P2-1/P2-3 from review:
- fetchCNQuota: credential-invalid now judged by StatusCode 401/403
(aligned with fetchCNBalance) instead of `!Success && !CredentialValid` —
CN quota service only sets CredentialValid=true on the success path, so
500/429/zhipu business errors were all misclassified as failed instead
of error.
- fetchCNBalance: snapshot carries new BalanceLow flag computed with the
scheduler's exact criterion (`!Available || allCNBalancesBelowThreshold`)
against Gateway.CNProviders.BalanceThreshold (ctor now takes cfg; wire
regenerated). quotaDegradedHint reports "balance low" instead of the old
`<=0` check, so an account already paused by the scheduler (balance 5 /
threshold 10) no longer shows green in the monitor.
- threshold helper falls back to viper default 0.5 for nil/<=0 config to
avoid a zero-threshold regression where balance=0 stops alerting.
Tests: CN quota status-code matrix (rewrites the test that cemented the
old behavior), balance-low matrix (below-threshold / unavailable /
multi-currency healthy), threshold-from-config; PayG stubs now set
Available explicitly (zero-value trap).
The channel cache holds a groupID -> platform map with a 10 minute TTL, and
only channel Create/Update/Delete call invalidateCache(). Changing a group's
platform through the admin API therefore leaves the cache pointing at the old
platform for up to 10 minutes.
Channel pricing, model mapping and the model whitelist are all matched per
platform, so during that window the lookups silently miss: pricing falls back
to the global LiteLLM price list, renames stop applying and the whitelist
stops restricting. Nothing is logged.
Inject a narrow ChannelCacheInvalidator into the admin service (same shape as
the existing APIKeyAuthCacheInvalidator) and call it from UpdateGroup only when
the platform actually changed. The dependency is optional -- when it is nil the
cache simply rebuilds on TTL expiry, as before.
Resolves three conflicts, all of the "both branches appended to the same
block" shape. Every one is resolved as a union of both sides; nothing from
either parent is dropped.
- handler/admin/setting_handler_update.go: keep ChannelMonitorHideThroughput
(V2) alongside GrokDefaultTextModel / GrokCrossClientModelMapEnabled /
GrokDefaultBaseURLMode (#5408). UpdateSettings writes every key on each
save, so dropping either side would reset those settings to zero values.
- service/domain_constants.go: keep SettingKeyChannelMonitorHideThroughput
and the three SettingKeyGrok* constants.
- repository/migrations_runner.go: keep the 195 checksum rule (V2) and the
218/219/220 rules (#5408).
Implements #2646: the risk-control content audit can now send OpenAI
Moderations requests through a proxy from IP Management - Proxy Servers.
Backend:
- ContentModerationConfig gains proxy_id (nil = direct, unchanged default)
- update semantics: null keeps, 0 clears, >0 selects (validated to exist)
- moderation calls build the client via the shared httpclient pool; proxy
resolution failure surfaces as a moderation error and never silently
falls back to direct connection
- proxy_id -> URL resolution cached 60s (single-entry, invalidated on
config save) so the pre-block hot path does not hit the DB per request
- test-key endpoint accepts proxy_id too (null = saved config's proxy,
0 = force direct), so input-key/saved-key tests exercise the same path
- proxy usage/inactivity logged (content_moderation.proxy_enabled /
proxy_not_active) without leaking credentials
Frontend:
- ProxySelector in the risk-control basic settings tab, proxy list loaded
non-blockingly; save and test payloads carry proxy_id; zh/en i18n
Admins often recreate groups with the same pricing, routing, and account membership. A server-side duplicate creates an inactive copy for review, preserves eligible account priorities, and recovers ambiguous retries without creating extra groups.
Constraint: Group has no neutral JSON metadata field for durable operation recovery
Constraint: Model routing references account IDs, so copied configuration requires matching bindings
Rejected: Rebuild from the list response | it omits configuration and account priority details
Rejected: Store operation identity in business configuration | it would pollute real group settings
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated groups inactive until an administrator reviews the copied configuration
Tested: Go unit and full tests, go vet, integration-tag compile, frontend Vitest, lint, typecheck, production build, and Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
Admins often need another account with the same provider and routing configuration. Duplicate on the server so credentials never return to the browser, preserve exact group priorities atomically, start the copy paused, and recover the same copy after ambiguous idempotency-store failures.
Constraint: Admin account responses redact credentials, so duplication must remain server-side
Constraint: OAuth and setup-token credentials rotate and must not be shared across account rows
Rejected: Copy raw account JSON to the clipboard | exposes credentials outside the server
Rejected: Duplicate rotating credentials | account-scoped refresh locks can race token rotation
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep copies paused, avoid automatic upstream probes, and exclude rotating credential types unless token ownership is redesigned
Tested: Targeted Go tests, Go vet, server build; frontend lint, typecheck, Vitest suite, production build; integration test compiled
Not-tested: Docker-backed PostgreSQL execution because Docker is unavailable
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#1379
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#2928
Randark