+	auditCtxKeyActorID    = "audit_actor_id"
+	auditCtxKeyActorEmail = "audit_actor_email"
+	auditCtxKeySkip       = "audit_skip"
+	// ContextKeyAuthEmail 认证中间件写入的用户邮箱（审计用）。
+	ContextKeyAuthEmail = "auth_email"
+	// ContextKeySessionID 认证中间件写入的会话 ID（refresh token family）。
+	ContextKeySessionID = "session_id"
+)
+
+// SetAuditAction 允许 handler / 中间件为当前请求指定审计动作名（覆盖自动推导）。
+func SetAuditAction(c *gin.Context, action string) {
+	c.Set(auditCtxKeyAction, action)
+}
+
+// SetAuditActor 允许 handler 在认证上下文缺失时（如登录接口）补充操作者身份。
+func SetAuditActor(c *gin.Context, userID int64, email string) {
+	if userID > 0 {
+		c.Set(auditCtxKeyActorID, userID)
+	}
+	if email != "" {
+		c.Set(auditCtxKeyActorEmail, email)
+	}
+}
+
+// SkipAudit 跳过当前请求的审计记录。
+func SkipAudit(c *gin.Context) {
+	c.Set(auditCtxKeySkip, true)
+}
+
+// auditSensitiveReads 需要审计的敏感 GET 读取（method+FullPath → 动作名）。
+var auditSensitiveReads = map[string]string{
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/accounts/data":             "admin.accounts.export",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/proxies/data":              "admin.proxies.export",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/redeem-codes/export":       "admin.redeem_codes.export",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/backups/:id/download-url":  "admin.backups.download",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/settings/admin-api-key":    "admin.admin_api_key.read",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/users/:id/api-keys":        "admin.users.api_keys.read",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/groups/:id/api-keys":       "admin.groups.api_keys.read",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/backups/s3-config":         "admin.backups.s3_config.read",
+	"GET /api/v1/admin/data-management/s3/config": "admin.data_management.s3_config.read",
+}
+
+// auditActionOverrides 变更类请求的动作名精确映射（未命中时自动推导）。
+var auditActionOverrides = map[string]string{
+	"POST /api/v1/auth/login":                              service.AuditActionLogin,
+	"POST /api/v1/auth/login/2fa":                          service.AuditActionLogin2FA,
+	"POST /api/v1/auth/register":                           service.AuditActionRegister,
+	"POST /api/v1/auth/refresh":                            service.AuditActionTokenRefresh,
+	"POST /api/v1/user/totp/step-up":                       service.AuditActionStepUpVerify,
+	"POST /api/v1/admin/audit-logs/clear":                  service.AuditActionAuditLogClear,
+	"POST /api/v1/admin/accounts/data":                     "admin.accounts.import",
+	"POST /api/v1/admin/backups":                           "admin.backups.create",
+	"POST /api/v1/admin/backups/:id/restore":               "admin.backups.restore",
+	"DELETE /api/v1/admin/backups/:id":                     "admin.backups.delete",
+	"PUT /api/v1/admin/backups/s3-config":                  "admin.backups.s3_config.update",
+	"POST /api/v1/admin/settings/admin-api-key/regenerate": "admin.admin_api_key.regenerate",
+	"DELETE /api/v1/admin/settings/admin-api-key":          "admin.admin_api_key.delete",
+}
+
+// auditBodyOmittedRoutes 请求体几乎整体由凭证构成的路由（如整块粘贴 auth JSON 的导入接口）。
+// 这类 body 的凭证内嵌在普通字符串值里，键级脱敏无法覆盖，整体不入库。
+var auditBodyOmittedRoutes = map[string]struct{}{
+	"POST /api/v1/admin/accounts/import/codex-session": {},
+}
+
+// NewAuditLogMiddleware 创建审计中间件。
+// 记录范围：变更类请求（POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE）+ 白名单内的敏感 GET 读取。
+// 挂载位置：admin / user / admin-payment 组挂在各自认证中间件之后（只审计已认证请求，
+// 未过认证的 401/403 不入库）；auth 组（登录/注册/刷新）无前置认证，天然记录失败尝试。
+func NewAuditLogMiddleware(auditService *service.AuditLogService) AuditLogMiddleware {
+	return AuditLogMiddleware(func(c *gin.Context) {
+		routeKey := c.Request.Method + " " + c.FullPath()
+
+		record := false
+		action := ""
+		switch c.Request.Method {
+		case "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE":
+			record = true
+			if v, ok := auditActionOverrides[routeKey]; ok {
+				action = v
+			}
+		case "GET":
+			if v, ok := auditSensitiveReads[routeKey]; ok {
+				record = true
+				action = v
+			}
+		}
+		if !record {
+			c.Next()
+			return
+		}
+
+		// 捕获请求体（读出后回填，避免影响后续 ShouldBindJSON）。
+		// 只读取脱敏解析上限内的字节，超出部分与已读部分拼接回填，
+		// 避免大体积导入请求被完整复制进内存两次。
+		var bodyRedacted string
+		if _, omit := auditBodyOmittedRoutes[routeKey]; omit {
+			bodyRedacted = "<credential-bearing body omitted>"
+		} else if c.Request.Body != nil && c.Request.Method != "GET" {
+			orig := c.Request.Body
+			raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(orig, service.AuditRequestBodyCaptureLimit+1))
+			if err == nil {
+				c.Request.Body = &restoredBody{
+					Reader: io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(raw), orig),
+					closer: orig,
+				}
+				bodyRedacted = service.RedactAuditBody(raw, c.GetHeader("Content-Type"))
+			}
+		}
+
+		start := time.Now()
+		c.Next()
+
+		if c.GetBool(auditCtxKeySkip) {
+			return
+		}
+
+		status := c.Writer.Status()
+		// token 刷新成功属于高频常规操作，只记录失败（潜在攻击信号）。
+		if routeKey == "POST /api/v1/auth/refresh" && status < 400 {
+			return
+		}
+
+		entry := &service.AuditLog{
+			CreatedAt:   time.Now().UTC(),
+			Action:      action,
+			Method:      c.Request.Method,
+			Path:        c.FullPath(),
+			ClientIP:    ip.GetTrustedClientIP(c),
+			UserAgent:   c.Request.UserAgent(),
+			RequestBody: bodyRedacted,
+			StatusCode:  status,
+			LatencyMs:   time.Since(start).Milliseconds(),
+		}
+		if entry.Path == "" {
+			entry.Path = c.Request.URL.Path
+		}
+		if entry.Action == "" {
+			entry.Action = deriveAuditAction(c.Request.Method, entry.Path)
+		}
+		if v, ok := c.Get(auditCtxKeyAction); ok {
+			if s, ok := v.(string); ok && s != "" {
+				entry.Action = s
+			}
+		}
+		if requestID, ok := c.Request.Context().Value(ctxkey.RequestID).(string); ok {
+			entry.RequestID = requestID
+		}
+
+		// 操作者身份：优先取认证中间件写入的上下文，其次取 handler 覆写（登录等场景）。
+		if subject, ok := GetAuthSubjectFromContext(c); ok && subject.UserID > 0 {
+			uid := subject.UserID
+			entry.ActorUserID = &uid
+		}
+		if role, ok := GetUserRoleFromContext(c); ok {
+			entry.ActorRole = role
+		}
+		entry.ActorEmail = c.GetString(ContextKeyAuthEmail)
+		entry.AuthMethod = c.GetString("auth_method")
+		if entry.AuthMethod == "" && entry.ActorUserID != nil {
+			entry.AuthMethod = service.AuditAuthMethodJWT
+		}
+		if v, ok := c.Get(auditCtxKeyActorID); ok {
+			if id, ok := v.(int64); ok && id > 0 {
+				entry.ActorUserID = &id
+			}
+		}
+		if v, ok := c.Get(auditCtxKeyActorEmail); ok {
+			if s, ok := v.(string); ok && s != "" {
+				entry.ActorEmail = s
+			}
+		}
+
+		// 请求头凭证掩码（仅保留首尾）。
+		entry.CredentialMasked = MaskedRequestCredential(c)
+
+		extra := map[string]any{}
+		if len(c.Params) > 0 {
+			params := make(map[string]string, len(c.Params))
+			for _, p := range c.Params {
+				params[p.Key] = p.Value
+			}
+			extra["params"] = params
+		}
+		if q := service.RedactAuditQuery(c.Request.URL.RawQuery); q != "" {
+			extra["query"] = q
+		}
+		if len(extra) > 0 {
+			entry.Extra = extra
+		}
+
+		auditService.Record(entry)
+	})
+}
+
+// restoredBody 把审计中间件按上限读出的前缀与未读完的原始 body 拼接回填，
+// 保证 handler 读到完整请求体；Close 委托给原始 body。
+type restoredBody struct {
+	io.Reader
+	closer io.Closer
+}
+
+func (b *restoredBody) Close() error { return b.closer.Close() }
+
+// MaskedRequestCredential 提取请求头中的凭证并做首尾掩码。
+func MaskedRequestCredential(c *gin.Context) string {
+	if apiKey := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader("x-api-key")); apiKey != "" {
+		return "x-api-key " + service.MaskAuditCredential(apiKey)
+	}
+	authHeader := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader("Authorization"))
+	if authHeader == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
+	if len(parts) == 2 {
+		return parts[0] + " " + service.MaskAuditCredential(strings.TrimSpace(parts[1]))
+	}
+	return service.MaskAuditCredential(authHeader)
+}
+
+// deriveAuditAction 由 method + 路由模板自动推导动作名，
+// 例：PUT /api/v1/admin/accounts/:id → admin.accounts.update
+func deriveAuditAction(method, fullPath string) string {
+	path := strings.TrimPrefix(fullPath, "/api/v1/")
+	path = strings.Trim(path, "/")
+	segs := strings.Split(path, "/")
+	parts := make([]string, 0, len(segs))
+	for _, seg := range segs {
+		if seg == "" || strings.HasPrefix(seg, ":") || strings.HasPrefix(seg, "*") {
+			continue
+		}
+		parts = append(parts, strings.ReplaceAll(seg, "-", "_"))
+	}
+	verb := ""
+	switch method {
+	case "POST":
+		verb = "create"
+	case "PUT", "PATCH":
+		verb = "update"
+	case "DELETE":
+		verb = "delete"
+	case "GET":
+		verb = "read"
+	default:
+		verb = strings.ToLower(method)
+	}
+	if len(parts) == 0 {
+		return verb
+	}
+	return strings.Join(parts, ".") + "." + verb
+}

backend/internal/server/middleware/audit_log_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package middleware
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestDeriveAuditAction(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		method string
+		path   string
+		want   string
+	}{
+		{"PUT", "/api/v1/admin/accounts/:id", "admin.accounts.update"},
+		{"POST", "/api/v1/admin/accounts", "admin.accounts.create"},
+		{"DELETE", "/api/v1/admin/backups/:id", "admin.backups.delete"},
+		{"GET", "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/api-keys", "admin.users.api_keys.read"},
+		{"POST", "/api/v1/admin/redeem-codes/batch", "admin.redeem_codes.batch.create"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		if got := deriveAuditAction(tc.method, tc.path); got != tc.want {
+			t.Fatalf("deriveAuditAction(%q, %q) = %q, want %q", tc.method, tc.path, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}

backend/internal/server/middleware/jwt_auth.go

@@ -11,8 +11,13 @@ import (
 )
 
 // NewJWTAuthMiddleware 创建 JWT 认证中间件
-func NewJWTAuthMiddleware(authService *service.AuthService, userService *service.UserService) JWTAuthMiddleware {
-	return JWTAuthMiddleware(jwtAuth(authService, userService, userService))
+func NewJWTAuthMiddleware(
+	authService *service.AuthService,
+	userService *service.UserService,
+	settingService *service.SettingService,
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService,
+) JWTAuthMiddleware {
+	return JWTAuthMiddleware(jwtAuth(authService, userService, userService, settingService, auditService))
 }
 
 type jwtUserReader interface {
@@ -24,7 +29,13 @@ type userActivityToucher interface {
 }
 
 // jwtAuth JWT认证中间件实现
-func jwtAuth(authService *service.AuthService, userService jwtUserReader, activityToucher userActivityToucher) gin.HandlerFunc {
+func jwtAuth(
+	authService *service.AuthService,
+	userService jwtUserReader,
+	activityToucher userActivityToucher,
+	settingService *service.SettingService,
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService,
+) gin.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(c *gin.Context) {
 		// 从Authorization header中提取token
 		authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
@@ -77,11 +88,18 @@ func jwtAuth(authService *service.AuthService, userService jwtUserReader, activi
 			return
 		}
 
+		// 会话绑定校验：IP/UA 任一变化即撤销会话（功能可在系统设置中关闭）
+		if !enforceSessionBinding(c, authService, settingService, auditService, claims) {
+			return
+		}
+
 		c.Set(string(ContextKeyUser), AuthSubject{
 			UserID:      user.ID,
 			Concurrency: user.Concurrency,
 		})
 		c.Set(string(ContextKeyUserRole), user.Role)
+		c.Set(ContextKeyAuthEmail, user.Email)
+		c.Set(ContextKeySessionID, claims.SessionID)
 		if activityToucher != nil {
 			activityToucher.TouchLastActiveForUser(c.Request.Context(), user)
 		}

backend/internal/server/middleware/jwt_auth_test.go

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func newJWTTestEnv(users map[int64]*service.User) (*gin.Engine, *service.AuthSer
 	userRepo := &stubJWTUserRepo{users: users}
 	authSvc := service.NewAuthService(nil, userRepo, nil, nil, cfg, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil, nil)
 	userSvc := service.NewUserService(userRepo, nil, nil, nil)
-	mw := NewJWTAuthMiddleware(authSvc, userSvc)
+	mw := NewJWTAuthMiddleware(authSvc, userSvc, nil, nil)
 
 	r := gin.New()
 	r.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(mw))
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func TestJWTAuth_ValidToken(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	router, authSvc := newJWTTestEnv(map[int64]*service.User{1: user})
 
-	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ func TestJWTAuth_ValidToken_LowercaseBearer(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	router, authSvc := newJWTTestEnv(map[int64]*service.User{1: user})
 
-	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -148,12 +148,12 @@ func TestJWTAuth_ValidToken_TouchesLastActive(t *testing.T) {
 	toucher := &recordingActivityToucher{}
 
 	r := gin.New()
-	r.Use(jwtAuth(authSvc, userSvc, toucher))
+	r.Use(jwtAuth(authSvc, userSvc, toucher, nil, nil))
 	r.GET("/protected", func(c *gin.Context) {
 		c.Status(http.StatusOK)
 	})
 
-	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ func TestJWTAuth_UserNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	// 创建环境时不注入此用户，这样 GetByID 会失败
 	router, authSvc := newJWTTestEnv(map[int64]*service.User{})
 
-	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(fakeUser)
+	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(context.Background(), fakeUser)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ func TestJWTAuth_UserInactive(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	router, authSvc := newJWTTestEnv(map[int64]*service.User{1: user})
 
-	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ func TestJWTAuth_TokenVersionMismatch(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	router, authSvc := newJWTTestEnv(map[int64]*service.User{1: userInDB})
 
-	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(userForToken)
+	token, err := authSvc.GenerateToken(context.Background(), userForToken)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

backend/internal/server/middleware/session_binding.go

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/ip"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// SessionBindingContext 全局中间件：将请求的可信客户端 IP 与 User-Agent 注入
+// request context，供 token 签发路径（登录 / 刷新 / OAuth 回调）读取并写入会话绑定。
+// 必须使用 GetTrustedClientIP（走 trusted_proxies 链），不可信头会导致绑定被伪造绕过。
+func SessionBindingContext() gin.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(c *gin.Context) {
+		binding := &service.SessionBinding{
+			IP:        ip.GetTrustedClientIP(c),
+			UserAgent: c.Request.UserAgent(),
+		}
+		c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(service.WithSessionBinding(c.Request.Context(), binding))
+		c.Next()
+	}
+}
+
+// currentSessionBindingHash 计算当前请求的会话指纹哈希。
+func currentSessionBindingHash(c *gin.Context) string {
+	binding := &service.SessionBinding{
+		IP:        ip.GetTrustedClientIP(c),
+		UserAgent: c.Request.UserAgent(),
+	}
+	return binding.Hash()
+}
+
+// enforceSessionBinding 校验 access token 的会话指纹（IP/UA 绑定）。
+// 指纹不匹配时：撤销该会话家族的所有 refresh token、写入审计安全事件、返回 401。
+// 返回 false 表示请求已被中断。
+//
+// 兼容性：claims.BindingHash 为空（功能上线前签发的旧 token）时放行，
+// 该会话在下一次 refresh 轮转时会自动获得绑定。
+func enforceSessionBinding(
+	c *gin.Context,
+	authService *service.AuthService,
+	settingService *service.SettingService,
+	auditService *service.AuditLogService,
+	claims *service.JWTClaims,
+) bool {
+	if settingService == nil || !settingService.IsSessionBindingEnabled(c.Request.Context()) {
+		return true
+	}
+	if claims == nil || claims.BindingHash == "" {
+		return true
+	}
+	current := currentSessionBindingHash(c)
+	if current == "" || current == claims.BindingHash {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if authService != nil {
+		_ = authService.RevokeSessionFamily(c.Request.Context(), claims.SessionID)
+	}
+	if auditService != nil {
+		uid := claims.UserID
+		path := c.FullPath()
+		if path == "" {
+			path = c.Request.URL.Path
+		}
+		auditService.Record(&service.AuditLog{
+			ActorUserID: &uid,
+			ActorEmail:  claims.Email,
+			ActorRole:   claims.Role,
+			AuthMethod:  service.AuditAuthMethodJWT,
+			Action:      service.AuditActionSessionBindingMismatch,
+			Method:      c.Request.Method,
+			Path:        path,
+			ClientIP:    ip.GetTrustedClientIP(c),
+			UserAgent:   c.Request.UserAgent(),
+			StatusCode:  401,
+		})
+	}
+	AbortWithError(c, 401, "SESSION_BINDING_MISMATCH", "Session network fingerprint changed, please login again")
+	return false
+}

backend/internal/server/middleware/step_up.go

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// StepUpAuthMiddleware 敏感操作 step-up 2FA 门控中间件类型。
+type StepUpAuthMiddleware gin.HandlerFunc
+
+// stepUpGrantChecker 抽象 TOTP step-up 授权检查能力（由 TotpService 实现）。
+type stepUpGrantChecker interface {
+	HasStepUpGrant(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey string) (bool, error)
+}
+
+// stepUpUserReader 抽象用户读取能力（检查 TOTP 是否启用）。
+type stepUpUserReader interface {
+	GetByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*service.User, error)
+}
+
+// StepUpSessionKey 计算 step-up 授权的会话键：
+// 优先绑定当前会话（refresh token family），无会话 ID 的旧 token 退化为用户级键。
+func StepUpSessionKey(c *gin.Context, userID int64) string {
+	if sid := c.GetString(ContextKeySessionID); sid != "" {
+		return sid
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("u%d", userID)
+}
+
+// NewStepUpAuthMiddleware 创建敏感操作 step-up 2FA 门控中间件。
+//
+// 通过条件（全部满足）：
+//  1. 必须是 JWT 认证的真人会话——admin API key（机器凭证）一律拒绝
+//  2. 当前用户已启用 TOTP（未启用则拒绝并提示先启用 2FA）
+//  3. 当前会话在有效期内完成过 TOTP step-up 验证（POST /api/v1/user/totp/step-up）
+//
+// 失败响应使用可区分的错误码，前端据此弹出 TOTP 验证对话框后重试。
+func NewStepUpAuthMiddleware(totpService *service.TotpService, userService *service.UserService) StepUpAuthMiddleware {
+	return StepUpAuthMiddleware(stepUpAuth(totpService, userService))
+}
+
+func stepUpAuth(grantChecker stepUpGrantChecker, userReader stepUpUserReader) gin.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(c *gin.Context) {
+		if c.GetString("auth_method") == service.AuditAuthMethodAdminAPIKey {
+			AbortWithError(c, 403, "STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN",
+				"Admin API key cannot access this endpoint; a two-factor verified admin session is required")
+			return
+		}
+
+		subject, ok := GetAuthSubjectFromContext(c)
+		if !ok || subject.UserID <= 0 {
+			AbortWithError(c, 401, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Authorization required")
+			return
+		}
+
+		user, err := userReader.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), subject.UserID)
+		if err != nil {
+			AbortWithError(c, 500, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "Failed to load user")
+			return
+		}
+		if !user.TotpEnabled {
+			AbortWithError(c, 403, "STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED",
+				"This operation requires two-factor authentication; please enable TOTP first")
+			return
+		}
+
+		sessionKey := StepUpSessionKey(c, subject.UserID)
+		granted, err := grantChecker.HasStepUpGrant(c.Request.Context(), subject.UserID, sessionKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			// 安全门控故障时选择 fail-closed。
+			AbortWithError(c, 503, "STEP_UP_UNAVAILABLE", "Step-up verification service unavailable")
+			return
+		}
+		if !granted {
+			AbortWithError(c, 403, "STEP_UP_REQUIRED",
+				"This operation requires recent two-factor verification")
+			return
+		}
+
+		c.Next()
+	}
+}

backend/internal/server/middleware/wire.go

@@ -19,4 +19,6 @@ var ProviderSet = wire.NewSet(
 	NewJWTAuthMiddleware,
 	NewAdminAuthMiddleware,
 	NewAPIKeyAuthMiddleware,
+	NewAuditLogMiddleware,
+	NewStepUpAuthMiddleware,
 )

backend/internal/server/router.go

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ func SetupRouter(
 	jwtAuth middleware2.JWTAuthMiddleware,
 	adminAuth middleware2.AdminAuthMiddleware,
 	apiKeyAuth middleware2.APIKeyAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog middleware2.AuditLogMiddleware,
+	stepUpAuth middleware2.StepUpAuthMiddleware,
 	apiKeyService *service.APIKeyService,
 	subscriptionService *service.SubscriptionService,
 	opsService *service.OpsService,
@@ -52,6 +54,8 @@ func SetupRouter(
 
 	// 应用中间件
 	r.Use(middleware2.RequestLogger())
+	// 将可信客户端 IP + UA 注入 request context，供 token 签发路径写入会话绑定
+	r.Use(middleware2.SessionBindingContext())
 	r.Use(middleware2.Logger())
 	r.Use(middleware2.CORS(cfg.CORS))
 	r.Use(middleware2.SecurityHeaders(cfg.Security.CSP, func() []string {
@@ -82,7 +86,7 @@ func SetupRouter(
 	}
 
 	// 注册路由
-	registerRoutes(r, handlers, jwtAuth, adminAuth, apiKeyAuth, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, cfg, redisClient)
+	registerRoutes(r, handlers, jwtAuth, adminAuth, apiKeyAuth, auditLog, stepUpAuth, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, cfg, redisClient)
 
 	return r
 }
@@ -94,6 +98,8 @@ func registerRoutes(
 	jwtAuth middleware2.JWTAuthMiddleware,
 	adminAuth middleware2.AdminAuthMiddleware,
 	apiKeyAuth middleware2.APIKeyAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog middleware2.AuditLogMiddleware,
+	stepUpAuth middleware2.StepUpAuthMiddleware,
 	apiKeyService *service.APIKeyService,
 	subscriptionService *service.SubscriptionService,
 	opsService *service.OpsService,
@@ -108,11 +114,11 @@ func registerRoutes(
 	v1 := r.Group("/api/v1")
 
 	// 注册各模块路由
-	routes.RegisterAuthRoutes(v1, h, jwtAuth, redisClient, settingService)
-	routes.RegisterUserRoutes(v1, h, jwtAuth, settingService)
-	routes.RegisterAdminRoutes(v1, h, adminAuth, settingService)
+	routes.RegisterAuthRoutes(v1, h, jwtAuth, auditLog, redisClient, settingService)
+	routes.RegisterUserRoutes(v1, h, jwtAuth, auditLog, settingService)
+	routes.RegisterAdminRoutes(v1, h, adminAuth, auditLog, stepUpAuth, settingService)
 	routes.RegisterGatewayRoutes(r, h, apiKeyAuth, apiKeyService, subscriptionService, opsService, settingService, cfg)
-	routes.RegisterPaymentRoutes(v1, h.Payment, h.PaymentWebhook, h.Admin.Payment, jwtAuth, adminAuth, settingService)
+	routes.RegisterPaymentRoutes(v1, h.Payment, h.PaymentWebhook, h.Admin.Payment, jwtAuth, adminAuth, auditLog, settingService)
 
 	handler.RegisterPageRoutes(v1, cfg.Pricing.DataDir, gin.HandlerFunc(jwtAuth), gin.HandlerFunc(adminAuth), settingService)
 }

backend/internal/server/routes/admin.go

@@ -14,10 +14,14 @@ func RegisterAdminRoutes(
 	v1 *gin.RouterGroup,
 	h *handler.Handlers,
 	adminAuth middleware.AdminAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog middleware.AuditLogMiddleware,
+	stepUpAuth middleware.StepUpAuthMiddleware,
 	settingService *service.SettingService,
 ) {
 	admin := v1.Group("/admin")
 	admin.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(adminAuth))
+	// 审计中间件挂在认证之后：所有管理面变更类操作 + 敏感读取入审计日志
+	admin.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(auditLog))
 	admin.Use(middleware.AdminComplianceGuard(settingService))
 	{
 		// 部署与运营合规确认
@@ -33,7 +37,7 @@ func RegisterAdminRoutes(
 		registerGroupRoutes(admin, h)
 
 		// 账号管理
-		registerAccountRoutes(admin, h)
+		registerAccountRoutes(admin, h, stepUpAuth)
 
 		// 公告管理
 		registerAnnouncementRoutes(admin, h)
@@ -51,7 +55,7 @@ func RegisterAdminRoutes(
 		registerGrokOAuthRoutes(admin, h)
 
 		// 代理管理
-		registerProxyRoutes(admin, h)
+		registerProxyRoutes(admin, h, stepUpAuth)
 
 		// 卡密管理
 		registerRedeemCodeRoutes(admin, h)
@@ -63,10 +67,10 @@ func RegisterAdminRoutes(
 		registerSettingsRoutes(admin, h)
 
 		// 数据管理
-		registerDataManagementRoutes(admin, h)
+		registerDataManagementRoutes(admin, h, stepUpAuth)
 
 		// 数据库备份恢复
-		registerBackupRoutes(admin, h)
+		registerBackupRoutes(admin, h, stepUpAuth)
 
 		// 运维监控（Ops）
 		registerOpsRoutes(admin, h)
@@ -106,6 +110,19 @@ func RegisterAdminRoutes(
 
 		// 邀请返利（专属用户管理）
 		registerAffiliateRoutes(admin, h)
+
+		// 操作审计日志
+		registerAuditLogRoutes(admin, h, stepUpAuth)
+	}
+}
+
+func registerAuditLogRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers, _ middleware.StepUpAuthMiddleware) {
+	auditLogs := admin.Group("/audit-logs")
+	{
+		auditLogs.GET("", h.Admin.AuditLog.List)
+		auditLogs.GET("/:id", h.Admin.AuditLog.Get)
+		// 清空需现场 TOTP 校验（在 handler 内强制），不复用 step-up sudo 窗口
+		auditLogs.POST("/clear", h.Admin.AuditLog.Clear)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -291,7 +308,7 @@ func registerGroupRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
 	}
 }
 
-func registerAccountRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
+func registerAccountRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers, stepUpAuth middleware.StepUpAuthMiddleware) {
 	accounts := admin.Group("/accounts")
 	{
 		accounts.GET("", h.Admin.Account.List)
@@ -330,7 +347,8 @@ func registerAccountRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
 		accounts.GET("/:id/models", h.Admin.Account.GetAvailableModels)
 		accounts.POST("/:id/models/sync-upstream", h.Admin.Account.SyncUpstreamModels)
 		accounts.POST("/batch", h.Admin.Account.BatchCreate)
-		accounts.GET("/data", h.Admin.Account.ExportData)
+		// 账号导出泄露上游凭证原文——要求 step-up 2FA
+		accounts.GET("/data", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.Account.ExportData)
 		accounts.POST("/data", h.Admin.Account.ImportData)
 		accounts.POST("/batch-update-credentials", h.Admin.Account.BatchUpdateCredentials)
 		accounts.POST("/batch-refresh-tier", h.Admin.Account.BatchRefreshTier)
@@ -414,12 +432,13 @@ func registerGrokOAuthRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
 	}
 }
 
-func registerProxyRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
+func registerProxyRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers, stepUpAuth middleware.StepUpAuthMiddleware) {
 	proxies := admin.Group("/proxies")
 	{
 		proxies.GET("", h.Admin.Proxy.List)
 		proxies.GET("/all", h.Admin.Proxy.GetAll)
-		proxies.GET("/data", h.Admin.Proxy.ExportData)
+		// 代理导出泄露账号密码原文——要求 step-up 2FA
+		proxies.GET("/data", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.Proxy.ExportData)
 		proxies.POST("/data", h.Admin.Proxy.ImportData)
 		proxies.GET("/:id", h.Admin.Proxy.GetByID)
 		proxies.POST("", h.Admin.Proxy.Create)
@@ -501,7 +520,7 @@ func registerSettingsRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
 	}
 }
 
-func registerDataManagementRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
+func registerDataManagementRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers, stepUpAuth middleware.StepUpAuthMiddleware) {
 	dataManagement := admin.Group("/data-management")
 	{
 		dataManagement.GET("/agent/health", h.Admin.DataManagement.GetAgentHealth)
@@ -514,22 +533,24 @@ func registerDataManagementRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
 		dataManagement.POST("/sources/:source_type/profiles/:profile_id/activate", h.Admin.DataManagement.SetActiveSourceProfile)
 		dataManagement.POST("/s3/test", h.Admin.DataManagement.TestS3)
 		dataManagement.GET("/s3/profiles", h.Admin.DataManagement.ListS3Profiles)
-		dataManagement.POST("/s3/profiles", h.Admin.DataManagement.CreateS3Profile)
-		dataManagement.PUT("/s3/profiles/:profile_id", h.Admin.DataManagement.UpdateS3Profile)
+		// 修改 S3 目标可将数据备份外泄——要求 step-up 2FA
+		dataManagement.POST("/s3/profiles", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.DataManagement.CreateS3Profile)
+		dataManagement.PUT("/s3/profiles/:profile_id", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.DataManagement.UpdateS3Profile)
 		dataManagement.DELETE("/s3/profiles/:profile_id", h.Admin.DataManagement.DeleteS3Profile)
-		dataManagement.POST("/s3/profiles/:profile_id/activate", h.Admin.DataManagement.SetActiveS3Profile)
-		dataManagement.POST("/backups", h.Admin.DataManagement.CreateBackupJob)
+		dataManagement.POST("/s3/profiles/:profile_id/activate", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.DataManagement.SetActiveS3Profile)
+		dataManagement.POST("/backups", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.DataManagement.CreateBackupJob)
 		dataManagement.GET("/backups", h.Admin.DataManagement.ListBackupJobs)
 		dataManagement.GET("/backups/:job_id", h.Admin.DataManagement.GetBackupJob)
 	}
 }
 
-func registerBackupRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
+func registerBackupRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers, stepUpAuth middleware.StepUpAuthMiddleware) {
 	backup := admin.Group("/backups")
 	{
 		// S3 存储配置
 		backup.GET("/s3-config", h.Admin.Backup.GetS3Config)
-		backup.PUT("/s3-config", h.Admin.Backup.UpdateS3Config)
+		// 修改 S3 目标可将数据库备份外泄——要求 step-up 2FA
+		backup.PUT("/s3-config", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.Backup.UpdateS3Config)
 		backup.POST("/s3-config/test", h.Admin.Backup.TestS3Connection)
 
 		// 定时备份配置
@@ -537,11 +558,12 @@ func registerBackupRoutes(admin *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.Handlers) {
 		backup.PUT("/schedule", h.Admin.Backup.UpdateSchedule)
 
 		// 备份操作
-		backup.POST("", h.Admin.Backup.CreateBackup)
+		backup.POST("", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.Backup.CreateBackup)
 		backup.GET("", h.Admin.Backup.ListBackups)
 		backup.GET("/:id", h.Admin.Backup.GetBackup)
 		backup.DELETE("/:id", h.Admin.Backup.DeleteBackup)
-		backup.GET("/:id/download-url", h.Admin.Backup.GetDownloadURL)
+		// 备份下载链接可直接取走整库数据——要求 step-up 2FA
+		backup.GET("/:id/download-url", gin.HandlerFunc(stepUpAuth), h.Admin.Backup.GetDownloadURL)
 
 		// 恢复操作
 		backup.POST("/:id/restore", h.Admin.Backup.RestoreBackup)

backend/internal/server/routes/auth.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ func RegisterAuthRoutes(
 	v1 *gin.RouterGroup,
 	h *handler.Handlers,
 	jwtAuth servermiddleware.JWTAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog servermiddleware.AuditLogMiddleware,
 	redisClient *redis.Client,
 	settingService *service.SettingService,
 ) {
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@ func RegisterAuthRoutes(
 	// 公开接口
 	auth := v1.Group("/auth")
 	auth.Use(servermiddleware.BackendModeAuthGuard(settingService))
+	// 认证事件（登录/注册/2FA/token 刷新失败）入审计
+	auth.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(auditLog))
 	{
 		// 注册/登录/2FA/验证码发送均属于高风险入口，增加服务端兜底限流（Redis 故障时 fail-close）
 		auth.POST("/register", rateLimiter.LimitWithOptions("auth-register", 5, time.Minute, middleware.RateLimitOptions{

backend/internal/server/routes/auth_rate_limit_test.go

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ func newAuthRoutesTestRouter(redisClient *redis.Client) *gin.Engine {
 		servermiddleware.JWTAuthMiddleware(func(c *gin.Context) {
 			c.Next()
 		}),
+		servermiddleware.AuditLogMiddleware(func(c *gin.Context) {
+			c.Next()
+		}),
 		redisClient,
 		nil,
 	)

backend/internal/server/routes/payment.go

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ func RegisterPaymentRoutes(
 	adminPaymentHandler *admin.PaymentHandler,
 	jwtAuth middleware.JWTAuthMiddleware,
 	adminAuth middleware.AdminAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog middleware.AuditLogMiddleware,
 	settingService *service.SettingService,
 ) {
 	// --- User-facing payment endpoints (authenticated) ---
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ func RegisterPaymentRoutes(
 	// --- Admin payment endpoints (admin auth) ---
 	adminGroup := v1.Group("/admin/payment")
 	adminGroup.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(adminAuth))
+	adminGroup.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(auditLog))
 	adminGroup.Use(middleware.AdminComplianceGuard(settingService))
 	{
 		// Dashboard

backend/internal/server/routes/user.go

@@ -13,11 +13,14 @@ func RegisterUserRoutes(
 	v1 *gin.RouterGroup,
 	h *handler.Handlers,
 	jwtAuth middleware.JWTAuthMiddleware,
+	auditLog middleware.AuditLogMiddleware,
 	settingService *service.SettingService,
 ) {
 	authenticated := v1.Group("")
 	authenticated.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(jwtAuth))
 	authenticated.Use(middleware.BackendModeUserGuard(settingService))
+	// 用户管理面变更类操作入审计（含 TOTP 启用/禁用、step-up 验证、密码修改等安全事件）
+	authenticated.Use(gin.HandlerFunc(auditLog))
 	{
 		// 用户接口
 		user := authenticated.Group("/user")
@@ -52,6 +55,8 @@ func RegisterUserRoutes(
 				totp.POST("/setup", h.Totp.InitiateSetup)
 				totp.POST("/enable", h.Totp.Enable)
 				totp.POST("/disable", h.Totp.Disable)
+				// 敏感操作二次验证：授予当前会话一段时间的 step-up 权限
+				totp.POST("/step-up", h.Totp.StepUp)
 			}
 		}
 

backend/internal/service/audit_log.go

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+package service
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/util/logredact"
+)
+
+// ErrAuditLogNotFound 审计日志不存在。
+var ErrAuditLogNotFound = infraerrors.NotFound("AUDIT_LOG_NOT_FOUND", "audit log not found")
+
+// 审计日志相关常量。
+const (
+	// AuditAuthMethodJWT / AuditAuthMethodAdminAPIKey 与 auth 中间件写入的 auth_method 对齐。
+	AuditAuthMethodJWT         = "jwt"
+	AuditAuthMethodAdminAPIKey = "admin_api_key"
+
+	// auditRequestBodyMaxBytes 请求体脱敏后入库的最大长度（字节），超出截断。
+	auditRequestBodyMaxBytes = 16 * 1024
+	// AuditRequestBodyCaptureLimit 请求体参与脱敏解析的原始大小上限（字节）。
+	// 审计中间件按此上限截断读取，超出的请求体仅记录占位符不解析。
+	AuditRequestBodyCaptureLimit = 256 * 1024
+)
+
+// 内置审计动作名（认证/安全事件与特殊操作使用固定值，普通请求由路由自动推导）。
+const (
+	AuditActionLogin                  = "auth.login"
+	AuditActionLogin2FA               = "auth.login.2fa"
+	AuditActionRegister               = "auth.register"
+	AuditActionTokenRefresh           = "auth.token.refresh"
+	AuditActionSessionBindingMismatch = "auth.session_binding.mismatch"
+	AuditActionStepUpVerify           = "auth.step_up.verify"
+	AuditActionAuditLogClear          = "admin.audit_log.clear"
+)
+
+// AuditLog 一条管理面操作审计记录。
+type AuditLog struct {
+	ID               int64          `json:"id"`
+	CreatedAt        time.Time      `json:"created_at"`
+	ActorUserID      *int64         `json:"actor_user_id,omitempty"`
+	ActorEmail       string         `json:"actor_email"`
+	ActorRole        string         `json:"actor_role"`
+	AuthMethod       string         `json:"auth_method"`
+	CredentialMasked string         `json:"credential_masked"`
+	Action           string         `json:"action"`
+	Method           string         `json:"method"`
+	Path             string         `json:"path"`
+	RequestID        string         `json:"request_id"`
+	ClientIP         string         `json:"client_ip"`
+	UserAgent        string         `json:"user_agent"`
+	RequestBody      string         `json:"request_body,omitempty"`
+	StatusCode       int            `json:"status_code"`
+	LatencyMs        int64          `json:"latency_ms"`
+	Extra            map[string]any `json:"extra,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// AuditLogFilter 审计日志列表查询条件。
+type AuditLogFilter struct {
+	Page     int
+	PageSize int
+
+	StartTime   *time.Time
+	EndTime     *time.Time
+	ActorUserID *int64
+	ActorEmail  string
+	AuthMethod  string
+	Action      string
+	Method      string
+	ClientIP    string
+	// Success: nil 全部；true 仅 2xx/3xx；false 仅 >=400。
+	Success *bool
+	// Query 对 path / action / actor_email 做模糊匹配。
+	Query string
+}
+
+// AuditLogList 分页结果。
+type AuditLogList struct {
+	Logs     []*AuditLog
+	Total    int
+	Page     int
+	PageSize int
+}
+
+// AuditLogRepository 审计日志持久化端口。
+// 注意：接口刻意不提供单条删除能力——审计日志只允许追加与全量清空。
+type AuditLogRepository interface {
+	BatchInsert(ctx context.Context, logs []*AuditLog) (int64, error)
+	// Insert 同步写入单条（用于清空留痕等必须落库的记录）。
+	Insert(ctx context.Context, log *AuditLog) error
+	List(ctx context.Context, filter *AuditLogFilter) (*AuditLogList, error)
+	GetByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*AuditLog, error)
+	Count(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
+	// TruncateAll 全量清空（TRUNCATE），返回前需调用方自行 Count 记录行数。
+	TruncateAll(ctx context.Context) error
+	// DeleteBefore 按保留期批量删除，返回本批删除行数（幂等，可多实例并发）。
+	DeleteBefore(ctx context.Context, cutoff time.Time, batchSize int) (int64, error)
+}
+
+// auditNormalizeBodyKey 归一化键名：小写并去除分隔符，
+// 使 private_key / privateKey / privatekey / api-v3-key 等写法共享同一判定，
+// 避免子串清单假设 snake_case 而漏掉支付渠道等无分隔符风格的密钥字段。
+func auditNormalizeBodyKey(key string) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.Grow(len(key))
+	for _, r := range strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key)) {
+		switch r {
+		case '_', '-', '.', ' ':
+			continue
+		default:
+			_, _ = b.WriteRune(r)
+		}
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// auditBodySensitiveExactKeys 请求体脱敏的精确匹配键（归一化后）。
+// 除内置清单外，程序化并入两份权威敏感表以防清单漂移：
+//   - SensitiveCredentialKeys：账号 credentials 的敏感子键（session_key / service_account_json 等）
+//   - providerSensitiveConfigFields：支付渠道密钥字段（pkey / privatekey / apiv3key 等）
+var auditBodySensitiveExactKeys = func() map[string]struct{} {
+	builtin := []string{
+		"code", "codes", "pin", "cvv",
+		"authorization", "cookie", "x-api-key",
+		"key",
+		// 字符串值内嵌完整凭证的字段：
+		// proxy_key 为 protocol|host|port|username|password 拼接，
+		// custom_key 为用户自设的平台 API Key 明文。
+		"proxy_key", "custom_key",
+	}
+	set := make(map[string]struct{}, len(builtin)+len(SensitiveCredentialKeys)+16)
+	for _, k := range builtin {
+		set[auditNormalizeBodyKey(k)] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	for _, k := range SensitiveCredentialKeys {
+		set[auditNormalizeBodyKey(k)] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	for _, fields := range providerSensitiveConfigFields {
+		for k := range fields {
+			set[auditNormalizeBodyKey(k)] = struct{}{}
+		}
+	}
+	return set
+}()
+
+// auditBodySensitiveSubstrings 请求体脱敏的包含匹配子串（对归一化后的键名比对）。
+// 命中任一子串即整体擦除该键的值（例如 new_password / secret_access_key / temp_token）。
+var auditBodySensitiveSubstrings = []string{
+	"password", "passwd", "secret", "token",
+	"apikey", "accesskey", "privatekey",
+	"otp", "credentialvalue",
+	"sessionkey", "serviceaccount",
+}
+
+func isAuditSensitiveBodyKey(key string) bool {
+	k := auditNormalizeBodyKey(key)
+	if _, ok := auditBodySensitiveExactKeys[k]; ok {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, sub := range auditBodySensitiveSubstrings {
+		if strings.Contains(k, sub) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+const auditRedactedPlaceholder = "***"
+
+// RedactAuditBody 对请求体做审计入库前的脱敏：
+//   - JSON：递归擦除敏感键的值（保留结构，base_url 等非敏感字段可见以便追责）
+//   - 非 JSON：返回占位说明
+//   - 超长：截断并附截断标记
+func RedactAuditBody(raw []byte, contentType string) string {
+	if len(raw) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	if len(raw) > AuditRequestBodyCaptureLimit {
+		// raw 可能已被中间件按上限截断，实际请求体只会更大，不报具体字节数。
+		return "<body omitted: exceeds " + strconv.Itoa(AuditRequestBodyCaptureLimit) + " bytes>"
+	}
+	ct := strings.ToLower(contentType)
+	if !strings.Contains(ct, "json") || !json.Valid(raw) {
+		// 表单等非 JSON 内容走文本兜底脱敏后仍可能含敏感信息，直接不入库。
+		return "<non-json body omitted: " + strconv.Itoa(len(raw)) + " bytes, content-type=" + strings.TrimSpace(contentType) + ">"
+	}
+
+	var value any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &value); err != nil {
+		return "<unparsable body omitted>"
+	}
+	redacted := redactAuditValue(value, 0)
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "<redacted>"
+	}
+	out := string(encoded)
+	if len(out) > auditRequestBodyMaxBytes {
+		out = out[:auditRequestBodyMaxBytes] + "...<truncated>"
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+const auditRedactMaxDepth = 24
+
+func redactAuditValue(value any, depth int) any {
+	if depth > auditRedactMaxDepth {
+		return "<depth limit exceeded>"
+	}
+	switch v := value.(type) {
+	case map[string]any:
+		out := make(map[string]any, len(v))
+		for k, item := range v {
+			if isAuditSensitiveBodyKey(k) {
+				out[k] = auditRedactedPlaceholder
+				continue
+			}
+			out[k] = redactAuditValue(item, depth+1)
+		}
+		return out
+	case []any:
+		out := make([]any, len(v))
+		for i, item := range v {
+			out[i] = redactAuditValue(item, depth+1)
+		}
+		return out
+	default:
+		return value
+	}
+}
+
+// MaskAuditCredential 对请求头中的凭证做首尾保留掩码：
+// 保留前 6 位与后 4 位，中间以 **** 表示；过短的凭证整体掩码。
+func MaskAuditCredential(credential string) string {
+	credential = strings.TrimSpace(credential)
+	if credential == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	if len(credential) <= 14 {
+		return "****"
+	}
+	return credential[:6] + "****" + credential[len(credential)-4:]
+}
+
+// RedactAuditQuery 对 URL query 做轻量脱敏后返回。
+func RedactAuditQuery(rawQuery string) string {
+	rawQuery = strings.TrimSpace(rawQuery)
+	if rawQuery == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return logredact.RedactText(rawQuery, "api_key", "apikey", "token", "secret", "key")
+}

backend/internal/service/audit_log_service.go

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+package service
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	auditLogQueueCapacity = 4096
+	auditLogBatchSize     = 100
+	auditLogFlushInterval = time.Second
+
+	auditRetentionCheckInterval = 24 * time.Hour
+	auditRetentionStartupDelay  = 5 * time.Minute
+	auditRetentionBatchSize     = 5000
+)
+
+// AuditLogService 管理面操作审计日志服务。
+// 写入端为非阻塞异步批量落库（不拖慢管理请求）；
+// 读取端提供分页查询；清空端点由 handler 层做 TOTP 强校验后调用 ClearAll。
+type AuditLogService struct {
+	repo           AuditLogRepository
+	settingService *SettingService
+
+	queue chan *AuditLog
+
+	ctx    context.Context
+	cancel context.CancelFunc
+	wg     sync.WaitGroup
+
+	droppedCount uint64
+	writeFailed  uint64
+	writtenCount uint64
+}
+
+func NewAuditLogService(repo AuditLogRepository, settingService *SettingService) *AuditLogService {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	return &AuditLogService{
+		repo:           repo,
+		settingService: settingService,
+		queue:          make(chan *AuditLog, auditLogQueueCapacity),
+		ctx:            ctx,
+		cancel:         cancel,
+	}
+}
+
+// Start 启动异步写入与保留期清理协程。
+func (s *AuditLogService) Start() {
+	if s == nil || s.repo == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s.wg.Add(2)
+	go s.runWriter()
+	go s.runRetentionLoop()
+}
+
+// Stop 停止服务并尽量落盘队列中剩余记录。
+func (s *AuditLogService) Stop() {
+	if s == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s.cancel()
+	s.wg.Wait()
+}
+
+// Record 非阻塞入队一条审计记录；队列打满时丢弃并计数（管理面流量下几乎不可能发生）。
+func (s *AuditLogService) Record(entry *AuditLog) {
+	if s == nil || entry == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if entry.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
+		entry.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
+	}
+	select {
+	case <-s.ctx.Done():
+		return
+	default:
+	}
+	select {
+	case s.queue <- entry:
+	default:
+		atomic.AddUint64(&s.droppedCount, 1)
+	}
+}
+
+// List 分页查询审计日志。
+func (s *AuditLogService) List(ctx context.Context, filter *AuditLogFilter) (*AuditLogList, error) {
+	return s.repo.List(ctx, filter)
+}
+
+// GetByID 查询单条详情。
+func (s *AuditLogService) GetByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*AuditLog, error) {
+	return s.repo.GetByID(ctx, id)
+}
+
+// ClearAll 全量清空审计日志并写入留痕记录。
+// 调用方（handler）必须先完成 TOTP 验证；本方法负责：
+//  1. 统计并清空全表
+//  2. 同步写入一条 "audit_log.clear" 留痕记录（绕过异步队列，保证落库）
+func (s *AuditLogService) ClearAll(ctx context.Context, trace *AuditLog) (int64, error) {
+	deleted, err := s.repo.Count(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("count audit logs: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.repo.TruncateAll(ctx); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("truncate audit logs: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if trace != nil {
+		trace.Action = AuditActionAuditLogClear
+		if trace.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
+			trace.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
+		}
+		if trace.Extra == nil {
+			trace.Extra = map[string]any{}
+		}
+		trace.Extra["deleted_rows"] = deleted
+		if err := s.repo.Insert(ctx, trace); err != nil {
+			// 留痕失败必须显式暴露：清空已发生，但审计链断裂。
+			return deleted, fmt.Errorf("audit logs cleared (%d rows) but failed to persist clear-trace record: %w", deleted, err)
+		}
+	}
+	return deleted, nil
+}
+
+func (s *AuditLogService) runWriter() {
+	defer s.wg.Done()
+
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(auditLogFlushInterval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	batch := make([]*AuditLog, 0, auditLogBatchSize)
+	flush := func() {
+		if len(batch) == 0 {
+			return
+		}
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+		inserted, err := s.repo.BatchInsert(ctx, batch)
+		cancel()
+		if err != nil {
+			atomic.AddUint64(&s.writeFailed, uint64(len(batch)))
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "time=%s level=WARN msg=\"audit log flush failed\" err=%v batch=%d\n",
+				time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), err, len(batch))
+		} else {
+			atomic.AddUint64(&s.writtenCount, uint64(inserted))
+		}
+		batch = batch[:0]
+	}
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-s.ctx.Done():
+			// 停机前排空队列。
+			for {
+				select {
+				case item := <-s.queue:
+					if item == nil {
+						continue
+					}
+					batch = append(batch, item)
+					if len(batch) >= auditLogBatchSize {
+						flush()
+					}
+				default:
+					flush()
+					return
+				}
+			}
+		case item := <-s.queue:
+			if item == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			batch = append(batch, item)
+			if len(batch) >= auditLogBatchSize {
+				flush()
+			}
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			flush()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// runRetentionLoop 按保留期定期删除过期审计日志。
+// 删除操作幂等，多实例并发执行无害，因此无需选主。
+func (s *AuditLogService) runRetentionLoop() {
+	defer s.wg.Done()
+
+	startupTimer := time.NewTimer(auditRetentionStartupDelay)
+	defer startupTimer.Stop()
+	select {
+	case <-s.ctx.Done():
+		return
+	case <-startupTimer.C:
+	}
+
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(auditRetentionCheckInterval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	s.runRetentionOnce()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-s.ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			s.runRetentionOnce()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *AuditLogService) runRetentionOnce() {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(s.ctx, 10*time.Minute)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	days := 0
+	if s.settingService != nil {
+		days = s.settingService.GetAuditLogRetentionDays(ctx)
+	}
+	if days <= 0 {
+		return // 0 或负值表示永久保留，仅支持手动清空
+	}
+	cutoff := time.Now().UTC().AddDate(0, 0, -days)
+	for {
+		deleted, err := s.repo.DeleteBefore(ctx, cutoff, auditRetentionBatchSize)
+		if err != nil {
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "time=%s level=WARN msg=\"audit log retention cleanup failed\" err=%v\n",
+				time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), err)
+			return
+		}
+		if deleted == 0 {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}

backend/internal/service/audit_log_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+package service
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestMaskAuditCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		in   string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"empty", "", ""},
+		{"short", "abc", "****"},
+		{"boundary_14", "12345678901234", "****"},
+		{"long", "sk-ant-api03-abcdefghijklmnop1234", "sk-ant****1234"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := MaskAuditCredential(tc.in)
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("MaskAuditCredential(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.in, got, tc.want)
+			}
+			// 掩码结果绝不能包含原始凭证的中间部分。
+			if len(tc.in) > 14 && strings.Contains(got, tc.in) {
+				t.Fatalf("masked value leaks full credential: %q", got)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRedactAuditBody_JSONRedactsSecrets(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := []byte(`{
+		"name": "acc1",
+		"base_url": "https://evil.example.com",
+		"credentials": {"api_key": "sk-secret-123", "base_url": "https://evil.example.com"},
+		"new_password": "hunter2",
+		"totp_code": "123456",
+		"nested": [{"access_token": "tok_abc"}]
+	}`)
+	out := RedactAuditBody(raw, "application/json")
+
+	var parsed map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &parsed); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("output is not valid JSON: %v\n%s", err, out)
+	}
+
+	// 敏感字段被擦除。
+	for _, secret := range []string{"sk-secret-123", "hunter2", "123456", "tok_abc"} {
+		if strings.Contains(out, secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("redacted body still contains secret %q: %s", secret, out)
+		}
+	}
+	// 非敏感字段（base_url、name）保留以便追责。
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "evil.example.com") {
+		t.Fatalf("base_url should be preserved for accountability: %s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "acc1") {
+		t.Fatalf("name should be preserved: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRedactAuditBody_AuthoritativeTablesSynced 覆盖曾经漏网的凭证字段：
+// 账号 credentials 敏感子键、支付渠道无分隔符密钥、字符串值内嵌凭证的 proxy_key / custom_key，
+// 以及 camelCase 等命名变体（归一化比对）。
+func TestRedactAuditBody_AuthoritativeTablesSynced(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := []byte(`{
+		"credentials": {
+			"session_key": "sk-session-aaa",
+			"service_account_json": "{\"private_key\":\"pem-body-bbb\"}",
+			"service_account": "sa-blob-ccc"
+		},
+		"proxy_key": "socks5|1.2.3.4|1080|proxyuser|proxypass-ddd",
+		"custom_key": "sk-custom-eee",
+		"config": {
+			"pkey": "easypay-merchant-fff",
+			"privateKey": "alipay-pem-ggg",
+			"apiv3key": "wxpay-v3-hhh",
+			"SecretKey": "stripe-sk-iii",
+			"webhookSecret": "whsec-jjj"
+		},
+		"provider_key": "stripe",
+		"name": "instance-1"
+	}`)
+	out := RedactAuditBody(raw, "application/json")
+
+	for _, secret := range []string{
+		"sk-session-aaa", "pem-body-bbb", "sa-blob-ccc",
+		"proxypass-ddd", "sk-custom-eee",
+		"easypay-merchant-fff", "alipay-pem-ggg", "wxpay-v3-hhh",
+		"stripe-sk-iii", "whsec-jjj",
+	} {
+		if strings.Contains(out, secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("redacted body still contains secret %q: %s", secret, out)
+		}
+	}
+	// provider_key 是渠道标识而非密钥，必须保留以便追责。
+	if !strings.Contains(out, `"provider_key":"stripe"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("provider_key should be preserved for accountability: %s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "instance-1") {
+		t.Fatalf("name should be preserved: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// SensitiveCredentialKeys 中的每个键都必须被审计脱敏判定命中（防两表漂移的守卫）。
+func TestAuditSensitiveKeys_CoverCredentialTable(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, k := range SensitiveCredentialKeys {
+		if !isAuditSensitiveBodyKey(k) {
+			t.Fatalf("credential key %q is not covered by audit redaction", k)
+		}
+	}
+	for provider, fields := range providerSensitiveConfigFields {
+		for k := range fields {
+			if !isAuditSensitiveBodyKey(k) {
+				t.Fatalf("payment provider %q sensitive field %q is not covered by audit redaction", provider, k)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRedactAuditBody_NonJSONOmitted(t *testing.T) {
+	out := RedactAuditBody([]byte("username=admin&password=secret"), "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+	if strings.Contains(out, "secret") {
+		t.Fatalf("non-json body must not leak content: %s", out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "omitted") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected omission marker, got: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRedactAuditBody_Empty(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := RedactAuditBody(nil, "application/json"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected empty for nil body, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSessionBindingHash(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &SessionBinding{IP: "1.2.3.4", UserAgent: "Mozilla/5.0"}
+	b := &SessionBinding{IP: "1.2.3.4", UserAgent: "Mozilla/5.0"}
+	if a.Hash() != b.Hash() {
+		t.Fatalf("identical bindings must hash equal")
+	}
+	if a.Hash() == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("non-empty binding must produce non-empty hash")
+	}
+
+	// IP 变化 → 哈希变化。
+	c := &SessionBinding{IP: "5.6.7.8", UserAgent: "Mozilla/5.0"}
+	if a.Hash() == c.Hash() {
+		t.Fatalf("changing IP must change hash")
+	}
+	// UA 变化 → 哈希变化。
+	d := &SessionBinding{IP: "1.2.3.4", UserAgent: "curl/8.0"}
+	if a.Hash() == d.Hash() {
+		t.Fatalf("changing UA must change hash")
+	}
+
+	// 空指纹 → 空哈希（旧 token 兼容）。
+	empty := &SessionBinding{}
+	if empty.Hash() != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("empty binding must hash to empty string")
+	}
+	var nilBinding *SessionBinding
+	if nilBinding.Hash() != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("nil binding must hash to empty string")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseAuditLogRetentionDays(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := map[string]int{
+		"":       defaultAuditLogRetentionDays,
+		"abc":    defaultAuditLogRetentionDays,
+		"90":     90,
+		"0":      0,
+		"-1":     0,
+		"  30  ": 30,
+	}
+	for in, want := range cases {
+		if got := parseAuditLogRetentionDays(in); got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("parseAuditLogRetentionDays(%q) = %d, want %d", in, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

backend/internal/service/auth_service.go

@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ type JWTClaims struct {
 	Email        string `json:"email"`
 	Role         string `json:"role"`
 	TokenVersion int64  `json:"token_version"` // Used to invalidate tokens on password change
+	// SessionID 会话 ID（与 refresh token family 对应），用于单会话撤销与 step-up 授权绑定。
+	SessionID string `json:"sid,omitempty"`
+	// BindingHash 会话指纹哈希（IP+UA），会话绑定开启时校验；空值表示旧 token（平滑升级）。
+	BindingHash string `json:"bnd,omitempty"`
 	jwt.RegisteredClaims
 }
 
@@ -265,7 +269,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) RegisterWithVerification(ctx context.Context, email, passw
 	}
 
 	// 生成token
-	token, err := s.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := s.GenerateToken(ctx, user)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("generate token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -460,7 +464,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, email, password string) (string
 	}
 
 	// 生成JWT token
-	token, err := s.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := s.GenerateToken(ctx, user)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("generate token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -561,7 +565,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) LoginOrRegisterOAuth(ctx context.Context, email, username
 			logger.LegacyPrintf("service.auth", "[Auth] Failed to update username after oauth login: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
-	token, err := s.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := s.GenerateToken(ctx, user)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("generate token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -1185,8 +1189,18 @@ func isReservedEmail(email string) bool {
 }
 
 // GenerateToken 生成JWT access token
-// 使用新的access_token_expire_minutes配置项（如果配置了），否则回退到expire_hour
-func (s *AuthService) GenerateToken(user *User) (string, error) {
+// 使用新的access_token_expire_minutes配置项（如果配置了），否则回退到expire_hour。
+// 会话指纹（IP/UA）从 ctx 中提取（由 HTTP 入口中间件注入），缺失时生成不带绑定的 token。
+func (s *AuthService) GenerateToken(ctx context.Context, user *User) (string, error) {
+	sessionID, err := randomHexString(8)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate session id: %w", err)
+	}
+	return s.generateAccessToken(user, sessionID, sessionBindingHashFromContext(ctx))
+}
+
+// generateAccessToken 生成带会话 ID 与绑定指纹的 access token。
+func (s *AuthService) generateAccessToken(user *User, sessionID, bindingHash string) (string, error) {
 	now := time.Now()
 	var expiresAt time.Time
 	if s.cfg.JWT.AccessTokenExpireMinutes > 0 {
@@ -1201,6 +1215,8 @@ func (s *AuthService) GenerateToken(user *User) (string, error) {
 		Email:        user.Email,
 		Role:         user.Role,
 		TokenVersion: resolvedTokenVersion(user),
+		SessionID:    sessionID,
+		BindingHash:  bindingHash,
 		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
 			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expiresAt),
 			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
@@ -1270,8 +1286,16 @@ func (s *AuthService) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, oldTokenString string) (
 		return "", ErrTokenRevoked
 	}
 
+	// 会话绑定检查：指纹变化的旧 token 不允许换发新 token。
+	if s.settingService != nil && s.settingService.IsSessionBindingEnabled(ctx) && claims.BindingHash != "" {
+		if current := sessionBindingHashFromContext(ctx); current != "" && current != claims.BindingHash {
+			_ = s.RevokeSessionFamily(ctx, claims.SessionID)
+			return "", ErrSessionBindingMismatch
+		}
+	}
+
 	// 生成新token
-	return s.GenerateToken(user)
+	return s.GenerateToken(ctx, user)
 }
 
 // IsPasswordResetEnabled 检查是否启用密码重置功能
@@ -1449,8 +1473,18 @@ func (s *AuthService) GenerateTokenPair(ctx context.Context, user *User, familyI
 		return nil, errors.New("refresh token cache not configured")
 	}
 
-	// 生成Access Token
-	accessToken, err := s.GenerateToken(user)
+	// 提前确定家族ID：作为 access token 的会话ID（sid），保证同一会话的
+	// access/refresh token 可以互相关联（单会话撤销、step-up 授权绑定）。
+	if familyID == "" {
+		familyBytes := make([]byte, 16)
+		if _, err := rand.Read(familyBytes); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate family id: %w", err)
+		}
+		familyID = hex.EncodeToString(familyBytes)
+	}
+
+	// 生成Access Token（携带会话ID与绑定指纹）
+	accessToken, err := s.generateAccessToken(user, familyID, sessionBindingHashFromContext(ctx))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate access token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -1496,6 +1530,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) generateRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, user *User, fami
 		UserID:       user.ID,
 		TokenVersion: resolvedTokenVersion(user),
 		FamilyID:     familyID,
+		BindingHash:  sessionBindingHashFromContext(ctx),
 		CreatedAt:    now,
 		ExpiresAt:    now.Add(ttl),
 	}
@@ -1580,6 +1615,16 @@ func (s *AuthService) RefreshTokenPair(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string)
 		return nil, ErrTokenRevoked
 	}
 
+	// 会话绑定检查：IP/UA 任一变化即撤销整个会话家族。
+	// data.BindingHash 为空表示功能开启前签发的旧会话，放行并在轮转时补齐绑定。
+	if s.settingService != nil && s.settingService.IsSessionBindingEnabled(ctx) && data.BindingHash != "" {
+		if current := sessionBindingHashFromContext(ctx); current != "" && current != data.BindingHash {
+			_ = s.refreshTokenCache.DeleteTokenFamily(ctx, data.FamilyID)
+			logger.LegacyPrintf("service.auth", "[Auth] Session binding mismatch on refresh for user %d, family revoked", data.UserID)
+			return nil, ErrSessionBindingMismatch
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Token轮转：立即使旧Token失效
 	if err := s.refreshTokenCache.DeleteRefreshToken(ctx, tokenHash); err != nil {
 		logger.LegacyPrintf("service.auth", "[Auth] Failed to delete old refresh token: %v", err)
@@ -1610,6 +1655,15 @@ func (s *AuthService) RevokeRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken strin
 	return s.refreshTokenCache.DeleteRefreshToken(ctx, tokenHash)
 }
 
+// RevokeSessionFamily 撤销单个会话家族（该会话的所有 refresh token）。
+// 用于会话绑定失效等单会话级撤销场景，不影响用户的其他设备会话。
+func (s *AuthService) RevokeSessionFamily(ctx context.Context, familyID string) error {
+	if s.refreshTokenCache == nil || familyID == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return s.refreshTokenCache.DeleteTokenFamily(ctx, familyID)
+}
+
 // RevokeAllUserSessions 撤销用户的所有会话（所有Refresh Token）
 // 用于密码更改或用户主动登出所有设备
 func (s *AuthService) RevokeAllUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID int64) error {

backend/internal/service/auth_service_register_test.go

@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ func TestAuthService_ValidateToken_ExpiredReturnsClaimsWithError(t *testing.T) {
 		Status:       StatusActive,
 		TokenVersion: 1,
 	}
-	token, err := service.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := service.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// 验证有效 token
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ func TestAuthService_ValidateToken_ExpiredReturnsClaimsWithError(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// 模拟过期 token（通过创建一个过期很久的 token）
 	service.cfg.JWT.ExpireHour = -1 // 设置为负数使 token 立即过期
-	expiredToken, err := service.GenerateToken(user)
+	expiredToken, err := service.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	service.cfg.JWT.ExpireHour = 1 // 恢复
 
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ func TestAuthService_RefreshToken_ExpiredTokenNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// 创建过期 token
 	service.cfg.JWT.ExpireHour = -1
-	expiredToken, err := service.GenerateToken(user)
+	expiredToken, err := service.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	service.cfg.JWT.ExpireHour = 1
 
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ func TestAuthService_GenerateToken_UsesExpireHourWhenMinutesZero(t *testing.T) {
 		TokenVersion: 1,
 	}
 
-	token, err := service.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := service.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	claims, err := service.ValidateToken(token)
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func TestAuthService_GenerateToken_UsesMinutesWhenConfigured(t *testing.T) {
 		TokenVersion: 1,
 	}
 
-	token, err := service.GenerateToken(user)
+	token, err := service.GenerateToken(context.Background(), user)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	claims, err := service.ValidateToken(token)

backend/internal/service/domain_constants.go

@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ const (
 	// TOTP 双因素认证设置
 	SettingKeyTotpEnabled = "totp_enabled" // 是否启用 TOTP 2FA 功能
 
+	// 会话安全设置
+	SettingKeySessionBindingEnabled = "session_binding_enabled" // 会话 IP/UA 绑定（变更即失效），默认开启
+
+	// 操作审计日志设置
+	SettingKeyAuditLogRetentionDays = "audit_log_retention_days" // 审计日志保留天数（<=0 永久保留），默认 180
+
 	// LinuxDo Connect OAuth 登录设置
 	SettingKeyLinuxDoConnectEnabled      = "linuxdo_connect_enabled"
 	SettingKeyLinuxDoConnectClientID     = "linuxdo_connect_client_id"

backend/internal/service/refresh_token_cache.go

@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ var ErrRefreshTokenNotFound = errors.New("refresh token not found")
 // RefreshTokenData 存储在Redis中的Refresh Token数据
 type RefreshTokenData struct {
 	UserID       int64     `json:"user_id"`
-	TokenVersion int64     `json:"token_version"` // 用于检测密码更改后的Token失效
-	FamilyID     string    `json:"family_id"`     // Token家族ID，用于防重放攻击
+	TokenVersion int64     `json:"token_version"`          // 用于检测密码更改后的Token失效
+	FamilyID     string    `json:"family_id"`              // Token家族ID，用于防重放攻击
+	BindingHash  string    `json:"binding_hash,omitempty"` // 会话指纹哈希（IP+UA），会话绑定开启时校验
 	CreatedAt    time.Time `json:"created_at"`
 	ExpiresAt    time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
 }

backend/internal/service/session_binding.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package service
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"strings"
+
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+)
+
+// ErrSessionBindingMismatch 会话绑定的 IP/UA 发生变化，会话已失效。
+var ErrSessionBindingMismatch = infraerrors.Unauthorized("SESSION_BINDING_MISMATCH", "session network fingerprint changed, please login again")
+
+// SessionBinding 会话指纹：登录时的客户端 IP 与 User-Agent。
+// 会话绑定开启时，两者任一变化即导致会话失效（防止凭证被盗后异地重放）。
+type SessionBinding struct {
+	IP        string
+	UserAgent string
+}
+
+// Hash 计算绑定指纹哈希（IP 与 UA 合并，任一变化哈希即变化）。
+func (b *SessionBinding) Hash() string {
+	if b == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	ip := strings.TrimSpace(b.IP)
+	ua := strings.TrimSpace(b.UserAgent)
+	if ip == "" && ua == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ip + "\n" + ua))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:16])
+}
+
+type sessionBindingCtxKey struct{}
+
+// WithSessionBinding 将会话指纹注入 context（由 HTTP 入口中间件调用）。
+func WithSessionBinding(ctx context.Context, binding *SessionBinding) context.Context {
+	if binding == nil {
+		return ctx
+	}
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, sessionBindingCtxKey{}, binding)
+}
+
+// SessionBindingFromContext 从 context 提取会话指纹；不存在时返回 nil。
+func SessionBindingFromContext(ctx context.Context) *SessionBinding {
+	if ctx == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	binding, _ := ctx.Value(sessionBindingCtxKey{}).(*SessionBinding)
+	return binding
+}
+
+// sessionBindingHashFromContext 提取指纹哈希，缺失时返回空串。
+func sessionBindingHashFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
+	return SessionBindingFromContext(ctx).Hash()
+}

backend/internal/service/setting_features.go

@@ -179,6 +179,44 @@ func (s *SettingService) IsTotpEncryptionKeyConfigured() bool {
 	return s.cfg.Totp.EncryptionKeyConfigured
 }
 
+// IsSessionBindingEnabled 检查会话 IP/UA 绑定是否启用（默认开启）。
+// 开启时会话与登录时的 IP/User-Agent 绑定，任一变化立即失效并撤销该会话。
+func (s *SettingService) IsSessionBindingEnabled(ctx context.Context) bool {
+	value, err := s.settingRepo.GetValue(ctx, SettingKeySessionBindingEnabled)
+	if err != nil {
+		return true // 默认开启
+	}
+	return value != "false"
+}
+
+// defaultAuditLogRetentionDays 审计日志默认保留天数。
+const defaultAuditLogRetentionDays = 180
+
+// GetAuditLogRetentionDays 审计日志保留天数（<=0 表示永久保留，仅支持手动清空）。
+func (s *SettingService) GetAuditLogRetentionDays(ctx context.Context) int {
+	value, err := s.settingRepo.GetValue(ctx, SettingKeyAuditLogRetentionDays)
+	if err != nil {
+		return defaultAuditLogRetentionDays
+	}
+	return parseAuditLogRetentionDays(value)
+}
+
+// parseAuditLogRetentionDays 解析保留天数配置，空/非法值回退默认值。
+func parseAuditLogRetentionDays(value string) int {
+	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
+	if value == "" {
+		return defaultAuditLogRetentionDays
+	}
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return defaultAuditLogRetentionDays
+	}
+	if n < 0 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
 // GetSiteName 获取网站名称
 func (s *SettingService) GetSiteName(ctx context.Context) string {
 	value, err := s.settingRepo.GetValue(ctx, SettingKeySiteName)

backend/internal/service/setting_parse.go

@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ func (s *SettingService) parseSettings(settings map[string]string) *SystemSettin
 		FrontendURL:                      settings[SettingKeyFrontendURL],
 		InvitationCodeEnabled:            settings[SettingKeyInvitationCodeEnabled] == "true",
 		TotpEnabled:                      settings[SettingKeyTotpEnabled] == "true",
+		SessionBindingEnabled:            settings[SettingKeySessionBindingEnabled] != "false", // 默认开启
+		AuditLogRetentionDays:            parseAuditLogRetentionDays(settings[SettingKeyAuditLogRetentionDays]),
 		LoginAgreementEnabled:            settings[SettingKeyLoginAgreementEnabled] == "true",
 		LoginAgreementMode:               normalizeLoginAgreementMode(settings[SettingKeyLoginAgreementMode]),
 		LoginAgreementUpdatedAt:          loginAgreementUpdatedAt,

backend/internal/service/setting_update.go

@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ func (s *SettingService) buildSystemSettingsUpdates(ctx context.Context, setting
 	updates[SettingKeyFrontendURL] = settings.FrontendURL
 	updates[SettingKeyInvitationCodeEnabled] = strconv.FormatBool(settings.InvitationCodeEnabled)
 	updates[SettingKeyTotpEnabled] = strconv.FormatBool(settings.TotpEnabled)
+	updates[SettingKeySessionBindingEnabled] = strconv.FormatBool(settings.SessionBindingEnabled)
+	updates[SettingKeyAuditLogRetentionDays] = strconv.Itoa(settings.AuditLogRetentionDays)
 	settings.LoginAgreementMode = normalizeLoginAgreementMode(settings.LoginAgreementMode)
 	settings.LoginAgreementUpdatedAt = strings.TrimSpace(settings.LoginAgreementUpdatedAt)
 	if settings.LoginAgreementUpdatedAt == "" {

backend/internal/service/settings_view.go

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ type SystemSettings struct {
 	FrontendURL                      string
 	InvitationCodeEnabled            bool
 	TotpEnabled                      bool // TOTP 双因素认证
+	SessionBindingEnabled            bool // 会话 IP/UA 绑定（变更即失效）
+	AuditLogRetentionDays            int  // 审计日志保留天数（<=0 永久保留）
 	LoginAgreementEnabled            bool
 	LoginAgreementMode               string
 	LoginAgreementUpdatedAt          string

backend/internal/service/totp_service.go

@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ type TotpCache interface {
 	IncrementVerifyAttempts(ctx context.Context, userID int64) (int, error)
 	GetVerifyAttempts(ctx context.Context, userID int64) (int, error)
 	ClearVerifyAttempts(ctx context.Context, userID int64) error
+
+	// Step-up grant methods (敏感操作 sudo 窗口)
+	SetStepUpGrant(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey string, ttl time.Duration) error
+	HasStepUpGrant(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey string) (bool, error)
 }
 
 // SecretEncryptor defines encryption operations for TOTP secrets
@@ -401,6 +405,26 @@ func (s *TotpService) VerifyCode(ctx context.Context, userID int64, code string)
 	return nil
 }
 
+// StepUpGrantTTL 敏感操作 step-up 验证的有效窗口（sudo 模式）。
+const StepUpGrantTTL = 15 * time.Minute
+
+// VerifyStepUp 校验 TOTP 码并授予当前会话一段时间的 step-up 权限。
+// 返回授权有效期，供前端展示/设置提醒。
+func (s *TotpService) VerifyStepUp(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey, code string) (time.Duration, error) {
+	if err := s.VerifyCode(ctx, userID, code); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	if err := s.cache.SetStepUpGrant(ctx, userID, sessionKey, StepUpGrantTTL); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("store step-up grant: %w", err)
+	}
+	return StepUpGrantTTL, nil
+}
+
+// HasStepUpGrant 检查当前会话是否在 step-up 有效期内。
+func (s *TotpService) HasStepUpGrant(ctx context.Context, userID int64, sessionKey string) (bool, error) {
+	return s.cache.HasStepUpGrant(ctx, userID, sessionKey)
+}
+
 // CreateLoginSession creates a temporary login session for 2FA
 func (s *TotpService) CreateLoginSession(ctx context.Context, userID int64, email string) (string, error) {
 	return s.createLoginSession(ctx, userID, email, nil)

backend/internal/service/wire.go

@@ -433,6 +433,14 @@ func ProvideOpsSystemLogSink(opsRepo OpsRepository) *OpsSystemLogSink {
 	return sink
 }
 
+// ProvideAuditLogService 创建操作审计日志服务并启动异步写入与保留期清理协程。
+// 停止逻辑挂在 cmd/server 的 provideCleanup。
+func ProvideAuditLogService(repo AuditLogRepository, settingService *SettingService) *AuditLogService {
+	svc := NewAuditLogService(repo, settingService)
+	svc.Start()
+	return svc
+}
+
 func buildIdempotencyConfig(cfg *config.Config) IdempotencyConfig {
 	idempotencyCfg := DefaultIdempotencyConfig()
 	if cfg != nil {
@@ -688,6 +696,7 @@ var ProviderSet = wire.NewSet(
 	ProvideBackupService,
 	ProvideOpsSystemLogSink,
 	ProvideOpsService,
+	ProvideAuditLogService,
 	ProvideOpsMetricsCollector,
 	ProvideOpsAggregationService,
 	ProvideOpsAlertEvaluatorService,

backend/migrations/180_audit_logs.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- 管理面操作审计日志（append-only）
+-- 记录管理员/用户在管理面（非 AI 网关转发面）的操作：
+--   变更类请求 + 敏感读取（导出/备份下载等） + 认证事件（登录/2FA/会话绑定失效）
+-- 设计约束：
+--   1. 不提供单条删除；仅支持带 2FA 验证的全量清空（TRUNCATE），清空后写入留痕记录
+--   2. credential_masked 仅保存请求头凭证的首尾片段（中间以 * 遮蔽）
+--   3. request_body 为脱敏后的请求体（敏感键值已擦除、超长截断）
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_logs (
+    id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    actor_user_id BIGINT,
+    actor_email VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    actor_role VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    auth_method VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    credential_masked VARCHAR(160) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    action VARCHAR(128) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    method VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    path VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    request_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    client_ip VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    user_agent VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    request_body TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    status_code INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    latency_ms BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    extra JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_logs_created_at_id
+    ON audit_logs (created_at DESC, id DESC);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_logs_actor_created
+    ON audit_logs (actor_user_id, created_at DESC);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_logs_action
+    ON audit_logs (action);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_logs_client_ip
+    ON audit_logs (client_ip);

frontend/src/api/admin/audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/**
+ * Admin operation audit log API.
+ *
+ * The audit log is admin-only (not exposed to end users). It records
+ * management-plane operations with masked header credentials and redacted
+ * request bodies. Entries cannot be deleted individually; the whole log can
+ * only be cleared with a fresh TOTP verification.
+ */
+
+import { apiClient } from '../client'
+import type { PaginatedResponse } from '@/types'
+
+export interface AuditLog {
+  id: number
+  created_at: string
+  actor_user_id?: number
+  actor_email: string
+  actor_role: string
+  auth_method: string
+  credential_masked: string
+  action: string
+  method: string
+  path: string
+  request_id: string
+  client_ip: string
+  user_agent: string
+  request_body?: string
+  status_code: number
+  latency_ms: number
+  extra?: Record<string, any>
+}
+
+export interface AuditLogQuery {
+  page?: number
+  page_size?: number
+  start_time?: string
+  end_time?: string
+  actor_user_id?: number
+  actor_email?: string
+  auth_method?: string
+  action?: string
+  method?: string
+  client_ip?: string
+  success?: string
+  q?: string
+}
+
+export type AuditLogListResponse = PaginatedResponse<AuditLog>
+
+/**
+ * List audit logs (paginated, filterable).
+ */
+export async function list(params: AuditLogQuery): Promise<AuditLogListResponse> {
+  const { data } = await apiClient.get('/admin/audit-logs', { params })
+  return data
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get a single audit log entry (includes the redacted request body).
+ */
+export async function get(id: number): Promise<AuditLog> {
+  const { data } = await apiClient.get(`/admin/audit-logs/${id}`)
+  return data
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clear all audit logs. Requires a fresh TOTP code (verified server-side);
+ * unavailable when 2FA is not enabled for the operator.
+ * @param totpCode - current 6-digit TOTP code
+ */
+export async function clear(totpCode: string): Promise<{ deleted: number }> {
+  const { data } = await apiClient.post('/admin/audit-logs/clear', { totp_code: totpCode })
+  return data
+}
+
+export const auditAPI = {
+  list,
+  get,
+  clear
+}
+
+export default auditAPI

frontend/src/api/admin/index.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import adminPaymentAPI from './payment'
 import affiliatesAPI from './affiliates'
 import riskControlAPI from './riskControl'
 import adminComplianceAPI from './compliance'
+import auditAPI from './audit'
 
 /**
  * Unified admin API object for convenient access
@@ -67,7 +68,8 @@ export const adminAPI = {
   payment: adminPaymentAPI,
   affiliates: affiliatesAPI,
   riskControl: riskControlAPI,
-  compliance: adminComplianceAPI
+  compliance: adminComplianceAPI,
+  audit: auditAPI
 }
 
 export {
@@ -100,12 +102,14 @@ export {
   adminPaymentAPI,
   affiliatesAPI,
   riskControlAPI,
-  adminComplianceAPI
+  adminComplianceAPI,
+  auditAPI
 }
 
 export default adminAPI
 
 // Re-export types used by components
+export type { AuditLog, AuditLogQuery, AuditLogListResponse } from './audit'
 export type { BalanceHistoryItem } from './users'
 export type { ErrorPassthroughRule, CreateRuleRequest, UpdateRuleRequest } from './errorPassthrough'
 export type { BackupAgentHealth, DataManagementConfig } from './dataManagement'

frontend/src/api/admin/settings.ts

@@ -366,6 +366,8 @@ export interface SystemSettings {
   invitation_code_enabled: boolean;
   totp_enabled: boolean; // TOTP 双因素认证
   totp_encryption_key_configured: boolean; // TOTP 加密密钥是否已配置
+  session_binding_enabled: boolean; // 会话 IP/UA 绑定
+  audit_log_retention_days: number; // 审计日志保留天数
   login_agreement_enabled: boolean;
   login_agreement_mode: "modal" | "checkbox" | string;
   login_agreement_updated_at: string;
@@ -669,6 +671,8 @@ export interface UpdateSettingsRequest {
   frontend_url?: string;
   invitation_code_enabled?: boolean;
   totp_enabled?: boolean; // TOTP 双因素认证
+  session_binding_enabled?: boolean; // 会话 IP/UA 绑定
+  audit_log_retention_days?: number; // 审计日志保留天数
   login_agreement_enabled?: boolean;
   login_agreement_mode?: "modal" | "checkbox" | string;
   login_agreement_updated_at?: string;

frontend/src/api/totp.ts

@@ -71,13 +71,32 @@ export async function disable(request: TotpDisableRequest): Promise<{ success: b
   return data
 }
 
+/**
+ * Step-up verification response
+ */
+export interface TotpStepUpResponse {
+  verified: boolean
+  expires_in: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a TOTP code to grant the current session a short-lived step-up
+ * (sudo) window for sensitive operations (account export, DB backup download...).
+ * @param code - 6-digit TOTP code
+ */
+export async function stepUp(code: string): Promise<TotpStepUpResponse> {
+  const { data } = await apiClient.post<TotpStepUpResponse>('/user/totp/step-up', { code })
+  return data
+}
+
 export const totpAPI = {
   getStatus,
   getVerificationMethod,
   sendVerifyCode,
   initiateSetup,
   enable,
-  disable
+  disable,
+  stepUp
 }
 
 export default totpAPI

frontend/src/components/auth/TotpStepUpDialog.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+<template>
+  <div v-if="controller.visible.value" class="fixed inset-0 z-[60] overflow-y-auto">
+    <div class="flex min-h-full items-center justify-center p-4">
+      <div class="fixed inset-0 bg-black/50 transition-opacity" @click="handleCancel"></div>
+
+      <div class="relative w-full max-w-md transform rounded-xl bg-white p-6 shadow-xl transition-all dark:bg-dark-800">
+        <div class="mb-6 text-center">
+          <div class="mx-auto flex h-12 w-12 items-center justify-center rounded-full bg-primary-100 dark:bg-primary-900/30">
+            <svg class="h-6 w-6 text-primary-600 dark:text-primary-400" fill="none" viewBox="0 0 24 24" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">
+              <path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" d="M16.5 10.5V6.75a4.5 4.5 0 10-9 0v3.75m-.75 11.25h10.5a2.25 2.25 0 002.25-2.25v-6.75a2.25 2.25 0 00-2.25-2.25H6.75a2.25 2.25 0 00-2.25 2.25v6.75a2.25 2.25 0 002.25 2.25z" />
+            </svg>
+          </div>
+          <h3 class="mt-4 text-xl font-semibold text-gray-900 dark:text-white">
+            {{ t('stepUp.title') }}
+          </h3>
+          <p class="mt-2 text-sm text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">
+            {{ t('stepUp.hint') }}
+          </p>
+        </div>
+
+        <div class="mb-6">
+          <input
+            ref="hiddenOtpInputRef"
+            type="text"
+            inputmode="numeric"
+            autocomplete="one-time-code"
+            maxlength="6"
+            class="pointer-events-none absolute left-0 top-0 h-px w-px opacity-0"
+            aria-hidden="true"
+            tabindex="-1"
+            @input="handleHiddenOtpInput"
+          />
+          <div class="flex justify-center gap-2">
+            <input
+              v-for="(_, index) in 6"
+              :key="index"
+              :ref="(el) => setInputRef(el, index)"
+              type="text"
+              maxlength="1"
+              inputmode="numeric"
+              pattern="[0-9]"
+              autocomplete="off"
+              class="h-12 w-10 rounded-lg border border-gray-300 text-center text-lg font-semibold focus:border-primary-500 focus:ring-primary-500 dark:border-dark-600 dark:bg-dark-700"
+              :disabled="verifying"
+              @input="handleCodeInput($event, index)"
+              @keydown="handleKeydown($event, index)"
+              @paste="handlePaste"
+            />
+          </div>
+          <div v-if="verifying" class="mt-3 flex items-center justify-center gap-2 text-sm text-gray-500">
+            <div class="animate-spin rounded-full h-4 w-4 border-b-2 border-primary-500"></div>
+            {{ t('common.verifying') }}
+          </div>
+        </div>
+
+        <button
+          type="button"
+          class="btn btn-secondary w-full"
+          :disabled="verifying"
+          @click="handleCancel"
+        >
+          {{ t('common.cancel') }}
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</template>
+
+<script setup lang="ts">
+import { ref, watch, nextTick } from 'vue'
+import { useI18n } from 'vue-i18n'
+import { useAppStore } from '@/stores'
+import { totpAPI } from '@/api'
+import type { StepUpController } from '@/composables/useStepUp'
+
+const props = defineProps<{
+  controller: StepUpController
+}>()
+
+const { t } = useI18n()
+const appStore = useAppStore()
+
+const verifying = ref(false)
+const code = ref<string[]>(['', '', '', '', '', ''])
+const inputRefs = ref<(HTMLInputElement | null)[]>([])
+const hiddenOtpInputRef = ref<HTMLInputElement | null>(null)
+
+// Focus the first cell whenever the dialog opens.
+watch(
+  () => props.controller.visible.value,
+  (open) => {
+    if (open) {
+      resetInputs()
+      nextTick(() => inputRefs.value[0]?.focus())
+    }
+  }
+)
+
+// Auto-submit once 6 digits are entered.
+watch(
+  () => code.value.join(''),
+  (newCode) => {
+    if (newCode.length === 6 && !verifying.value) {
+      submit(newCode)
+    }
+  }
+)
+
+async function submit(otp: string) {
+  verifying.value = true
+  try {
+    await totpAPI.stepUp(otp)
+    verifying.value = false
+    resetInputs()
+    props.controller.onVerified()
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    verifying.value = false
+    appStore.showError(err?.message || t('stepUp.verifyFailed'))
+    resetInputs()
+    nextTick(() => inputRefs.value[0]?.focus())
+  }
+}
+
+function resetInputs() {
+  code.value = ['', '', '', '', '', '']
+  inputRefs.value.forEach((input) => {
+    if (input) input.value = ''
+  })
+  if (hiddenOtpInputRef.value) hiddenOtpInputRef.value.value = ''
+}
+
+function handleCancel() {
+  if (verifying.value) return
+  props.controller.onCancel()
+}
+
+const setInputRef = (el: any, index: number) => {
+  inputRefs.value[index] = el as HTMLInputElement | null
+}
+
+const handleCodeInput = (event: Event, index: number) => {
+  const input = event.target as HTMLInputElement
+  const value = input.value.replace(/[^0-9]/g, '')
+  code.value[index] = value
+  if (value && index < 5) {
+    nextTick(() => inputRefs.value[index + 1]?.focus())
+  }
+}
+
+const handleHiddenOtpInput = (event: Event) => {
+  const input = event.target as HTMLInputElement
+  const digits = input.value.replace(/[^0-9]/g, '').slice(0, 6).split('')
+  for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+    code.value[i] = digits[i] || ''
+    if (inputRefs.value[i]) inputRefs.value[i]!.value = digits[i] || ''
+  }
+}
+
+const handleKeydown = (event: KeyboardEvent, index: number) => {
+  if (event.key === 'Backspace') {
+    const input = event.target as HTMLInputElement
+    if (!input.value && index > 0) {
+      event.preventDefault()
+      inputRefs.value[index - 1]?.focus()
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+const handlePaste = (event: ClipboardEvent) => {
+  event.preventDefault()
+  const pastedData = event.clipboardData?.getData('text') || ''
+  const digits = pastedData.replace(/[^0-9]/g, '').slice(0, 6).split('')
+  for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+    code.value[i] = digits[i] || ''
+    if (inputRefs.value[i]) inputRefs.value[i]!.value = digits[i] || ''
+  }
+  const focusIndex = Math.min(digits.length, 5)
+  nextTick(() => inputRefs.value[focusIndex]?.focus())
+}
+</script>

frontend/src/components/layout/AppSidebar.vue

@@ -800,7 +800,8 @@ const adminNavItems = computed((): NavItem[] => {
         { path: '/admin/orders/plans', label: t('nav.paymentPlans'), icon: CreditCardIcon },
       ],
     },
-    { path: '/admin/usage', label: t('nav.usage'), icon: ChartIcon }
+    { path: '/admin/usage', label: t('nav.usage'), icon: ChartIcon },
+    { path: '/admin/audit-logs', label: t('nav.auditLogs'), icon: ShieldIcon, hideInSimpleMode: true }
   ]
 
   const visible = applyFeatureFlags(baseItems)

frontend/src/composables/__tests__/useStepUp.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
+import {
+  useStepUp,
+  isStepUpRequired,
+  isStepUpBlocked,
+  isStepUpCancelled,
+  stepUpBlockReason,
+  StepUpCancelledError
+} from '../useStepUp'
+
+describe('useStepUp error classification', () => {
+  it('detects STEP_UP_REQUIRED from code field', () => {
+    expect(isStepUpRequired({ status: 403, code: 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED' })).toBe(true)
+    expect(isStepUpRequired({ status: 403, reason: 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED' })).toBe(true)
+    expect(isStepUpRequired({ status: 500, code: 'INTERNAL' })).toBe(false)
+    expect(isStepUpRequired(null)).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('detects blocked (non-retryable) step-up errors', () => {
+    expect(isStepUpBlocked({ code: 'STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED' })).toBe(true)
+    expect(isStepUpBlocked({ reason: 'STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN' })).toBe(true)
+    expect(isStepUpBlocked({ code: 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED' })).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('surfaces the block reason marker', () => {
+    expect(stepUpBlockReason({ reason: 'STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN' })).toBe('STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN')
+    expect(stepUpBlockReason({ code: 'OTHER' })).toBe('')
+  })
+})
+
+describe('useStepUp.run', () => {
+  it('returns the action result directly on success', async () => {
+    const stepUp = useStepUp()
+    const result = await stepUp.run(async () => 42)
+    expect(result).toBe(42)
+    expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('re-throws non-step-up errors without prompting', async () => {
+    const stepUp = useStepUp()
+    const err = { status: 500, code: 'INTERNAL' }
+    await expect(stepUp.run(async () => { throw err })).rejects.toBe(err)
+    expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('re-throws blocked errors without prompting', async () => {
+    const stepUp = useStepUp()
+    const err = { status: 403, code: 'STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED' }
+    await expect(stepUp.run(async () => { throw err })).rejects.toBe(err)
+    expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('prompts on STEP_UP_REQUIRED and retries after verification', async () => {
+    const stepUp = useStepUp()
+    let calls = 0
+    const action = async () => {
+      calls++
+      if (calls === 1) throw { status: 403, code: 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED' }
+      return 'ok'
+    }
+    const promise = stepUp.run(action)
+    // The dialog should now be open, awaiting verification (after the first rejection is handled).
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(true))
+    stepUp.onVerified()
+    await expect(promise).resolves.toBe('ok')
+    expect(calls).toBe(2)
+    expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('throws a cancellation sentinel (not the original error) if the user cancels the prompt', async () => {
+    const stepUp = useStepUp()
+    const err = { status: 403, code: 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED' }
+    const promise = stepUp.run(async () => { throw err })
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(true))
+    stepUp.onCancel()
+    await expect(promise).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(StepUpCancelledError)
+    expect(stepUp.visible.value).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('classifies the cancellation sentinel distinctly from step-up errors', () => {
+    const cancelled = new StepUpCancelledError()
+    expect(isStepUpCancelled(cancelled)).toBe(true)
+    expect(isStepUpRequired(cancelled)).toBe(false)
+    expect(isStepUpBlocked(cancelled)).toBe(false)
+    expect(isStepUpCancelled({ status: 403, code: 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED' })).toBe(false)
+  })
+})

frontend/src/composables/useStepUp.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * Step-up (sudo) 2FA composable.
+ *
+ * Wraps a sensitive admin action so that when the backend responds with a
+ * STEP_UP_REQUIRED error, the caller can prompt for a TOTP code, obtain a
+ * short-lived grant, and transparently retry the original action.
+ *
+ * Usage in a view:
+ *   const stepUp = useStepUp()
+ *   async function exportData() {
+ *     await stepUp.run(() => adminAPI.accounts.exportData(...))
+ *   }
+ *   // template: <TotpStepUpDialog :controller="stepUp" />
+ */
+import { ref } from 'vue'
+
+/** Error codes the backend uses to signal step-up state. */
+const STEP_UP_REQUIRED = 'STEP_UP_REQUIRED'
+const STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED = 'STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED'
+const STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN = 'STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN'
+
+/**
+ * Thrown by run() when the user dismisses the TOTP dialog.
+ * Callers should treat it as a silent no-op, not an error to toast.
+ */
+export class StepUpCancelledError extends Error {
+  readonly code = 'STEP_UP_CANCELLED'
+  constructor() {
+    super('step-up verification cancelled by user')
+    this.name = 'StepUpCancelledError'
+  }
+}
+
+export function isStepUpCancelled(err: unknown): boolean {
+  return err instanceof StepUpCancelledError
+}
+
+interface ApiError {
+  status?: number
+  code?: string | number
+  reason?: string
+  message?: string
+}
+
+/** Extract the semantic error marker from either envelope shape (code or reason). */
+function markerOf(err: unknown): string {
+  const e = (err ?? {}) as ApiError
+  const candidates = [e.code, e.reason].map((v) => (typeof v === 'string' ? v : ''))
+  return candidates.find((v) => v.startsWith('STEP_UP')) || ''
+}
+
+export function isStepUpRequired(err: unknown): boolean {
+  return markerOf(err) === STEP_UP_REQUIRED
+}
+
+export function isStepUpBlocked(err: unknown): boolean {
+  const m = markerOf(err)
+  return m === STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED || m === STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN
+}
+
+export function stepUpBlockReason(err: unknown): string {
+  return markerOf(err)
+}
+
+export type StepUpController = ReturnType<typeof useStepUp>
+
+export function useStepUp() {
+  const visible = ref(false)
+  const blockedReason = ref<string>('')
+  let resolver: ((ok: boolean) => void) | null = null
+
+  /** Open the TOTP dialog and resolve true once a grant is obtained. */
+  function prompt(): Promise<boolean> {
+    visible.value = true
+    return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
+      resolver = resolve
+    })
+  }
+
+  function onVerified() {
+    visible.value = false
+    resolver?.(true)
+    resolver = null
+  }
+
+  function onCancel() {
+    visible.value = false
+    resolver?.(false)
+    resolver = null
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Run a sensitive action. On STEP_UP_REQUIRED, prompt for a TOTP code and
+   * retry once. STEP_UP_TOTP_NOT_ENABLED / admin-api-key errors are surfaced
+   * to the caller (they cannot be resolved by entering a code). If the user
+   * cancels the prompt, a StepUpCancelledError is thrown so callers can
+   * distinguish "user changed their mind" from real failures.
+   */
+  async function run<T>(action: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+    try {
+      return await action()
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (isStepUpBlocked(err)) {
+        blockedReason.value = markerOf(err)
+        throw err
+      }
+      if (!isStepUpRequired(err)) {
+        throw err
+      }
+      const ok = await prompt()
+      if (!ok) {
+        throw new StepUpCancelledError()
+      }
+      // Retry once now that the session holds a step-up grant.
+      return await action()
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    visible,
+    blockedReason,
+    prompt,
+    onVerified,
+    onCancel,
+    run
+  }
+}

frontend/src/i18n/locales/en/admin/audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+export default {
+  audit: {
+    title: 'Audit Logs',
+    description: 'Records management-plane operations by admins and users. Header credentials keep only their first/last characters and request bodies are redacted. Entries cannot be deleted individually; clearing all requires two-factor verification.',
+    clearAll: 'Clear All',
+    empty: 'No audit logs yet',
+    loadFailed: 'Failed to load audit logs',
+    filters: {
+      all: 'All',
+      q: 'Keyword',
+      qPlaceholder: 'Path / action / actor email',
+      actorEmail: 'Actor Email',
+      action: 'Action',
+      clientIp: 'Client IP',
+      method: 'Method',
+      authMethod: 'Auth Method',
+      result: 'Result',
+      resultSuccess: 'Success',
+      resultFailure: 'Failure',
+      startTime: 'Start Time',
+      endTime: 'End Time'
+    },
+    columns: {
+      time: 'Time',
+      actor: 'Actor',
+      action: 'Action',
+      method: 'Method',
+      result: 'Result',
+      clientIp: 'Client IP',
+      detail: 'Detail'
+    },
+    detail: {
+      title: 'Audit Log Detail',
+      actorRole: 'Role',
+      methodPath: 'Method / Path',
+      latency: 'Latency',
+      requestId: 'Request ID',
+      credential: 'Credential (masked)',
+      userAgent: 'User-Agent',
+      requestBody: 'Request Body (redacted)',
+      extra: 'Extra'
+    },
+    clearConfirm: {
+      title: 'Clear All Audit Logs',
+      message: 'This permanently deletes all audit logs and cannot be undone. The clear action itself is recorded. Continue?',
+      totpTitle: 'Enter Two-Factor Code',
+      totpHint: 'Clearing audit logs requires a fresh TOTP verification.',
+      success: 'Cleared {count} audit log(s)',
+      failed: 'Failed to clear audit logs'
+    }
+  }
+}

frontend/src/i18n/locales/en/admin/index.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import accounts from './accounts'
 import resources from './resources'
 import ops from './ops'
 import settings from './settings'
+import audit from './audit'
 
 export default {
   ...overview,
@@ -12,4 +13,5 @@ export default {
   ...resources,
   ...ops,
   ...settings,
+  ...audit,
 }

frontend/src/i18n/locales/en/admin/settings.ts

@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ export default {
         totpKeyNotConfigured:
           'Please configure TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY in environment variables first. Generate a key with: openssl rand -hex 32'
       },
+      security: {
+        sessionBinding: 'Session IP/UA Binding',
+        sessionBindingHint: 'Bind login sessions to the client IP and User-Agent. Any change immediately invalidates the session and forces re-login, raising the bar for stolen-credential reuse.',
+        auditRetention: 'Audit Log Retention (days)',
+        auditRetentionHint: 'Audit logs older than this are cleaned up automatically. Set to 0 to keep them forever (manual clear only).'
+      },
       turnstile: {
         title: 'Cloudflare Turnstile',
         description: 'Bot protection for login and registration',

frontend/src/i18n/locales/en/common.ts

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ export default {
     channelMonitor: 'Channel Monitor',
     channelStatus: 'Channel Status',
     riskControl: 'Risk Control',
+    auditLogs: 'Audit Logs',
   },
 
   // Auth
@@ -413,5 +414,14 @@ export default {
     invalidOrExpiredToken: 'The password reset link is invalid or has expired. Please request a new one.'
   },
 
+  // Step-up (sudo) 2FA prompt
+  stepUp: {
+    title: 'Two-Factor Verification Required',
+    hint: 'Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app to continue this sensitive operation.',
+    verifyFailed: 'Verification failed, please try again',
+    notEnabled: 'This operation requires two-factor authentication. Please enable TOTP in your profile first.',
+    adminApiKeyForbidden: 'Admin API keys cannot perform this operation. Use a two-factor verified admin session.'
+  },
+
   // Dashboard
 }

frontend/src/i18n/locales/zh/admin/audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+export default {
+  audit: {
+    title: '操作日志',
+    description: '记录管理员与用户的管理面操作，请求头凭证仅保留首尾、请求体已脱敏。日志无法单条删除，全量清理需二次验证。',
+    clearAll: '全部清理',
+    empty: '暂无操作日志',
+    loadFailed: '加载操作日志失败',
+    filters: {
+      all: '全部',
+      q: '关键字',
+      qPlaceholder: '路径 / 动作 / 操作者邮箱',
+      actorEmail: '操作者邮箱',
+      action: '动作',
+      clientIp: '客户端 IP',
+      method: '请求方法',
+      authMethod: '认证方式',
+      result: '结果',
+      resultSuccess: '成功',
+      resultFailure: '失败',
+      startTime: '开始时间',
+      endTime: '结束时间'
+    },
+    columns: {
+      time: '时间',
+      actor: '操作者',
+      action: '动作',
+      method: '方法',
+      result: '结果',
+      clientIp: '客户端 IP',
+      detail: '详情'
+    },
+    detail: {
+      title: '操作日志详情',
+      actorRole: '角色',
+      methodPath: '方法 / 路径',
+      latency: '耗时',
+      requestId: '请求 ID',
+      credential: '凭证（掩码）',
+      userAgent: 'User-Agent',
+      requestBody: '请求体（已脱敏）',
+      extra: '附加信息'
+    },
+    clearConfirm: {
+      title: '清理全部操作日志',
+      message: '此操作将永久删除所有操作日志，且不可恢复。清理动作本身会被留痕记录。确定继续吗？',
+      totpTitle: '输入二次验证码',
+      totpHint: '清理操作日志需要现场验证 TOTP 验证码。',
+      success: '已清理 {count} 条操作日志',
+      failed: '清理操作日志失败'
+    }
+  }
+}

frontend/src/i18n/locales/zh/admin/index.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import accounts from './accounts'
 import resources from './resources'
 import ops from './ops'
 import settings from './settings'
+import audit from './audit'
 
 export default {
   ...overview,
@@ -12,4 +13,5 @@ export default {
   ...resources,
   ...ops,
   ...settings,
+  ...audit,
 }

frontend/src/i18n/locales/zh/admin/settings.ts

@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ export default {
         totpKeyNotConfigured:
           '请先在环境变量中配置 TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY。使用命令 openssl rand -hex 32 生成密钥。'
       },
+      security: {
+        sessionBinding: '会话 IP/UA 绑定',
+        sessionBindingHint: '将登录会话与客户端 IP 和 User-Agent 绑定，任一变化即强制该会话失效并需重新登录（提升被盗凭证的利用门槛）。',
+        auditRetention: '操作日志保留天数',
+        auditRetentionHint: '超过该天数的操作日志将被自动清理；填 0 表示永久保留（仅支持手动清空）。'
+      },
       turnstile: {
         title: 'Cloudflare Turnstile',
         description: '登录和注册的机器人防护',

frontend/src/i18n/locales/zh/common.ts

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ export default {
     channelMonitor: '渠道监控',
     channelStatus: '渠道状态',
     riskControl: '风控中心',
+    auditLogs: '操作日志',
   },
 
   // Auth
@@ -412,5 +413,14 @@ export default {
     invalidOrExpiredToken: '密码重置链接无效或已过期。请重新请求一个新链接。'
   },
 
+  // Step-up（敏感操作二次验证）
+  stepUp: {
+    title: '需要二次验证',
+    hint: '请输入身份验证器应用中的 6 位验证码以继续此敏感操作。',
+    verifyFailed: '验证失败，请重试',
+    notEnabled: '此操作需要开启二次验证，请先在个人资料中启用 TOTP。',
+    adminApiKeyForbidden: '管理 API Key 无法执行此操作，请使用已通过二次验证的管理员会话。'
+  },
+
   // Dashboard
 }

frontend/src/router/index.ts

@@ -415,6 +415,18 @@ const routes: RouteRecordRaw[] = [
       descriptionKey: 'admin.ops.description'
     }
   },
+  {
+    path: '/admin/audit-logs',
+    name: 'AdminAuditLogs',
+    component: () => import('@/views/admin/AuditLogView.vue'),
+    meta: {
+      requiresAuth: true,
+      requiresAdmin: true,
+      title: 'Audit Logs',
+      titleKey: 'admin.audit.title',
+      descriptionKey: 'admin.audit.description'
+    }
+  },
   {
     path: '/admin/users',
     name: 'AdminUsers',

frontend/src/views/admin/AccountsView.vue

@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@
     </ConfirmDialog>
     <ErrorPassthroughRulesModal :show="showErrorPassthrough" @close="showErrorPassthrough = false" />
     <TLSFingerprintProfilesModal :show="showTLSFingerprintProfiles" @close="showTLSFingerprintProfiles = false" />
+    <TotpStepUpDialog :controller="accountExportStepUp" />
   </AppLayout>
 </template>
 
@@ -488,6 +489,8 @@ import { adminAPI } from '@/api/admin'
 import { useTableLoader } from '@/composables/useTableLoader'
 import { useSwipeSelect, type SwipeSelectVirtualContext } from '@/composables/useSwipeSelect'
 import { useTableSelection } from '@/composables/useTableSelection'
+import { useStepUp, isStepUpBlocked, isStepUpCancelled, stepUpBlockReason } from '@/composables/useStepUp'
+import TotpStepUpDialog from '@/components/auth/TotpStepUpDialog.vue'
 import AppLayout from '@/components/layout/AppLayout.vue'
 import TablePageLayout from '@/components/layout/TablePageLayout.vue'
 import DataTable from '@/components/common/DataTable.vue'
@@ -1797,14 +1800,14 @@ const handleExportData = async () => {
   if (exportingData.value) return
   exportingData.value = true
   try {
-    const dataPayload = await adminAPI.accounts.exportData(
+    const dataPayload = await accountExportStepUp.run(() => adminAPI.accounts.exportData(
       selIds.value.length > 0
         ? { ids: selIds.value, includeProxies: includeProxyOnExport.value }
         : {
             includeProxies: includeProxyOnExport.value,
             filters: buildAccountQueryFilters()
           }
-    )
+    ))
     const timestamp = formatExportTimestamp()
     const filename = `sub2api-account-${timestamp}.json`
     const blob = new Blob([JSON.stringify(dataPayload, null, 2)], { type: 'application/json' })
@@ -1822,12 +1825,23 @@ const handleExportData = async () => {
       appStore.showSuccess(t('admin.accounts.dataExported'))
     }
   } catch (error: any) {
-    appStore.showError(error?.message || t('admin.accounts.dataExportFailed'))
+    if (isStepUpCancelled(error)) {
+      // 用户主动取消 step-up 验证，静默返回，不弹错误提示。
+    } else if (isStepUpBlocked(error)) {
+      appStore.showError(
+        stepUpBlockReason(error) === 'STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN'
+          ? t('stepUp.adminApiKeyForbidden')
+          : t('stepUp.notEnabled')
+      )
+    } else {
+      appStore.showError(error?.message || t('admin.accounts.dataExportFailed'))
+    }
   } finally {
     exportingData.value = false
     showExportDataDialog.value = false
   }
 }
+const accountExportStepUp = useStepUp()
 const closeTestModal = () => { showTest.value = false; testingAcc.value = null }
 const closeStatsModal = () => { showStats.value = false; statsAcc.value = null }
 const closeReAuthModal = () => { showReAuth.value = false; reAuthAcc.value = null }

frontend/src/views/admin/AuditLogView.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+<template>
+  <div class="space-y-6">
+    <!-- Page header -->
+    <div class="flex flex-col gap-2 sm:flex-row sm:items-center sm:justify-between">
+      <div>
+        <h1 class="text-2xl font-bold text-gray-900 dark:text-white">{{ t('admin.audit.title') }}</h1>
+        <p class="mt-1 text-sm text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.description') }}</p>
+      </div>
+      <button type="button" class="btn btn-danger btn-sm" @click="openClearDialog">
+        {{ t('admin.audit.clearAll') }}
+      </button>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Filters -->
+    <div class="card p-4">
+      <div class="grid grid-cols-1 gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-4">
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.q') }}</span>
+          <input v-model.trim="filters.q" class="input" :placeholder="t('admin.audit.filters.qPlaceholder')" @keyup.enter="search" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.actorEmail') }}</span>
+          <input v-model.trim="filters.actor_email" class="input" @keyup.enter="search" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.action') }}</span>
+          <input v-model.trim="filters.action" class="input" @keyup.enter="search" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.clientIp') }}</span>
+          <input v-model.trim="filters.client_ip" class="input" @keyup.enter="search" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.method') }}</span>
+          <Select v-model="filters.method" :options="methodOptions" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.authMethod') }}</span>
+          <Select v-model="filters.auth_method" :options="authMethodOptions" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.result') }}</span>
+          <Select v-model="filters.success" :options="resultOptions" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.startTime') }}</span>
+          <input v-model="filters.start_time" type="datetime-local" class="input" />
+        </label>
+        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
+          <span class="text-xs text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.filters.endTime') }}</span>
+          <input v-model="filters.end_time" type="datetime-local" class="input" />
+        </label>
+      </div>
+      <div class="mt-3 flex gap-2">
+        <button type="button" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm" :disabled="loading" @click="search">
+          {{ t('common.search') }}
+        </button>
+        <button type="button" class="btn btn-secondary btn-sm" :disabled="loading" @click="resetFilters">
+          {{ t('common.reset') }}
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Table -->
+    <div class="card overflow-hidden">
+      <div class="overflow-x-auto">
+        <table class="min-w-full divide-y divide-gray-200 dark:divide-dark-700">
+          <thead class="bg-gray-50 dark:bg-dark-900/40">
+            <tr>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.time') }}</th>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.actor') }}</th>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.action') }}</th>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.method') }}</th>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.result') }}</th>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-left text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.clientIp') }}</th>
+              <th class="px-4 py-3 text-right text-xs font-medium uppercase text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.columns.detail') }}</th>
+            </tr>
+          </thead>
+          <tbody class="divide-y divide-gray-200 dark:divide-dark-700">
+            <tr v-if="loading">
+              <td colspan="7" class="px-4 py-8 text-center text-sm text-gray-500">{{ t('common.loading') }}</td>
+            </tr>
+            <tr v-else-if="logs.length === 0">
+              <td colspan="7" class="px-4 py-8 text-center text-sm text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.empty') }}</td>
+            </tr>
+            <tr v-for="log in logs" :key="log.id" class="hover:bg-gray-50 dark:hover:bg-dark-800/60">
+              <td class="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 text-sm text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300">{{ formatTime(log.created_at) }}</td>
+              <td class="px-4 py-3 text-sm text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300">
+                <div class="font-medium">{{ log.actor_email || '—' }}</div>
+                <div class="text-xs text-gray-400">{{ log.actor_role }}<span v-if="log.auth_method"> · {{ log.auth_method }}</span></div>
+              </td>
+              <td class="px-4 py-3 text-sm font-mono text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300">{{ log.action }}</td>
+              <td class="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 text-sm text-gray-500">{{ log.method }}</td>
+              <td class="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 text-sm">
+                <span :class="statusBadgeClass(log.status_code)">{{ log.status_code }}</span>
+              </td>
+              <td class="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 text-sm text-gray-500">{{ log.client_ip || '—' }}</td>
+              <td class="whitespace-nowrap px-4 py-3 text-right text-sm">
+                <button type="button" class="text-primary-600 hover:underline dark:text-primary-400" @click="openDetail(log.id)">
+                  {{ t('admin.audit.columns.detail') }}
+                </button>
+              </td>
+            </tr>
+          </tbody>
+        </table>
+      </div>
+      <div class="border-t border-gray-200 px-4 py-3 dark:border-dark-700">
+        <Pagination
+          :total="total"
+          :page="page"
+          :page-size="pageSize"
+          @update:page="onPageChange"
+          @update:pageSize="onPageSizeChange"
+        />
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Detail dialog -->
+    <BaseDialog :show="detailVisible" :title="t('admin.audit.detail.title')" width="wide" @close="detailVisible = false">
+      <div v-if="detailLoading" class="py-8 text-center text-sm text-gray-500">{{ t('common.loading') }}</div>
+      <div v-else-if="detail" class="space-y-3 text-sm">
+        <div class="grid grid-cols-1 gap-2 sm:grid-cols-2">
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.columns.time')" :value="formatTime(detail.created_at)" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.columns.actor')" :value="detail.actor_email || '—'" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.detail.actorRole')" :value="detail.actor_role" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.filters.authMethod')" :value="detail.auth_method" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.columns.action')" :value="detail.action" mono />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.detail.methodPath')" :value="`${detail.method} ${detail.path}`" mono />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.columns.result')" :value="String(detail.status_code)" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.detail.latency')" :value="`${detail.latency_ms} ms`" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.columns.clientIp')" :value="detail.client_ip || '—'" />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.detail.requestId')" :value="detail.request_id || '—'" mono />
+          <DetailRow :label="t('admin.audit.detail.credential')" :value="detail.credential_masked || '—'" mono />
+        </div>
+        <div>
+          <div class="mb-1 text-xs font-medium text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.detail.userAgent') }}</div>
+          <div class="break-all rounded bg-gray-50 p-2 font-mono text-xs text-gray-600 dark:bg-dark-900/40 dark:text-gray-400">{{ detail.user_agent || '—' }}</div>
+        </div>
+        <div v-if="detail.request_body">
+          <div class="mb-1 text-xs font-medium text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.detail.requestBody') }}</div>
+          <pre class="max-h-72 overflow-auto rounded bg-gray-50 p-3 font-mono text-xs text-gray-600 dark:bg-dark-900/40 dark:text-gray-400">{{ prettyBody(detail.request_body) }}</pre>
+        </div>
+        <div v-if="detail.extra && Object.keys(detail.extra).length">
+          <div class="mb-1 text-xs font-medium text-gray-500">{{ t('admin.audit.detail.extra') }}</div>
+          <pre class="max-h-48 overflow-auto rounded bg-gray-50 p-3 font-mono text-xs text-gray-600 dark:bg-dark-900/40 dark:text-gray-400">{{ JSON.stringify(detail.extra, null, 2) }}</pre>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </BaseDialog>
+
+    <!-- Clear confirmation → step-up TOTP -->
+    <ConfirmDialog
+      :show="clearConfirmVisible"
+      :title="t('admin.audit.clearConfirm.title')"
+      :message="t('admin.audit.clearConfirm.message')"
+      :confirm-text="t('admin.audit.clearAll')"
+      :cancel-text="t('common.cancel')"
+      danger
+      @confirm="onClearConfirmed"
+      @cancel="clearConfirmVisible = false"
+    />
+
+    <!-- Reused: TOTP prompt for the clear operation -->
+    <div v-if="clearTotpVisible" class="fixed inset-0 z-[60] overflow-y-auto">
+      <div class="flex min-h-full items-center justify-center p-4">
+        <div class="fixed inset-0 bg-black/50" @click="cancelClearTotp"></div>
+        <div class="relative w-full max-w-md rounded-xl bg-white p-6 shadow-xl dark:bg-dark-800">
+          <h3 class="mb-2 text-center text-lg font-semibold text-gray-900 dark:text-white">{{ t('admin.audit.clearConfirm.totpTitle') }}</h3>
+          <p class="mb-4 text-center text-sm text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">{{ t('admin.audit.clearConfirm.totpHint') }}</p>
+          <input
+            v-model.trim="clearTotpCode"
+            type="text"
+            inputmode="numeric"
+            maxlength="6"
+            autocomplete="one-time-code"
+            class="input mb-4 text-center text-lg tracking-[0.5em]"
+            placeholder="••••••"
+            @keyup.enter="submitClear"
+          />
+          <div class="flex gap-2">
+            <button type="button" class="btn btn-secondary flex-1" :disabled="clearing" @click="cancelClearTotp">{{ t('common.cancel') }}</button>
+            <button type="button" class="btn btn-danger flex-1" :disabled="clearing || clearTotpCode.length !== 6" @click="submitClear">
+              {{ clearing ? t('common.loading') : t('admin.audit.clearAll') }}
+            </button>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</template>
+
+<script setup lang="ts">
+import { computed, h, onMounted, reactive, ref } from 'vue'
+import { useI18n } from 'vue-i18n'
+import { adminAPI, type AuditLog } from '@/api/admin'
+import Pagination from '@/components/common/Pagination.vue'
+import Select from '@/components/common/Select.vue'
+import BaseDialog from '@/components/common/BaseDialog.vue'
+import ConfirmDialog from '@/components/common/ConfirmDialog.vue'
+import { useAppStore } from '@/stores'
+
+const { t } = useI18n()
+const appStore = useAppStore()
+
+// Tiny inline label/value row for the detail dialog.
+const DetailRow = (props: { label: string; value: string; mono?: boolean }) =>
+  h('div', { class: 'flex flex-col gap-0.5' }, [
+    h('span', { class: 'text-xs text-gray-400' }, props.label),
+    h('span', { class: ['text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-200 break-all', props.mono ? 'font-mono text-xs' : ''] }, props.value)
+  ])
+
+const loading = ref(false)
+const logs = ref<AuditLog[]>([])
+const total = ref(0)
+const page = ref(1)
+const pageSize = ref(20)
+
+const filters = reactive({
+  q: '',
+  actor_email: '',
+  action: '',
+  client_ip: '',
+  method: '',
+  auth_method: '',
+  success: '',
+  start_time: '',
+  end_time: ''
+})
+
+const methodOptions = computed(() => [
+  { value: '', label: t('admin.audit.filters.all') },
+  { value: 'POST', label: 'POST' },
+  { value: 'PUT', label: 'PUT' },
+  { value: 'PATCH', label: 'PATCH' },
+  { value: 'DELETE', label: 'DELETE' },
+  { value: 'GET', label: 'GET' }
+])
+
+const authMethodOptions = computed(() => [
+  { value: '', label: t('admin.audit.filters.all') },
+  { value: 'jwt', label: 'JWT' },
+  { value: 'admin_api_key', label: 'Admin API Key' }
+])
+
+const resultOptions = computed(() => [
+  { value: '', label: t('admin.audit.filters.all') },
+  { value: 'true', label: t('admin.audit.filters.resultSuccess') },
+  { value: 'false', label: t('admin.audit.filters.resultFailure') }
+])
+
+function toRFC3339(local: string): string | undefined {
+  if (!local) return undefined
+  const d = new Date(local)
+  if (Number.isNaN(d.getTime())) return undefined
+  return d.toISOString()
+}
+
+function buildQuery() {
+  return {
+    page: page.value,
+    page_size: pageSize.value,
+    q: filters.q || undefined,
+    actor_email: filters.actor_email || undefined,
+    action: filters.action || undefined,
+    client_ip: filters.client_ip || undefined,
+    method: filters.method || undefined,
+    auth_method: filters.auth_method || undefined,
+    success: filters.success || undefined,
+    start_time: toRFC3339(filters.start_time),
+    end_time: toRFC3339(filters.end_time)
+  }
+}
+
+async function fetchLogs() {
+  loading.value = true
+  try {
+    const res = await adminAPI.audit.list(buildQuery())
+    logs.value = res.items
+    total.value = res.total
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    appStore.showError(err?.message || t('admin.audit.loadFailed'))
+  } finally {
+    loading.value = false
+  }
+}
+
+function search() {
+  page.value = 1
+  fetchLogs()
+}
+
+function resetFilters() {
+  filters.q = ''
+  filters.actor_email = ''
+  filters.action = ''
+  filters.client_ip = ''
+  filters.method = ''
+  filters.auth_method = ''
+  filters.success = ''
+  filters.start_time = ''
+  filters.end_time = ''
+  search()
+}
+
+function onPageChange(p: number) {
+  page.value = p
+  fetchLogs()
+}
+
+function onPageSizeChange(ps: number) {
+  pageSize.value = ps
+  page.value = 1
+  fetchLogs()
+}
+
+// Detail dialog
+const detailVisible = ref(false)
+const detailLoading = ref(false)
+const detail = ref<AuditLog | null>(null)
+
+async function openDetail(id: number) {
+  detailVisible.value = true
+  detailLoading.value = true
+  detail.value = null
+  try {
+    detail.value = await adminAPI.audit.get(id)
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    appStore.showError(err?.message || t('admin.audit.loadFailed'))
+    detailVisible.value = false
+  } finally {
+    detailLoading.value = false
+  }
+}
+
+function prettyBody(body: string): string {
+  try {
+    return JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(body), null, 2)
+  } catch {
+    return body
+  }
+}
+
+// Clear-all flow: confirm → TOTP → clear
+const clearConfirmVisible = ref(false)
+const clearTotpVisible = ref(false)
+const clearTotpCode = ref('')
+const clearing = ref(false)
+
+function openClearDialog() {
+  clearConfirmVisible.value = true
+}
+
+function onClearConfirmed() {
+  clearConfirmVisible.value = false
+  clearTotpCode.value = ''
+  clearTotpVisible.value = true
+}
+
+function cancelClearTotp() {
+  if (clearing.value) return
+  clearTotpVisible.value = false
+}
+
+async function submitClear() {
+  if (clearTotpCode.value.length !== 6) return
+  clearing.value = true
+  try {
+    const res = await adminAPI.audit.clear(clearTotpCode.value)
+    clearTotpVisible.value = false
+    appStore.showSuccess(t('admin.audit.clearConfirm.success', { count: res.deleted }))
+    search()
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    appStore.showError(err?.message || t('admin.audit.clearConfirm.failed'))
+    clearTotpCode.value = ''
+  } finally {
+    clearing.value = false
+  }
+}
+
+// Helpers
+function formatTime(iso: string): string {
+  const d = new Date(iso)
+  if (Number.isNaN(d.getTime())) return iso
+  return d.toLocaleString()
+}
+
+function statusBadgeClass(status: number): string {
+  const base = 'inline-flex rounded-full px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium '
+  if (status >= 500) return base + 'bg-red-100 text-red-700 dark:bg-red-900/30 dark:text-red-300'
+  if (status >= 400) return base + 'bg-amber-100 text-amber-700 dark:bg-amber-900/30 dark:text-amber-300'
+  return base + 'bg-green-100 text-green-700 dark:bg-green-900/30 dark:text-green-300'
+}
+
+onMounted(fetchLogs)
+</script>

frontend/src/views/admin/BackupView.vue

@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@
         </div>
       </transition>
     </teleport>
+    <TotpStepUpDialog :controller="backupStepUp" />
 </template>
 
 <script setup lang="ts">
@@ -284,9 +285,23 @@ import { useI18n } from 'vue-i18n'
 import { adminAPI } from '@/api'
 import { useAppStore } from '@/stores'
 import type { BackupS3Config, BackupScheduleConfig, BackupRecord } from '@/api/admin/backup'
+import { useStepUp, isStepUpBlocked, isStepUpCancelled, stepUpBlockReason } from '@/composables/useStepUp'
+import TotpStepUpDialog from '@/components/auth/TotpStepUpDialog.vue'
 
 const { t } = useI18n()
 const appStore = useAppStore()
+const backupStepUp = useStepUp()
+
+// 敏感操作被 2FA 门控拦截时的统一提示。
+function reportStepUpBlocked(error: unknown): boolean {
+  if (!isStepUpBlocked(error)) return false
+  appStore.showError(
+    stepUpBlockReason(error) === 'STEP_UP_ADMIN_API_KEY_FORBIDDEN'
+      ? t('stepUp.adminApiKeyForbidden')
+      : t('stepUp.notEnabled')
+  )
+  return true
+}
 
 // S3 config
 const s3Form = ref<BackupS3Config>({
@@ -523,11 +538,19 @@ async function loadBackups() {
 async function createBackup() {
   creatingBackup.value = true
   try {
-    const record = await adminAPI.backup.createBackup({ expire_days: manualExpireDays.value })
+    const record = await backupStepUp.run(() => adminAPI.backup.createBackup({ expire_days: manualExpireDays.value }))
     // 插入到列表顶部
     backups.value.unshift(record)
     startPolling(record.id)
   } catch (error: any) {
+    if (isStepUpCancelled(error)) {
+      creatingBackup.value = false
+      return
+    }
+    if (reportStepUpBlocked(error)) {
+      creatingBackup.value = false
+      return
+    }
     if (error?.response?.status === 409) {
       appStore.showWarning(t('admin.backup.operations.alreadyInProgress'))
     } else {
@@ -539,9 +562,16 @@ async function createBackup() {
 
 async function downloadBackup(id: string) {
   try {
-    const result = await adminAPI.backup.getDownloadURL(id)
-    window.open(result.url, '_blank')
+    const result = await backupStepUp.run(() => adminAPI.backup.getDownloadURL(id))
+    // 预签名 URL 带 attachment disposition，同页 anchor 导航直接触发下载；
+    // 不用 window.open：step-up 弹窗 await 会耗尽瞬态用户激活，新标签页会被浏览器拦截。
+    const link = document.createElement('a')
+    link.href = result.url
+    link.rel = 'noopener'
+    link.click()
   } catch (error) {
+    if (isStepUpCancelled(error)) return
+    if (reportStepUpBlocked(error)) return
     appStore.showError((error as { message?: string })?.message || t('errors.networkError'))
   }
 }

frontend/src/views/admin/SettingsView.vue

@@ -1577,6 +1577,41 @@
                   :disabled="!form.totp_encryption_key_configured"
                 />
               </div>
+
+              <!-- 会话 IP/UA 绑定 -->
+              <div
+                class="flex items-center justify-between border-t border-gray-100 pt-4 dark:border-dark-700"
+              >
+                <div>
+                  <label class="font-medium text-gray-900 dark:text-white">{{
+                    t("admin.settings.security.sessionBinding")
+                  }}</label>
+                  <p class="text-sm text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">
+                    {{ t("admin.settings.security.sessionBindingHint") }}
+                  </p>
+                </div>
+                <Toggle v-model="form.session_binding_enabled" />
+              </div>
+
+              <!-- 审计日志保留天数 -->
+              <div
+                class="flex items-center justify-between border-t border-gray-100 pt-4 dark:border-dark-700"
+              >
+                <div>
+                  <label class="font-medium text-gray-900 dark:text-white">{{
+                    t("admin.settings.security.auditRetention")
+                  }}</label>
+                  <p class="text-sm text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400">
+                    {{ t("admin.settings.security.auditRetentionHint") }}
+                  </p>
+                </div>
+                <input
+                  v-model.number="form.audit_log_retention_days"
+                  type="number"
+                  min="0"
+                  class="input w-28 text-right"
+                />
+              </div>
             </div>
           </div>
 
@@ -8157,6 +8192,8 @@ const form = reactive<SettingsForm>({
   password_reset_enabled: false,
   totp_enabled: false,
   totp_encryption_key_configured: false,
+  session_binding_enabled: true,
+  audit_log_retention_days: 180,
   login_agreement_enabled: false,
   login_agreement_mode: "modal",
   login_agreement_updated_at: "2026-03-31",
@@ -9521,6 +9558,12 @@ async function saveSettings() {
       invitation_code_enabled: form.invitation_code_enabled,
       password_reset_enabled: form.password_reset_enabled,
       totp_enabled: form.totp_enabled,
+      session_binding_enabled: form.session_binding_enabled,
+      // 清空数字框时 v-model.number 会得到空串，后端 int 字段解析空串会 400 拒绝整次保存；
+      // 空/非法值回退默认 180（与后端 parseAuditLogRetentionDays("") 语义一致，0 仍表示永久保留）。
+      audit_log_retention_days: Number.isFinite(form.audit_log_retention_days)
+        ? form.audit_log_retention_days
+        : 180,
       login_agreement_enabled: form.login_agreement_enabled,
       login_agreement_mode: form.login_agreement_mode,
       login_agreement_updated_at: form.login_agreement_updated_at,